Thinking the maternal collectively: a feminist critique of equality, individualism and universalism by Paiola, Sara
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Enabling Open Access to Birkbeck’s Research Degree output
Thinking the maternal collectively: a feminist critique
of equality, individualism and universalism
https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/46206/
Version: Full Version
Citation: Paiola, Sara (2021) Thinking the maternal collectively: a fem-
inist critique of equality, individualism and universalism. [Thesis] (Un-
published)
c© 2020 The Author(s)
All material available through BIROn is protected by intellectual property law, including copy-
right law.














Thinking the Maternal Collectively 




School of Law,  




submitted for the degree of  






























I hereby declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own, except 





This thesis is an attempt to conceptualise motherhood in a collective, 
relational way and to examine whether a relational model of motherhood can 
be transformative for a mother‘s sense of self–her subjectivity. I attempt the 
broader social and philosophical work of placing the mother and the work of 
reproduction within the realm of the concrete and the real, not of the 
metaphor. I suggest that a model of relational motherhood grounded in 1970s 
and 1980s Italian and French sexual difference feminism offers us an 
alternative way to talk about ‗community‘ and maternal subjectivity in order to 
challenge and ward off the isolation many new mothers and carers experience. 
Centering primarily on the work of those authors who have engaged with a 
relational ontology framework as their core sustained interest, I focus on the 
alliance between Luce Irigaray and Italian sexual difference feminism, in 
particular the work by feminist political philosopher Adriana Cavarero and 
the Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective. I suggest this work offers a radical 
example of a critique of equality, individualism and universalism as a solution 
for women‘s freedom. I draw on a variety of materials and approaches to 
support my argument throughout the thesis (including a case study of a 
mothers‘ collective, Il Collettivo Madri, set up by a group of mothers in Rome, 
Italy, in the early 1970s, and my collaboration with artists to use coloured 
thread to explore carers‘ relationality). I engage with feminist psychoanalysts‘ 
and psychotherapists‘ readings of maternal subjectivity. The concept and 
practice of relationality links these approaches and engagements, which 
illustrate the potential of a relational model of motherhood to disrupt law‘s 
patriarchal hegemonic default position. Ultimately, I attend to the politics that 
I argue is inherent in relationality between women who are mothers, and I 
suggest that mothers‘ subjectivity has the potential to be transformed by 
disengaging it from the individualistic view of the subject prevailing in liberal 
discourses and that motherhood needs to be ‗rescued‘ from the a-political 
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As the child of a radical feminist mother and left-wing parents I have 
formative memories of comic strips with strong girls and women in them. I 
liked the comic strip Peanuts drawn by Charles M. Shultz and the character 
Lucy Van Pelt was one of my favourites.1 Lucy was a feminist girl who often 
stood up to her friends and her brother and claimed her autonomy. In one 
strip in
                                                     
1 Mafalda was another comic strip I loved, my favourite actually. It was written and drawn by Argentinian 
cartoonist Quino and it ran from 1964 until 1973. Mafalda is a feminist six-year-old girl who is concerned 
about world problems, politics, women‘s emancipation and peace. The strip was translated and published in 
Italy in 1970 and became a feature in progressive left-wing homes. 
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particular, featured in the Italian left-leaning monthly magazine Linus, we see 
Lucy shouting ‗Io sono mia!,‘ which in English would be ‗I belong to myself!‘ 
 
 Linus, anno X, numero 1, Milano Libri 1974 
 
Peanuts appeared in Italy in various magazines, including Linus, which 
featured a mix of comic strips, politics, literature, society, mass media and 
other cultural themes. The comic strip of Lucy shouting ‗I belong to myself‘ 
was a reinterpretation made just for the Italian public. It was a representation 
of a time when many feminist demonstrations were taking place in Italy, some 
of which my mother Bertilla, her sisters, and her friends took part in. This 
phrase was often shouted by women in feminist demonstrations in Italy and 





Photo from an unknown Italian Magazine depicting a woman at a demonstration in Italy 
around the 1970s. 
 
The cartoon strip with Lucy shouting ‗I belong to myself!‘ might be seen as 
a purely individualistic, liberal feminist statement, but there is more to it 
than this. I believe it is a thought-provoking strip that, when used by 
feminists, exemplifies an important step that women were starting to take 
in the late 1960s and 1970s in order to find themselves. The fact that 
women and mothers would have had access to the magazine at home, 
whilst in the domestic space, adds to its significance. The domestic space 
was seen as private but feminists claimed it was actually of public, political 
importance. Women, mainly those who identified as feminists, or even 
before calling themselves as such, were going through an important 
subjectivising process, in which they were becoming, some for the first 
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time, themselves.2 A feminist subjectivity shaped by relationships with 
other women, not an autonomous subjectivity of the male tradition or the 
―non-subjectivity‖ – because constrained by the demands of patriarchy so 
not ―self-chosen‖ - of many women throughout history.  
For feminist theorist Rosi Braidotti as well as for other feminists, and 
following our comic strip theme, for Lucy, the process of subjectivisation was 
fundamental. It meant becoming a woman, self-defined through relationships 
– often with other women – through a new freedom and against a patriarchal 
history which had confined and framed women in externally dictated, 
predefined roles.3 To belong to oneself, for feminists in the 1970s and 1980s, 
meant to work on an individuation process separately from what it meant to 
be mothers, daughters, partners or wives. It meant, among other things, 
learning to put some boundaries between oneself and one‘s parents, the  
children, the family, the partner, to form an identity which was an internal 
sustaining space for oneself, something that women had historically rarely 
been able to achieve. Moreover, women believed that only by finding this 
internal space would they be better able to relate to other people as equal 
partners in a relationship made up of exchanges between freer persons. The 
                                                     
2 In this regard, Braidotti states that ‗the redefinition of the female feminist subject starts with the revaluation 
of the bodily roots of subjectivity, rejecting any universal, neutral and, consequently, any gender-free 
understanding of human embodiment.‘ Rosi Braidotti, ―Becoming Woman: Or Sexual Difference Rivisited,‖ 
Theory, Culture & Society 20, no. 3 (2003): 43–64.  
3 Ibid. Also see these other three books by Rosi Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance. A Study of Women in 
Contemporary Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).; Rosi Braidotti, Metamorphoses (Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Polity Press, 2002). Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects. Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary 
Theory. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). To read a genealogy of patriarchal history‘s definition 
and framing of women in and since classical Greek times see Adriana Cavarero, In Spite of Plato. A Feminist 
Rewriting of Ancient Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).   
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cartoon strip depicting Lucy is furthermore significant for the focus, and the 
argument, of my thesis because, following Braidotti‘s statement above, I 
suggest that for a mother, having an embodied sense of self and declaring or 
attempting to declare that ‗I belong to myself!‘ can lead to a more fulfilling 
experience of motherhood exactly at the moment when a woman‘s identity 
changes dramatically and can become enmeshed with that of her baby. Hence 
Braidotti‘s quote above – and, less overtly but still present, Lucy‘s phrase ‗Io 
sono mia!‘ - is a starting point of and for the argument of this thesis, from 
which other aspects of the research will stem.   
The image of Lucy shouting ‗Io sono mia‘ and the meaning of this 
statement are connected to my proposal and argument of commoning and 
collectivising care via the transition from an individualised female subjectivity of 
an isolated mother who is inside a patriarchal, capitalistic system of the 
domestic sphere to an inter-subjective, collective model of care and 
motherhood intended as a network of women/mothers/carers as a kind of 
anti-patriarchal-family or extended ‗family‘. For commoning care I mean the idea 
of caring for one‘s child (or any person one cares for) collectively, sharing the 
responsibilities, swapping care between carers/mothers to operate a de-
individualisation of care. The term leans heavily from the idea and practice of 
the commons as theorised by feminist Silvia Federici and more specifically on 
her thinking on the work of reproduction.4 She says:  
                                                     
4 Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero. Homework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 
2012). See as well Marina Vishmidt, "Permanent Reproductive Crisis: An Interview with Silvia Federici."  
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The common, quite simply, is a particular way of organising society. It 
is a particular way of conceiving relations among people and also 
relations to the means of production, relations to the land, relations to 
natural abundance, and to the wealth that we produce. The common is 
reflected in a very classic conception of what communalism is 
supposed to stand for. It means a society where we have access to 
natural wealth, the wealth we produce, cooperation, and government 
from below.5  
 
Commoning care leans as well on other theorists and the experiences of Black 
mothers historically engaged in social reproduction/mother work collectively, 
what Patricia Hill Collins calls ―othermothering‖6 and indigenous 
communities around the world who still care collectively, and see care as a 
collective pursuit not an individual one, due to collective living. The passage 
then is from, a feminist subjectivity which departs from the autonomous 
subject of the metaphysical abstract objectifying tradition, to an 
intersubjective model of subjectivity where subjects are viewed as connected 
and dependant on each other. This new model of subjectivity (at least in the 
so-called West), that emerged in the late 1960s/70s and as thought of by 
many feminists, gives me the possibility, and the desire, to think of care as 
collective. This new feminist subjectivity that has been theorised by feminists 
                                                                                                                                                           
―Https://Www.Metamute.Org/Editorial/Articles/Permanent-Reproductive-Crisis-Interview-Silvia-
Federici,‖ Mute, 2013. Silvia Federici, ―Feminism and the Politics of the Commons,‖ in Uses of a Whirlwind. 
Movement, Movements, and Contemporary Radical Currents in the Unites States, ed. C. Hughes, S. Peace, and K. Van 
Meter (Oakland, CA: Team Colors 225 Collective, AK Press, 2010). Silvia Federici, Re-Enchanting the World. 
Feminism and the Politics of the Commons (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2019).  
5 Silvia Federici, ―The Commons Is Upon Us. Principles of Health Autonomy.,‖ in For Health Autonomy: 
Horizons of Care Beyond Austerity-Reflections from Greece., ed. Carenotes (Common Notions, 2020). 
6 ―The different political interpretations attached to motherwork within Black civil society, in particular 
community othermothering traditions that elevated motherhood as a symbol of power, potentially politicized 
Black women‘s motherwork.‖ In Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought. Knowledge, Consciousness and the 
Politics of Empowerment. (London, New York: Routledge, 1990). p. 296.   
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like Rosi Braidotti, Adriana Cavarero, Luce Irigaray and many others enable 
me to think of a different model of motherhood and care that departs from 
the traditional parameters of the woman/mother in the family. The political 
practice of communing care criticises and challenges the idea of the traditional 
family. These theorists help me to propose a kind of collective model of 
motherhood/care, or what I call commoning care. This is my contribution to 
knowledge in which – via the history and experiences of a feminist 
subjectivity I propose a feminist model of care, a collective one. In this thesis 
I link a model of feminist subjectivity with a model of feminist 
motherhood/feminist care.  
I used the image of Lucy shouting ―Io sono mia‖ to illustrate a 
theoretical concept, and a subjective reality, which has been theorised by 
feminists. An image is often more immediate. We can understand quickly 
what is meant by a feminist subjectivity by seeing an image of Lucy shouting 
the statement ‗Io sono mia‘.  I am not an artist – in the classic sense that I 
make art often – but, in this thesis, I use images for their immediacy to 
exemplify some concepts.  ‗Io sono mia‘ extrapolates women and mothers 
from the patriarchal family and allowed me to think of a different idea and 
practice of care (as we will see in Chapter 4 on the Italian mothers‘ collective). 
When, in the feminist demonstrations in the 1970s, women shouted ―Io sono 
mia‖ it was not only a form or emancipation, it created a different kind of 
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woman from the one being defined at that time by the constraints of 
patriarchy. 
 The overall proposition, and argument of my thesis, is to move away 
from a model of care based on liberal individualism to a feminist model based 
on relational ontology. Hence how to move to a model of care that fosters the 
commoning of care as a form of political collective organising that counters the 
neoliberal forces that tend at individualising care among other aspects of our 
lives? In other words what interests me is how to think and how to shift from 
individualised care practices to commoning and collective practices of care? 
Relationality is the main concept that helps me to construct this argument; 
hence I propose a model of relationality specific to motherhood and to carers 
in general and argue that it can help us to rethink in a different way two main 
points: firstly in relation to existing inequality and its impact on different 
individuals, and in particular different genders, and secondly it can help us to 
rethink individualistic models of legal and political subjectivity especially in 
the case of motherhood and care.  
The five central questions of the thesis are: firstly, is a relational and 
collective model of motherhood and care important for rethinking women‘s 
political subjectivity? Secondly, how has the abstract, universalistic and 
autonomous view of the subject influenced law and is it detrimental to all 
humans and specifically women, mothers and carers too? Thirdly, does 
thinking about the meaning of commoning care or a relational model of 
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motherhood, disrupt the individualistic idea of the subject and can it broadly 
challenge individualism? Fourthly, can a relational model of motherhood, 
commoning care, ‗protect‘ women from the loneliness7 many experience in the 
first years of a baby and child‘s life? I link this more applied question to the 
previous three questions because I believe that a more concrete, embodied 
view of humans is needed to then make a philosophical conceptual case. A 
solely abstract, philosophical thesis to think on the commoning of care, work 
of reproduction, collectivity, relationality and to look at mothers‘ loneliness 
and post-natal depression would not suffice.  
The way I link the two different registers in my thesis, is to lean my 
thinking towards those feminist thinkers who worked to de-universalise the 
subject and think the subject as an embodied subject. The main feminist 
thinker that helps me communicate between these two registers is Adriana 
Cavarero as she refrains to use an abstract language when speaking of the 
subject but prefers to think in terms of ‗embodied uniqueness‘ of each of us. 
By doing this we are ‗forced‘ to think of each person with a different and 
unique face, a singular life story and as Cavarero would say unique voice8 and 
overall a unique embodied and concrete materiality of who they are which is 
                                                     
7 In 2016 research published by the Co-op and the Red Cross identified becoming a new mum as one of six 
main causes of loneliness.  They say ‗New research shows that a staggering 82 per cent of mums under 30 
feel lonely some of the time while more than four in 10 (43 per cent) are lonely often or always.‘ 
https://www.Co-Operative.Coop/Media/News-Releases/Shocking-Extent-of-Loneliness-Faced-by-Young-
Mothers-Revealed, 2018.   https://www.Channel4.Com/News/the-Loneliness-of-Becoming-a 
-New-Mum, 2016. 
8 Adriana Cavarero, A Piu’ Voci: Per Una Filosofia Dell’espressione Vocale. (Milano: Feltrinelli, 2003). Adriana 
Cavarero, For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2005). 
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different for each of us. Her work aims to make an intervention at the level of 
discourse and representation but it is ultimately a concrete and de-
universalising discourse too and that is why for me it works in linking it to the 
roman mothers‘ collective which were making an intervention at the level of 
maternal practice and experience that could then be theorised. Exactly 
because the Italian feminism I am interested in proposes the practice of doing9 
and the theory came after the practice10, I have been interested in linking 
philosophical thinking to the work of a group of mothers who got together to 
share, think and elaborate on what motherhood is. For these reasons, I am 
comfortable with this and I am interested in mixing these two strands 
together. And, the fifth and final question is, does engaging in 
mothering/caring while being supported by other mothers, carers and the 
community change the subjectivity of a mother/carer?  
The remainder of the Introductory chapter is organised in this way: in 
the first section titled ‗on terminology‘ I explain some of the terms I use in 
the thesis, what I mean for ‗maternal‘, ‗mothering‘, ‗motherhood‘ and 
‗subjectivity‘. In the second section titled ‗the personal is political‘11 and in line 
                                                     
9 ‗Around 1975, feminist groups devoted to setting up enterprises such as bookstores, libraries, small 
publishing houses, and meeting places began to be formed. That was how the so called practice of doing 
among women began. It derived, we said, from the practice of relations between women and was a specific 
instance of it.‘ The Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice. 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990). p. 81 
10 ‗We believe that to write theory is partly to tell about practice, since theoretical reasoning generally refers to 
things which already have names.‘ Ibid. p. 1.  
11 Carol Hanisch, ―www.Carolhanisch.Org/CHwritings/PIP.Html,‖ n.d. She wrote a pamphlet called ―The 
Personal Is Political‖ in 1969 which was originally published in Notes from the Second Year: women‘s 
liberation and was reprinted and passed around in the feminist movement and reached Italy too where it had 
a wide influence in the Italian feminist movement. Some Italian feminists brought it back when they went to 
the USA. Hanisch says that this motto and its meaning was thought through the experiences of the feminist 
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with the feminist motto written in 1969 by the American radical feminist 
Carol Hanisch I explain the relation between theory and lived experience. In 
the third section I have written a brief literature review on the main feminist 
theorists and theorists on motherhood and on the maternal that have 
influenced my writing. In the fourth section titled ‗methodology‘ I trace my 
interdisciplinary approach in which I use philosophy, psychoanalysis, 
sociology, a case study of a mothers‘ collective founded in the early 1970s in 
Rome and an artistic practice based exercise to explore collective care. In the 
fifth and last section titled ‗chapter outline‘ I set out how my thesis – and my 
argument – has developed from one chapter to the next.   
on terminology   
Concepts and meanings are important to contextualise and frame my position 
and for making my argument within the discourse I am exploring in this 
thesis. The most important terms I use in my thesis are concepts like 
―subject‖, ―subjectivity‖, ―work of reproduction‖, ―thread‖, ―maternal‖, 
―maternal subjectivity‖, ―motherhood‖ and ―mothering‖. My theoretical 
contribution is on the realm of care, of commoning care a term to describe the 
act of ―transforming care from individual to communal‖, maternal studies, 
relationality, and what is new is the consistent and focused work on the 
                                                                                                                                                           
groups and was thought collectively by several women in the movement, not just by her. It was theory that 
came after practice.   
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importance of relationality and support for carers and the de-individualisation 
of care, hence the terminology section relates to these themes.   
The idea of the ―subject‖ as defined by classical Western philosophical 
discourses as autonomous, rational, self-sufficient and independent is what 
stands at a far distance to how I envisage a subject to be. I think of a subject 
as the ―embodied uniqueness‖ Cavarero talks about which is vulnerable, 
incarnated, necessarily dependant and exposed to others. Judith Butler who 
has been inspired by Cavarero‘s work, has talked of a dependant, vulnerable 
and precarious subject.12 My understanding of what a subject is then of an 
interdependent, vulnerable being, dependant and exposed to others, an idea in 
which the metaphysical idea of the subject actually disappears as it‘s intended 
only in reciprocity, that is why it is almost easier to define subjectivity then the 
subject. The feminist idea of ―subjectivity‖, one that is shaped and sustained 
via relationships, is how I intend it to be seen in this thesis. This is different 
from ―the self‖ or ―experience‖ and the formation of a subjectivity that goes 
beyond biology through the subject‘s immersion in society‘s language and 
rules.  
Differently from Anglo-Saxon and French feminism the question of 
―subjectivity‖ and ―identity‖ are terms that have not much prevalence in the 
radical Italian feminist groups of sexual difference and their explicit political 
                                                     
12 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Power of Mourning and Violence. (London & New York: Verso, 2004). p. 48.  
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valence.13 Subjectivity as I envisage it is rooted in Italian feminism, and in the 
practice of relationality. It is not intended as a self-defining, autonomous 
subjectivity but in radical Italian feminism ‗there is a preference to speak of a 
self to which the signification is produced in the relational context by which 
this – signification – is produced.’’14 Hence I am interested in the passage 
from the notion of the metaphysical autonomous abstract subject of western 
philosophy to a subject seen as intersubjective – connected to others, as we 
will see further in the first three chapters. Also, I am critical of Lévinas‘ idea 
of subjectivity for his use of the metaphor of the mother – to signify a face-
to-face with the Other15 – as it stereotypes and naturalises motherhood and 
even more significantly, erases the mother as a concrete person/subject or 
―embodied uniqueness‖ (in her own right) which Cavarero speaks about.16  
The ―work of reproduction‖ is that unpaid care that maintains future 
workers or elderly care which is in general and historically being done always 
by women, migrant women, marginalised and Black women. This conception 
of unpaid care as that which maintains capitalism has been theorised by 
feminist Marxists like Mariarosa dalla Costa, Leopoldina Fortunato and Selma 
                                                     
13 Franco Cavarero, Adriana and Restaino, Le Filosofie Femministe. (Torino: Paravia Editore, 1999). p. 142.  
14 Adriana Cavarero says ‗Si preferisce parlare di un se’ la cui significazione si produce nel contesto relazionale 
ed e‘ insieme da esso prodotta.‘ Ibid. p. 142. My translation.  
15 ‗Maternity, in short, is here the exemplary case of an extreme passivity, in which the entirety of the 
Lévinasian ethical subject is perfectly reflected, because the face of the other calls it, without any action on its 
own part, to be ―for the other despite itself‖.‘ Adriana Cavarero, ―Coda. Adieu to Levinas,‖ in Inclinations. A 
Critique of Rectitude (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 133–75. p. 153. 
16 Cavarero says that for Lévinas woman is ‗Silent angel of the home, Woman is at the service of an 
exquisitely virile I that,  far from being born of a woman erects itself through enjoyment.‘ Ibid. p. 145. 
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James and Italian feminist Marxist theorist Silvia Federici which I will discuss 
further in the literature review.   
The word ‗thread‘ has many connotations, which can be symbolic and 
tangible it can refer to a storyline, a sewing thread, something that links and 
connects, a subjective thread and it can represent an umbilical cord too. In my 
thesis I speak of a ‗thread‘ as a symbolic thread.17 At the same time, I also 
speak of a concrete, tactile, thick and colourful, fabric ball of thread, which I 
work with in my research to represent – symbolically and concretely - 
mothers‘ relationality to build and weave webs of support for each other, 
illustrating my proposition with Berlin-based artist Alex Martinis Roe as we 
will see in Chapter Five. The most significant meaning I give to the thread, in 
this thesis, is that it represents relationality and support between mothers and 
carers: the commoning of care. Moreover, I speak of a ‗maternal thread‘ 
because part of my interest in the maternal threads through both my 
childhood and adulthood due to the relationship I had with my now late 
mother. This is the colourful thread I have used to signify relationality:  
                                                     
17 Jose‘ Saramago in the book All the Names uses the metaphor of a thread and umbilical cord for the main 
character, Senhor José, searching a sea of archives and also he says ―are bound to each other by a thread of 
tears.‖ Saramago mentions Ariadne‘s thread too, which coincidentally I have written about (unpublished). 
Ariadne uses the thread to save Theseus but he then betrays her. I suggest, from a feminist lens, the 
importance for women of passing/using the thread in line with feminist genealogies, to people who support 
us in our desires. So, I ask, what if Ariadne did not use the thread to save Theseus?  Jose‘ Saramago, All the 
Names (New York: Vintage Classics, 1999). p.  
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Photo: Sara Paiola 
According to Baraitser and Spigel since Adrienne Rich‘s 1977 important book 
Of Woman Born, ‗mothering‘ has been used largely to signal the realm of 
maternal experience, and ‗motherhood‘ to refer to the institution.‘18 Indeed in 
her book Rich distinguished:  
two meanings of motherhood, one superimposed on the other: the 
potential relationship of any woman to her powers of reproduction – 
and to children; and the institution – which aims at ensuring that that 
potential – and all women – shall remain under male control.19  
Rich, for the first time, brought to the fore the material relations between 
herself and her children, the distinct pleasures and pains that motherhood 
affords, and the institution of motherhood – how motherhood is regulated 
                                                     
18 Lisa Baraitser and Spigel Sigal, ―Editorial,‖ Studies in the Maternal 1, no. 1 (2009), 
https://doi.org/http://doi.org/10.16995/sim.170. 
19 Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution. (W. W. Norton & Company, 1995). 
p. 13.  
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and framed in a patriarchal society.20 In this thesis I use these two terms as 
understood by Rich.  
In addition I use the term ―mothering‖ as it is used by Sara Ruddick.  
In her vision of maternal thinking she advocates a specific embodied form of 
thinking and decision making that is done on a moment by moment basis by 
women as feeling-thinking subjects.21 Ruddick‘s concept of maternal thinking 
has influenced many maternal studies scholars in situating the mother as an 
embodied and concrete subject. It is this aspect that I find interesting in her 
work and which translates into my use of the term ‗maternal.‘ What I 
appreciate about her thinking is the concrete and ‗anti-universalist‘ lens in 
which she reads the maternal which is similar, but in different ways, to the 
Arendtian idea of ―uniqueness‖ and Cavarero‘s extension on her thinking 
adding a feminist layer to the concept of uniqueness which becomes more an 
―embodied uniqueness.‖  
British Professor of social work Brid Featherstone argues that in 
sociological accounts of motherhood what is ‗lost in the process are accounts 
of maternal subjectivity which can take into account the ways that fantasy, 
meaning, biography and relational dynamics inform individual women‘s 
position in relation to a variety of discourses concerning motherhood.‘22 
Following Hollway and Featherstone, I decided to use a psychoanalytic and a 
                                                     
20 Ibid. 
21 Ruddick, Sara, Maternal Thinking. Towards a Politics of Peace.  
22 Brid Featherstone, ―Introduction: Crisis in the Western Family.,‖ in Mothering and Ambivalence. ed. Wendy 
Hollway and Brid Featherstone (London: Routledge, 1997), 1–16.  
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philosophical lens in my thesis too. In conducting   research that asks 
questions about what it means to mother in relative isolation and how the 
experience of mothering may shift positively if mothers work in collaboration 
with other mothers, I have at times used a psychoanalytic lens – because a 
‗purely‘ sociological or post-structuralist account of mothering would be too 
limited in scope. The psychoanalytic lens allows me to look at unconscious 
material that women who are mothers may bring in the relationships with 
other women and mothers. This is unconscious material which originates 
from their childhood and their relationship with their own mothers. There 
may be projections, identifications, envy, anger and other feelings transferred 
from one relationship to the other.  
  The overall concept of motherhood that I aim to challenge in this 
thesis is the one that has emerged within the Western concept of the 
bourgeois, patriarchal nuclear family, which became functional in the 
formation of a capitalistic society. I still feel it is important to challenge this 
concept and sociological reality as it is a pervasive ideology in many parts of 
the world. This ideology is functional to patriarchy and more often than not it 
is detrimental to women. In addition, the concept of patriarchy that I work 
around is one of male domination and the rule of the father that has seen 
women as solely or mainly functional to the family, husband and children and 
where the woman and the mother are seen as the keepers of morality in 
society. This varies from country to country but is still very present, both in 
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progressive and in more traditional societies, as a set of ideas which shape  
culture, society, law, economy, and religion into being overall more 
advantageous for men.  
I do not have a monolithic idea of patriarchy; I think it varies, but it has 
in general some fundamental commonalities. Women in all societies resist and 
disrupt patriarchal culture in different ways. Sadly neoliberalism has taken 
advantage of some feminist ideas, which have become instrumentalised to the 
functioning of capitalism.23 Like other feminists who use an intersectional and 
sociological approach I see a very tight connection between capitalism, 
patriarchy and racism.24  At the same time I appreciate the complexity of 
individual subjectivities, while also understanding individuals as collectively 
subject to the pressures and various features of capitalism and neoliberalism. 
In other words in thinking about subjectivities I understand them, in some 
ways, in a Foucauldian perspective too, as being subjects who have agency 
and being subjects of something. But as I said previously in the section on 
terminology my main understanding of subjectivity comes from the theory on 
intersubjectivity, we are formed in and become through relations.  
 
                                                     
23 Nancy Fraser, Fortunes of Feminism. From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis (London and New York: 
Verso, 2014).  
24 See these works Federici, Revolution at Point Zero. Homework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle. Ailsa 
Bjornholt, Margunn and MacKay, ed., Counting on Marilyn Waring. New Advances in Feminist Economics., Second 
Edition (Bradford, Canada: Demeter Press, 2014). Heidi Hartmann, ―Towards a Definition of Patriarchy.,‖ in 
Oppression, Privilege, and Resistance: Theoretical Perspectives on Racism, Sexism, and Heterosexism., ed. Lisa Heldke and 
Peg O‘Connor (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 143–47. 
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 The term and subject that is most difficult to define is the ‗mother.‘  
This term at times causes tension in the thesis and I have not exactly found a 
solution on how to define it. I suggest that this difficulty I have with defining 
‗the mother‘ originates from a similar place as Baraitser and Spigel‘s assertion 
that:  
the maternal subject, perhaps more than any subject position, is 
downright slippery. ‗She‘ is one of those ever-present and yet shadowy 
figures who seem to disappear from various discourses that specifically 
try to account for her.25  
The reason for this difficulty, as stated above, is that a mother is not an easily 
‗defined‘ subject – and I want to keep open this difficulty in ‗defining‘ her, so 
that defining her is not a problem but an integral part of what a mother is. It 
is exactly because mothers have been labelled and framed for centuries by 
patriarchy as human beings with specific qualities, duties and expectations that 
I now think any label needs to be subverted in the name of the freedom of 
any woman to define her maternal subjectivity for herself.  I prefer again to 
define a mother by the ―embodied uniqueness‖ which Cavarero discusses. 
This uniqueness is as far as possible from the subject of metaphysics. On a 
‗practical‘ level the mothers I am talking about ‗can become parents as a result 
of sexual intercourse, artificial insemination, in vitro fertilisation, adoption, 
co-habiting or step-parenting.‘26  The mother I speak about is therefore not – 
or not necessarily – defined by particular biological criteria. Even though I 
                                                     
25 Baraitser and Sigal, ―Editorial.‖ 
26 Roszika Parker, Torn in Two. The Experience of Maternal Ambivalence. (London: Virago Press, 1995). 
introduction| 27 
know that the embodied experience of pregnancy, birth, and breastfeeding as 
many scholars thinking about the mother across disciplines have argued, 
leaves an important unconscious ―sign‖ in a biological mother and her child 
which cannot be ignored.  
 Another important distinction to make is between the subjects of a 
mother and of a woman. This is because pregnancy, birth, and motherhood 
always risk ‗sliding‘ or ‗falling‘ into a conservative paradigm in which the 
mother‘s subjectivity is more often than not attached to and/or collapsed into 
that of her children. Hence, I suggest the importance of calling mothers 
women first and foremost, or ‗women who mother.‘ In this thesis at times I 
will use this phrase and at times for convenience I will use mothers only.  To 
me it is important to emphasise this, because I do not want to collapse the 
identity of a woman into that of a mother. Baraitser notes the importance of 
this distinction  ‗[We need to] repeat the second-wave move to uncouple 
maternity and femininity…not this time for the sake of the feminine, but for 
the sake of the maternal.‘27 I believe they are two somehow separate identities, 
that a woman is a mother but that she retains, or it is important that she 
retains the identity of a woman separate from her children. Her identity as a 
woman is of course transformed subjectively by the experience of 
motherhood – these two identities influence each other once one becomes a 
mother – but nevertheless remains separate or at least it is important that it is 
                                                     
27 Lisa Baraitser, Maternal Encounters. The Ethics of Interruption. (Routledge, 2008). p. 10.  
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partially separate. ‗Mother‘ as another layer on top of race, age, and class, 
shaping and shaped by these but not erasing them.  
In psychological terms, I think that it is important for women to build a 
separate identity in which her objects of desire, attention, and ‗passion‘ are 
not ‗only‘ her children. This work was fundamental for feminists in the 1960s 
through to the 1980s to reconfigure their own identities and challenge the 
stereotypical image of motherhood, as natural destiny, historically attached to 
women. This is important for mothers and even more so, in a way, for their 
children. Historically women‘s identities have been merged into their 
identities as mothers at a huge detriment to their own lived experiences as 
beings separate from their children and from their families.28 Sociologist Tina 
Miller states:  
I have been conscious of foregrounding the term ‗woman‘ when writing 
about individual experiences around motherhood rather than ‗mother‘. 
This is in an attempt not to lose sight of the women I am writing about, 
or deny their agency in circumstances where the identity ‗mother‘ and its 
maternal associations can become all consuming, diminishing traces of 
other identities.29 
                                                     
28 I was reminded of this by my feminist aunt Francesca Bonato and by her and my mother Bertilla Bonato‘s 
lived experience of motherhood and the importance of cultivating their own experiences and passions 
separate from us children.  
29 Tina Miller, ―Thoughts around the Maternal: A Sociological Viewpoint,‖ Studies in the Maternal 1, no. 1 
(2009): 1–3. This theme is an important aspect of the work of second wave Italian feminist writer and activist 
Lea Melandri, Amore e Violenza. Il Fattore Molesto Della Civiltà. (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2011). Lea 
Melandri, Love and Violence: The Vexatious Factors of Civilisation (New York: SUNY Press, 2019). All the rest of 
her books are sadly not translated into English yet. 
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It is exactly this tension between avoiding diminishing the traces of other 
identities and keeping those traces alive and subjectively visible that forms an 
important aspect of the maternal I am interested in.   
There are various reasons why I want to bring mothers, and those who 
identify as mothers, to the centre of this thesis. Firstly, it is for the reasons 
Cavarero points out in her latest book, titled Inclinations. A Critique of Rectitude: 
At the same time that the infant, as the emblem of a unilateral and absolute 
dependence, often appears at centre stage to exemplify relational ontology, 
the mother, because of the burdensome self-sacrificing stereotype that is 
draped over her, is often absent.‘30  
 
Following her thinking my aim in this thesis in contrast to other relational 
ontologies which often disregard or ‗forget‘ to include the ‗mother‘, is to do 
‗just‘ that – to bring mothers and carers to the forefront. I place them at the 
centre of the thesis, and, as Cavarero has suggested in her work, I critique and 
challenge the ‗burdensome self-sacrificing stereotype‘31 attached to the 
maternal. For this reason, and in particular because of the meaning that the 
maternal carries with it, it is too important to leave it out or to leave it ‗just‘ to 
signify a sacrificial image of motherhood. My aim to bring mothers to the 
forefront is also for the same reasons Julia Kristeva has aptly summarised: ‗It 
seems . . . difficult to speak today of maternity without being accused of 
                                                     
30 Cavarero Adriana, Inclinations. A Critique of Rectitude. (Stanford : Stanford University Press, 2016), p. 13. 
Cavarero Adriana, Inclinazioni. Critica Della Rettitudine. (Raffaello Cortina Editore, 2014), p. 24.   
31 Cavarero Adriana, Inclinations. A Critique of Rectitude. p. 13.  
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normativism, read: of regression.‘32 I intend to challenge this thinking that 
motherhood can be discussed only in certain domains without being seen as 
regressive because this thinking is linked to what Cavarero is suggesting, that 
the mother is often not discussed because she carries with her a sacrificial 
image.  
Secondly, I do not want to generalise and diffuse the experiences of 
mothers to parenting in general, specifically because this would dilute and 
neuter women‘s maternal work and their experiences of mothering. 
Therefore, it is the gendered reality of mothering33 that is the focus and 
priority of this thesis:  
The reality is that caregiving continues to be highly gendered, and while I 
acknowledge ―mothering‖ occurs in many forms, it is also crucial to 
acknowledge that it is women who are globally performing the majority 
of this mothering work.34 
 
What is at stake here is a recognition that a whole sector of the economy is 
invisible and submerged – that of the unpaid care work that happens in the 
household, which is mainly gendered in the feminine. This is important to 
focus on as this work is mainly still done by women because capitalism, as 
Silvia Federici has so aptly argued, depends on the economies of unpaid 
                                                     
32 Julia Kristeva cited in Fanny Söderbäck, ―Motherhood According to Kristeva. On Time and Matter in 
Plato and Kristeva,‖ PhiloSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism 1, no. 1 (2011): 65–87.  
33 Ruddick, Maternal Thinking. Towards a Politics of Peace., p. 206.  
34 Melinda Giles Vendenbeld,  Introduction in Melinda Giles Vanderbeld, ed., Mothering in the Age of 
Neoliberalism. (Bradford, Canada: Demeter Press, 2014). p. 2.  
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domestic care work and community care work.35 Historically within families 
women, more often than not, have performed more unpaid care and received 
less care. Care work in general is seen as unskilled because women do it, so 
overall the skills learned at home go unrecognised and undervalued.  
To avoid diffusing the experiences of mothers I think it is important not 
to universalise the experience of one person to another. I do not believe we 
can. Universalism renders irrelevant the specificity of each human being in 
terms of sex, gender, class, race, historical-socio-cultural, and economic 
reality. I can relate with Cavarero‘s thinking and I second her statement when 
she says ‗I am of the opinion that universality does not exist.‘36 At the same 
time, as stated above, most mothering is done globally by women and 
culturally, societally, symbolically and politically it is highly gendered work. 
This is with the exception of Northern European countries, where care 
responsibilities are more equally distributed.  
The experiences of a father who is the primary carer of a child may be a 
bit different to those of a mother. One difference can be if he parents a child 
who is a boy or a girl.37 Then there are subjective, identarian differences in a 
father. How he identifies with his children or not, how he projects his dreams, 
                                                     
35 Federici, Revolution at Point Zero. Homework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle. See as well Chiara Saraceno and 
Wolfgang Keck, ―Towards an Integrated Approach for the Analysis of Gender Equity in Policies Supporting 
Paid Work and Care Responsibilities,‖ Demographic Research 25 (2011): 371–405. Bjornholt, Margunn and 
MacKay, Counting on Marilyn Waring. New Advances in Feminist Economics. 
36 Elisabetta Bertolino and Adriana Cavarero, ―Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference: An Interview with 
Italian Feminist Philosopher Adriana Cavarero.,‖ Differences 19, no. 1 (2008): 128–67, https://doi.org/DOI 
10.1215/10407391-2007-019, 2008. p. 143.  
37 Veronique Rouyer et al., ―Fathers of Girls, Fathers of Boys: Influence of Child‘s Gender on Fathers‘ 
Experience of, Engagement in, and Representations of Paternity,‖ Swiss Journal of Psycholohy 66, no. 4 (2007): 
225–33. Jessica Benjamin, ―Father and Daughter: Identification with Difference - A Contribution to Gender 
Heterodoxy,‖ Psychoanalytic Dialogues 1, no. 3 (1991): 277–99. 
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fears and needs – conscious and unconscious - onto his children. My own 
father, who was, as I said, my primary carer for ten years38 was praised and 
admired for being a sole father. A sole mother in the late 1970s and 1980s in 
Italy did not receive this kind of support. The experiences of fathers, sole 
fathers and fatherhood require, I believe, focused research on fatherhood and 
relationality. I recognise as well that some of this discussion will be applicable 
to non-binary/trans-parents or trans-mothers and that some parents who do 
care work do not place themselves in the category of ‗mother‘ or ‗father.‘ It 
can also be pertinent for any primary carer for a baby or child, but for this 
thesis I have focused on women who mother, as motherhood is highly 
gendered and it is gendered as feminine.  I use mothers/carers to be more 
inclusive at times where I feel that this is appropriate.   
 I do not attach the word woman to sexual orientation but to an 
ontological feminist world view which has, in a way, re-appropriated the term 
woman as an embodied experience away from what patriarchy still dictates 
women to be. As Cavarero says:  
The Italian equivalent term for gender, (genere), is notoriously so generic 
(precisely!) that its use is inadvisable in the theoretical field. Also, in 
Italian feminist theory, speaking of sex (sesso) or sexual difference 
(differenza sessuale) does not imply a mere biological level, but rather a 
                                                     
38 Jennifer Walters, Working with Fathers. From Knowledge to Therapeutic Practice (Basingstoke & New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
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mode in which biological, cultural, material, symbolic, morphological, 
and imaginary elements traverse one another.39 
To put it more simply, I use the term woman in a strategic way, trying not to 
lose sight, of women‘s material work and experiences that, more often than 
not, still involve a higher percentage of the work of reproduction than men. 
At the same time I suggest that the mothering experience is universal, in the 
sense that it ‗calls us‘, ci chiama, all humans, to experiences and emotions 
similar to those that maternal studies scholars Baraitser and Spigel define thus:  
The maternal is understood broadly as lived affective and embodied 
experience, social location and social relation, political and scientific 
practice, economic and ethical challenge, and as a theoretical question 
and structural dimension in human relations, politics and ethics.40  
 
It is this understanding of the maternal that I am interested in working with.  
 Moreover, motherhood is still seen in many ways as essential to 
women‘s lives in a way that it is not for men. Therefore, the main focus of 
this thesis is relations between mothers and carers, between those who, the 
world over, are still mainly ‗rocking the cradle‘41 in the first few years of a 
child‘s life. Women make up half of the world's population and many of them 
will go on to experience pregnancy, childbirth and motherhood at some point 
                                                     
39 Bertolino and Cavarero, ―Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference: An Interview with Italian Feminist 
Philosopher Adriana Cavarero.‖ p. 149.   
40 Baraitser and Sigal, ―Editorial.‖ 
41 Dorothy Dinnerstein, Rocking of the Cradle and the Ruling of the World (London: The Women‘s Press Ltd., 
1987). 
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in their lives. British feminist philosopher Alison Stone states ‗it remains very 
largely women and not men who are the principal child-carers.‘42  
“the personal is political”  
The first time I have heard the motto ‗the personal is political‘ was from my 
feminist mother Bertilla. While I was growing up she recounted – as a form of 
storytelling – how important the consciousness raising group she went to 
from 1972 was for her younger self, as a twenty-two year old woman/mother 
of a two-year-old daughter, namely myself. In effect I was told the story of 
her discovery of feminism over many years. I was told of these meetings and I 
was present in many situations where my mother and her friends engaged in 
deep discussions about themselves ‗loro stesse‘, their lives, the relationships 
they had with each other which raised their consciousness so to speak and 
consequently brought some changes in their lives (personal, political and 
professional) this is embodied knowledge to me. What they engaged in was 
political practice, I did not read it in books, I heard it and witnessed it in 
person.  
Many years later I understood that it was Carol Hanisch43 who 
popularised the phrase ‗the personal is political‘, or as other feminists then 
expanded on, what happens in the private (home) is political. Hanisch wrote 
this slogan in a pamphlet in 1969 while she was part of New York‘s radical 
                                                     
42 Stone, Alison, Feminism, Psychoanalysis and Maternal Subjectivity. p. 16. 
43 Hanisch, ―www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.Html.‖ 
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feminist movement. Hanisch‘s text is like a report of a consciousness raising 
meeting, what happened, what was discussed, what was decided, it is not 
theory, it comes from practice. Broadly speaking, the slogan meant that there 
is a link between personal experiences and to wider political and social 
conditions and inequalities. Hanisch is best known for having popularised the 
phrase but she does not take responsibility for inventing it. This idea was 
born out of the practice of consciousness raising groups in the United States, 
which the women adopted from the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s.44 
After a meeting held in New York in 1969 Hanisch says that: 
One of the first things we discover in these groups is that personal 
problems are political problems. There are no personal solutions at this 
time. There is only collective action for a collective solution.45  
The slogan ‗personal is political‘ is linked, and it‘s the key, to the dialogic 
practice of speaking and listening (which is political) of the consciousness 
raising groups of women where they met regularly to discuss their problems 
and concerns as women.46 Each woman spoke one at a time and then after the 
choral discussion there was the analysis of what had been discussed, this 
allowed women to understand that the problems each women had was not 
personal only to them but it was part of a systematic problem, hence meeting 
                                                     
44 ―Consciousness-Raising (C-R) is a tool that the Women‘s Liberation Movement adopted from the Civil 
Rights Movement in the 1960s, where it was known as ―telling it like it is‖ in 
―https://Womensliberation.Org/Priorities/Feminist-Consciousness-Raising/,‖ n.d. cited in Lucia Farinati 
and Claudia Firth, ―Feminism - Speaking and Listening in Feminist Consciouness Raising Groups,‖ in The 
Force of Listening (Berlin: Errant Bodies Press, 2017), 40–55. p. 40.  
45 Hanisch, ―www.carolhanisch.org/CHwritings/PIP.Html.‖  
46 One book which discusses the importance of speaking seen more as narrating is Adriana Cavarero, Relating 
Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood (New York: Routledge, 2005). And another book by the same author 
discusses the importance of the voice to represent our uniqueness and embodied singularity Cavarero, For 
More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression. 
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with other women in these groups Hanisch stated was like doing ―political 
therapy.‖ Calling it ―political therapy‖ distinguishes it from psychoanalysis or 
psychotherapy where one – in this case a woman - goes when one is unwell or 
wishes to unearth some part of oneself that are not clear, instead of seeing it 
as a structural problem. In other words the problems women had then were 
not ‗just‘ an individual problems, in which one is unwell and seeks therapy. By 
being a structural, societal problem it was a collective problem and it needed a 
collective solution or approach. Consciousness raising groups allowed women 
to see that their problems were the same as others‘, and not as an isolated 
instance. This sharing makes ‗the personal‘ political, to do it together is a way 
to reclaim a space and together there is the possibility to reclaim some rights. 
It follows that the commoning of care is political too as it is done together, it 
disrupts the individualised, capitalistic notion of care.  
For many feminists consciousness raising groups, where women met to 
share various concerns – and which initially they thought were personal but 
soon realised they were collective concerns - were key to the formation of a 
feminist subjectivity, or what Cavarero calls a subjectivity founded on 
relationality which becomes intersubjectivity. Relationality understood as 
politics. This is the key to understand that relationality – as understood in 
these terms – is political. Some criticized these groups for being ―not 
political‖ and instead engaged in ―personal therapy‖.47 In reality the issues the 
                                                     
47 Hanisch, ―Www.Carolhanisch.Org/CHwritings/PIP.Html.‖   
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women brought to these groups were personal, in the sense that it affected 
them and their lives personally, but they were political as they symbolised, and 
they were examples of, the oppression of women perpetuated by, and 
foundational of a capitalist society. Hence if they did not have universal public 
childcare for instance it was due to the fact that it was seen as natural for 
women to care for their children. As Carol Hanisch said in her manifesto 
‗individual struggle is always limited‘.48 The consciousness raising groups that 
Carol Hanisch talks about were organised in this way:  
in a small group it is possible for us to take turns bringing questions to 
the meetings (like ―Which do you prefer a baby boy or girl or no 
children? What happens to your relationship if your partner makes 
more then you, less then you?). Then we go around the room to 
answer questions from our personal experiences. Everybody talks that 
way. At the end of the meeting we try to sum up and generalise from 
what‘s been said and make connections. I believe at this point, and 
maybe for a long time to come, that these analytical sessions are a form 
of political action.49    
This resonates with me in a poignant way as I have some typewritten notes of 
the consciousness raising group meetings my mother Bertilla and other 
women set up in the early 1970s in the public library of the town I was born 
in, Castelfranco Veneto, North-East Italy. The notes were given to me by 
Italian feminist author Lea Melandri50 after my mother passed away in 2016. 
Lea wrote the notes when she went to some of these meetings, she had kept 
                                                     
48 Ibid.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Lea Melandri is an important reference figure in Italian feminism. She is a writer and journalist. She has 
written many important books which include Melandri, Love and Violence: The Vexatious Factors of Civilisation. 
And Lea Melandri, Come Nasce Il Sogno D’Amore. (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002). 
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them all these years in her archive. These notes are written partly in dialect51 
from the Veneto region as many women, including my mother, spoke dialect 
then and still do. By reading them we perceive the birth of a collective 
consciousness, by sharing their experiences they could see they were not alone 
in what they felt. This is why this is ―political therapy‖, because it happens in 
collectivity, in relationality with other people. Politics as intended as well by 
Hannah Arendt and Adriana Cavarero. 
literature review 
The objective of this review is to review the work of some feminist authors 
who have been foundational in the way I approached writing this thesis, it‘s a 
short genealogy of the main threads of literature that ground and feed into my 
project. I start by saying that I own an archive of books written by Italian 
feminists, pamphlets, posters, pictures, typewritten notes of meetings, 
newspapers cuttings of feminist writers and journalists and feminist 
magazines among which Via Dogana52 and Sottosopra53 both published by the 
Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective. I have inherited this archive by my late 
mother when she passed away in 2016. Previous to that, several years ago, I 
had asked my mother and my feminist aunts if they could lend me some of 
their feminist books to read. Therefore it has been several years now that I 
have used original archival material to write my thesis. This has a meaning for 
                                                     
51 These notes are from a meeting on the 6th January 1973.  
52 ―https://www.Libreriadelledonne.It/Categorie_pubblicazioni/Viadogana/,‖ n.d. 
53 ―https://www.Libreriadelledonne.It/Categorie_pubblicazioni/Sottosopra/,‖ n.d. 
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the literature I have used in particular as I have centred my argument around 
the relationality expounded by Italian feminists, and as well it has meaning in 
terms of the methodology as my choice of material has been made, in a way, 
by my history as the daughter of a feminist mother, so because of that this 
choice can be seen as part of an embodied methodology.  
The existing studies on motherhood and the maternal are now many.  
This was not the case until around 20 years ago. In the last twenty years there 
has been a rich development of thinking and theorising around motherhood. 
These works range from psychoanalysis, psychology, sociology, 
anthropological and philosophical approaches to the maternal. They include 
as well artistic depictions on motherhood by women artists54 and 
representations of motherhood in the realms of drama, cinema and dance. In 
addition in Chapter Four I review studies on experiences and proposals on 
collective mothering and the commoning of care. 
The authors who have most influenced my thinking on maternal 
subjectivity are: Baraitser,55 Stone,56 Ettinger57, Parker58, Hollway59, Raphael-
                                                     
5454 There are many women artists who work around depicting motherhood and the maternal. As they are 
now too many to name here I list these websites of UK based artists or organisations working on these 
themes ―Http://Mamsie.Org/Art-Collection/,‖ n.d.; ―Procreate Project,‖ n.d., 
https://www.procreateproject.com/.;  ―Birth Rites Collection,‖ https://www.birthritescollection.org.uk/, 
n.d.; ―Http://Www.Desperateartwives.Co.Uk/,‖ n.d.; ―Https://Motherswhomake.Org/About,‖ n.d. 
―Https://Www.Spiltmilkgallery.Com/,‖ n.d. ―Https://Www.Mothervoices.Org/,‖ n.d.  
55 Baraitser, Maternal Encounters. The Ethics of Interruption. 
56 Stone, Feminism, Psychoanalysis and Maternal Subjectivity. 
57 Bracha Ettinger, The Matrixial Borderspace. (Theory Out of Bound). (University of Minnesota Press, 2006). 
58 Rozsika Parker, Mother Love/Mother Hate. The Power of Maternal Ambivalence. (New York: BasicBooks, 1995). 
59 Wendy Hollway, ―From Motherhood to Maternal Subjectivity,‖ International Journal of Critical Psychology 2 
(2001): 13–38. 
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Leff60, Benjamin61. I have written about these authors‘ thinking in Chapter 
Five titled ‗relational maternal subjectivity‘. In addition Cavarero, Luisa 
Muraro and Lea Melandri of whom I have written more in Chapters One, 
Two and Three. For Baraitser it is important that mothers are seen as able to 
display and express a range of emotions that can go from the benevolent to 
the aggressive towards their children. Only in that way can we keep maternal 
subjectivity alive and real. For Baraitser maternal subjectivity is one of 
interruption. A mother is interrupted in her daily tasks to care for a baby or 
young children.  What gets interrupted is the mother‘s autonomy, the flow of 
the day, her sense of self. Baraitser suggests that ―the interruptions‖ is 
probably what makes maternal subjectivity. She contends that ‗one of the 
particularly striking shifts in a mother‘s kinetic experience is a newfound sense 
of clumsiness, slowness and delay. Motherhood, I would suggest, has its own 
kind of viscosity‘62 in which a mother‘s subjectivity is shaped by these 
experiences among others. 
There are many novels too that I read during the years that influenced 
my thinking on motherhood and the maternal in the way in which they depict 
a complex figure of the mother, layered by many feelings, by ambivalence, 
sheer love, hatred too. To name a few of note are Jamaica Kincaid‘s 
Autobiography of My Mother (1996) a fictionalised book set in Jamaica where a 
                                                     
60 Joan Raphael-Leff, ―Maternal Subjectivity,‖ Studies in the Maternal 1, no. 1 (2009): 1–5. 
61 Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and the Problem of Domination (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1988). 
62 Baraitser, Maternal Encounters. The Ethics of Interruption. p. 128-129.  
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daughter writes the story of her mother almost like she is her mothers herself. 
It is an interesting perspective and a complex story of maternal love, 
ambivalence, abandonment and distance influenced by the history of 
enslavement. Toni Morrison‘s Beloved63 (1987) which asks important questions 
about mother‘s love and sacrifice for love to kill her daughter to set her free, 
not to have her enslaved. Sibilla Aleramo‘s autobiography Una donna (1906) 
had a great impact in Italy on how she describes the plight of women and the 
way she describes motherhood which was revolutionary for Italian society in 
1906. Aleramo‘s books were read widely during the second wave feminist 
movement in Italy, they were rediscovered then and given value by women 
‗by articulating her won pain and relating its origin to women‘s social position, 
she made a unique contribution to Italian feminism‘.64  
Some influential writers on motherhood in the USA are Adrienne 
Rich‘s book Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution65 (1976) 
which I have briefly dealt with in the section above. I add that Rich‘s analysis 
of motherhood has been very influential to detach the maternal from the 
naturalised image it had for a long time. Betty Friedan The Feminine Mystique 
(1963); Kate Millet‘s Sexual Politics66 (1970); Shulamith Firestone‘s The 
Dialectic of Sex67 (1970). These books had a particular influence for me because 
                                                     
63 Toni Morrison, Beloved. (London: Vintage Classics, 2007). 
64 Ann Caesar, ―Italian Feminism and the Novel: Sibilla Aleramo‘s ‗A Woman,‘‖ Feminist Review 5 (1980). 
65 Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution. 
66 Kate Millet, Sexual Politics (Champign, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 2000). 
67 Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex. The Case for Feminist Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 
2003). 
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my mother used to tell me many times how these books awakened a feminist 
subjectivity in her and how they changed her life. I have some of these books 
in Italian in my bookshelves which were the books my mother read in the 
1970s. Especially I remember my mother saying how Kate Millet‘s book was 
translated in 1971 and published in sections each week in an Italian magazine 
called L‘Espresso, and she read it and that was the first time she questioned her 
position as a woman, the first time she realised she was a woman even. Before 
it was an unquestionable fact, then it became a reality.  
Theorising on motherhood in France are Simone de Beauvoir Le 
Deuxième Sexe 1949; Luce Irigaray; Hélène Cixous; Julia Kristeva. Some of 
these French authors have been important to me as they were the books my 
mother, many of her friends and some of my aunts read since the 1970s so I 
have heard speak about them many times and I leaned towards using some 
writing of these authors as well for a geographical and linguistic reason. 
France and Italy are close by and culturally are quite similar. In addition I 
speak fluent French so I have had a long term inclination towards French 
speaking authors which I often read in the original.  
Important for my understanding of motherhood is the work of French 
feminist Elisabeth Badinter because of her work around the construction of 
some myths surrounding motherhood which has made it seen as natural, 
when she argues it is not. She investigates how on mothers and motherhood 
was lived and seen in history, especially in France. According to Badinter 
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motherhood was invented. She gives an account on how historically, since the 
1700 c, women who were mothers often did not look after their children, if 
they were rich they had nannies, if they were middle class they sent their 
children to be looked after in the countryside by other women and if they 
were poor they had to work and so their children were looked after by others 
too. French mothers, she says, did not have much qualms to leave their 
children to other women to look after. They wanted to be free. She argues 
that during modern time motherhood has been romanticised. It is an 
interesting historical research which would be interesting to copy for other 
countries too to find out how was motherhood lived in history.68  
Theorising on motherhood in Italy are Luisa Muraro‘s L’ordine simbolico 
della madre, and Lea Melandri‘s Amore e violenza in this book Lea says that there 
is an inextricable link between what happens in the home and what is seen as 
love, (between parents and children, husbands and wives, partners) and 
violence. Love, often idealised and romanticised needs to be looked at in 
more depth she argues not left in the shadow.  
Several journals have dedicated work on motherhood and the maternal 
which have been important to my work. The main ones include the UK based 
                                                     
68 Elisabeth Badinter, Mother Love. Myth & Reality (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1981). A note 
to say that on the other hand I find Badinter‘s critique of the use of the veil by some French Muslim women 
as being against the values of the Republic problematic. Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2007). p. 85. In a comment by a French Muslim woman (who wears the veil) who 
said that women‘s emancipation and Westernization should be separated Badinter disagreed, she said 
―Rightly so; they are rightly connected to one another.‖ Scott says that ―In her comment there is a fascinating 
slippage from ―Westernisation‖ to the emancipatory values of republican France and from there, tacitly, to 
modernity. For Badinter, ―France‖ is the highest embodiment of the Western and the modern.‖  
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Studies in the Maternal 69 and the Canadian based Journal of the Motherhood 
Initiative.70  In 2014 I did an internship at MamSie (Mapping Maternal 
Subjectivity, Identity and Ethics) and the articles in its journal Studies in the 
Maternal had a great influence on me and my thinking. They are too many to 
name here, some are referenced in the thesis. Mostly I have been influenced 
by the way in which motherhood, mothers, the maternal was depicted from a 
variety of angles, all valid and all multifaceted to depict a complex 
representation of motherhood.  
In turning the history I am looking at into scholarship through a PhD 
project I have engaged with the literature that has been important to me as a 
student (Baraitser, Stone, Irigaray, Cavarero and other Italian feminist 
authors). This canon is shaped by the same processes that I am critiquing so 
that it was less natural or obvious to me to turn to Black feminist scholarship 
on the maternal, by doing that it might have produced a different discussion – 
if Joy James was, for example, as central to the project as Baraitser or 
Cavarero, it would be something different.  
Black scholar Joy James calls for a reappraisal of the politics of Western 
white feminist theory, theory that she names as ‗Womb Theory‘, calling for 
those using it – and I include myself here – to notice within it what she calls 
the ‗Captive Maternals‘.  What is excluded in ‗Womb Theory‘, James argues, is 
                                                     
69 ―Https://Www.Mamsie.Bbk.Ac.Uk/,‖ n.d. 
70 ―Https://Journalofmotherhoodinitiative.Org/,‖ n.d. 
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the ―Captive Maternals‖ – ‗those most vulnerable to violence, war, poverty, 
police, and captivity: those whose very existence enables the possessive 
empire that claims and dispossess them.‘71 Following Joy James‘s invitation I 
side with her idea to think maternal politics in which the question is to think 
that those oppressed ‗offer new theories as leverage of freedom.‘72 The work 
of UK Black scholar Tracey Reynolds on Black mothers is focused too to 
move Black mothers from the margins to the centre of maternal studies.73 
Even as I have sought to unearth and excavate the lessons of one partially 
overlooked feminist tradition, the Italian feminist tradition, I participated in 
the marginalisation of another. Overall I have been interested on Italian 
feminism, since doing my Master Research where I wrote a dissertation using 
Italian feminism, to move the Italian feminist experience from the margins 
(there are a great number of Italian books written by feminists which are not 
translated in English), but that it has meant that I have not engaged with race 
as much as I might have.  
Other existing studies on motherhood and care are mainly based in 
relation to the issue of social reproduction and reproductive labour – which is 
very important and is a point of reference to me – but the issue of 
                                                     
71 Joy James, ―THE WOMB OF WESTERN THEORY: TRAUMA, TIME THEFT, AND THE CAPTIVE 
MATERNAL,‖ Carceral Notebooks 12 (2016): 253–96. p. 255. See as well this article for how maternal studies 
can heed the ‗Captive Maternal‘ to see a new form of maternal ethics to emerge: Lisa Baraitser and Sigal 
Spigel, ―Editorial,‖ Studies in the Maternal 13, no. 1 (2020): 1, https://doi.org/doi: 
https://doi.org/10.16995/sim.313. 
72 James, ―THE WOMB OF WESTERN THEORY: TRAUMA, TIME THEFT, AND THE CAPTIVE 
MATERNAL.‖ p. 286.  
73 Tracey Reynolds, ―Studies of the Maternal: Black Mothering 10 Years On,‖ Studies in the Maternal 13, no. 1 
(2020), https://doi.org/https://www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk/article/id/4314/. 
introduction| 46 
motherhood as commoning, collective care is a less explored, less developed 
and a under theorised aspect and approach on care and motherhood. The 
reason is that care is still feminised and naturalised so there has been less 
work on commoning as it automatically undermines one of the main 
assumptions of patriarchy that women are natural mothers. My thesis helps to 
cover this gap of this less explored themes and approaches relating to 
motherhood and care. Referring to social reproduction I refer to the work of 
Silvia Federici and Mariarosa Dalla Costa and her sister Giovanna Franca 
Dalla Costa. The feminist take on motherhood in the early 1970s has always 
been connected to the critique of Marx‘s idea of labour because social 
reproduction was excluded from the Marxist analysis of capitalism and 
labour.74 This was one of the first feminist critiques of Marxism which comes 
from the work of Italian feminists linked to the Marxist movement, they were 
Mariarosa Dalla Costa and her sister Giovanna Franca Dalla Costa and Silvia 
Federici who all came from the tradition of the Italian operaismo75 a grassroots 
socialist, Marxist approach to labour, they then joined Lotta Femminista.76 Lotta 
Femmista was founded by Mariarosa Dalla Costa – who came from the Lotta 
Operaia movement – and Leopoldina Fortunato.77 Lotta Operaia was a 
movement connected to factory‘s workers and it was connected to the 
                                                     
74 Mariarosa Dalla Costa, ―Introduction to the Archive for Feminist Struggle for Wages for Housework,‖ 
Viewpoint Magazine, 2015. 
75 Operaismo was a Marxists Italian workers‘ organising movement started in 1969.  
76 Lotta Femminista was founded in Padova by several women including Leopoldina Fortunato, Mariarosa 
Dalla Costa.  
77 Leopoldina Fortunati, L’arcano Delle Riproduzione. Casalinghe, Prostitute, Operai e Capitale (Venezia: Marsilio 
Editori, 1981). Leopoldina Fortunati, The Arcane of Reproduction. Housework, Prostitution, Labour and Capital (New 
York: Autonomedia, 1995). 
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Marxist movement. Mariarosa Dalla Costa wrote about the wages for 
housework with Selma James in 197378 when they met in London.  
Another example of the critique of the exploitation linked to the work 
of reproduction is the Icelandic women‘s strike on 24th October 1975.79 On 
that day (for 24 hours) women who participated in the strike (about 90 per 
cent) did not go to work outside the home and those engaged in the work of 
reproduction did not cook, look after children or clean the home. They 
wanted to show how women‘s work was indispensable for the economy. They 
wanted to show that when women stop, everything stops as the women of the 
Wages for Housework campaign asserted.  The work of reproduction and care 
was so undervalued – because work done by women - as to be underpaid or 
not paid at all if the women worked from home.  
This thesis will not concentrate so much on the sociological and 
economical idea of social reproduction but to the issue of care which is 
connected to social reproduction. It is really a specific aspect, the one of 
commoning care and this is what I will cover. How, as a community of 
mothers and/or carers, we support each other, we support the social 
reproduction, we support a certain economy? How do we do it? We do it by 
creating and sharing a space, we create commoning and we create that 
support. This is the reason why this is important for any form of care. This is 
                                                     
78 Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James, The Power of Women and the Subversion of the Community (Bristol: 
Falling Wall Press Ltd, 1973).   
79 M. E. Johnson, ―Women in Iceland‖ (Durham, 1984). 
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why the thread exercise that I developed– which we will see in more detail in 
Chapter Five – is an exercise in trying to think and organise care as collective. 
My contribution is not only to address the issue of care that is connected and 
in the context of the work of reproduction relating to motherhood but 
commoning care also in other spheres of the work of reproduction broadly.   
methodology 
In this thesis I am informed by two approaches, theoretical and political 
practice. Some of this political practice comes from what I have described in 
the section above titled the personal is polititical which is in some ways part of 
my methodology too. This kind of feminist political practice is not considered 
personal experience but embodied and situated knowledge. In relation to 
theory I have used critical legal feminist studies, feminist philosophy, 
psychoanalysis and sociology. I have mixed a theoretical and more practical, 
art based methodology because in this thesis I write theory which is informed 
by practice. Not only is it informed by political practice but I use an artistic 
device – the workshop I did in Berlin in 2016 in collaboration with artist Alex 
Martinis Roe where I used the colourful thread previously discussed in the 
section on terminology – to show theory. My methodology then in other 
words is a practice that informs theory and theory that informs practice. My 
invitation to women to think of care as collective in the workshop I just 
mentioned - catalysed with the thread exercise in 2016 - further developed 
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this link between theory and practice. This is how these elements come 
together.  
Using feminist theory/philosophy, feminist critical legal theory, and 
psychoanalysis make my argument stronger because I lean on theory – which 
I often see as coming from practice – to expand, verbalise, symbolise the 
practice of the thread which represents relationality. I am ‗attached‘ to 
materiality, the visual and the concrete and a thread – and its artistic, practical 
application - adds substance to my thinking. This is my contribution to 
knowledge, doing an exercise with women/carers to experience, elaborate and 
think through care and how to make it collective. Furthermore, in my thesis 
the feminist critical legal theory and the feminist philosophers I used highlight 
some elements to do with the critique of universality, abstractness, the neuter 
which helps me bring to bear how care and the work of reproduction escape 
these generalising strategies which are detrimental for the material, 
economical, racial, class, unequal condition in which the work of reproduction 
operates. Using psychoanalysis and some psychology help me elaborate and 
uncover some of the subjective realities mothers and carers experience while 
caring which help me show how it is the embodied uniqueness of each 
person‘s maternal experience which is of interest here, not a universal, 
abstract experience. This is broadly how I use my sources and how they shape 
my argument of commoning care. These diverse aspects of my thesis help 
shape my main argument of commoning/collective care in relation to some 
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of the gaps in literature on collective/commoning care when discussing care 
and the maternal.  
In this thesis I have theorised the commoning of care. In a way which 
my mother and her working-class friends, who shared childcare between each 
other80, were not able to theorise because they needed to work. This relates to 
intersectionality in terms of class. The practice of doing between mothers and 
carers is fundamental. I am a daughter of a working-class feminist mother and 
she and her friends engaged in what can be called a feminist praxis, we can 
read this as a way which challenges the dualism between abstract theory and 
lived experience. Their praxis was to pass (on) the knowledge between 
women by doing, being together, talking and listening to each other. In a way 
they theorised a lot but did not write it down, locating it in a ‗scholarship‘. 
The fact that the theory of collective mothering had not been written by these 
women was because my mother, her friends, and other women had to work 
and look after their children. There are multiple feminist ways of producing 
theory and I particularly value those that are grounded in particular embodied 
experiences, even if these are often excluded from definitions of ‗theory‘. In 
this way, my mother and many others did produce theory and that is also a 
tradition that I am attempting to follow.  
                                                     
80 My mother had me two weeks short of her 20th birthday in 1970. She told me that when I was little she 
had this thought: ―Why should I be at home alone with my child when one of my friends who has a child too 
could come over and we could spend some time together, the children could play and maybe we‘d manage to 
do other things, follow our interests or help each other clean the house or have a nap?‖ It seems a simple 
thought, but for a woman just 20 years old who was not yet a feminist it was a somewhat, I believe, 
revolutionary thought: ‗Why should I look after my daughter alone at home?‘ This desire made her start 
creating occasions to share childcare with some her friends.  
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In relation to class in Italy we have had a very significant internal 
migration till the late 1970s. Many men, women, families from the south 
migrated to the north of Italy (and from the late 1800 till the 1960s, when 
Italy was very poor, by the millions they migrated to other European 
countries, to the USA, Canada, South America, Australia and other parts of 
the world) which was much more industrialised and wealthier. The south of 
Italy had been historically left poorer, Gramsci wrote about it too.81 This 
internal migration was a form of subalternity as many Italians from the south 
were illiterate and were seen in a very disparaging way by richer people from 
the North. Many northern Italians were racists towards people from the 
south. They did the most badly paid jobs and had poorer and precarious life 
conditions – after moving in the north too - at least till the late 1970s.  
 The Milan Womens’s Bookstore Collective has done much work relating to 
the work of reproduction and in the 1970s and 1980s they were criticised by 
women from feminist Marxist groups. At some point in the late 1970s Italian 
Marxist women workers abandoned the consciousness raising groups as they 
felt that their concerns of class and inequality was not taken in more 
consideration. So there was a problem of intersectionality between poor, 
working class women and educated, bourgeois women. This is something 
Silvia Federici said many times, feminists abandoned the concern of the 
economical but the economical will always come back as we live in a capitalist 
                                                     
81 Antonio Gramsci, The Southern Question, VIA Folios (New York: Bordighera Press, 2015). 
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society.82 My mother went several times to the Milan Women‘s Bookstore 
Collective to learn, meet other women, enrich her culture (as I mentioned 
previously she was forced to leave school at 14 years old) but she found 
herself more attracted by other strands of feminism because the women of 
the Milan Boostore Collective were more involved in philosophical work 
which my mother was less familiar with. She did not go there to organise the 
commoning of care or find support for that (apart from the fact that I did not 
live in Milan with her). What I am trying to say is that the Libreria was not a 
space of support for women in that sense. Many of the intellectual feminist 
women of the Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective were linked to the 
University of Trento‘s department of sociology (where my father studied too) 
which in the 1960s and 1970s was a hot bed for radical ideas. Nevertheless we 
can say that feminism had expanded all over Italy and in every region there 
were and still are, in the south too, some womens‘ libraries and feminist 
collectives. So the practice of doing, il fare tra donne, took hold in many other parts 
of Italy but initially it was theorised by the women of the Milan Bookstore 
Collective.  
Here we can see that intersectionality in Italy was mainly linked to class 
for many years and which created a divide, which was cultural and social 
between the better off, more ‗civilised‘ North and a poorer, uneducated 
South.  
                                                     
82 Federici, Revolution at Point Zero. Homework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle. 
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The way I link intersectionality related to class in my thesis is that I 
know that the class factor has influenced women and mothers for many 
decades since the inception of the second wave of feminism in Italy. What is 
also particular about Italy as well is the economic boom of the 1960s which 
increased quite quickly the economic abilities of many families. Italy was not 
an industrial society till then, compared for instance to the UK which was an 
industrial society since the 1700s, Italy was mainly agricultural. Just to give a 
concrete example relating to my family, my mother and her four sisters and 
one brother until the late 1950s were helping their parents in the fields to 
plough their fields. With no cow, it was my granddad that would be the first 
in line and all his children in front of him to pull the plough). My mother 
would have been nine in 1959 then and in 1969 she was pregnant with me 
and discovered feminism in 1971/72 which changed her life. One of her 
sisters had to leave school at 10 years old to work in tobacco factories to pay 
the family debts never to study again until her twenties as she had to work 
and lived with the family until she was thirty. She became a feminist too in her 
early thirties and she said it was like coming out of a shell. Now she is a 
documentary maker in her late seventies.  
 An interesting aspect of Italian feminism and its connection to practice 
is that in the 1970s the feminist movement worked to establish the Consultori 
Famigliari in many parts of Italy, a place where women could go and where 
there was a female gynaecologist, and a sexual clinic, all run by women for 
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women. They were open in 1975 and they were similar to family planning 
centers. The name famigliari, linked to family planning, was added by the 
catholic strand of the group of women who campaigned to create the 
consultori famigliari, the feminist women wanted to call it Consultori per donne. 
It was funded by the Italian equivalent of the NHS, la Sanita‘ Pubblica. It was 
a very important space for women created by women.83  
Going back to the theory I have used in relation to the Milan Women’s 
Bookstore Collective does not reflect in some senses the idea of commoning care 
– they did not write and theorise about it - this is because many women 
involved in the Libreria were middle class and most likely had babysitters, if 
they had children, so this was not a concrete, practical need they had and they 
did not think of writing about it. After the experience of the consciousness 
raising groups the women of the Libreria (active till the late 1970s) what 
became important to them, and the meetings promoted by them at the 
Libreria, was to read books by women writers as they found out that they did 
not have a language of women‘s lives in history as they had always read – if 
they read books (at that time) – books written by men. What became 
important then was to recount each other‘s stories, through storytelling. They 
believed that where there is storytelling, there is sharing, listening and reading. 
So the women who went to the Libreria‘s meetings went for this reason, they 
                                                     
83 The history of the creation of the Consultori Famigliari in Italy is very interesting for its links with the 
feminist movement. This is an aspect of my thesis which I have not elaborated and that would deserve more 
attention. It would be interesting to look at if in these spaces there were experiences of commoning care.  
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did not go to discuss, organise or do the commoning of care. The Libreria was 
an intellectual space open to all, women and men. Therefore what I am doing 
in this thesis is informed by the Milan Women’s Bookstore Collective idea of doing 
between women, entrustment, being in groups.  
However the Milan bookstore did not apply their theory to 
motherhood and the communing of care. This is what I am doing instead, I 
am applying their theory of doing together in relation to the commoning of 
care. Instead for the women of the Milan Bookstore Collective the strategy to 
see women differently is the notion of Entrustment, a notion of Authority. I like 
it as an idea, as an intellectual principle but in terms of support, and 
community work I am not convinced. So why were there not theories of 
commoning care? I think maybe too much attention was given – 
internationally too – to the work of the Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective. 
The commoning of care is under theorised (at least in relation to Italian 
feminism). What I am doing in this thesis is that I am rethinking the link to 
the practice of doing to and to think about and around a different notion of 
care with new concepts, with a new language and with the desire to transmit 
the message.  
 What I am doing in introducing the commoning of care is exactly that. 
Can we extend the notion of Entrustment to other forms of care? Which is 
not simply to share knowledge about books and literature, but practical 
support and help in terms of care? The women of the Milan Bookstore 
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Collective founded a community run library but it is still a library – an 
intellectual project. The Milan Women‘s Bookstore collective did not theorise 
‗doing between mothers‘ but doing between women/feminists. I am drawing 
on and developing this thread of feminist thought but I find it lacking in some 
ways, one of which is the thinking on the work of reproduction, which 
touches all humans but women in particular and more in particular Black, 
Brown, Latina and marginalised women.  
 On the other hand Adriana Cavarero‘s theory, and her notion of 
intersubjectivity, is applicable to any intersection because by focusing on 
uniqueness, and the fact that we human beings are all different, you allow the 
notion of relationality in terms of plurality. What Cavarero insists on, 
politically, is plurality. She is weary of ideas that tend to homogenises and 
standardizes human beings under one all compassing umbrella. By not basing 
herself on pluralism, she allows for all intersections to talk to each other. 
Intersections of gender, race, colour, class, sexual orientation, disability and so 
on. Cavarero would say and by looking at uniqueness, the fact we are all 
different in our unique way, Cavarero states that politics is the result of this 
uniqueness to expose to each other and not to homogenise each other in one, 
all-encompassing identity idea. When all these intersections are together and 
because one embraces uniqueness, there is this sense that this is more 
inclusive as there is less need to create a group framed by identity, we are all 
together, everybody is embraced in the idea of uniqueness to create a politics 
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by what we have different and unique in us. It‘s not an easy project but it is a 
project that does not perform a manoeuvre of homogenising humans. In 
homogenising we lose sight of uniqueness and we risk losing sight of 
humanity. Cavarero and the Milan bookstore collective have in common the 
notion and interest of sexual difference feminism, however one keystone of 
the Milan Bookstore collective is the notion of Entrustment which is not so 
strong in Cavarero. What I take from the Milan bookstore collective is the 
practice of doing between women, which informs my idea and practice of 
communing care. I come from the ―tradition‖ of Italian feminism which is 
very much linked to the practice and not (just) to the theory.  As Cavarero 
says first there is the practice then the theory in Italian feminism.  
 The Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective is not a Consultorio Famigliare, 
where women of all social classes can enter and be seen. This is an important 
aspect of the history of feminism in which women learned to see their bodies 
and ‗own‘ their bodies themselves. The Milan Bookstore Collective created an 
interesting, important and fascinating theory, but can we apply the idea of 
Entrustment to the commoning of care? The idea of Entrustment of the 
Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective is more complex than relationality. So 
the problems that emerged at times in the consciousness raising groups was 
the mute woman who is not able to speak, does not say anything, ―I do not 
feel privileged‖, ―I do not want to say anything.‖ Consciousness raising was a 
horizontal space between women but then when they made links with the 
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macro politics of the political parties there was a problem as the most 
prominent, more outspoken, often the more educated and intellectual women 
‗naturally‘ became the feminist ‗stars‘. That became a problem because in the 
consciousness raising groups all women felt recognised or given space but 
then when the links with macropolitics were made some women emerged 
more than others so the horizontal nature of their groups was interrupted.  
I now have the knowledge, and I am working on this PhD, but I don‘t 
want to lose sight of the link with the practice of doing, la pratica del fare tra donne. 
This is why my practice with the thread is important, it is to be able to 
transmit a message with the thread. So it is pedagogical too. One does not 
have to read the thesis to understand what I mean by commoning care, it is 
understood by the practice of passing the thread to each other. Anyone can 
understand it. My message of the thread is that we are all connected, we are 
not autonomous. We depend on each other. So this is not just a narrative or 
an autoethnography, it shows that we depend on each other and we can be a 
web of support to each other.   
Italian feminism is not like French feminism that had some feminist 
theorists like Hélène Cixous and the two feminist psychoanalysts Julia 
Kristeva and Luce Irigaray who started theorising early on in the history of 
French feminism. Italian feminism from the 1970s and 1980s was different, it 
is born out of practice, speaking with each other, relating to each other and 
the practice of autocoscienza, the concept of affidamento (from the Milan 
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bookstore collective) is born out of the practice created between women. It 
comes from speaking to each other, reading to each other, basically from 
communicating. It is theory informed by practice and this is part of my 
genealogy. Consciousness raising in Italy was different from consciousness 
raising in the USA and the UK, it developed in the practice of the 
unconscious which was a transfer of the psychoanalytic setting to the 
women‘s groups. I am writing a theoretical thesis (in which I theorise the 
importance of the commoning of care) and I use concepts that come from 
practice. One of these concepts that started as a practice is affidamento, 
entrustment that I discussed earlier and the way I write the thesis is influenced 
by my mother and by other women, in particular Maria Silvia Parolin one of 
her best friends, and some of my aunts. This is a form of embodied 
knowledge – entrustment not only from a feminist mother to a daughter – but 
as well in the way I shape my thinking.  
Entrustment as a way of doing research and I adopt it as a theory and 
practice as I am writing of feminism and that I grew up in a feminist 
environment surrounded by many feminist women to whom I entrusted 
myself. I have lived and now live with a feminist archive inherited from my 
mother and all the letters my mother wrote to me. Her experience and what 
she said between women, I have many documents of these encounters. This is 
part of my bibliography, I have read these books and material during the years 
and they have informed my knowledge and way of thinking. This is embodied 
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knowledge, not just being inspired by feminist theory in the abstract. This, for 
me, is embodied knowledge or can be called situated knowledge not 
autoethnography or personal narrative so this is the way in which personal 
experiences sit in relation to theory in my thesis.  
For embodied knowledge I mean a feminist epistemology based on 
embodied ways of knowing which has many proponents in feminist theory. In 
this thesis then I am informed by two main approaches, theory and 
embodied/situated knowledge (called political practice ‗pratica politica‘ by 
some feminists). This is my positionality. Due to my upbringing in the 1970s 
and 1980s feminist and left-wing movements we can say in some ways that I 
am the result of that political practice. It was an embodied knowledge while I 
was growing up and for which many years later I have wanted to find a 
language for, part of this thesis is about seeking out that language which I did 
not have as a child to understand what was happening around me and to me. 
Academic research has the reputation of being impartial but as a feminist I 
marry the idea and practice – ‗naturally‘ - of embodied and situated knowledge 
as well as the feminist concept of ‗standpoint epistemology‘ as theorised by 
Patricia Hill Collins (knowledge/perspective from within) and others, where 
there is no separation between my personal experience and how I think and 
see and read the world.  
I am the daughter of a feminist and I speak of/to/for feminists and 
embodied knowledge is a way of creating knowledge and being critical which 
introduction| 61 
is feminist. Feminism is not ‗just‘ a methodology but is a way of thinking too. 
The personal is not political per se, it is when it is framed within collective 
structures such as feminist conscience raising groups that it becomes political. 
My argument and notion of collective and/or relational motherhood is 
informed by direct experience of collective care and mothering both as a child 
growing up in a commune and as a mother myself. 
As an example of how this practice came before the theory in Italian 
feminism, the women of the Milan Bookstore Collective first met in 
consciousness raising groups, then they applied the practice of the 
unconscious and then the practice of doing between women fare tra le donne, - 
it is from this practice that the Milan Bookstore Collective was opened in 
1975 (and it is still open today), it is an example of making between women. 
Then at the end of the 1980s they wrote the book they are most known by 
‗Non credere di avere dei diritti‘ so they theorised afterwards. The book was 
born after the practice of doing. This is a fundamental aspect of Italian 
feminism.  
Personal narrative has been the motivation and inspiration for some 
parts of my thesis but the social circumstances that created that narrative 
needs also to be analysed and historicised. How one method compliments 
another and why one was needed to supplement another to explain my 
trajectory. In my methodology I want to give value to body to body 
transmission that I received from my mother, her friends and my aunts. I use 
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both theory and practice for doing that. Especially in relation to the colourful 
thread I went back to the practice of being in a room full of women, so in a 
way I returned to the format of the consciousness raising groups. One can 
ask, what is the practice of the thread? It is the practice of signifying 
relationality needed when involved in care. It can be a way to understand how 
we can practice communing care.  
When we have a horizontal meeting it becomes a way of sharing 
knowledge, a practice. Some practices developed in the 1970s by feminists 
were forms of direct democracy, and they were developed then. However, we 
forget that meeting in a circle and speaking is something that, at least in the 
west, became widespread during the student revolts (even if it often seems 
those had more men speaking and it was more of a kind of top-down 
organising) and feminists collectivising. It becomes a way of sharing 
knowledge, and there is a practice of listening and speaking. And we go back 
to this practice which is a form of direct democracy and that can be 
developed into a practice.  
 My methodology is feminist, where I value personal, embodied experiences, 
as Kawash describes: ‗a new generation of feminist scholar-mothers schooled 
in poststructuralist gender theory began to explore the possibilities for 
expressing their feminist commitments through and in their mothering.‘84 In 
                                                     
84 Samira Kawash, ―New Directions in Motherhood Studies,‖ Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 36, 
no. 4 (2011): 969–1003. p. 972.   
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addition I have my own raced, gendered, and class positions from which I 
experience and see the world. I grew up in what is considered, a Marxist 
perspective, the capitalist West, during the 1970s and 1980s, but while it was 
in the midst of societal, cultural and political transformations in which ideas 
of collectivity were embraced and experimented with. Mine was also a 
working-class family but both of my parents were educated (my mother was 
not allowed to study any longer at secondary school level after turning 14 
years old because she had to work for her family. She went back to study 
when she was 18 and always had a thirst for knowledge after that). We are a 
white Italian family and lived in a medium size conservative and 
predominantly catholic town where I perceived the difference in my 
alternative upbringing. My parents and their friends embraced collectivism. 
These are some of the collective experiences I grew up in: my summers were 
spent wild camping in collective holidays with many children (and their 
parents or alone looked after by family or family friends) along the coasts of 
Italy; my father founded an organic food cooperative with others in the early 
1970s, one of the first in Italy; I was born in a commune; my mother lived in 
a self-managed squat in Milan for thirty years and I consider one of my 
mother‘s best friends as an aunt/second mum because of the role she had and 
has had in my life. This upbringing has shaped how I read personal-political-
socio-cultural experiences: one in which I value collectivity. This situatedness 
shapes my perspective and my thesis as this is embodied knowledge and as I 
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focused on thinking through and about relationality which was a prevalent 
‗mood‘ of my life while growing up. Hence disrupting the idea of 
individualism comes from an embodied idea of collectivity. Similarly, this 
situatedness shapes the thesis as I have sought to politicise the maternal and 
to think of it collectively.  
My methodology relates to the questions I want to answer as I am 
engaging in a feminist rethinking of community based on concrete, embodied 
mothers‘ and carers‘ relationality. I am writing with and about Italian 
feminism for an Anglophone context. This is a particular way of writing, 
because I think that the understanding of Italian feminism in and among 
Anglophone feminists has been historically limited, in part because of partial 
access to texts and translations.85 As Teresa de Lauretis stated ‗Italian 
feminism is not well known in North America. With very few, very recent 
exceptions, its critical texts are not translated, discussed, or cited by American 
and other Anglophone feminists.‘86 A very small minority of Italian feminist 
texts have been translated into English.87 I think this is linked with the politics 
                                                     
85 ‗Now out of print, Sexual Difference is a deeply challenging work which never found much of an audience 
among American feminists—it is virtually missing from the so-called category of women debates of the 
1990s.‘ Linda M. G. Zerilli, ―Feminists Makes Promises: The Milan Collective‘s Sexual Difference and the 
Project of World Building.,‖ in Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 
93–124. p. 93. In Italian the title of the book is  ‗Libreria delle Donne di Milano, Non Credere Di Avere Dei 
Diritti: La Generazione Della Liberta’ Femminile Nell’idea e Nelle Vicende Di Un Gruppo Di Donne (Turin: Libreria 
delle Donne, 1987). (Don‘t Think You Have Any Rights: The Engendering of Female Freedom in the 
Thought and Vicissitudes of a Women‘s Group) a text collectively written in 1987 by the Libreria delle 
Donne di Milano (Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective) and published in English under the title The Milan 
Women‘s Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice. 
86 Teresa de Lauretis, co-translator of ―Sexual Difference‖ cited in Zerilli, ―Feminists Makes Promises: The 
Milan Collective‘s Sexual Difference and the Project of World Building.‖ p. 212.  
87 Since 2015 I have been part of the Feminist Duration Reading Group who met once a month to read 
initially Italian feminist texts (the few translated and some translated by the Italian members of the group). 
Then we read other under-known and under-appreciated feminist texts, movements and struggles from 
outside the Anglo-American canon. The group has developed a practice of reading out loud, together, one 
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of translation too,88 which have consequences for how theory and literature is 
understood and ‗translated‘ into other languages and contexts. Hence some of 
my statements about Italian feminism may sound strong for lack of a better 
word but it is because I have been immersed in this reality – via theory, texts 
and feminist practices– all my life. Therefore, I reflect, and I write politically 
and linguistically between the two fields of Italian and Anglophone languages, 
cultures and psycho-socio-political realities.   
I am a daughter of the 1970s, as it is by now abundantly clear, and this 
research is in part a way to try to make sense of those years. Feminist 
historian Luisa Passerini argued that ‗we can say that the culture of 1968 in 
the first place had produced biographies and that those are its culture.‘89 In 
other words, to live through those years was to experience what Passerini calls 
an ―impennata soggettiva‖ a ‗subjective upturn,‘90 a period of significant 
personal and political struggle. Moreover, Italian feminists stated the vital 
importance for feminists of starting from oneself, partire da sé,91 as the most 
relevant starting point for feminist politics and feminist subjectivity. In 
                                                                                                                                                           
paragraph at a time, with the aim of creating a sense of connection and intimacy during meetings. 
―Www.Feministduration.Com,‖ n.d. 
88 ‗One consequence of globalisation, by whatever definition, would seem to be that translations account for 
only 2 to 4 per cent of books published in the United States or the United Kingdom. This general proportion 
is much lower than the percentages often cited for other countries: 15 to 18 per cent for France, 11 to 14 for 
Germany, some 25 for Italy, 24 to 26 for Spain to bring together reports for years between 1985 and 1992 
(Ganne and Minon 1992).‘ in Anthony Pym and Grzegorz Chrupala, ―The Quantitative Analysis of 
Translation Flows in the Age of an International Language,‖ in Less Translated Languages, ed. Anderson 
Branchadell and Lovell Margaret West (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 
2004). p. 27.  Hephzibah Anderson, ―Why Won‘t English Speakers Read Books in Translation?,‖ 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/culture/story/20140909-why-so-few-books-in-translation. 
89 Luisa Passerini, Autobiography of a Generation, Italy 1968. (Hanover, New England: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1996). Luisa Passerini, Autoritratto Di Gruppo. (Milano: Giunti Editori S.p.A., 1988), p. 206 
90 Passerini, Autobiography of a Generation, Italy 1968. 
91 Diotima, La Sapienza Di Partire Da Sé. (Napoli: Liguori Editore, 1996). 
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addition, mine is in a way, overall, a Cavarerian method. Adriana Cavarero 
says that we are all unique beings, and in this thesis by starting from myself I 
have put my embodied ‗uniqueness‘ to the forefront as a starting point in a 
feminist methodological move.92 Cavarero is an important interlocutor in this 
thesis, as will become apparent especially in Chapters One, Two and Three. 
She is a prominent Italian feminist political philosopher, widely recognised for 
her work on Plato, feminist theory and philosopher Hannah Arendt. She is a 
classicist who accesses ancient Greek texts in the original language to analyse 
and criticise them from a feminist standpoint.  
Cavarero‘s work on relationality and her reading of Hannah Arendt‘s 
idea of plurality in its own right93 influences my understanding and approach 
regarding subjectivity and relationality. In her work spanning several decades, 
she takes Arendt‘s concern with restoring plurality to the political and turns it 
into ‗an ontology of plural uniqueness‘ constitutive of each existent. For her, 
there is no universal subject. Instead, Cavarero proposes an open, more 
altruistic subject—one inclined towards the other. She reminds us how, from 
the very start, in having been born into a condition of relational dependence 
on others, typically the mother, humans are primarily relational. For Cavarero, 
it is from this primarily materialist, anti-metaphysical, relational ontology that 
politics should inscribe itself. For instance, when she states: ‗I intend, in fact, 
                                                     
92 Cavarero is greatly inspired by Hannah Arendt‘s work and she has reworked some of her themes, including 
the idea of uniqueness, from a feminist lens. I will discuss this more in Chapters 1, 2 and 3.  
93 ‗Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men without intermediary of things or matter, 
corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.’93       
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, First edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). p.7 
[Emphasis mine].  
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this relationality in material, contextual, local, and current terms. Each of us is 
practically in relation to those with whom—here and now, in a specific 
physical space and in a specific definite time—one is exposed.‘94 Relationality 
between mothers for me means a specific, unique mother who relates to 
another specific unique mother with a voice, a face, a body: 
A woman who is here, in flesh and blood, with a face, a name, a story, 
a voice, whose uniqueness is exposed and shared by others, in the 
vulnerable context of human, material and transient life.95  
This concrete relationship which Cavarero talks about and my own 
understanding of relationality are both rooted in Cavarero‘s reading of 
Hannah Arendt‘s work; this includes Arendt‘s idea of plurality as stated 
above. On relationality, my specific question is: what would maternal 
subjectivity be like if motherhood was lived in a more collective mode?  
As I have said, research shows that many women become isolated after 
they have a child, and several classical psychoanalysts, as I discuss in Chapter 
Three, have viewed the mother as an isolated figure, considered, on the 
whole, mainly through an individualistic lens. It is into this discourse that I 
wish to insert my idea of collective mothering. Baraitser argues that: 
In some senses it is barely possible to conceive of maternal subjectivity 
outside of interruption. The daily breaches in maternal thinking, 
maternal activity and maternal repose conducted by the infant, toddler 
                                                     
94 Elisabetta Bertolino and Adriana Cavarero, ‗Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference: An Interview with 
Italian Feminist Philosopher Adriana Cavarero.‘ Differences, 19, no 1 (2008): p. 162.  
95 Ibid., p. 133. 
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and young child add up to an onslaught on a mother‘s mental, 
emotional and social functioning that can be experienced with a 
nightmarish intensity.96  
I contend that this experience of motherhood is mainly of mothers mothering 
often in isolation with little support. Therefore, in my interest in relationality I 
try to re-think mothers‘ subjectivities in a more collective way in which 
mothers are more supported, helped by others, and are able to ask for help. 
My question emerges in conversation with Baraitser‘s important and 
influential conception of maternal subjectivity. I ask, how might the mother 
experience her subjectivity differently from the experiences Baraitser 
describes if the maternal were thought collectively? 
I think collective mothering is an important paradigm to think through. 
As some black maternal scholars97 have stated; for centuries Black mothers 
have often mothered collectively and their subjectivity is/was shaped in this 
collective, relational mode more than in the autonomous and individualistic 
mode of liberal classical philosophy as U.S. black feminist scholar Patricia Hill 
Collins suggests in relation to the experiences of black mothers in the US.98 
Hill Collins‘s work refers importantly to possible differences in relationships 
to the collective mothering paradigm that might be shaped by factors like 
race, class and geographic location. She highlighted the practice of ‗other 
                                                     
96 Lisa Baraitser, Maternal Encounters. The Ethics of Interruption (Routledge, 2008). p. 67.  
97 Patricia Hill Collins, ―Shifting the Center: Race, Class and Feminist Theorising about Motherhood,‖ in 
Mothering: Ideology, Experience and Agency, ed. Evelyn Glen Nakano, Grace Chang, and Linda Forcey Rennie 
(New York and London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 45–66. 
98 Patricia Hill Collins, ―The Meaning of Motherhood in Black Culture and Black Mother/Daughter 
Relationships,‖ A Scholarly Journal on Black Woman, 1987. Collins Hill, ―Shifting the Center: Race, Class and 
Feminist Theorising about Motherhood.‖ 
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mothering‘ to describe care system in which black women provide care for 
children in the community. I understand that motherhood has different 
connotations in different cultures, so in some cultures, historically and in the 
present day too, biological mothers were important but less important than in 
what is called ‗the West‘; their function was supplemented by other mothers, 
other women, aunts, uncles, grandparents and friends in the community who 
became co-mothers to the mother who gave birth.  
There are many different traditions of collective mothering I could 
have drawn from and for this project I have chosen to engage with the 
literature that comes primarily from the Italian context because as I have 
previously mentioned, I am writing from my particular situated position in the 
Italian feminist tradition. In this thesis I have not engaged in a sustained way 
with the literature on Black motherhood/mothering described in the 
paragraph above but that, as I said it earlier, it may have offered something 
different to the thesis. For me it is embodied knowledge and I am writing 
about this tradition because the commoning of care was less theorised by 
Italian feminists. Hence, as for me this was a lived, concrete, practical 
experience of being the subject of collective care while growing up I wanted 
to understand it better and process the experience and the relevance of this to 
inform other collective practices which have been already explored. The 
collective care experience of the Italian context from a feminist perspective 
had not been explored yet in the English language. In a future project, I may 
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want to expand by engaging in other collective mothering traditions and 
literatures, but the scope of this particular project I am grappling with is 
formative literature from a particular tradition that relates to my own 
experience.  
I acknowledge that the psychoanalytic maternal studies literature has 
been given in some ways the status of a kind of universal theory and that I 
had a blind spot in relation to this literature. I have chosen multidisciplinary 
and interdisciplinary approaches to read and discuss the maternal in this thesis 
as it is a complex and multi-layered life experience which requires, I believe, a 
wide spectrum or ‗vision‘. Probably it was not wide enough as it did not 
include the collective maternal experiences of other traditions too. For me, a 
philosophical and metaphorical understanding of motherhood is interesting, 
but it does not enable us to understand all the complexities of the experience 
of mothers and carers. This is the reason why I use philosophical, 
sociological, legal, psychoanalytic and psychological lenses to read the 
maternal because for me ‗what‘s at stake is not a metaphor of the maternal, 
but rather the real mother as a figure of metonymic symbolisation.‘99  
 Reading the maternal with a wider perspective is advantageous for some 
of the reasons that British feminist psychologist Wendy Hollway articulates. 
Hollway is not convinced by ‗exclusively sociological accounts of mothering 
                                                     
99 Metonymy has the effect of creating vivid and concrete images instead of generalities. Cesare Casarino and 
Andrea Righi, eds., Another Mother. Diotima and the Symbolic Order of Italian Feminism. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2018). p. 50.  
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be they structural or discursive,‘ 100 nor by post-structuralist accounts of 
subjectivity in which it seems, that ‗the power is all one-way; as if subjects are 
malleable material into which childcare manuals, expert knowledge and 
government policies can be applied to shape our subjectivity.‘101 She follows 
on by saying that ‗policies, advice and knowledge only effect change in so far 
as they are pulling in a direction made possible not only by people‘s 
circumstances, but by their desires, identities, commitments, and anxieties.‘102  
chapter outline   
To summarise my earlier points, this thesis is an attempt to think motherhood 
in a collective, relational way and to think how and if a relational model of 
motherhood can be transformative for a mother‘s sense of self, her 
subjectivity. I suggest that a model of relational motherhood, where care is 
seen as collectivised and motherhood de-individualised, grounded in 1970s 
and 1980s Italian and French sexual difference feminism, instead of a model 
of caregiving based on a liberal and individualistic view of the subject, offers 
us an alternative way to talk about maternal subjectivity and community and 
suggests where there could be the possibility to challenge and ward off the 
isolation many new mothers and carers experience. In other words, what 
captures and holds my interest in mothers‘ relationality is the possibility that it 
can be a ‗feminist challenge to the androcentrism of the public sphere and the 
                                                     
100 Wendy Hollway, ―From Motherhood to Maternal Subjectivity,‖ International Journal of Critical Psychology 2 
(2001): 13–38, p. 6.  
101 Ibid. p. 6.  
102 Ibid. p. 6.  
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constitution of alternative spaces of freedom.‘103 Hence, I am interested in 
looking at those ‗alternative spaces of freedom‘ created by mothers. Overall, 
in a feminist move, this thesis is an attempt to bring back the maternal, the 
material and the concrete to theory.  The thesis makes use of a diverse range 
of materials and approaches to make its arguments. It is structured thus: in 
Chapter 1 titled ‗a feminist critique of equality, individualism and 
universalims‘ I set out to challenge the liberal idea of equality, individualism, 
universalism and the abstract subject of law. I demonstrate the limitations of 
liberal equality and non-relational, individualistic, liberal feminism in this area. 
I make an argument for these processes as particularly important for 
understanding the law‘s failure in terms of mothers and motherhood. The 
main question I set out to investigate in this chapter and Chapter 2 is this: is a 
relational model of motherhood important for rethinking women‘s political 
and legal subjectivity? I offer a critical account of legal equality and the 
abstract subject of law from a feminist perspective, illustrating how some 
feminist legal philosophers (Lia Cigarini, Marie Ashe, Martha Fineman and 
Carol Smart) have imagined a different kind of human, more dependent, 
relational and concrete. I finally make a claim for the alliance between Irigaray 
and Italian sexual difference feminism to provide a uniquely enlightening 
rethinking of that claim and how they can help us move towards a relational 
model of motherhood.  
                                                     
103 Linda M. G. Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005), ix. 
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Chapter 2 titled ‗legal imaginations. women challenge the law‘ details the 
approach towards the law and equality of The Milan Women‘s Bookstore 
Collective. I show how the neutral language of classical philosophy is 
detrimental when used in legal cases. I do so by looking at a series of events 
that were organised in the 1980s by the Milan Bookstore Women‘s Collective 
where some feminist philosophers looked at the problem of the use of the 
neuter and the universal in language. I then consider Cavarero‘s approach to 
the law and its relationship with women, mothers, and the maternal. I 
specifically look at legal cases and show how the law is often not favourable 
to women in relation to reproduction and autonomy. The two cases I take 
into consideration are Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd104 and Attorney General v X 
[1992] 1 IR 1.105  
 Then the main question I set out to investigate in Chapter 3 is this: does a 
relational model of motherhood/care disrupt the individualistic idea of the 
subject? This chapter titled ‗conceptualising mothers‘ relationality and the 
political in women‘s relations‘, is where I conceptualise relationality and the 
political in women‘s relations. I expound my idea of thinking motherhood in a 
relational way, one which is rooted in political resistance resting on 
relationality, as developed by Cavarero and her work on relationality based on 
concrete, embodied, plural encounters. I briefly look at how Freud, Bowlby 
and Winnicott considered the mother a solitary figure only devoted to her 
                                                     
104 Natalie Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd (2004). 
105 Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1 (n.d.). 
introduction| 74 
child. I show how, instead, mothers can become figures of resistance and 
freedom by imagining a different way of being mothers that is more collective 
and less individualised. These first three chapters set out the theoretical 
foundations for the rest of the thesis (Chapters 4 and 5). 
In Chapter 4 titled ‗rome 1970s: the politics and praxis of Il collettivo 
madri‘ I focus on a case study centring on collectivity, relationality and 
feminist politics in a group of Italian feminist mothers. It delves into Il 
Colletivo Madri, a mothers‘ collective based in Rome in the 1970s. I discuss 
how the project came about through their desire to form a collective which 
would be a base for practical support and elaboration of their experience of 
motherhood. In addition, I look at a previous collective of some of the same 
mothers when they formed a group to support birthing mothers. I give an 
account of some of the achievements of the mothers‘ collective. I detail the 
work of the Research Centre on Motherhood and Women’s Condition (Il Taccuino 
D’Oro) that they founded few years later. In concluding this chapter, I think 
about the importance of this group to show in practice how mothering can be 
lived in a more collective and communal manner and be a site of resistance.  
Chapter 5 titled ‗relational maternal subjectivity‘ is the chapter in which I 
put into practice some of my ideas of relational motherhood, as discussed in 
the previous four chapters. I explore postnatal depression in more depth, 
focusing on one of its causes, which is isolation and individualised care. There 
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I argue that maternal subjectivity can be transformed by a solid critique of 
individualism and that it can be reconceptualised via the feminist practice and 
theory of relationality that I expounded in the previous chapters. I then delve 
into the art practice, inspired by the main themes of my thesis, which I have 
devised in collaboration with Berlin-based artist Alex Martinis Roe to 
represent relationality between mothers and carers through the use of a 
colourful thread. In 2016 we created a proposition called ‗Ritual for the 
support of mothers‘, in which mothers/carers pass each other a thread asking 
for support from another person. The result of this workshop is that a visual, 
concrete web made of a thread is created. Subsequently I outline how 
London-based artist Rose Gibbs and I run this workshop at The Women‘s 
Art Library at Goldsmiths with a group of mothers and carers. This chapter 
serves to show how relationality can be represented in practice. This exercise 
helps to disengage it from a purely abstract concept to make it concrete and 
visible but symbolic at the same time. 
In conclusion I link the threads of each chapter and argue for the 
destabilising of individualism, for the re-thinking of subjectivity and for a 
stronger relational maternal/care experience to make up webs of relationships 
between mothers and carers to ward off isolation and make it a less isolated 
experience. Overall my aim is a move to politicise and collective care, the 

































a feminist critique of equality, individualism and universalism| 77 
 
1 




In this chapter I explore how mothers have been affected by an idea of 
equality that perpetuates the Man as the representative of humanity, and  I 
critique both liberalism and liberal feminism for having often failed to take 
into consideration the specificities of what the work of reproduction entails. 
The central question I set out to explore in this chapter is this: is a relational 
model of motherhood important for rethinking women‘s political and legal 
subjectivity? I carry on exploring this question in Chapter Two too. To do this 
I make the following points. Firstly, I offer a critical account of liberal 
equality, liberal feminism, and the abstract subject of law from a feminist 
perspective. Secondly I make a claim that Irigaray‘s thinking is helpful to 
reframe the meaning of equality from a feminist perspective. Thirdly I make a 
claim for the alliance between Irigaray and Italian feminism to provide a 
unique rethinking of equality, universality and the problem with neutral 
language. Fourthly I criticise the limitations of equality or non-relational 
feminism in this area and I show how the liberal, individualistic and 
universalistic logic of the law exclude mothers from its world view. All in all 
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the main claim in this chapter is that these processes of criticising liberalism 
from a feminist perspective are particularly important for understanding the 
law‘s failure in terms of mothers and motherhood.  
 I have chosen to look at a particular point in history – the mid-1980s – 
when Irigaray met Italian feminists in Naples. On that occasion Irigaray 
presented her critique of equality and law to Italian feminists. The 
presentation is important because this dialogue between feminists related 
specifically to law and included a critique of equality. Her way of engaging 
with other women challenged the phallocentrism of traditional institutional 
politics and created concrete ‗alternative spaces of freedom.‘106 I focus 
specifically on this event to bring to light Irigaray‘s thought on the law and 
how she and other feminists consider equality as a flawed notion.  
The central problem of this chapter is similar to what feminist legal 
scholars Ngaire Naffine and Margaret Davis discuss when they say that 
pregnant women fall outside the legal category of personhood: ‗The standard 
model of the person remains firmly the non-pregnant and indeed impregnable 
person, the self-proprietor who possesses clear territorial boundaries and 
pregnant women remain legal curiosities who must somehow be made to fit 
the model.‘107 That is the reason I am unpacking the liberal ideas of equality, 
individualism and universalism. Because while discussing maternal 
                                                     
106 Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom. p. ix.  
107 Ngaire Davies, Margaret, and Naffine, Are Persons Property? Legal Debates about Property and Personality 
(London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2001). p. 155.  
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subjectivity, we are necessarily faced with ideas of personhood and identity 
that escape the normative liberal idea of what a human being stands for: 
individualistic, self-sufficient and autonomous. This view of the human does 
not fit most human beings.  Feminists have said they do not fit women, and I, 
like others, argue that they do not fit what the maternal experience is for most 
women or carers in general. Joan Raphael-Leff argues:  
Addressing ‗The‘ Mother universalises the particular, neglecting each 
mother‘s unique attributes and personal psycho-histories, including the 
specific circumstances of this particular conception; her own current 
internal representations of mothers and mothering, the number of 
other children in her household, and the age gaps between them, the 
degree of practical and emotional support available to her, as well as 
the surrounding matrices of socio- cultural expectations, economic 
resources and restrictions, provisions of maternity care, grants and 
leave, and normative considerations of age, sex, education, peers, class, 
race, ethnicity and so on.108  
 
This concept of the particularity and difference of each mother‘s experience 
will accompany my project. Following this significant point, I declare an 
uneasiness with the term ―equality‖ as expounded by liberalism because the 
liberal meaning of the subject incorporates and assimilates all differences in it, 
women included, and for the purpose of this thesis, I believe the ‗specificities‘ 
of mothers are important. That is why it is important to critique the abstract 
                                                     
108 Joan Raphael-Leff, ―Healthy Maternal Ambivalence,‖ Studies in the Maternal 2, no. 1 (2010): 1–15. p. 3.  
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liberal legal subject and its individualistic109 pose, in which mothers fit 
uncomfortably.  
liberal feminism  
The political philosophy of liberalism originates from the Enlightenment110 
period as a response to the birth of nation states. Ideas of liberalism are broad 
but probably the two most unifying aspects are that the individual is 
paramount – as against the collective – and that the individual has the right to 
inalienable freedom. John Locke is named as the founder of liberal 
philosophy with his belief that each man has a natural right to private 
property, life, and liberty. Behind most of the ideas of liberal philosophy is the 
concept of the human as essentially individualistic. The idea of individualism, 
of the autonomous subject who is sufficient to herself and himself originated 
with Thomas Hobbes in the 17th century. He was the first modern theorist to 
formulate the idea of a social contract between citizens (or ‗subjects‘) and the 
State. Hobbes argued that subjects need to obey a sovereign, or an absolute 
State, or otherwise chaos, the state of nature, will reign. Locke developed 
Hobbes‘ ideas further.111 One of the main, more recent, exponents of 
liberalism is John Rawls. His idea of justice demands maximum freedom, 
                                                     
109 ‗individualism in reality functions as the immunitary ideologemme through which modern sovereignty 
implements the protection of life. We should not lose sight of any intermediate passage in this dialectic.‘ 
Roberto Esposito, Bíos : Biopolitics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). p. 61. See 
as well Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995). See in particular Chapters 2 and 3.  
110 Steven Wall, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). p. 
4.  
111 Of course there are many other historical theorists (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill and Kant) 
who developed the liberal ideas that would form the basis for more recent legal theorists like John Rawls, 
Ronald Dworkin, Francis Fukuyama and Richard Rorty, Robert Nozick, Fuller among others. 
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equality and ―fair equality of opportunity‖ for all citizens.112 A social 
contractarian theorist of justice, Rawls argues that to identify a fair idea of 
justice we need to rid ourselves of our specificity, for instance gender, race, 
class, education, and religion.  
The ideology of liberal equality stems from liberal philosophy. 
Liberalism has been criticised by critical legal scholars and by feminist legal 
scholars and philosophers. Critical legal scholar Costas Douzinas argues that 
‗liberal philosophy, in its attempt to glorify the individual, denies our 
dependence on the world and, with arrogant self-certainty, artificially erases 
the traces of otherness and imagines self as identical with itself.‘113 Liberal 
democracies are founded on an individualistic ontology which still considers 
individual rights as the paramount of democracy, as opposed to other 
societies and cultures in other parts of the world where collective rights are 
important too.114 The important factor to pay attention to when looking at 
liberal equality and its narrow legal definitions is the marginal presence of a 
discourse on differences.  
Feminist political theorist Carole Pateman115 has criticised liberalism as 
based on the idea of a free chosen social contract between individuals and the 
State. When the social contract was theorised, what was left aside was the 
                                                     
112 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).  
113 Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights : Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2000). p. 270-271.  
114 N. David Gellner, ―From Group Rights to Individual Rights and Back: Nepalese Struggles over Culture 
and Equality,‖ in Cultures and Rights: Anthropological Perspectives, ed. Jane K. Cowan, Marie-Benedicte Dembour, 
and Richard A. Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
115 Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988). 
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sexual contract. Pateman argues that women have historically not been able to 
decide freely to which social contract to submit to, if any. The social contract 
should have been called the social-sexual contract and it is from here that 
patriarchy has kept exercising power over women. She argues this does not 
mean women accept their powerless position, they have always resisted, 
dissented from that position at different levels and creatively. Nevertheless, it 
is important to analyse the premise of the social contract, which is behind 
liberalism, and what it meant for women to accept it or partially accept it even 
if it did not speak of and for them.  
Many early proponents of women‘s rights wrote in the liberal tradition. 
They were: Mary Wollstonecraft and Olympe de Gouges in eighteenth 
century, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor in the nineteenth century and 
Betty Friedan in the twentieth century. In the UK, liberal feminism stems in 
conjunction with the birth of liberalism during the Enlightenment period 
when new and more progressive ideas of human beings and society took hold 
in writers, intellectuals and artists, philosophers and some politicians.116 Liberal 
feminists are committed not just to liberalism but to making liberalism fulfil 
its potential in relation to gender. They often believe that laws are 
advantageous for women, and if they struggled to achieve legal recognition 
and rights any ensuing disadvantage would end. Furthermore, they often do 
not question the main premise of liberalism which is based on the idea of the 
                                                     
116 Karen O‘Brien, ―Introduction: The Progress of Society,‖ in Women and Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century 
Britain (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 1–34. 
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autonomous, self-sufficient, rational and individualistic subject. Therefore, 
they do not struggle for structural change in society and patriarchal culture. 
Their main interest is in women acquiring the same rights as men without 
questioning the premise on which these rights are gained.  
We can say that both liberal feminists and radical feminists of the 
Irigarayian tradition valued the idea of women belonging to themselves, as 
Lucy Van Pelt reminds us and as framed in a more elaborate manner by 
Braidotti as the ‗revaluation of the bodily roots of subjectivity.‘117 Nevertheless 
they had, I argue, a different understanding of what it meant to belong to 
oneself. The main difference is that liberal feminists did not particularly 
question the idea of laws coming from the State in a top down manner, from 
the State to women. On the other hand, radical feminists did question this. As 
Italian feminist philosopher Angela Putino argued in relation to laws: ‗After 
all, we never really took seriously these laws and their claim to be the only 
ones. We never really believed – and here, to believe means to think that one‘s 
freedom is in step with the laws.‘118 Those women argued that unless there is a 
change in the subjective experience of women through the political sphere of 
feminist activism, laws do not give women a way to belonging to oneself, to 
become self-determined. Like Putino, feminist socio-legal scholar Carol Smart 
elucidates how women can relate to law in an alternative way or abandon it 
altogether: 
                                                     
117 Braidotti, ―Becoming Woman: Or Sexual Difference Rivisited.‖ 
118 Angela Putino, ―Jumping.,‖ in The Lonely Mirror: Italian Perspectives on Feminist Theory., ed. Sandra Kemp and 
Paola Bono (London and New York: Routledge, 1993). 227. 
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Feminist legal scholarship is no longer assuming the stance of a 
supplicant requesting that the orthodoxy hears the case for women‘s 
rights or extends the benefits of objectivity and neutrality to the 
female legal subject. Rather, feminist work has shown that the 
foundations on which jurisprudence rests are deeply imbued with a 
masculine perspective and privilege. Moreover it has become clear 
that what is required is either a radical transformation or an 
abandonment of jurisprudence altogether.119 
 
It is this radical transformation or an abandonment of the law altogether 
that I am interested in this thesis, as I will further explore in Chapter 2 on 
women and the law.  
In the next section I will look at the importance of challenging the 
individualistic approach to law to see how law is ingrained with a universal 
and abstract idea of the subject that does not take into account difference: 
and, I argue, mothers‘ singularities. To begin to understand these limitations, 
we will first look at some feminist philosophers and feminist legal scholars 
who have criticised liberal equality and universalism. 
critical accounts of equality, individualism and universalism  
The main question I explore in this section is how does motherhood and 
pregnancy disrupt and challenge legal discourse and its notions of personhood 
and the self? The history of law is a history of individualistic, self-determining 
and atomistic beings rather than one that offers a different kind of belonging 
to the self and the other, which is the one I am interested in here.120 
                                                     
119 Carol Smart, ―Feminist Jurisprudence,‖ in Dangerous Supplements. Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence, ed. 
Peter Fitzpatrick (London: Pluto Press, 1991). p. 133. 
120 To read other examples of alternative feminist readings of law, see Erika Hunter, Rosemary, McGlynn, 
Clare and Rackley, ed., Feminist Judgments. From Theory to Practice. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010).; Maria 
Drakopoulou, ed., Feminist Encounters with Legal Philosophy. (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2013). For 
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Historically, patriarchal culture subjected women and mothers to a condition 
that negated or reduced their power to expand, or rather, their power to form their 
identity and subjectivity freely. This can be associated with the fact that 
women bear children and their reproductive function has placed them in a 
position in which others speak for them.  In other words, the ‗reproductive‘ 
body of women stands for and symbolises what society is afraid of, wants to 
control and legislate on, it is a catalyst, using Esposito‘s phrase, for the overall 
meaning of the ‗protection of life.‘121  
Therefore, we need to try to evaluate the importance of mothers 
becoming aware of themselves subjectively, of starting to ‗belong to 
themselves‘, as Lucy van Pelt claims, to follow one‘s destiny and desires. We 
could see this idea of belonging to oneself as an example of possessive 
individualism, therefore it is important here to ask ourselves: how might I 
distinguish a relational model of subjectivity from the possessive 
individualistic model? In relation to carers and mothers, an alternative model 
of subjectivity is needed. This alternative, relational model of subjectivity will 
be the theme of Chapters 3 and 5.  
So, for the themes of this chapter, how should the language of law be 
altered to accommodate differences and, in the case of this thesis, mothers‘ 
                                                                                                                                                           
the purpose of this thesis see in particular Maria Drakopoulou, ―Introduction: Reading Law Reading 
Women,‖ in Feminist Encounters with Legal Philosophy, ed. Maria Drakopoulou (Abingdon and New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 1–8.; Alison Stone, ―Hegel on Law, Women and Contract.,‖ in Feminist Encounters with Legal 
Philosophy, ed. Maria Drakopoulou (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2013), 104–22. and Patrick Hanafin, 
―A Voice beyond the Law: Reading Cavarero Reading Plato,‖ in Feminist Encounters with Legal Philosophy., ed. 
Maria Drakopoulou (Routledge, 2013), 9–19.  
121 Roberto Esposito, Immunitas. The Protection and Negation of Life. (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press, 
2011). 
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different, specific (reproductive, childcare) needs? Individualism, I argue, is a 
problematic concept for mothers, as once they have a child, in ‗ideal 
conditions‘ they need to be able to think about themselves and about another 
human being. The liberal feminists that I critique, following Irigaray‘s 
perspective, are those who believe that rights and equality are the most 
fundamental factors necessary to change society and make women equal to 
men. Liberal equality is the foundational ideology behind today‘s democracies, 
yet sexual difference feminists argue that within liberal equality women 
disappear and they become assimilated to the male paradigm. This often 
happens with the use of the neuter/neutral term Man which supposedly 
includes women. Man meaning ―humankind‖ in reality expels women from its 
term and world view, as Wendy Brown states:  
 
If the attributes and activities of citizenship and personhood within 
liberalism produce, require, and at the same time, disavow their 
feminized opposites, then the liberal subject emerges as pervasively 
masculinist not only in its founding exclusions and stratification but in 
its contemporary discursive life.122  
   
Feminists have called this phallo-logocentrism, which is discourse dominated 
by the male subject. Feminist critical legal scholar Maria Drakopoulou argues: 
through the interpretation of established ‗texts‘ of Western intellectual 
traditions feminist scholarship has been able to elucidate their deeper 
meanings, expose their patriarchal and phallocentric nature, and come to 
understand Woman‘s oblique, absent or negated relationship with the 
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symbolic order as an excluded subject of the very language She Herself 
speaks.‘123  
 
This erasure of women from the philosophical discourse, to which 
Drakopoulou‘s alludes, was glorified by various Western classical 
philosophers.124  
How then have the legal texts been re-interpreted by feminist legal 
scholars? One way has been to uncover the neuter used in the language of 
classical legal texts from which women were absent. Legal scholar Marie Ashe 
proposes that we need to account for differences. ‗I believe that the 
fundamental question of difference cannot ultimately be avoided, that it 
demands confrontation. To abandon the project of speaking meaningfully of 
―difference‖ is to abandon the project of speaking meaningfully of 
―women.‖125 As I discuss in chapter 3, I maintain that a relational feminist 
analysis, or relational ontology, can help us in challenging the idea of the 
human contained in the language of liberal equality, that of the abstract, 
autonomous subject of Western classical philosophy.126 This model has been 
                                                     
123 Drakopoulou, ―Introduction: Reading Law Reading Women.‖ 1.  
124 For an account on this theme see Adriana Cavarero, Stately Bodies: Literature, Philosophy and the Question of 
Gender (The University of Michigan Press, 1992). Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance. A Study of Women in 
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125 Marie Ashe, ―Mind‘s Opportunity: Birthing a Poststructuralist Feminist Jurisprudence.,‖ in Legal Studies as 
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126 For an interesting approach to the question of the abstract and classical philosophy‘s view on women see 
Marisa Forcina, Soggette. Corpo, Politica, Filosofia: Percorsi Nella Differenza (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2000).  
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sustained by the ideology of patriarchy127 and it hinders and flattens the 
experiences of women and, I argue, more so of mothers.  
As we have seen there is a tight connection between the law and 
liberalism. Given the overwhelming liberalism of law (and legal scholars), and 
given that mainstream feminism is also liberal, it becomes evident how 
thinking about motherhood demonstrates liberalism‘s inadequacy. Hence a 
liberal feminist reading of the experience of motherhood and the needs of 
mothers is often as limited as that of traditional liberalism. That is why we 
need to substitute it with a relational feminist analysis.  
This is so because motherhood and the maternal constantly make us 
face the utter vulnerability of the human being, hence it challenges and re-
challenges ( if adequately observed and given the attention it requires) the 
abstract idea of the human as autonomous and self-sufficient. As Martha 
Fineman argues, we are ―inevitably dependent‖ at various stages in our lives.128 
The mother can be seen as the epitome of this vulnerability because she can 
become more vulnerable once she has a baby, who is in turn an utterly 
vulnerable human being, as I will show in more detail later on. It is because of 
this vulnerability to which mothers/carers can become more exposed once 
they have a baby that I suggested in the introduction that relationality between 
mothers can be helpful in supporting the work of care.  
                                                     
127 See Libreria delle Donne di Milano, Non Credere Di Avere Dei Diritti: La Generazione Della Liberta’ Femminile 
Nell’idea e Nelle Vicende Di Un Gruppo Di Donne. The Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A 
Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice. 
128 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Authonomy Myth. A Theory of Dependency. (New York: The New Press, 
2005). 
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I maintain that maternal subjectivity and relationality between mothers 
are deeply interlinked, because within an abstract concept of the subject once 
a woman becomes a mother she can realise several things. Firstly, that her 
subjectivity is not universal, that her experience can be very different from 
other mothers and that her experience is very different from a man‘s, from 
which, as we have just pointed out, the idea of the subject was derived. 
Secondly, that her experience of becoming a mother is far from abstract–from 
being pregnant, to giving birth, to breastfeeding, all these bodily experiences 
are grounded in an embodied and embedded experience of herself. Thirdly, 
she comes to realise that she is not autonomous, as the child‘s vulnerability 
and needs put the very idea of an autonomous self into question.129 Not all 
women will experience all the aspects of motherhood that I discussed above, 
nor will they experience them in the same way. Trans-mothers, adoptive 
mothers, surrogate mothers, foster parents and grandparents or carers may 
experience the same or some of the aspects described above. At the same 
time some fathers experience the above aspects of the ‗maternal‘ too.  
I do not want to generalise, assimilate, or presume that the experiences 
of any parent can be captured in a universal reference. Moreover, the idea of 
the universal subject —its abstractness, individualism, and self-sufficient 
autonomy — contribute, I believe, to causing some women to experience 
                                                     
129 ‗Given the western focus on autonomous individuality and the tacit message of impossible bodily 
connectedness and/or psychic fusion, pregnancy and providing sustenance from the juices of her own body 
in utero and breastfeeding, may seem equally strange to a new mother.‘ Raphael-Leff, ―Healthy Maternal 
Ambivalence.‖ p. 5. 
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solitude in their newly changed role as mothers. Postnatal depression, for 
example, can implode a mother‘s sense of selfhood,130  which is challenging 
and disrupting to a ‗mythological‘ idea of the unity of the self.131  
Universalism tends to incorporate the female subject either by forcing it 
towards a male homologation or treating women as the universal minus. As 
Cavarero explains: 
The consequence for woman is that she cannot recognize herself in the 
thought system and the language of a neutral subject which does not 
contain her – and indeed excludes her – without accounting for that 
exclusion. The universal, presuming to hold true for the excluded sex as 
well, erases the logical space of originary differing, and transfers it to a 
lower level of consequent differing. Thus woman is the universal man 
with ‗a plus‘ of feminine gender. We well know how this addition does 
not empower the universal, but rather disempowers it: in fact the ‗plus‘ is 
more coherently a ‗minus‘, that is, the neutral-universal man minus the 
feminine gender which is precisely the real content and the true genesis 
of this universalization. 132 
 
Human beings, men and women, are not general nor all the same. Formal 
equality has, at times and in some contexts, trapped women and mothers 
between gaining the same rights as men and acting as and desiring similar lives 
to men.  
As Federici argues ‗there was a time, in the US at least, when feminists 
were even afraid to fight for maternity leave, convinced that if we asked for 
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(London and New York: Routledge, 1998).  
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‗privileges‘ we would not be justified in demanding equal treatment.‘133 In this 
case we can see how equality can assimilate women to men and a male 
paradigm, even in a major event like giving birth, some feel asking for paid 
time off would be being privileged. Currently women in the USA have one of 
the worst deals in the world once they become mothers.134 In some states, 
women have only twelve weeks‘ maternity leave. This only applies in some 
instances if they work in companies of over fifty employees, otherwise they 
do not have enshrined rights to any maternity leave, and ‗Shockingly, 23 per 
cent of new mothers return to work two weeks after giving birth.‘135  
Some research has highlighted how Black and Latina mothers take even 
less time off than that, as they are often the main breadwinners, and they 
often need to get back to work not long after having a baby. The research 
considers how longer maternity leave has been associated with improved 
maternal mental and physical health.136 Black mothers in the US, and the UK, 
also have disproportionally high rates of mortality in childbirth and in the 
post-partum months and they have higher rates of post birth complications 
than their white peers. There are many factors for this (like structural racism 
in childbirth wards in hospitals and in the post-natal care) but racialised 
                                                     
133 Vishmidt, ―Https://Www.Metamute.Org/Editorial/Articles/Permanent-Reproductive-Crisis-Interview-
Silvia-Federici.‖ 
134 ―The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993‖ (1993). ―Https://Www.Govtrack.Us/Congress/Bills/103/Hr1,‖ n.d. 
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distribution of maternity leave may play a part in this too.137 Women and 
mothers have fallen in this crevice where their identity⁠—their embodiment 
and concreteness⁠—have disappeared within the liberal universal abstraction 
of the legal subject where she is not.  Feminist socio-legal scholar Carol Smart 
writes: 
feminism has gradually and painstakingly created a fundamental 
critique of orthodox jurisprudence which insists that all the taken-for-
granted assumptions about universality, objectivity and neutrality are 
swept aside to make room for a completely new conception of law and 
its underpinnings.‘138  
 
Against abstraction, priority should be given to women‘s, and, I argue, to 
mothers‘, specific experiences. Smart considers the words by legal feminist 
scholar Kathleen Lahey on the dangers of abstraction and the importance of 
feminist theory being grounded in women‘s experiences: 
Lahey does not claim that consciousness-raising is a perfect method 
either; she sees it as a continuing, imperfect struggle. Her main tenet, 
however, is that consciousness-raising produces feminist theory, but 
it is only feminist as long as it remains grounded in women‘s 
experience. Theory that is not so grounded but which derives from 
abstraction, she argues, is dangerous to feminist thinking.‘139  
 
I follow Smart‘s analysis of Lahey‘s thinking here. At the same time I contend 
that as feminist historian Joan Wallach Scott has famously argued  theory 
‗only‘ grounded on ‗experience‘ can be dangerous. Smart and Wallach Scott 
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139 Ibid. p. 143. 
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are of a similar generation and while from different disciplines they are both 
interested in women‘s relationships with the law. Heeding Wallach Scott‘s 
warning, in this thesis I make sure that the experience of motherhood does 
not become ‗itself cumulative and homogenizing, providing the common 
denominator in which class consciousness is built.‘140 Therefore as Wallach 
Scott suggests I will not get rid of the term ‗experience‘ or stop taking 
experiences seriously, but I will: 
work with it, to analyse its operations and to redefine its meaning. This 
entails focusing on processes of identity production, insisting on the 
discursive nature of ―experience‖ and on the politics of its 
construction. Experience is always already an interpretation and 
something that needs to be interpreted. What counts as experience is 
neither self-evident nor straight forward; it is always contested and 
always therefore political141 
 
Smart argues that ‗maybe the response should be one of resistance rather than 
calling for more law – even law based on agreed principles…and if we should 
ask the question why we would still wish to retain such a reliance on law to 
tackle the oppression of women.‘142 Indeed there are many feminists who have 
questioned the validity of the law to liberate women. Drakopoulou argues:  
Here, we could opt for a reading of law in terms of sexual difference, 
and develop ruses and tactics for disturbing the meaning of the legal 
text to reveal its patriarchal ancestry – the sex/gender system upon 
which law is founded. This would open a discursive space which allows 
                                                     
140 Joan W Scott, ―The Evidence of Experience. (Questions of Evidence),‖ Critical Inquiry 17, no. 4 (1991): 
773–98. p. 785.  
141 Ibid. p. 797.  
142 Smart, ―Feminist Jurisprudence.‖ p. 156. 
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for the process of re-considering the feminist engagement in law, its 
objectives and its ethical and political validity.143  
 
This is a feminist approach to law where a more sceptical view of the law is 
imagined and proposed, where the law is not the only valid instrument to gain 
recognition as women. I think this approach is very important and valid. As 
the previous authors have expounded, for me it is important to take real 
women‘s concrete lives, or real-life women144 as Braidotti calls them, as the 
point of departure and to move away from abstract legal concepts.  
Italian feminist writer Silvia Ballestra says of the woman who is attracted 
to the idea of equality that she will have ‗colonised thoughts and mental 
structures, she will think of her subjected situation as natural and she will 
accept it without resistance.‘145 So, the question is when does a subject, a 
woman‘s, relationship with the law form and how can it be changed? I posit 
that it requires a change in subjectivity, a shattering of subjectivity and 
forming of a new one. It is a revolutionary subjective change. Therefore, as I 
have argued from the start of this chapter, equality is a flawed notion and it is 
vital for women and mothers to subvert and modify the language of law, to 
appropriate it, re-use it, and re-interpret it to avoid its abstractness and make 
it significant to oneself. If recognition happens when a person is identified 
with another, can a woman find herself if the other person is a male, white, 
middle class, educated exemplary of the universal legal subject? I think that 
                                                     
143 Maria Drakopoulou, ―The Ethics of Care, Female Subjectiviy and Feminist Legal Scholarship.,‖ Feminist 
Legal Studies, no. 8 (2000): 199–226. 
144 Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects. Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Theory. p. 94, 121.  
145 Silvia Ballestra, Contro Le Donne Nei Secoli Dei Secoli (Milano: Il Saggiatore S.p.A., 2006). p. 81. 
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through relationality between mothers and through a (psychoanalytically 
speaking), ‗homosexual identification‘146 with other women a woman can find 
her similar, and her subjective self can appear in the world. This is important 
in shaping women‘s subjectivity and eventually informing their relationship 
with the law.   
My model of relational motherhood is grounded on interconnections, 
relationships, inter-dependency, vulnerability–in a word, affect, where a mother 
feels, therefore she is. In other words, if we are all made of feelings, not only 
thoughts, the embodied reality and the feelings of a woman who is a mother 
are important. What she feels, therefore plays a part in how her subjectivity is 
informed, formed, shaped, and re-shaped. This is not the model Descartes 
postulated, one where he thinks, therefore he is. In this Cartesian logic of 
human affairs, we see that in the paradigm of a positivistic approach to law 
the rational human being is paramount.  
Hence, as we have seen, the subject is modelled according to the male 
rational Cartesian subject historically by keeping women–and through 
colonialism and imperialism, colonised people–out of the legal and political 
process, thus white European men have increased and consolidated their 
power and control. As we have also seen, the problem with liberal equality is 
the universal paradigm on which it is built. Cavarero maintains that 
universalism does not exist. As a consequence, she argues that if rights and 
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law are given to women by the State, women have not gained them, but they 
have been given to them in a top down movement. This means they can be 
taken away at any time. Similarly, Hanafin argues this top down move to give 
women rights ‗continues to reside within the space of masculine 
permission.‘147 The State grants women some laws specific to them when it 
decides to do so but these rights can be taken away by the State at any time.  
limitations of liberal feminism: a case for women who are mothers  
Liberal feminism applied to the maternal is exemplified in the work of 
feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan. She famously 148 argued that women have 
a different voice when it comes to taking moral and ethical decisions, one that 
is more interested in relationships and assessing where responsibilities lie. 
Consequently, she argued, women see moral problems embedded in context. 
On the other hand, she argued that men make moral and ethical judgements 
in terms of rules and fairness. This argument would then ties in with an idea 
that the experience of motherhood is central to feminist ethics. Gilligan‘s 
argument has been refuted extensively in the last thirty years and I add my 
criticism to the other voices. Her understanding of an ethics of care stands in 
opposition to mine. Hers seems linked to an essentialised view of women as 
intrinsically more caring. I think this view is problematic, and it goes against 
                                                     
147 Patrick Hanafin, Conceiving Life. Reproductive Politics and the Law in Contemporary Italy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2007). p. 88.  
148 Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development., Reissue ed (Cambridge, MA: 
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any understanding and inclusion of ambivalence within the maternal, so 
central to the experience of motherhood.149  
I agree with Cavarero‘s view on the problematic, unquestioned 
association of the ethics of care to women and mothers. She states ‗this does 
not lead me to celebrate an ethics of care. On the contrary, it leads me to 
investigate a negative or even disgusting sense of every ethical discourse that 
engages with the maternal figure and trusts uncritically in its traditional 
goodness.‘ 150 Similarly, Drakopoulou151 is doubtful of the ethics of care 
perspective championed by Gilligan. She says that this perspective has filtered 
into feminist critical legal jurisprudence in trying to make a more caring law, 
but she argues it is not enough to make law more caring without facing the 
question of women‘s subjectivity too. Furthermore she says that adopting a 
view of a feminist jurisprudence influenced by the ideas of Gilligan on the 
ethics of care would produce an approach to law which sides with an 
essentialist view of the innate ‗goodness‘ of women. My view of a more caring 
law rests not on the association with the ‗natural goodness‘ of women but, as 
we will see, on Cavarero‘s idea that a subject inclined towards the other – ‗de-
erectified‘ - is a more caring subject – for everyone – not only for women. 
Therefore, I make use of Cavarero‘s strategic move to use the stereotype of 
                                                     
149 Raphael-Leff, ―Healthy Maternal Ambivalence‖; Parker, Torn in Two. The Experience of Maternal Ambivalence.; 
Parker, Mother Love/Mother Hate. The Power of Maternal Ambivalence. 
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the caring mother to incline the subject and in this logic I attempt the idea of 
inclining the law in which it becomes ‗a more attentive and listening‘ law.  
In addition to the reasons I have described in my introduction for my 
interest in motherhood and the maternal I am interested in these themes 
because ‗motherhood brings feminist theory closest to its own blind spots.‘152 
Matters of reproduction cannot be eliminated when speaking as feminists and 
of feminism. At the same time when speaking of motherhood it is important 
to keep in mind why feminists have rightly rejected the natural association of 
woman with domesticity, motherhood, and the family and to avoid ‗the trap‘ 
of the ethics of care associated with the maternal. I also want to pause, and 
ponder what motherhood is, for the reason Michelle Boulous Walker states 
clearly here ‗women are silenced most effectively by their association with 
maternity.‘153 This happens, according to Boulous Walker, in the way women 
are excluded from the texts of Western philosophy written by men. She 
identifies this exclusion in the work of Plato, Marx, Althusser and Freud in 
particular. She elucidates that ‗the maternal body occupies the site of a radical 
silence in the text of Western philosophy, psychoanalysis and literature. Read 
symptomatically, these texts reveal a masculine imaginary that speaks for the 
maternal.‘154 This silence is symptomatic of Western philosophy‘s view of 
women. If Boulous Walker works at unearthing the silencing of women, it is 
                                                     
152 Lisa Baraitser, ―Communality Across Time: Responding to Encounters with Maternal Encounters: The 
Ethics of Interruption,‖ Studies in Gender and Sexuality 13, no. 2 (2012): 117–22.  
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in a different manner but with the same aim as Cavarero, who states that when 
classical philosophers speak of women, they often use a stereotype, and in a 
strategic manner Cavarero ‗enjoys‘ working on that stereotype.155 She enjoys 
overturning them and giving them a different meaning.  
As Baraitser and Spigal state, ‗there are growing inequalities for women 
who mother, and ongoing complexities of the politics of reproduction.‘156 If 
equality has not yet happened we still need to keep critiquing equality as a 
feminist panacea. After decades of equal opportunities laws and some 
(limited) moves by the State to grant more equality to women in different 
fields, we can see there are still many inequalities. This begs the question, does 
equality really work? What else could make a more fundamental change in 
women‘s lives?  
Wallach Scott offers a poignant critique of liberal equality. The French 
and British models of equality are different. In France when the census is 
done sex, gender and ethnicity are not accounted for. Hence citizens are 
perceived as being all the same, until they are not. On the other hand, in 
Britain the census is done taking differences of sex, gender, and ethnicity into 
account. Wallach Scott argues:  
French universalism insists that sameness is the basis for equality. 
To be sure, sameness is an abstraction, a philosophical notion 
meant to achieve the formal equality of individuals before the law. 
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But historically it has been applied literally: assimilation means the 
eradication of difference. That is why the French census makes no 
record of the religion, ethnicity, or national origin of its population; 
such figures would represent France as fractured and divided, not ⁠— 
as it claims to be ⁠— a united, singular entity. 157 
Arguably gender operates as an ‗exceptional‘ difference in France which the 
State does not recognise but, at the same time, incorporates to neutralise. 
Other types of difference, though, are seemingly incorporated but violently 
rejected as per the case of ethnicity and religious differences, and the veil in 
particular.  This demonstrates how liberal states – at different levels nationally 
– account for the specificities, uniqueness – as Arendt would say – of its 
citizens or not. It is interesting to look at this because even in countries like 
France – where the idea of equality egualité - is very ingrained in the idea of the 
State, matters are not so clear cut. Precisely as Wallach Scott says sameness is 
the basis of equality, but its dangerous counter-discourse is negation of 
differences and an assimilationist paradigm which negates what makes 
humans who they are. Not a mass of people who are all the same158 but unique 
beings with specific personal-cultural-psychological-biographical lives.  If in 
this specificity we then account for the act of being pregnant, giving birth and 
all that entails, we see that if this is a specific physical, psychological and 
phenomenological experience that should not be ‗lost‘ and diffused in  
assimilatory discourses, then all the others should not as well.  
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In the next section I explore how Italian sexual difference feminism, in 
particular the political work done by the Milan Women‘s Bookstore 
Collective159 in its alliance with and inspired by Irigaray‘s thought, has 
contributed to an interesting critique of the universal subject of law. This 
analysis will help us understand why we need to bring sexual difference into 
law. In effect the original title in Italian of their book poignantly reminded 
women ‗non credere di avere dei diritti‘, ‗don‘t think you have any rights‘ or in 
other words, ‗do not delude yourself that you have any rights.‘ Or to put it 
another way, you may have rights, but rights do not automatically give you 
freedom. Freedom is something different. Theirs is a thinking which 
destabilises and shakes the foundations of the abstract subject towards what 
Cavarero calls, following Arendt, a move from the abstract ―what‖ to a 
particular and embodied ―who.‖160  
questions around equality 
The critique of equality that I find most useful comes from Luce Irigaray. 
Irigaray161, in alliance with Italian sexual difference feminist thinking, in 
particular that of Cavarero and the Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective, will 
                                                     
159 Libreria delle Donne di Milano, Non Credere Di Avere Dei Diritti: La Generazione Della Liberta’ Femminile 
Nell’idea e Nelle Vicende Di Un Gruppo Di Donne.; For a book that evaluates the work of the Milan Bookstore 
Collective see Chiara Martucci, Libreria Delle Donne Di Milano. Un Laboratorio Di Pratica Politica. (Milano: 
FrancoAngeli, 2008).  
160 Cavarero, For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression.  
161 The body of work of Luce Irigaray is mainly focused on a critique of equality. In 1970 Carla Lonzi 
published a book titled Carla Lonzi, Sputiamo Su Hegel. (Scritti di Rivolta Femminile, 1970). She wrote: 
‗Women‘s difference is her millennial absence from history. Let us profit from this difference; for once we 
have achieved inclusion in society, who is to say how many more centuries will have to pass before we can 
throw off this new yoke? Equality is what is offered as legal rights to colonized people. And what is imposed 
on them as culture. It is the principle through which those with hegemonic power continue to control those 
without.‘  
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help me develop a critique of the myths surrounding equality. These two 
authors and the Collective‘s thinking help me make my argument for a more 
material feminist practice. In other words, what these authors have 
highlighted is liberal feminism‘s inability to translate relationality into practice 
and to envisage what a relational feminism would look like. Italian sexual 
difference feminism needs to be understood in a specific context. Italian 
feminism emerged in the 1960s and one of its first inspiring voices was art 
critic and feminist activist and writer Carla Lonzi.162  Lonzi was one of the 
founders of Rivolta Femminile and she wrote foundational books like La 
donna clitoridea e la donna vaginale163 [The Clitoral Woman and the Vaginal 
Woman], Sputiamo su Hegel164 [Let‘s Spit on Hegel]. Many writers, activists and 
thinkers started writing, opening feminist publishing houses, and feminist 
bookshops like the Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective, and research 
groups like Diotima in Verona. Feminist writers and philosophers Luisa 
Muraro, Adriana Cavarero, Lea Melandri became important voices among 
others within the feminist movement. Ideas of sexual difference spread 
throughout many Italian cities and towns as the main feminist approach. 
These feminists greatly admired Luce Irigaray and she was an inspiration to all 
of them. In relation to Italian feminism‘s approach to sexual difference 
Cavarero states: 
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In the Italian context, sexual difference was interpreted as a 
question of experience not of identity. Emphasis was placed on 
political, social, and symbolic practices and on the collective 
dimension of women‘s experience, expressing the Italian feminist 
desire to replace traditional political forms with more democratic 
and fully participatory approaches to political and social activism.165 
 
Linda Zerilli makes a similar point about liberalism when considering the 
work done by the Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective and how their 
political interest lay outside the paradigm of equality. She points out: 
The Italians are not deaf to the rhetoric of freedom that has been central 
to the idea of a social contract, but it is not a model of freedom they 
think worth emulating. Apart from its historical formulation as the 
freedom of (some) men, it is a freedom constructed as a fantasy of 
sovereignty. This fantasy, uncritically adopted by many first- and second-
wave feminists, has kept feminism tethered to a certain form of the 
social contract (liberalism), which tends to reduce political freedom to 
negative liberty and the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the 
individual.166  
 
In this project I use their approach to help me formulate relational 
motherhood. Does sexual difference theory help to bring a relational 
feminism into legal thinking? To find that out I consider those thinkers who 
have taken sexual difference seriously, therefore, as I have pointed out in the 
introduction, it is Italian sexual difference feminist thought, including 
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Cavarero‘s, that I will be using throughout, together with that of Luce 
Irigaray.167  
In the next section, I consider Irigaray‘s critique of patriarchy and the 
legal system that is embedded by it. I then focus on the tight relationship 
between Irigaray‘s thought and Italian feminists. In particular, I look at a 
meeting between Irigaray and Italian feminists that happened in the mid-
eighties in Naples.  
italian sexual difference feminism’s debt to irigaray’s thought 
Irigaray started a dialogue with Italian feminists in the early 1970s when she 
began making frequent visits to Italy, which she continued to do through the 
1980s and early 1990s. She attended and spoke at several conferences, 
debates, and political meetings where she had a great impact on Italian sexual 
difference thinking, which then developed independently in Italy, always 
acknowledging the debt to Irigaray‘s thinking. This debt to Irigaray resides 
particularly in relation to her writings in the, in her own words, ‗early‘ and 
‗middle‘ phases.168 Irigaray‘s books were translated into Italian soon after they 
came out in France, unlike in the English-speaking world where they were 
translated and published about ten years after the French publications. In this 
regard Braidotti points out, ‗I think it is important to clarify the extraordinary 
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role played by Luce Irigaray in Italian feminist politics and in Cavarero‘s own 
work […] Irigaray met with instant recognition in Italian culture and especially 
within the women‘s movement.‘169  
 In October 1986, Irigaray was one of the key speakers at a feminist 
conference in Bologna, where she discussed the need for laws and 
jurisprudence that take sexual difference into consideration, to challenge those 
laws that appeared to be neutral but were not, and were often 
disadvantageous for women.170 Whitford has commented of Anglophone 
feminists, ‗it is only quite recently that we have become aware of the link 
between Irigaray and Italian feminism and the remarkable theoretical work 
being produced in Italy.‘171 In this regard she adds that: 
 
Irigaray theorises that it is a condition of the coming-to-be of sexual 
difference that we create a female homosexual economy and a 
maternal genealogy that would provide a counterweight to, and have 
an effect on, the male monosexual economy that we know as 
patriarchy. Women need to learn to love themselves and each other, she argues 
in Ethics of Sexual Difference. But this love must take a public form, and 
not be confined to passional relationships at the individual level. The 
collective accession to symbolization is essential. It is a question of 
embodying sexual difference through the representation of a different 
sex and a different genealogy – in language, culture, symbol, religion, 
social practises, civil and legal status, and so on. It is in Italy that this 
vision has been taken most seriously and where there have been 
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concerted attempts to translate Irigaray‘s ideas into political 
practice.‘172 
 
Italian sexual difference feminists became interested in Irigaray‘s thought for 
various reasons, but mainly for the following five reasons. Firstly, because her 
work was centred on female subjectivity and sexuality it gave them a language 
to speak about themselves, their bodies and their world. Braidotti points out 
that Irigaray‘s focus is in the redefinition of female subjectivity. This is, she 
thinks, her most pressing issue: ‗how to make the feminine express the 
―different difference,‖ a pure difference, released from the hegemonic 
framework of oppositional, binary thinking within which Western philosophy 
had confined it.‘173 It is this dislodging from the hegemonic framework which 
is the most pressing job for white feminists, Black and Latina feminists, and 
LGBT feminists. Secondly, Irigaray‘s work problematized the quest for 
equality between the sexes and Italian feminists were very engaged in this 
theme too. Thirdly, she analysed classical Western philosophy as a site of 
patriarchy which has, for millennia, generated power relationships between 
men and women. This was of interests to Italian feminists as among them 
there were several women who had studied philosophy at secondary school 
level and some at university level or were interested in it and to discover the 
roots of patriarchy in philosophy was very enlightening to them. Fourthly, 
Italian feminists became interested in Irigaray as she is a psychoanalyst and 
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several groups of Italian feminists were interested in psychoanalysis and 
developed a feminist psychoanalytic praxis in the practice of the unconscious.174 
Fifthly, Italian feminists were interested in delving in and account for the 
relationship between mothers and daughters. They realised in the early 1970s 
that they did not want to be like their mothers, who were mostly ‗only‘ 
dedicated to their children, husband, and home. As with Anglophone 
feminists, this created ‗generational conflicts‘ between mothers and daughters. 
Nevertheless, Italian feminists delved deeper and earlier, we can say, than 
Anglophone feminists into the ‗mother issue‘ and thought through, wrote, 
and theorised very seriously and poignantly on this theme from early on, 
creating an interesting and extensive amount of ‗theory on the mother‘, sadly 
most of it not translated into English.175 In relation to mother-daughter 
relationships Irigaray says: 
the oedipal structure as access to the cultural order is already 
structured within a single, masculine line of filiation which does not 
symbolise the woman in relation to her mother. Mother-daughter 
relationships in patriarchal societies are subordinated to relations 
between men.176 
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According to Irigaray, the mother-daughter relationship has been under-
represented in patriarchal societies, making it important that this experience 
be given words and meaning. Irigaray thinks that a woman‘s fidelity towards 
her own thought and her own genealogy is of paramount importance. 
Relationships between women have a primary position in her philosophy. She 
insists that it is vital to found an ‗ethical order among women that will have at 
least two dimensions: a vertical one, the genealogical mother-daughter axis, 
and a horizontal one, the well-known axis of sisterhood.‘177 In this respect 
Italian feminist philosopher Luisa Muraro says, ‗for Irigaray the existence of 
female genealogies constitutes a necessity of ethical nature.‘178 The final aspect 
of Irigaray‘s work that Italian feminists appreciated was her analysis of the 
question of language. Irigaray sees the importance of excavating all the 
instances in which language perpetuates patriarchal ideas through its 
grammatical structure. She argued that the feminine has become the non-
masculine, the abstract non-existent reality-neutral. Irigaray sees the neutral as 
loss of identity, and argues: 
Most women‘s experience tells them, on a cultural level, that they are 
first and foremost asexual and neuter, apart from when they are 
subjected to the norms of the sexual arena in the strict sense and to 
family stereotypes. The difficulties they face in order to enter the 
between-men cultural world lead almost all of them, including those 
who call themselves feminists, to renounce their female identity and 
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1994), 317–34. p. 323. 
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relationship with other women, bringing them to an individual and 
collective impasse when it comes to communication.179 
 
To counteract this impasse, following Irigaray, Braidotti argues: 
 
Feminist solidarity in the sense of the recognition of a relational link, 
a fundamental connection among women, has also brought out most 
strongly the relational mode of feminist thinking. Thinking oneself 
through and with the other, in a positive relationship to the alterity 
of the other as woman, is the starting point for what Luce Irigaray 
defines as an alternative form of philosophy, a radically new image 
of what thinking means.180  
 
I maintain that through Irigaray‘s concept of women‘s relationality and her 
subsequent critique of liberal equality, her thinking helps explain and provide 
an alternative model to the hetero-patriarchal law of Western modernity. In 
the next part I show how Irigaray‘s thought can inform us of a different way 
of thinking the law. We need to understand how Irigaray critiqued equality 
and universalism in law and we need to inject sexual difference thinking to 
counteract equality as it is constructed in law.  
 Irigaray spoke at a feminist conference in Naples in 1986. This speech 
is an example of an attempt to ‗recuperate‘ women from disappearing from 
legal discourses. In the subsequent chapter I will look at how Irigaray 
influenced Cavarero‘s work in particular. Here I will bring to light the 
question of sexual difference and its relation to law, and how it needs to be 
put into legal thinking through Irigaray‘s work. Through the analysis of 
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language Irigaray has uncovered the patriarchal bias which has made language 
an instrument of power. The power inherent in language and its connection 
to law has historically curtailed women‘s abilities to draw their own destinies. 
Irigaray has argued for several decades that ‗we need laws that valorise 
difference. Not all subjects are the same and equal, and it wouldn‘t be right 
for them to be so.‘181 The main question is how do we do that? How do we 
think a law that valorises difference? We can say that law already valorises 
some differences over others, so a better question would be how do we 
contest and politicize which differences are valorised and which ones are not?  
In this respect Irigaray has pointed out how women should re-
appropriate language to be able to use a language that is in line with their 
feminine subjectivity and embodied reality:  
It would be better if women, without ceasing to put sexual difference 
into words, were more able to situate themselves as I, I-she / they (je-
elle[s]), to represent themselves as subjects, and to talk to other women. 
That requires a development in subjectivity and a transformation of the 
rules of language. To date, women have had to remain among themselves 
not only in order for a plural to be feminine–elles s’aiment (they love 
each other), elles sont belles (they are beautiful)–but also for a relationship 
to the subjectively female world to be possible. This linguistic necessity 
lays the basis for certain sorts of liberation movements.182  
 
Irigaray then argues that it is important for women to put in place a linguistic 
transformation which will bring about a subjective transformation resulting in 
an increase in political consciousness. Political transformation is not possible 
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for Irigaray unless the abstract and disembodied language of law is unmasked. 
For this reason, her work focuses on bringing to light the embodied reality of 
men and women. This is an aspect of her thought which Italian sexual 
difference feminists, as we will see further in Chapters 2 and 3, have 
developed extensively, and in a theoretical form the philosophy of Cavarero is 
also centred on this theme.183 
The aim of this section is to consider the significance of sexual 
difference to counteract abstractness and the vacuity of liberal equality. How 
has abstraction undermined and affected mothers? Are women still 
considered the ‗Other‘ to men, as argued by sexual difference feminists? 
Irigaray is an excellent interlocutor to explore this theme with, due to her 
work on the abstract language used in Western classical philosophy and its 
link to the law. Her perspective is vital if we want to engage in an alternative 
way of thinking about the law, one that rejects the abstract, autonomous, 
solipsistic individual in favour of one that instead stresses the concreteness of 
each one of us in our embedded, singular, and embodied existence.184  
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luce irigaray: for a sexuate law 
As I said at the start of the chapter questioning equality has been very 
important in Irigaray‘s work, she poignantly said about women and equality: 
‗equal to whom?‘185 Her work has been innovative in understanding law as a 
problematic paradigm for women. From the late 1960s feminists including 
Irigaray, engaged in a vast project of interpretations of texts. For Irigaray the 
law of the father, or phallocentrism, has prevailed in Western culture and 
infiltrated language, law, and society with a patriarchal discourse where 
women‘s realities, their autonomy, disappeared. In relation to women who are 
mothers Irigaray‘s argument is valid because reproduction is a matter highly 
regulated by the law, so it touches women‘s bodies in a particular way. Once a 
child is born, legislation with regard to the extent of the maternity leave, 
maternity pay and the availability of universal childcare has a huge effect on 
women‘s lives.186 So this is why I think it is useful to keep Irigaray‘s work in 
mind when thinking through mothers and motherhood.  
Before doing that I want to illustrate the particular relevance of 
Irigaray‘s sexual difference thinking and to show how for the purpose of this 
thesis it is even more important to explain the non-coincidence of sexual 
difference with biological determinism. Motherhood and the association with 
the biological and the natural have been seen as equivalent in Western culture 
for thousands of years. Philosopher Alison Stone explains:  
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that Irigaray‘s conception of sexual difference is non-biological is 
important, to recall, because if she were to collapse sexual difference into 
biological sex difference, then she should have slipped into biological 
determinism, overlooking the specificity of both social relations and 
symbolic formations.‘187  
 
According to Stone, who has taken sexual difference seriously and has 
engaged with it, Irigaray‘s thinking on sexual difference should not be quickly 
dismissed: 
Fortunately, on closer inspection, Irigaray‘s mature conception of 
human sexual difference proves different from her belief in the 
determining power of biological sex. She generally distinguishes 
between sexual difference (la difference sexuelle) and biological sex 
difference (la difference des sexes). She draws this distinction because, as 
she repeatedly states, she sees sexual difference as an ontological, not a 
biological phenomenon.188 
 
This is an important point of distinction between sexual difference and sex 
difference that Italian sexual difference feminists of the seventies and eighties 
also made. They too, like Irigaray, saw sexual difference as an ontological, not 
a biological matter. An ontological difference is influenced by an embodied 
sense of self, but it is not determined by it.  
At the conference in Naples, Irigaray189 discussed the genealogy of the 
history of the family as thought by Hegel.190 She said that Hegel assigned ‗the 
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exclusive banality of the maternal role to women‘191 and that this stereotypical 
framing of women‘s ‗natural‘ role as mothers has had long lasting 
consequences for how women are still viewed today in Western cultures. 
Stone points out that in ‗Hegel‘s account of ancient Greece he analyses how 
polis and family clash. He emphasises that the two institutions are sexually 
divided: only men progress out of the family into political life. He attributes 
this division, rather vaguely, to the sexes‘ ‗diverse dispositions and 
capacities.‘192 Consequently Irigaray shows, through her critique of Hegel, how 
these diverse ‗dispositions and capacities‘ were detrimental for mothers: 
Women are indoctrinated to believe that their duty is to preserve life 
for the other, particularly the child, not for themselves. In past times, 
and sometimes even today, the woman has to be sacrificed to the 
child, in childbirth, for example, but more generally in the obligation 
laid upon her to bear children. The choice of child over mother can 
be understood as a mandatory sacrifice to the husband‘s genealogy. 
No rights protect the woman‘s life against violence in the home, 
against unwanted pregnancies. A right that should be guaranteed and 
protected by society and the State is instead a barely tolerated claim, 
sometimes partially heeded but always at the mercy of decisions 
made by specific individuals: this doctor, this judge, this expert will 
consult their consciences, and decide on a woman‘s right, within a 
contest that allows no generalisations. The process has to be started 
from scratch and pursued in isolation by each woman in turn since 
there is no legal recourse that is specific to woman.193  
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We can see how Irigaray here questions what Hanafin calls ‗masculine 
permission‘194, or those rights that are ‗granted‘ to women by a patriarchal 
logic. Showing how we reached this point, Irigaray affirms that once we enter 
a dualist regime (like the one theorised by Western classical philosophy where 
the oppositions are between nature and culture) often the result is the 
sacrifice and exclusion of women. Subsequently, she elucidates, this exclusion 
resembles a repeated immolation. This putting aside (l’écart), or indoors (au 
secret), of women, is an ethical guilt (faute). The hiding and exclusion of women 
is counteracted by a preference, typical of patriarchy, towards war and 
sociality among men.195  
The effect of all this, Irigaray argues, and what is at stake, is to keep 
women outside the social contract, outside government, and separate from each 
other. This separation, Irigaray claims, is the foundational point of Western 
patriarchal culture, which founded and reproduced itself from a negation of 
the maternal, provoking what Irigaray calls a matricide.196 In analysing the 
ancient Greek tragedy of Oresteia, Irigaray states that this myth is at the 
foundation of the institution of the legal system as a patriarchal legal system 
which, with the acquittal of matricide, destined the maternal to be 
undervalued in Western culture.197 Like Irigaray, Cavarero too defines ‗classical 
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Greece‘ [as]‗a golden age for the patriarchal order‘.198 In this context we can 
ask, how then has this ‗golden age‘ informed law? As law has always been a 
male domain, feminists are trying to disrupt it, re-appropriate it and resist it or 
make do without law. Following Irigaray, Fineman and Thomadsen Sweet 
have argued that to deconstruct patriarchal legal texts is a long task but that 
feminist legal theorists have had ‗the grand realisation that law is gendered, 
that law is a manifestation of power, that law is detrimental to women.‘199 
Genealogy between women is very important in Irigaray‘s thinking, even 
though she has given less attention to the specific relationality between 
women who are mothers. Like Irigaray, I am of the opinion that relationality 
between women, and for the purpose of this thesis, relationality between 
mothers, is paramount. Irigaray insists on the importance of relations among 
women since they have been separated from each other concretely and 
symbolically by patriarchal culture. To counteract this ancestral separation of 
women from each other in Éthique de la Différence Sexuelle she writes: 
A symbolism has to be created among women if love among them is 
to take place. Right now in fact, such love is possible only among 
women who are able to talk to each other. Lacking this interval of 
exchange, whether of words or deeds, women‘s passions work on an 
animal and vegetal level, in a rather cruel manner. Why on that 
grounds, does society, does the community, have an interest in 
maintaining women‘s silence? In order to perpetuate all the existing 
norms of the society and the culture which also depend on separating 
women from each other.200  
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As Muraro puts it, ‗I have experienced the power for change of the practice of 
the genealogical relation.‘201 Following Irigaray‘s thought she goes on to say 
that for her the heart of politics remains the genealogical relation, not ‗the 
feminism of rights and equality, but the movement that has led us to choose 
to stay among women, to choose to act in accordance with the judgement of 
our fellow women, to accept the authority of women, and to seek the 
nourishment of female thought for our minds.‘202 Irigaray elucidates that Oedipus‘s 
guilt, a guilt ‗shared‘ by psychoanalysis, is that of forgetting the significance of 
the mother-daughter relationship and of female genealogy203, in their necessity 
for a constitution of a gender which is lively and ethical. Moreover, in her 
discussion of the Oresteia, it is in the legal system‘s acquittal of the murder of 
the mother that the other part of Western civilisation‘s guilt rests.  
Furthermore, Irigaray explains, natural immediacy is almost always 
sexuate, but it remains un-thought. We can explore an example here: the fact 
that many women menstruate, but others, including transgender women, 
some intersex women, and post-menopausal women, do not have periods. 
Menstruation is a sexuate reality (cisgender men do not have periods), but 
menstruation culturally and socially has for millennia been despised, ignored, 
and teased. This we can say, is the meaning of Irigaray‘s statements above, 
again menstruation remains un-thought and in what follows we can see why. 
The problem remains that the immediacy of nature as sexuate falls into the 
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‗natural‘ paradigm of reproduction and is not elaborated as an embodied view 
of the subject made of a body and flesh. This applies to postnatal depression 
too; even if it sometimes occurs in men, it occurs much more frequently in 
pregnant women (antenatal depression) or after birth or in the months and 
years to come. Unless this corporal given is thought through, patriarchy 
becomes the repressive force of gender and, as Irigaray elucidates, it is 
collapsed into the natural immediacy of generation and reproduction.  
Moreover, she discusses how women historically have had to abandon 
their family, their mother,204 their genealogy, their home, and their name 
(when and if they take their husband‘s surname) for the husband‘s family, his 
home, and his name. According to Irigaray and Cavarero205 the Western 
theoretical tradition has retained, since ancient Greece, a patriarchal vision of 
woman and, as mentioned earlier, Irigaray‘s analysis is that the West is built 
on a matricide.206 For Irigaray this also signifies that the child that a woman 
birthed, that grows inside her, that she nourished in her womb and then at her 
breasts will have the name of the father‘s genealogy. Furthermore, the woman 
taken away from her ancestors, particularly from her mother, is transported 
and assigned to the natural immediacy of reproduction which has historically 
been given more value when it results in a son instead of a daughter. Irigaray 
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points out that man will remain always a son and at the same time a citizen. In 
relation to this point, Stone says that Irigaray ‗explains that the fact that men 
wish to deny the importance of corporality stems from their infantile 
difficulties in separating from their mothers. [….] These difficulties lead boys 
to disavow their early intertwinement with their mothers and, at the same 
time, their corporality.‘207  
Irigaray elucidates that ‗the spirit of the people will always be un-thought 
(impensé) in the relationship of the citizens with birth, maternity, their gender, 
their development. The citizens are separated from their corporal roots as to belonging a 
gender.’208 This unresolved situation, Irigaray considers, remains in the domain 
of the un-thought (impensé) and it is not processed through; it is carried 
forward– open and alive – in their relationship with women who are then 
reduced to the maternal and the domestic. In light of this insight, how do we 
rewrite rights? According to Stone, in contrast to Hegel‘s justification of the 
confinement of women in the house, Irigaray ‗proposes to identify the 
mechanism which makes women‘s confinement in domesticity necessary to 
modern society, in a way which will clearly expose its injustice.‘209  
Irigaray relates that this problem – a man reducing women to the 
maternal – is part of an unconscious ‗move‘ he makes because he has not 
thought through and elaborated upon her gender. Therefore, men pretend to 
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be the only citizens with full rights. For centuries, Irigaray says, the spirit of 
the people has been the spirit of men who women have nourished with 
motherhood, cooking, feeding, maternage, the availability of their body and 
their flesh. Woman on her part is made to submit to a destiny imposed by the 
father, by her brothers, by her husband, by the king, by civil laws as they are 
conceived by men and by the State. In this respect philosopher Diane Perpich 
explains that:  
Irigaray‘s worry is not only that women have not been accorded the 
status of subjects in the same sense or to the same degree as men (de 
facto exclusion), but more significantly, that the conditions under which 
(masculine) subjectivity has been produced in Western theoretical 
discourses have demanded the invisibility of the feminine and feminine 
desire (symbolic exclusion).210  
 
Irigaray argues that this is the reason why in a patriarchal culture woman 
needs to remain invisible as Woman in society, consigned to a natural destiny, 
reproducer of bodies. For this same reason woman has spiritualised her body 
as the female side of the link in the couple. She has perpetuated a natural state 
without transforming it and without modifying the spirit of the people or 
departing from her reproductive capacities in the family, the couple, as the 
place and space of procreation of and between the two genders. In classical 
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philosophy the concrete materiality of the individual is often amputated in his 
or her sexuate vision and is already abstracted.211  
Irigaray explains that ‗we need to have laws which include 
representation, presence, sign(s) of the rights of each sex as different from 
each other. We need to write rights as visible representations of concrete, 
alive realities‘. 212 Naomi Schor says that when Irigaray talks about feminine 
specificity her main point is to discredit ‗the possessive fiction of a universal 
subject‘.213 Irigaray identifies that the ethical responsibilities of women, their 
participation in and contribution to the order of the family and therefore of 
the people need to become socially visible in their sexuate singularity. In her 
interpretation of Hegel, she says that in his thought there is no thinking of 
human beings as sexuate beings. This is reflected as well in society and the 
State: 
This is expressed, moreover, as the denied and unsaid in the pretence 
of a universal neutral paradigm. The universal needs to manifest and 
feed the becoming of human beings, as sexuate beings. As the universal 
is unfaithful to this micro and macro cosmic concrete reality, it is a 
duty to think this abstraction.214 
 
This abstraction, Irigaray elucidates, is the loss of the sensitive immediacy, 
from the concrete from which Hegel always wanted to re-depart. The passage 
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of the subjective into the objective and of the objective into the subjective is 
interrupted. Irigaray sees Hegel‘s flight from the concrete in operation in 
today‘s laws. I argue that, Irigaray‘s project since the early 1970s ‗gave‘ women 
‗permission‘ to celebrate their bodies for themselves and for other women 
without the mediation and interference of patriarchal culture. Women‘s 
bodies started to have the possibility to become their own, as Lucy van Pelt 
said, not the ‗object‘ of patriarchal culture. Through Irigaray‘s thinking the 
female body stopped serving specific patriarchal functions: sexual, 
reproductive, and maternal. Irigaray took it upon herself to speak on the 
female body exactly because it was a body that had not been really seen, known, 
or touched by each individual woman, a body that was not an integral part of 
women‘s subjectivity but only external to them so that it served the needs that 
patriarchy had assigned them. Elisabeth Grosz says of Irigaray‘s work: 
Irigaray strategy is to seek out the blind spots, the points of textual 
excess that all texts rely on yet disavow. In her understanding, this 
occurs most commonly where phallocentric discourses pose the 
question of femininity, female sexuality and the maternal function.215 
 
One of the main strengths of Irigaray‘s work is her determination for things 
to be named. In the 1970s she was the first feminist to start naming the 
objects, relations, feelings, fluids, sensations, voices and needs that arose from 
women‘s bodies and lives.216 She argued for the need for women to have a 
                                                     
215 Elisabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions. Three French Feminists. (Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1989). p. 110. 
216 Luce Irigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).  
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distinct socio-symbolic existence away from the language and patriarchal 
culture in which they lived.  
In this respect Braidotti explains that the feminism of sexual difference 
‗argues that women have borne, both materially and symbolically, the costs of 
the masculine privilege for autonomous self-definition: they have been 
psychically and symbolically dispossessed of a place from which to speak.‘217 
In comparing Simone de Beauvoir and Irigaray, Schor says that for the latter, 
women‘s subjectivity means ‗clearly becoming speaking subjects in their own 
rights‘.218 And, she adds, Irigaray believes that to speak ‗woman‘ is, above all, 
‗not to speak ‗universal.‘219 Stone suggests that Irigaray is not opposed to 
equality per se:  
Nevertheless that Irigaray believes a culture of sexual difference to 
be necessary for women to achieve a level of self-realisation 
equivalent to that of men implies that she is less unequivocally 
opposed to equality then her denunciation of it suggests. Her 
criticism of equality feminism for denying women comparable self-
realisation only makes sense if she retains some commitment to 
equality, albeit interpreted in a different sense than in conventional 
egalitarian feminism.220  
 
Instead, Stone explains, ‗rather than rejecting equality altogether, [Irigaray] is 
offering a new interpretation of the respect in which equality is desirable: ‗it 
is…in terms of difference that we should be seeking equivalence and equality of 
rights.‘221 Therefore, if in following Irigaray we are not to abandon the idea of 
                                                     
217 Braidotti, ―On Bugs and Women: Irigaray and Deleuze on the Becoming-Woman.‖, p. 123. 
218 Schor, ―This Essentialism Which Is Not One: Coming to Grips with Irigaray.‖ p. 64. 
219 Ibid. p. 64. 
220 Stone, Luce Irigaray and the Philosophy of Sexual Difference. p. 182. 
221 Ibid. p. 182.  
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equality altogether, we may ask ourselves: what might a sexual difference 
inflected form of equality look like? This will be the theme of Chapter 3.  
In this chapter I attempted to move away from the universal subject 
who inhabits the language and imaginary of liberalism which, I propose, 
denies the specific embodied realities of women and mothers. We have seen 
how Irigaray has worked extensively around these terms and proposed an 
injection of sexual difference into law. I also showed how Italian sexual 
difference feminism thinking has developed political and theoretical concepts 
which are useful for a critique of liberal equality. I began to explore how 
Irigaray, in alliance with Italian feminists, has done important work towards 
de-universalising the abstract subject of philosophy and law. This alliance of 
Italian feminists with Irigaray is explored further in Chapters 2 and 3, where I 
critically engage more specifically with the work of the Milan Women‘s 
Bookstore Collective. Furthermore, this alliance can show us an alternative 
way of looking at law, one that considers the singularity, the embodied and 
embedded experiences of each woman and mother. Following Irigaray, 
Braidotti, and Italian sexual difference feminism I have argued that women‘s 
subjectivity, and in particular mothers‘ subjectivity (because of the risk of 
post-natal depression), benefits from being experienced as relational and 
collective in contrast to the individualistic, autonomous and self-centred pose 
of Western classical philosophy. More so, if experienced as relational, hence 
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through concrete relations, I argue mothers have more possibility to ‗take 
control‘ over their subjectivity. 
In the next chapter I focus specifically on the law.  I consider the UK 
and the Republic of Ireland and examine two legal cases in particular Evans v 
United Kingdom and Attorney General v  X [1992]. I recognise that each 
jurisdiction is different but what is universal is that in all jurisdictions most 
likely than not, the law affects women differently from men. Often this is 
particularly true of law that relates to reproduction, and for women‘s 
relationship to the law as actual or potential mothers. In addition to the legal 
cases, the chapter centres on a series of philosophical debates which took 
place in the late 1980s at The Milan Collective around the themes of 
universality, equality and the problem with the neuter (the neutral in language) 
usage in discourse. This section focuses in particular in the presentation of 
feminist philosopher Wanda Tommasi. I then explore Cavarero‘s insights on 
the law and its origin within the patriarchal language of Greek philosophy and 
how the Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective imagined a different relation 

















In the previous chapter I discussed the problems with liberalism, equality, 
individualism, and the abstract subject of law from a feminist perspective. 
That discussion helps me to carry on looking at the law using a feminist lens. 
The main question of this chapter is: how has the abstract and universalistic 
language of classical philosophy influenced law? These other questions follow 
on from the main one, firstly how and why have feminists criticised this 
abstract language? Secondly, how have feminists proposed a more concrete 
use of language which sees human beings as unique and specific, and why is 
this important for law?  
                                                     
222 This first part of the title for this chapter was inspired by the title of a conference I attended at Perugia 
University (Faculty of Law) in July 2015. ―Visioni Del Giuridico/Legal Imaginations. Rileggendo Pasolini. Il 
Diritto Dopo La Scomparsa Delle Lucciole.,‖ https://www.scipol.unipg.it/home/eventi/in-
collaborazione/410-visioni-del-giuridico-legal-imagination-s, n.d. 
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In the first section I critically examine a series of philosophical debates 
which took place in the late 1980s at the Milan Women‘s Bookstore 
Collective. In so doing, I elucidate how Italian feminist philosophers, 
particularly Wanda Tommasi, addressed the themes of universality, equality, 
and the problem with the neuter usage in philosophical discourse. In the 
second section I explore Cavarero‘s insights on the law and its origin within 
the patriarchal language of Greek philosophy. I further examine how the 
Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective and feminist lawyer Lia Cigarini 
imagined a different relation for women with the law or outside the law. 
Finally, in the third section I analyse two legal cases Evans v United Kingdom and 
Attorney General v x [1992] relating to reproduction in the UK and Ireland.  
The law is gendered and it affects women in different ways. A feminist 
law can be responsive to this gender and sexual difference. This is true for 
areas of law that relate to reproduction and for women‘s relationship to the 
law as actual or potential mothers (abortion, fertility treatments, morning after 
pill, maternity leave and universal childcare or lack of). Women should not be 
defined and framed by their bodies, or by the fact that they have reproductive 
capacities. Nevertheless, as feminist legal scholar Ngaire Naffine223 argues, the 
law has very particular ideas on how women‘s reproduction should be 
regulated, and how their body defines who they are. To negate this fact, to 
negate this difference, law puts women at a disadvantage. This is particularly 
                                                     
223 Ngaire Naffine, ―The Body Bag,‖ in Sexing the Subject of Law, ed. Ngaire Naffine and R. J. Owens (Sydney: 
Law Book Company, 1997), 79–93.  
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the case because the law, as Naffine elaborates, has an inherent problem with 
bodies that are not male and heterosexual. So what is needed to insert 
difference into law? To envisage a law that sees the uniqueness of each of us?  
The women of The Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective challenged 
and confronted the theme of the law too, because they realised early on that 
the law affects women‘s lives and their bodies in the way they are framed, 
judged, and controlled. In the 1970s and 1980s Italian radical feminists were 
suspicious as to whether the law could bring freedom to women, moreover 
they saw the law as an instrument of a patriarchal society, which enables it to 
keep controlling women, not as an instrument that frees them. The Milan 
Bookstore Women‘s Collective was founded in 1975 by a group of women 
including feminist lawyer and legal theorist Lia Cigarini and feminist 
philosopher Luisa Muraro. They co-wrote, with the rest of the women‘s 
collective, the book Non credere di avere dei diritti. La generazione della liberta’ 
femminile nelle idee e nelle vicende di un gruppo di donne. [Don‘t Think You Have Any 
Rights: The Engendering of Female Freedom in the Thought and Vicissitudes 
of a Women‘s Group].224 This book exemplifies what a different law looks 
like, and how relationality between women is often more important than 
equality, as the collective argued. Cigarini became a lawyer in the 1970s and 
soon after she became involved with the Milan Collective, where she realised 
                                                     
224 Libreria delle Donne di Milano, Non Credere Di Avere Dei Diritti: La Generazione Della Liberta’ Femminile 
Nell’idea e Nelle Vicende Di Un Gruppo Di Donne. The book  was translated few years later as The Milan 
Women‘s Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice.  
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the importance of relationships among women. She decided that she had to 
change the way she practised law, as she understood that to be a feminist 
lawyer or a feminist judge adds another layer to legal interpretation. She 
decided that she would only defend women in court, that her time as a 
feminist lawyer was better spent in defending women who had always been 
silenced by the law. In an article titled ‗Lo Stupro Simbolico‘ ‗The Symbolic 
Rape‘ that appeared in 1979 in the Italian left-wing daily newspaper Il 
Manifesto, Cigarini says:  
I think that the law of the codes is the extreme abstraction of the law of 
the father. In those years our practice worked towards women‘s 
autonomy, symbolic and sexual, and we kept our distance from the law 
of the father because it is the one that regulates sexuality and symbolic 
representations of women. I am interested in seeing the relationship 
woman-law in this perspective, and it is in this sense that I say that women 
should not promote laws.‘225  
Cigarini‘s argument was one against engagement with the law of the father. 
Since the symbolic order is still patriarchal, she argues that any engagement 
with the law would probably leave women unsatisfied and would also co-opt 
them into the patriarchal system. This is why Cigarini ultimately argued for a 
suspension of engagement with the law, when possible. In promoting laws as 
a means of progress, women would often be unsatisfied – at least in the 1970s 
                                                     
225 ‗Credo che la legge dei codici costituisca l‘estrema astrazione della legge del padre. La nostra pratica in 
questi anni e‘ andata nel senso dell‘autonomia delle donne, simbolica e sessuale, prendendo le distanze dalla 
legge del padre che e‘ quella che regola la sessualita‘ e la simbolizzazione.‘ Lia Cigarini, Lo Stupro Simbolico. ―il 
manifesto‖,  20 Novembre 1979. This article is included in Cigarini, La Polit. Del Desiderio. p. 85. [my 
translation] 
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and 1980s – as the State and as a consequence its laws - remained the same, 
still rooted in a broad patriarchal system.  
American radical feminist legal scholar Catherine Mackinnon226 had a 
similar approach to law, but I suggest that there is a difference between her 
approach and that of the women of the Milanese Collective. MacKinnon 
fights to change laws or make new laws. By contrast, the Milanese Collective, 
exemplified by Cigarini, put more focus and energy on struggling to change 
society and challenge patriarchy at a societal and cultural level.  They realised 
that acquiring rights for women had a limited scope.  
Unlike liberal feminists, discussed in Chapter 1, the Milanese Collective 
aimed to challenge and change the patriarchal structure of the State, culture, 
and society. Their main aim was not to struggle for a ‗mere‘ acquisition of 
rights. They believed, as did Italian radical feminist Carla Lonzi, that ‗equality 
is what is offered as legal rights to colonised people.‘227 Those feminists saw 
legal equality as a gain and victory that came from the top down not as 
something which is acquired by fundamentally changing the premise of the 
culture that produces that inequality and in turn changing women‘s 
subjectivity.228 The women of the Milanese Collective dared imagine the law 
                                                     
226 Catharine MacKinnon, Women’s Lives, Men’s Laws (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2005). 
227 Lonzi, Sputiamo Su Hegel. In English it‘s Let’s Spit on Hegel.  
228 When I interviewed my mother - in 2007 on her experience in the feminist movement - on the theme of 
the law and rights she stated: ―Rights derive from the State, the law. To have a right means to struggle to 
obtain it. Rights in themselves do not produce transformation. Rights produce a legal evidence of law, sustain 
the dignity of personhood, but in themselves do not operate a transformation in a woman as a thinking 
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differently. They believed that it was the patriarchal structure of society and 
the State that needed to be fundamentally changed. Their effort to think the 
law differently in relation to women‘s lives culminated in their 1987 collective 
book Non Credere di Avere dei Diritti.229  
One of the authors of the above book, Cigarini defined a term and a 
feminist practice called above the law [sopra la legge].230 Cigarini defines the term 
above the law as a space which is important for women; it is ‗the place of 
symbolic existence, the place of ‗authority‘ that I recognise in other women 
that recognise me‘231. Hence she argues, together with the Milanese Collective, 
that relationality between women is more liberating then acquiring formal 
legal rights. Above the law is a symbolic space for women to occupy. It refers to 
the idea that it is important for women to question the law, to create a 
suspension from the law, an anarchist and resistant relationship to the law. It 
is this space above the law that was of interest to radical feminists, and I think it 
remains an important move for women to define and interpret the law in their 
own words, appropriate it, and if necessary, reject it. Above the law is precisely 
where the Milanese Collective wanted to be. Cigarini further argues, ‗I think 
that a political movement asks for the support from the formality of the norm 
                                                                                                                                                           
subject. This can be reached only in the recognition, the relationship, exchange and esteem between women, 
because in giving value to the other we give value to ourselves and vice versa.‘  
229 Libreria delle Donne di Milano, Non Credere Di Avere Dei Diritti: La Generazione Della Liberta’ Femminile 
Nell’idea e Nelle Vicende Di Un Gruppo Di Donne. The book was later translated into English as The Milan 
Women‘s Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice.  
230 Lia Cigarini, ―Sopra La Legge,‖ in La Politica Del Desiderio (Parma: Nuova Pratiche Editrice, 1995). p. 195–
97. 
231 Cigarini, La Polit. Del Desiderio. p. 197, [my translation]. See as well, L’Autorita’ Femminile. Incontro Con Lia 
Cigarini., Gruppo B (Edizioni Centro Culturale Virginia Woolf, 1991).  Her work has been discussed from a 
feminist legal perspective by Hanafin, Conceiving Life. Reproductive Politics and the Law in Contemporary Italy. p. 94-
96. 
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when it does not have any more political ideas in its head.‘232 Instead, we need 
to ‗open some voids or gaps in the masculine order of the law. It is female 
freedom which opens the space of the above the law for women and men.‘233 
For Cigarini above the law (sopra la legge) means women engaging in their own 
relational practice of law.234  
philosophy and the law: quattro giovedi’ e un venerdi’ per la filosofia235 
In October 1987 a public philosophical debate took place over five days at 
The Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective. The main speakers were four 
Italian feminist philosophers (Wanda Tommasi, Chiara Zamboni, Laura 
Boella, Angela Putino) and the politician, writer and scientist Laura Conti. 
The four philosophers‘ presentations were commented on and critiqued by 
other women philosophers: Luisa Muraro, Vita Cosentino, Clara Jourdan, 
Laura Balestrini, and Diana Sartori. These philosophical discussions had 
important implications for a feminist understanding of the law. I examine 
them here in order to set the foundation of the problem of language 
impregnated with universalistic and abstract ideas. This analysis helps me set 
the stage for my exploration of Cavarero‘s work on similar themes in the next 
section. This debate was one of many intense public debates (on themes as 
varied as sentiment, history, humour, poetry and fiction), that The Milan 
Collective held every week for several years.  
                                                     
232 Lia Cigarini, ―La Pratica Del Processo,‖ in La Politica Del Desiderio. (Parma: Nuova Pratiche Editrice, 1995), 
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233 Cigarini, La Polit. Del Desiderio. p. 232-233. 
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In these debates, we can see an example of politics in practice, or 
political praxis. The themes were always oriented towards a critique of 
patriarchy. The women participating wanted to learn about a genealogy based 
on women‘s intellectual work against a culture which had hidden the work of 
women for millennia. This is an example of how a group of women reflected 
on what it means to be a woman, and chose to think those subjects from a 
different point of view.  A point of view which starts from oneself and from a 
woman‘s experience, in and with the world and people around her; it is called 
partire da se’.  
Partire da se’ is different from an experience that comes from abstract 
analysis of the world. An abstract view of the world is often encouraged by a 
patriarchal viewpoint which is derived from an external master narrative. We 
can see how these debates created political engagement outside the 
government and the realm of the State and had an effect on women‘s sense of 
self. The Milan Collective‘s book Sexual Difference236 expounded the radical idea 
that often women lose out when they are granted equal rights with men by the 
State. As the Italian title of their book (Don‘t think you have any rights) 
indicated, women may indeed acquire rights but the story is not so straight 
forward and simple. They argued that freedom, for women, comes from 
working on the self collectively with other women. As Cigarini wrote, ‗A 
relational conception of freedom, that is my human story that we do together 
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with other women, is not aimed at gaining my individual rights but it‘s a 
process, a story that I make and develop together with other women.‘237  
Linda Zerilli has highlighted the original work of the Collective, which 
departs from most other feminist thinking on equality. She says of their work 
that ‗a freedom that, paradoxically, demands no vindication of the rights of 
woman, no equal rights under the law, but only a full, political and personal 
accountability to women, is as startlingly radical a notion as any that has emerged 
in Western thought.‘238 That the Milanese Collective and other Italian feminist 
activists put relationships first is what makes their work revolutionary. What 
they had realised was that gaining rights on an individual level will never bring 
about a true change at a cultural, political and societal level.  
The public philosophical debates mentioned previously are interesting 
because these feminist philosophers did not debate abstract philosophical 
themes. They were not interested in what Cavarero would call the ―what‖ of 
philosophy, but in the embodied and embedded ―who‖ of the singular and 
concrete experiences of human beings.  
What is interesting about these five days of debates is that a group of 
women met to think and re-think philosophy to make it their own. In what 
follows we shall see how these women tried to make of philosophy not a 
grand external master theory but a concrete reality that changed their lives. 
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238 Linda M. G. Zerilli, ―Feminists Makes Promises: The Milan Collective‘s Sexual Difference and the Project 
of World Building.,‖ in Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 93–
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They made words come alive to give meaning to their own lives, and they 
reflected on how words often have a different meaning for women. 
Consequently, they reflected on the themes I discussed at the beginning of 
this section (universalism, individualism, equality, abstraction, language), with 
an emphasis on giving a meaning that worked for them. The result of the 
presentations, debates and discussions that took place in October 1987 was a 
small booklet titled quattro giovedi’ e un venerdi’ per la filosofia.239 For the purpose 
of my research I am interested in the presentation of philosopher Wanda 
Tommasi, as we can see the direct influence that Irigaray had on her thinking, 
and how she tried to elaborate on her ideas and put them into practice. These 
elaborations, too, all have implications on understandings of the law.  
Tommasi‘s240 presentation was titled L’ambizione, l’inciampo, la piu’ alta 
pretesa [The Ambition, the Stumble, the Highest Claim] and it was commented 
on by philosopher Luisa Muraro.241 Tommasi expounded the problems for 
women with the neuter as a cultural, social and linguistic paradigm which 
hides the difference between the sexes and renders woman the same as man, 
assimilated to the male paradigm.  
The neuter has direct links to how questions of equality are framed in 
law. Equality often works within a framework which is based upon the neuter. 
Men and women can be equal only if the law sees them as the same. The law, 
                                                     
239 La Libreria delle Donne, Quattro Giovedi’ e Un Venerdi’ per La Filosofia.   
240 Wanda Tommasi is an Italian philosopher. She teaches history of philosophy at the University of Verona.  
241 Luisa Muraro is an Italian philosopher. She was the founder, together with other feminists, of the 
philosophical community Diotima in Verona. She was one of the founders of The Milan Women‘s Bookstore 
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especially positivistic approaches to the law, finds it difficult to extrapolate 
difference when it thinks it wants to be equal and fair. The law has a one 
direction view of equality: to reach it, all differences need to be erased. The 
neuter, Tommasi argued, ‗represents a supposed neutral human being but 
incorporates in it the male sex – as the signifier of Man. In reality it is Man 
minus sexual difference, a human being which is mutilated, halved, lacking 
something – the female sex – that is not able to be in the field of 
knowledge.‘242 Especially for legal positivists and analytical legal positivists, the 
law is viewed as objective, abstract, understood straightforwardly as 
regulations to be followed that are not linked, necessarily, to morality and 
ethics.243  
Therefore, Tommasi argued that by neutralising language women 
become assimilated to a male paradigm, with several drawbacks for women. 
This is evident in legislation where the idea is that the law is equal, when 
instead it erases the difference of women. Tommasi continued, saying that she 
was not referring to a biological essential difference but to the social, 
culturally different worlds that women come to inhabit and which see them 
differently. Indeed, sexual difference was never, for the Italians, a matter of 
identity or identity politics. It was recognising the socio-historical-cultural and 
                                                     
242 Wanda Tommasi ‗Un essere umano meno l‘apparteneza sessuata, un essere mutilato, dimidiato, privato di 
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political structures in which women had lived for millennia. Tommasi 
explained: 
I think that the temptation of the neuter constitutes almost an 
obligatory passage for all women [. . .]. The profession a woman 
chooses, the career and knowledge posit themselves as neutral and 
they seem to contain – because of their neutrality and universality – a 
promise of emancipation.244 
 
Tommasi explains that the illusion of the neuter is exactly this: in the moment 
in which it is women who adhere to it, it becomes a form of compliance.245 
For men, she explains, the neuter does not pose a problem; it does not mean 
a cancellation of one‘s sexual identity, but for women, it does. The neuter is 
an illusion, moreover, because implicitly and indirectly it contains a marker for 
sexual difference so even if it is not there explicitly, it is present but it is 
erased. Besides, when a woman renounces the attraction of the neuter she 
tries to give a voice to that which the neuter always forgets, sexual difference. 
On the other hand, for women, Tommasi continues, the neuter 
contains the knowledge of how to demean one‘s sex, of its social and 
symbolic inferiority, of its inadequacy in the field of science and philosophy. 
Faced with the demeaning of one‘s sex and with a loss of strong and 
                                                     
244 Wanda Tommasi ‗Credo che la tentazione del neutro costituisca quasi un passaggio obbligato per tutte 
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authoritative female points of reference, two destinies are left to women: one 
is to choose the traditional role for women, which has been assigned by 
patriarchy, and the other is to choose the road of the neuter, negating one‘s 
belonging to one‘s sex. According to Tommasi, when a woman chooses the 
latter: 
she can find that she becomes split, lacerated: asexual at the level of 
knowledge, woman only when in the private sphere. She will 
reproduce, within herself, in an alternating painful form, often 
unbearable, the illusion of the choice that is offered to women between 
womanhood and professional competence.246  
 
The neuter is found in law and the idea of equality and it has often negative 
implications for both. Sadly, once within the universalising language of liberal 
equality, as I argued in Chapter 1, the neuter does not maintain the promise of 
emancipation.  
Tommasi points out that with all the contradictions, if a woman still 
chooses the path of the neuter, it is often because she has a strong ambition 
which she sees as being held back by her belonging to the female sex. In light 
of that, this sexual identity will be erased at the level of knowledge. This 
violent gesture of erasure of one‘s sexual identity – which as Tommasi argues 
is never fully achieved – is already a rebellious act that a woman can perform 
to avenge the humiliation that her sex has experienced. Therefore, instead of 
                                                     
246 Wanda Tommasi ‗Salvo poi, in quest‘ultimo caso, ritrovarsi scissa, lacerata: neutro, assesuata a livello del 
sapere, donna solo nel privato; riproducendo cosi‘ dentro di se‘, nella forma di un‘ alternanza dolorosa, 
spesso insostenibile, la scelta illusoria che viene proposta alle donne fra femminilita‘ e competenza 
professionale.‘ La Libreria delle Donne, Quattro Giovedi’ e Un Venerdi’ per La Filosofia. p.13 [my translation] 
legal imaginations. women challenge the law| 139 
accepting this humiliation, many women prefer to erase their belonging to a 
sex.  
Tommasi notes that some women realise that they are good at 
repeating, good at commenting on other thinkers‘ ideas – what is missing is 
the ability to speak for oneself, the ability to speak with mastery. Irigaray talks 
about this in terms of mimesis and hysteria. She discusses how within the 
patriarchal system, women are destined to mimic, become the hysteric, or stay 
in silence.247 Tommasi elucidates that it is important for women to realise that 
they are repeating what others, mainly men, have thought. Once women 
realise that, it allows them to name their inadequacy within their field of 
knowledge. Once this inadequacy is named, a woman realises that she is not 
alone, that this inadequacy is the lot experienced by many other women. It is 
the lot of the female sex which often maintains a distance, almost a suspicion, 
which is a sign of its original distance from the land of the logos (originaria 
lontananza dalla patria del logos). During the 1970s and 1980s for Tommasi and 
the women of the Milanese Collective and many other feminists to be able ‗to 
exit‘ (uscire) from the neuter is achieved in proximity with other women, in a 
sexuate space. They and other women practised what is called separatism 
(being only among women for a period of time and in some situations). 
The most important redemption to come out of this discovery for 
women was the realization, together with other women, that they no longer 
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wished to feel estranged from the fields of knowledge. This brought about a 
thirst for knowledge of which women were themselves the subjects and they 
were not simply repeating what others – often men – had thought and written 
before them. In this context, Tommasi relates:  
women started to shape a desire, an unprecedented pretence to be at 
home in and with language. They wished to be able to move around in 
the realm of knowledge, like full human beings shaping their own point 
of view on the world.248  
 
This woman wants to put herself at the origin of her speech: she wants to 
speak as a full human being, without mutilations and renunciations. She 
refuses the servile and repetitive function of weaving at the margins of the 
logos, because she wants to put forward a higher demand, a more relevant 
request. Also, she wishes to develop her own desire – a desire that is not 
formed by the desire of the other as Irigaray also insists.249 This request means 
to be able to formulate a thought that begins from oneself (un pensiero che parta 
da se’), like a full human being. This request is a desire to produce a language 
that takes fully into account the experience and all the signs of the finitude of 
human beings, first and foremost their sexual difference. Tommasi indicates 
that for the women who want to escape the neuter it is vital to have a point of 
reference in other women. Moreover, she adds that in this way women will 
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find an adequate measure for themselves, one in which the potency of the 
female sex is understood, together with its necessary limit: 
What women gain from this is a world view marked by sexual 
difference. Limited, therefore, limited by sexuation, hence because 
of this, powerful. In this, women will be able to escape the painful 
alternating in which they often navigate, between an illusion of 
omnipotence and degradation. This enables women to speak, emit 
their speech outside the murmur (far uscire la loro parola), which is 
at the margins of the neuter and also from the silence of the what 
(il cosa) that one is unable to say. All this enables women to speak 
for themselves, and no more just to repeat someone else‘s 
thought.250 
 
We see in these philosophical debates, which were attended by many women, 
an attempt to think politics in a different way, to make it relevant to them in a 
concrete manner and not a distant concept. What we have seen from these 
presentations is how all these women talked of a debt they owed to Luce 
Irigaray‘s thought.251 Through the work of these women we can clearly see 
how their political actions made it possible for them to account for 
themselves and value the importance of relations they had with other women. 
It was an attempt to think law otherwise, as the Milan Bookstore Collective 
practice did and Cigarini enacted in her feminist legal practice. In this section, 
I set the foundations for the next part of the chapter, where I discuss 
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Cavarero‘s work challenging the individualistic, abstract, and neutral view of 
the subject.   
language and the law 
We can see how language is important for Cavarero and how through 
language the patriarchal order has infiltrated philosophy and subsequently, 
law. Cavarero writes: 
For me, sexual difference is a given of the human condition translated by 
logocentrism into a hierarchical scheme that prevents one of the two 
sexes from representing herself outside the stereotypes of the feminine. 
However, precisely those stereotypes disclose a nucleus of resistance 
against the very logic and content of the system that has informed 
them.252 
 
Cavarero deliberately uses words in a disrespectful way striking at 
philosophy‘s heart; we can see how this has an important role in demystifying 
power structures. Language is political and the way language is used in law is 
the expression of relations of power, because power is defined through the 
way we use language. The other crucial importance of language is in forming 
and articulating one‘s desire. If it‘s the language of the other our desires are 
shaped externally to us too. Law can be rigid and fixed, and if metaphors are 
essential to meanings we need to look at instilling law with metaphors, so that 
words become less rigid and more fluid and flexible. If law is to evolve and 
incorporate concrete human beings in its paradigm it needs to acquire 
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metaphorical meanings. Conversely, as legal scholar Robert Cover253 has 
famously put it, law deals in life and death. He says that open, playful 
meanings and metaphors (as some law and literature scholars have conceded) 
have material, significant consequences in law, unlike in literature. Cavarero 
too argues that we should play with language, take it less seriously, have fun 
with it and treat it with less reverence: 
Words are not sacred or untouchable, especially in philosophy. Rather it 
is necessarily to use words with bad intentions (cattive intenzioni), situating 
them in a different context that can overwhelm and recodify them, 
pushing those terms toward unpredictable meanings. One needs 
ultimately to use words that are metaphysically compromised – and 
ontology is one of them – to attack the system that produces them and to 
finally destabilize them. 254 
Language is not fixed and to attack the rigid notion of law can help us to go 
beyond law, its positivist approach. To be able to go beyond law‘s positivistic 
approach I suggest we need ‗linguistic filters‘255 so that the law loses its 
mystified position.  
French feminist Hélène Cixous‘s idea of ―ecriture feminine‖ which she 
first coined in her book The Laugh of the Medusa (1975)256 acts as an example of 
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a language which loses its mystified position, rewrites the body, the affective, 
the unconscious into language. How do these linguistic filters work to make 
law lose its mystifying position? Following Cavarero on the critique of rectitude 
and ‗inclining‘ the law can help us add a notion of the law that needs to be 
inclined to singular people‘s experiences.257 The law is about human beings. If 
it is to be human it needs to absorb within its approach the inclination that 
challenges the rigidity of seeing human beings as erect, rational, fixed, and 
homogeneous. This can become a new way of imagining the law, a law which 
ultimately always deals with life and death and the realities of life, not abstract 
interpretations of law, as Cover stated.  
adriana cavarero and the law 
In this section I explore the work of Cavarero, and other Italian sexual 
difference feminists, who challenge the rigidity and universalising pull of the 
law as it is constructed in Western thought and theory. Even though Cavarero 
is a feminist political philosopher, she has approached and worked on 
questions of law in several of her books and articles. She does this because 
she argues ‗it is not possible [. . .] to attack the ontology of the individual 
without taking into account the fact that this attack falls back into the 
conception of the normative system of the State.‘258 Cavarero creates a space 
outside the law for women to work towards becoming subjects of the law in 
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their own terms, or to attempt to imagine spaces outside of the law altogether 
(or above the law as Cigarini proposed). What Cavarero means by this is that it 
is important for women to learn that freedom does not come only by 
achieving legal rights and that unless they learn not to submit to the law 
‗blindly‘, women will not learn to become subjects in their own terms. She 
argues that the symbolic order has filtered in to other forms of language like 
in legal documents or philosophical treatises.259 It is the patriarchal symbolic 
order inherent in legal documents that we are interested in here and the ones 
women should be often, but not always, suspicious about.  
What interests me about Cavarero‘s work and what I find useful for 
this chapter and the overall thesis is exactly her analysis on how the 
patriarchal symbolic order has filtered into classical philosophy and from 
there into our legal texts. It is alerting us to this ancestral connection that I 
find inspiring, as it brings light to modern legal reasoning, texts, and cases, 
and it reminds us to never let our guard down, to keep unearthing the 
patriarchal power and hegemony inherent in legal texts. The importance of re-
reading Greek philosophy and its connection to law from a feminist 
perspective is fundamental to unearthing the foundations of Western law, 
which in turn has filtered into other cultures and legislatures through 
imperialism and colonialism.260 This has supported a patriarchal legal symbolic 
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order and culture which has been complicit in the erasure of maternal power. 
In contrast to this death-bound philosophy,261 culture and society, which is 
suspicious of materiality and the maternal, Arendt‘s concepts of action, 
plurality and natality, as interpreted by Cavarero, can bring new ‗vitality‘262 to 
philosophy and help us re-think our relationship with the law.  
So what might a rewritten, feminist law look like? I am interested in 
engaging with Cavarero‘s work and exploring concrete examples to attempt to 
answer this question. Cavarero‘s feminist reading and critique of classical 
philosophy and the legal position of women within ancient and ‗modern‘ 
societies allows for a re-claiming of space for women within philosophy and 
the political realm which comprises the law. She explores ‗the philosophy of 
antiquity which posits itself at the onset of our history, making its mark in the 
destiny of the so-called ―West.‖263 Cavarero‘s 1995 book In Spite of Plato: A 
Feminist Reading of Ancient Philosophy delves into these themes. In this book, 
Cavarero sets herself the task of ‗stealing‘ female figures like Penelope, 
Diotima, Demeter and the Maidservant from Thrace from ancient myths, 
repositioning them from a reduced, fractured status within the ancient Greek 
texts and giving them back a magnified symbolic position:  
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the figures that I steal already appear anomalous. Stealing figures in this 
way is therefore a way of working on stereotypes. I am convinced that, in 
particular, most feminine stereotypes contain a nucleus of meaning that can be retrieved 
with a different sense, which the standard explanation or function of the 
stereotype tends to hide.264  
 
Revealing this nucleus of meaning is the key for a reading of the patriarchal 
language used in law. As Western law‘s origins are in ancient Greece and 
ancient Rome, in re-reading the ancient Greek myths Cavarero is shaking the 
foundation of law too. She says that in the classical Greek texts, female figures 
like Penelope, Diotima, Demeter and the Maidservant from Thrace are 
mortified, squeezed between gigantic male figures and lack a space and a 
voice. The trilogy of Greek tragedies written by Aeschylus The Oresteia265 - 
which I mentioned in the previous chapter - is paradigmatic of the patriarchal 
origin of Western legal system. Significantly, Cavarero defines classical Greece 
as ‗a golden age for the patriarchal order.‘266 In this context we can ask, how 
then has this ‗golden age for the patriarchal order‘ informed law?  
Cavarero investigates the possible detrimental connection between ancient 
myths, philosophy, patriarchy, and law, and the influence of this connection 
on the assimilation of women to a patriarchal order, the annihilation of their 
difference, and the colonisation of maternal power by men. In this last aspect 
Cavarero argues that maternal power has been taken from women by a 
                                                     
264 Bertolino and Cavarero, ―Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference: An Interview with Italian Feminist 
Philosopher Adriana Cavarero.‖ p.135. [My emphasis] 
265 Aeschylus, The Oresteia. Agamemnon, the Libation Barers, the Eumenides., ed. Robert Fagles, 5th ed. (London & 
New York: Penguin Books, 1984). 
266 Cavarero, In Spite of Plato. A Feminist Rewriting of Ancient Philosophy. p.71. 
legal imaginations. women challenge the law| 148 
patriarchal order whose regulation spans from antiquity through to ‗modern‘ 
times with the invasion and control of women‘s bodies by the legal and 
medical professions. As a result, she argues, this invasion is an erasure of 
women‘s maternal power. The patriarchal order maintains that maternity is a 
social function and therefore needs to be regulated.  
In In Spite of Plato Cavarero examines how ancient Greek philosophy 
was complicit in spreading this ideology of suspicion in relation to the 
maternal. She states that ‗the earliest philosophers are ―chronologically‖ closer 
to the great matricidal felony, the erasure of the maternal, to what underlies 
the universalizing arrogance of the patriarchal order.‘267 Here we see a very 
important connection between ancient myths, philosophy, patriarchy and law 
on one hand, and on the other hand women‘s assimilation and the 
annihilation of maternal power. This link is something that needs further 
exploration and it is essential to continue the re-appropriation of ancient texts 
from a feminist perspective to allow for a re-reading and a reinterpretation of 
important historical moments lost to women. These reinterpretations help us 
to unpack and understand the law and its classical origins. 
In reinterpreting and rewriting the destinies of women in Greek myths and 
tragedies, she generously offers a ‗gift‘ to Penelope, Demeter, Diotima and the 
Maidservant of Thrace – the gift of a life, a new birth and identification with 
other women. And these figures give Cavarero the gift of another way of 
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reading these old myths. Together with other Italian sexual difference 
feminists268, she has reiterated that rights do not make women‘s relationship to 
law better per se. Rights are granted by law in order, in liberal theory, to 
substantively change lives, but the real transformation needs to happen within 
the patriarchal symbolic order to bring a concrete substantial change in 
women‘s lives. Lawyer Diane Polan too states that ‗it is not so much that laws 
must be changed; it is patriarchy that must be changed.‘269 This point is crucial 
for our enquiry and as we will soon see Cavarero believes, to a certain extent, 
in the disengagement of women from the State and its laws. She is interested 
in relations between women, and it is within those relations that it becomes 
possible for women‘s lives to change the most.270 
According to Cavarero, law is embedded with power and when it 
reflects the dominant discourse it externalises its power in very damaging 
ways. She believes that the universalization of the male paradigm annihilates 
women, therefore she does not approve of a politics that asks women to 
assimilate to Man‘s universal standard. Cavarero calls for a difference that filters 
deeply into law; she wants to expand the boundaries and redefine the borders 
of law. As Cavarero puts it, the ‗female invaders‘ of the patriarchal 
occupation, feminists, ‗put into practice rules that are finally free from the 
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universalizing claims of abstract totalization.‘271 Only when women oppose the 
male dominant discourse in law will their perspective be taken into account in 
law.  
Within critical legal studies a feminist re-reading is transformative for law 
because it can shake its static and rigid setting. Cavarero is able to 
demonstrate how language and stereotypes used in texts by Ancient Greek 
philosophers like Plato, Socrates, and Aristotle have been transmitted in 
European classical philosophical texts and eventually made their way into 
legal texts, which are imbued with patriarchal bias. Cavarero argues that the 
concept of anthropos – Man – which is singular and masculine, but in reality 
neutral-universal, made its way into philosophical language where it was used 
to indicate humankind as a whole. From there it came into common use, and 
it remains in the language that we still speak.272 At the same time we can see 
that in legal texts the law is intrinsically filled with the universal idea of 
humankind which takes its standard from the masculine and this ‗mould‘ is 
then applied, unsuccessfully, to represent women‘s realities. As Cavarero 
notes ‗woman‘ ‗realises that within the male order of knowledge she really is 
not, since there is no woman in the idea of the universal Man. The idea of Man 
is said to be neutral and universal, without gender, be it masculine or 
feminine.‘273  
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The abstract notion of Man which represents humankind is detrimental 
for men too. Men are different from each other and no one, neither men nor 
women can be ‗contained‘ in an abstract objectification of their humanity. If, 
then, the abstract notion of humanity does not exist, an abstract notion of 
Woman and Man do not exist either; there exist instead many different 
women and men in different contexts. American political theorist Zillah 
Eisenstein argues that universality does not account for differences. She states 
that neutrality hides power. It is the power that it hides, that is not openly 
recognised, which makes it unfair.274 
Sex is an embodied difference even when it is complicated, contested and 
diversified.275 Cavarero writes that the fact that there is a corporal 
morphology, in the ‗signifiers‘ masculine and feminine, is a banality. To negate 
this, to be necessarily postmodern, she thinks is this century‘s illness.276 At 
times though, as trans and non-binary people can attest, lived gender and 
genitalia don‘t match. Even if we accept the relevance of biological difference, 
‗man‘ and ‗woman‘ as social categories are not reducible to genitalia.  
Eisenstein states that ‗―Difference‖ framed as a duality attempts to make 
things clear-cut, much as the determinations in a court of law are supposed to 
be. Subtlety, ambiguity and relatedness are denied, and in the process 
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differences become inequalities.‘277  Eisenstein‘s comment may read as a 
critique of Cavarero‘s notion of sexual difference, but Cavarero‘s sexual 
difference thinking works to spell away the erasure of the maternal and of 
women. Hence, it is not a move to make things clear cut or to deny 
ambiguity, but to keep the uniqueness of each woman in the picture as it has 
been violently evicted or erased from our culture for centuries. Eisenstein 
explains further: 
by pluralizing equality I do not mean to condone the idea of ―separate 
but equal‖ or that of ―separate spheres.‖ To the contrary, I mean to 
argue that the concept of equality is best reconstructed through a 
completely pluralized notion of difference(s), one that rejects a politics 
of inequality and demands a radical egalitarianism.278  
 
I think that this ‗completely pluralised notion of difference(s)‘ for which 
Eisenstein argues is similar to Cavarero‘s insistence on the uniqueness of each 
human being. By paying attention to this uniqueness, this ‗pluralised notion of 
difference‘ the concept of equality can be enriched in a more human, material 
way.  
Cavarero explains how the dominant structure controls women‘s 
bodies, while women are still subjected to what Hanafin calls ‘patriarchal 
permission.’279 This paradigm is particularly important for understanding rights 
in relation to abortion, as Hanafin argues. The State and the judiciary maintain 
the ‗privilege‘ of legislating on matters that concern only women. The State 
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operates in a mode whereby it ‗allows‘ certain privileges and freedoms, as long 
as they are limited to certain timeframes and limits. That is not enough. That 
is exactly how a patriarchal father figure operates. It allows some freedom as 
long as one does not overtake the limit set by the authority (a father, the law, 
the church). That is why I suggest abortion should be decriminalised.  
Cavarero‘s philosophy works at different levels, one of the most 
important being in seeing human beings as unique individuals who are, if at 
all, subjects of law and not objects of law. Women‘s individual narratives 
become history, or better, her-story. She pushes the boundaries of individuality 
and redefines the boundaries of law. In this regard, Hanafin points out that 
Cavarero‘s definition of maternal power is as ‗a right whose norms cannot be 
arbitrarily negotiated, or compared with other juridical situations.‘280 
Informing law with her philosophy can contribute to the discourse of feminist 
legal theory, and moreover, it can challenge patriarchal legal theory.  
colonisation of maternal power 
Cavarero draws attention, to the colonisation of women‘s maternal power by 
patriarchal culture, writing: 
The basic coordinates of this symbolic framework are simple: the 
function of maternity is reproductive, and the function of reproduction 
is social. Both are made to belong to the realm of human cohabitation, 
and both are a matter of public interest that can be regulated by laws. 
This has an even simpler consequence: politically organised society 
continues to claim that maternal nurturing is to be taken for granted and 
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will be provided in the form of unpaid household labour and care giving. 
281 
 
The maternal nurturing (often taken for granted), which Cavarero discusses 
about, when it becomes the idealisation of the maternal, I argue that, it can 
become the opposite of the erasure of the maternal: it can become the blowing 
up or inflating of the maternal. This is problematic.  
Not accounting for differences allows for stereotypical descriptions of 
women and mothers. The idealisation of the maternal reduces the function of 
reproduction to its social role. This means not only to be concerned primarily 
with social, economic (to say it crudely: the more citizens are ‗produced‘ the 
more factories are filled) demographic stability but also to view women as 
functional to society which in turns idealises the institution of motherhood.282 
While this approach sees women as merely ‗serving‘ within society, the 
control of the reproductive phase of society sees the woman and the foetus as 
separate entities and the woman‘s autonomy over her own body becomes 
irrelevant. Cavarero argues that the State takes up the role of regulating the 
birth rates and its production (women‘s reproduction) is planned and 
controlled.  Hence even though the meaning of the uterus has changed from 
being the ―little oven‖ in which the sperm and the ‗the paternal gene was 
nurtured and cosily leavened; it still looks a lot like it, however.‘283  
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 In a very poignant passage of In Spite of Plato Cavarero traces many 
ethical questions that still appear in the current debate relating to 
reproduction, in particular laws that regulate abortion. She argues that ―the 
fact that the woman wants to abort is never presented as a question of 
women‘s free choice (to be followed automatically by the medical assistance 
the woman requires). Instead, abortion is politicized as ―a concern of the 
state.‖284 The legal regulation of abortion offers a useful way to critiquing the 
inadequacies of liberalism.  
In the 1970s another Milanese feminist collective, Via Cherubini 8,285 
advocated for the decriminalisation of abortion, instead of the legalisation of 
abortion. They wanted to open women only clinics run by women, and 
demanded that once abortion was decriminalised, women could access 
abortion in public hospitals when they wanted, on demand.286 They advocated 
against the State passing laws on abortion because they considered this a short 
cut which did not help women achieve self-determination. Sadly this approach 
did not take hold with the wider feminist movement in Italy. 
 Cavarero argues women have always tried to choose when to become 
mothers, even in the patriarchal order in which they live, they subvert its 
restrictions. It is necessary, she argues, to accept ‗the sovereignty of maternal 
subjectivity, as witnessed everywhere down through the millennia of chosen 
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abortions.‘287 A similar argument is taken up by Rebecca Schiller, a doula and 
the director of Birthrights, a UK organisation that supports women‘s choice in 
childbirth. In her book All that Matters: Women’s Rights in Childbirth she argues 
that it is still difficult to understand that the ultimate choice should always be 
the woman‘s.288  
In this respect Cavarero, who is against state regulation and intervention 
in the realms of birth, love and death, argues that ‗the juridification of the 
lifeworld is only the most evident, tangible aspect of society‘s invasion of the 
symbolic order of birth.‘289 It is an invasion which has been nurtured and 
sustained by metaphysics and ethics, secular and otherwise, down through the 
millennia. As Patrick Hanafin states, Cavarero‘s analysis of reproduction ‗leads 
her to conclude that maternal sovereignty should remain beyond legal 
regulation.‘290 This is a radical statement which is frequently left out of 
mainstream liberal feminist legal discourses.  
 Here we see the connection Cavarero makes, between science, 
medicine, and law and its invasion of women‘s bodies. She states: 
Scientific experimentation has invaded the realm of life (bios), bringing 
the law with it. This raises a question on the limits of such invasiveness. 
The answer is left to bioethics. Obviously, those who provide answers 
are ―experts‖, mostly philosophers and theologians. Jurists, however, 
also lend a hand. This should not be surprising: they have long been 
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familiar with the field of bios, having produced the laws on abortion. By 
now they are ―connoisseurs‖ in good standing, because the limitations 
imposed by ethics must also be translated into public laws in order to be 
effective and respected by scientists.291 
 
With abortion and reproductive politics, women‘s bodies are invaded by the 
patriarchal legal-scientific order which makes them a site for experimentation, 
the uterus being disembodied, objectified and rendered ‗a laboratory.‘292 
Unfortunately such an invasion is so embedded in our society that not many 
women are aware of it; on the contrary, their maternal power has been 
‗colonised‘ and they too are complicit in this order, with at times problematic 
consequences: ‗one must ask which symbolic female figure can sustain this 
desire to be a mother at any price.‘293 With this in mind we see how Cavarero 
argues that this invasion of the maternal power erases it: 
In my view this play on the word ―progress‖ indicates that, if maternal 
power has been erased from the start and reduced to a reproductive 
function of the womb, then all restrictions on invading bios are removed; 
the symbolic order where living creatures find a secret, protected, 
maternal home has been cancelled. This is one of the great many 
meanings of the secret of birth: birth is not what cannot be explained 
―scientifically‖, but the symbolic figure declared inviolable by maternal 
power.294 
 
This colonisation295 and expropriation of maternal power and the social 
function given to maternity by the patriarchal order can make some women 
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think of themselves as ‗the Other‘. Cavarero argues that to counterbalance 
this colonisation of women‘s bodies, women can learn what it means to have 
a sexed thought. The way to discover this ‗sexed thought‘, the action of 
consciousness-raising through relations with other women can help in bringing 
this awareness to the fore from a sense of self that was previously submerged.  
For this purpose, the use of personal narrative is very important for feminists 
because in telling ‗unimportant‘ personal stories they describe suffering, often 
caused by unjust laws:  
this conception of the unique existent is the contrary of what of 
universal humanism, the disembodied subject of rights. It is the who of 
the unique self–possessed of her own speech, her own narrative, which 
she relates to another unique existent.296  
 
Cavarero notes that ‗by focusing in the category of one‘s uniqueness, she 
disrupts the sacrificial economy of traditional ontology, where one‘s 
uniqueness is only a ―superfluous‖ element, repeatedly negated in favour of 
generality and abstraction.‘297 It is the intersection between humans as unique, 
vulnerable and ―inclined”, from her book Inclinations298, to others that I find 
interesting.  
In the following section I analyse two legal cases, one which centres on 
a woman undergoing fertility treatment and one of a fourteen year-old Irish 
                                                                                                                                                           
for women. In recent decades we can say that this has mostly been directed at middle class white women. At 
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girl who was raped but nevertheless denied an abortion under the restrictive 
ban on abortion which was in place in the Republic of Ireland until 31st 
December 2018. Both cases are concrete examples of Cavarero‘s argument on 
a patriarchal-legal-scientific order which renders the woman‘s uterus a 
disembodied entity.  
a feminist rewritten law or the discourse on decriminalisation  
Evans v United Kingdom, Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd299 are a series of cases, 
that show the law sometimes does not hear women‘s voices, and that the 
insistence on a universal and equal subject of the law loses out on attending to 
the uniqueness of the individual. The other case I focus on here is Attorney 
General v X. Both cases relate to the reproduction and the politics and 
institution of motherhood. The Evans case relates to the desire of a woman to 
have her own biological child. Natalie Evans was diagnosed with ovarian 
cancer and was told by the clinic that treated her that her ovaries would need 
to be removed. Evans did not have children at the time, but she desired one–
she was in effect undergoing fertility treatment with her partner Johnston. 
The same day that the tumour was discovered the hospital suggested Evans 
should store some of her fertilised eggs. She and Johnston decided to freeze 
her fertilised eggs so that they could have the chance to have a child in the 
future.  
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Evans asked the clinic if she could store some of her unfertilised eggs 
as well, in case she and Johnson were to separate, and she was told by a nurse 
that it was not a procedure that was available at that clinic. According to 
Evans, Johnston then reassured her that he would be with her forever and 
wanted to have children with her, so it was not necessary for her to store her 
unfertilized eggs: ‗At that juncture Mr Johnston reassured Ms Evans that they 
were not going to split up. She did not need egg freezing. She should not be 
negative. He wanted to be the father of her child.‘300 Some years later the 
relationship between Evans and Johnston broke down, with Johnston 
refusing to allow Evans to use her fertilised eggs to have a child, the only 
biological child she could have.301 Evans decided to take her case to court and 
she was unsuccessful in the English High Court, in the Court of Appeal and 
at the European Court of Human Rights and in the Grand Chamber. In all 
judgements Evans‘ claim and perspective were quashed, and the judges agreed 
with Johnston that he should not be forced to father a child he no longer 
wanted. The dilemma in the case was not an easy one. The destruction of the 
fertilised eggs meant Evans had been forbidden to ever have her own 
biological children while Johnston could still have his own biological children 
for many years to come. Hanafin argues in relation to the same case:  
 The question here is an emotive one. Should a woman be enabled to 
implant embryos fertilised by her former partner when the latter refuses 
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to consent to the procedure? It would be fair that the right to have a 
child also includes the right not to have a child.302 
It seems that the judges did not empathise with Evans‘s predicament, but 
instead they sided with Johnston‘s view of the situation. They did not want to 
allow Evans to use her fertilised eggs, even when she argued that she felt 
misled by Johnston who had promised that he loved her and would stay with 
her forever, causing her to think she did not need to freeze her unfertilised 
eggs. Eventually Johnston‘s right to avoid genetic parenthood outweighed her 
right to have her only genetic children ever. Hanafin argues that in the Evans 
case the law by being neutral failed to truly see the difference of outcomes for 
both parties: 
This gave credence to a scenario in which the male narrative was seen by 
the judge as more reliable, notwithstanding the fact that it was Ms 
Evans‘ ability to reproduce a genetically related child that was at stake.303  
There are many legal cases, in most jurisdictions, which demonstrate what 
Cavarero states, as discussed previously, in relation to a systematic disregard 
to each human being‘s uniqueness. This is one of them. I chose this case as 
it‘s quite exemplary in this respect in relation to what we are discussing.  
This case reflects how women‘s bodies are still regulated by 
juridification, which does not take into consideration the uniqueness of that 
woman, or the particular situation she finds herself in. The law often 
interferes with life and death in a particularly intrusive way. In this regard 
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Hanafin comments of Cavarero that ‗in her analysis of the myth of Demeter, 
she notes that birth must be won back from the legal technical gaze of the male.‘304 
In the case of Natalie Evans we can see how the technical gaze of the male or 
patriarchal legal system disregarded the ‗maternal power‘ of Evans and erased 
it from its discourse. Ms. Evan‘s desire was ignored, her only possibility to 
have a child rendered meaningless. Maybe the court was more attentive to the 
right of Evans‘ partner not to have a child. They were more attentive to her 
partner non-desire to have a biological child and they respected that.  
Following Cavarero then, how can we have a law that is attentive to the 
singular case of a unique person, in this case, Natalie Evans? Cavarero argues 
that the law is too rigid and we need a law, I would say, using the title of her 
latest book, that ‗inclines‘ itself to the needs of singular people. As we have 
seen the origins of relationality, where singular beings look after singular 
beings, in that uniqueness Arendt talks about, we can ask: how can the law 
become more ‗caring‘ of singular people‘s needs, their uniqueness? How can 
the law, and how the law is practised, become infused with the idea that 
human beings are interconnected and care for each other at different stages of 
their lives? Feminist rewriting of judgements is one way in which the law can 
be interpreted in favour of women.305 To accommodate a more flexible, 
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humane and caring application of the law306 it would be necessary for the law 
to ‗incline‘ itself to each singular person‘s needs, to exemplify a recognition of 
each person‘s vulnerability. Hanafin has seen the similarity of the term above 
the law, theorised by Cigarini, to what Cavarero terms the absolute local.307 They 
are both relational spaces, where the relational is a political space, outside of 
the formalities of state politics and the realm of acquiring rights from the 
outside. Hanafin says that according to Cavarero: 
It is imperative that women recover their own voice. In order for this to 
occur a new female symbolic space must be created. Cavarero names this 
space of relational subjectivity the absolute local. For her, the absolute local is 
a space that names a taking place of the political [. . ..]. The absolute local 
refers not to what those who share this space are, but to who they are. 
This space then is the space of the who, the unique individual.308 
This shows the importance of embodied uniqueness against the generalising 
universal and assimilatory terms like ‗individual‘ and ‗subject‘ where a person 
represents a general idea of who they are, not the who of the unique individual 
proposed by Cavarero. 
The next case discussed is Attorney General v X [1992] 1 IR 1. This is an 
Irish case, involving a fourteen years old‘s young woman who had been raped. 
Since this case and many others abortion is now legalised in the Republic of 
Ireland. The constitutional ban on abortion was removed via the ―repeal the 
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8th‖ referendum in May 2018. In the case of X in 1992, the law did not allow a 
simple conclusion of what she desired: an abortion. Article 40.3.3 of the 
Constitution of Ireland stated that ‗The State acknowledges the right to life of 
the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, 
guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to 
defend and vindicate that right.‘ She had to suffer; the law did not have regard 
for her lived experiences. What mattered was that the law was applied ‗justly‘ 
as far as the legislation in Ireland was concerned. X‘s parents wanted her to 
travel to England to access abortion, something that, until May 2018, was 
legal only in rare cases.  
The case is an attempt to impede X from travelling to England. In the 
words of the judge:  
 
Notwithstanding the very fundamental nature of the right to travel and 
its particular importance in relation to the characteristics of a free 
society, I would be forced to conclude that if there were a stark conflict 
between the right of a mother of an unborn child to travel and the 
right to life of the unborn child, the right to life would necessarily have 
to take precedence over the right to travel. I therefore conclude that 
the submission made that the mother of the unborn child had an 
absolute right to travel which could not be qualified or restricted, even 
by the vindication or defence of the right to life of the unborn, is not a 
valid or sustainable submission in law.309  
 
We can see here how the law has been applied in an impartial and objective 
way, without taking in consideration the specificity and uniqueness of this girl. 
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As feminist legal theorist Ruth Fletcher writes ‗Ignoring certain life 
experiences, which may be unfamiliar to us, is likely to produce a rather partial 
account of law and life.‘310 Abortion was illegal in the Republic of Ireland, as 
already mentioned, till May 2018, as per the Eighth Amendment to the Irish 
Constitution: Article 40.3.3. This article comprised the protection of the life 
of the unborn311 and also gives the right to travel312 and the right to know 
about services available under other jurisdictions.  
As abortion legislation in various parts of the world shows313, rights are 
part of a paradox314, they allow some freedom so long as one sticks to the limit 
inscribed in the law. As I mentioned earlier this is what is called ‗patriarchal 
permission.‘ It seems to be a freedom with conditions, one that treats 
humans, in this case women, in a very infantile way. The law permits rights 
and freedom, in this case in relation to reproduction, up to a limit. In the case 
of X, her family wanted to travel to England to access an abortion for their 
daughter. She said that she was feeling suicidal due to her unwanted 
pregnancy and the violence experienced. Before travelling her family asked 
the Irish Police force if it was possible for a DNA sample of an aborted 
foetus to be obtained, as the family wanted the man who had raped their 
daughter to be prosecuted. In hearing that, the police informed the Attorney 
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General, who sought an injunction under article 40.3.3. The injunction was 
granted by the High Court in February 1992. Then the Supreme Court 
appealed the decision and it won with four in favour and one judge 
dissenting. The judges in favour argued that being suicidal is a great risk to life 
hence they granted her the possibility to travel. Even though abortion has 
now been legalised in Ireland, under liberal equality women‘s reproduction is 
still controlled by the State. I suggest instead that as a long-term solution, in 
the Republic of Ireland and everywhere, it would be better to decriminalise 
abortion. This is to allow for women‘s bodies to be truly their own, as Lucy 
van Pelt and feminist women in the 1970s said: our bodies, our choice. As we 
have seen with the Attorney General v X case just discussed, legalisation of 
abortion can take away full autonomy from women over their bodies because 
the rules of the law remain in the hands of the legislator. The more patriarchal 
the State, the more restrictive and cruel the limitations can be.  
To find examples of a law ‗inclined‘ to a singular person‘s needs and not 
to universal assimilating ideas of the subject, we can look at the work of the 
Northern/Irish Feminist Judgements,315 The Feminist Judgements Project in 
the UK, the Women‘s Court of Canada (WCC) and feminist lawyers like 
Cigarini. Attorney General v X, has in fact been adjudicated from a feminist 
perspective by legal feminist academic Ruth Fletcher in Northern/Irish Feminist 
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Judgements. Judges’ Troubles and the Gendered Politics of Identity (2017). Fletcher 
reads this case giving attention to the singular and unique needs of Ms X and 
she decides that Ms X ‗has the right to abortion in the Irish health care system 
on the ground that her pregnancy imposes an impracticable burden on her 
rightful life.‘316  
This is how Fletcher comes to this decision: first she adopts the 
principle of impartiality and she notes that objectivity is likely to be adopted 
better if the limits of judicial knowledge are taken in consideration.317 Thus, 
she asserts, to be impartial it is important to take the diversity of human 
experiences into consideration. Secondly, in exercising her judicial discretion 
she applied the doctrine of harmonious interpretation. She applied this 
doctrine to her assessment of the three key aspects of the case, namely, the 
text, the craft and the evidence.318 The doctrine of harmonious interpretation 
in relation to a text says that a one piece of text needs to be coherent with the 
rest of the text. Fletcher argues that the adoption of the Eighth Amendment 
in the Irish constitution was a key moment in the ‗disruption of the plain 
meaning of key constitutional terms.‘319 In relation to the principle of evidence 
she said that one needs to determine if a pregnancy is dangerous for a woman 
as some pregnancies may be not beneficial for women because they threaten 
their dignity, health, and well-being. All reasons to allow an abortion. Lastly, 
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in relation to the use of judicial craft and seeing the Constitution as a living 
document, Fletcher writes ‗when judges  are tasked with the job of giving life 
to law, of caring for its intricacies and deciding what to do with its rough 
edges, they must tread gently on the people‘s dreams.‘320 In her ‗hypothetical‘ 
decision she argues that it was within the realm of Irish law to allow Ms X an 
abortion and that the State had a duty to support Ms X in an attentive manner 
which recognized she had become pregnant through rape and that her young 
age meant she needed added support.321  
We can see how, like Lia Cigarini‘s reframing of her legal practice in the 
1970s and 1980s, The Feminist Judgement Project has sought to read the law 
and legal judgements with a feminist lens ‗Feminist judges will take different 
facts from the mass of detail to tell the story in a different way, to bring about 
features which others discard, and to explain the features which others find 
difficult to understand‘.322 This approach can be seen as Cavarerian. It is 
similar to the inclination Cavarero speaks about and the importance of 
considering the uniqueness of each human being, the singularity of their 
experiences against a homogenous approach which leaves out the 
individuality, the ―absolute local‖323 of each of us. What does it mean, then, to 
tell a story in a different way?  
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Another way in which a law  ‗inclined‘ to people‘s uniqueness and 
singularity becomes a listening law, can be found in the statements of  Irish 
Judge Patricia Smyth at a Symposium titled ―Just Improvisation: Enriching 
child protection law through musical techniques, discourses and pedagogies‖. 
In a poignant statement, which was video recorded, Smyth argued: 
As a family judge I think there is huge scope for improvisation, 
flexibility, creativity to get the right solution to individual families. One 
of the things that struck me early on since becoming a family judge three 
years ago was the rule based text book approach of social workers and 
other professionals brought to the resolution of an infinite variety of 
family problems. I think as a judge we have huge scope to be creative if 
we want to do that and if we can see the various ways in which a 
problem can be looked at differently […] once we recognise that every 
child is an individual and every family is different and needs bespoke 
solutions. In my own experience if people feel they have been listened 
to, they feel that the judge has understood their point and given it proper 
consideration even if they lose they can deal with it because they believe 
they have been listened to. It is a key task for any judge not just to listen 
but to convey the fact to the person that they have been listened to.324  
 
This quote exemplifies how a judge can see that each client has different 
problems that require ‗bespoke solutions‘, as Smyth says. Hence to keep at 
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bay the erect vision that the law has of human beings, as this judge is able to 
demonstrate, it is important to reiterate that, in Arendtian terms, we are all 
unique, singular and utterly vulnerable beings. Legal critical scholar Daniel 
Monk argues that ‗This is achieved within a flexible framework that creates 
space for and recognises, [. . .] social, cultural, and individual contingencies.‘325 
Hence an inclined law, less ego-centric and hegemonic, would be a slow and 
careful law, as reflected by the judge quoted above, which puts an active, 
attentive and compassionate listening ear at the service of its clients. This 
point is often made in relation to sexual violence too. One case in which a 
victim of sexual violence was not listened to was the case of violinist Frances 
Andrade who killed herself in January 2013 after being accused of lying in 
court.326 The defence lawyer did not listen to her, did not hear the singularity 
and uniqueness of her experience. It was after the court case that she 
committed suicide.  
 The importance of Cavarero for law is her contribution to views on 
maternity and motherhood and her challenge to reactionary views on women 
and motherhood. The view that woman is her body is very pervasive in many 
societies, hence women very often end up being boxed up in a one size fits all 
model of who they should be: a woman, a mother, a wife to someone. In this 
respect Carol Smart discusses how ‗legal discourse spawns the ‗good 
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mother/bad mother‘ dichotomy.‘327 Women‘s opportunity to control their 
reproductive choice is a vital point, one that needs to be taken seriously in 
order to bring back maternal power within female control and not leave it as 
part of the patriarchal hegemonic order which controls them and is external 
to them. 
 Reproductive laws affect women‘s lives, and they should have a say in 
them because these laws concern their bodies and their identity. The power to 
decide should be given back to them; the choice should be fully theirs. One 
case which exemplifies the cruel and ‗erect‘ application of the law is the 
Attorney General v X328 case. In addition, this case exemplifies what Cavarero 
argues, as I showed in the previous section, that the patriarchal-legal- 
scientific order sees the uterus, very problematically, as a disembodied entity. 
To look at legislation on abortion in Ireland, Northern Ireland, Italy and 
many other countries is a sobering enterprise. One realises so poignantly that 
women‘s bodies are still not fully their own, with consequent ramifications on 
their subjectivity and lived experience. There are many situations in which it is 
not only in the most extreme or obvious moments of legal control that 
control over women‘s lives and bodies occurs.  
A liberal feminist discourse on abortion and women‘s rights has been 
the most successful in all countries of the world where abortion is legalised. 
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This has been seen (probably naively) as the best solution; after all, liberal 
feminism believes in the laws that they think bring equality. Emancipation 
feminism was an easier discourse to follow–that women want to be equal to 
men and laws will give us that equality. As women‘s bodies, and subjectivities, 
were mainly and sometimes totally in the hands of a patriarchal understanding 
of womanhood for many centuries, to think we do not need a legislator to 
legislate on our bodies was still a big step, sadly, for many women to take. It 
was a step women were not used to taking freely as their bodies had been 
controlled and dominated externally by men for thousands of years.  
In the decriminalisation of abortion discourse, we can see a ‗new‘ 
freedom that women might have for their bodies and their subjectivities, a 
body and a subjectivity finally ‗controlled‘ internally and intrinsically by each 
woman, not controlled externally and extrinsically by the legislator and the 
State. During 2019, statutory restrictions on abortion rights have increased in 
the USA, where conservatives have pushed for abortion bans in different 
states, mainly Alabama, Georgia and Texas. A recent example of the denial of 
women‘s freedom has been seen in Alabama, where a ban was proposed by 
mainly male legislators.329 If abortion was decriminalised then these instances 
of trying or succeeding in banning women‘s abortion rights would not occur. 
The Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective, Irigaray, Cavarero, Cigarini and 
                                                     
329 Owen Dyer, ―Alabama Law Makes Almost Any Abortion a Crime,‖ British Medical Journal 365 (2019). 
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many other feminist legal scholars and ordinary women, tried to imagine a 
different relation, for women, with or ‗outside‘ the law.  
 In the next chapter, building on my analysis of Irigaray, Cavarero, and 
Italian sexual difference feminists, I further explore how relationality between 
mothers and carers is important for challenging the individualistic, 
universalistic and abstract view of the subject I have been criticising here. In 
the next chapter, I focus specifically on applying the frameworks I have 
analysed over the past two chapters to thinking through the relationality 






















Chapter 1 focused on a critique of the liberal subject and the problems with 
individualism, universalism, liberal equality and the abstract subject of law. I 
suggested that Irigaray, the Milan Women‘s Collective and feminist critical 
lawyers can inject a feminist approach into law. In Chapter 2 I discussed what 
a different kind of law might look like. The main question for this chapter is: 
does a relational model of motherhood disrupt the individualistic idea of the 
subject? Further questions I set out to explore are: how can the liberal subject 
of law, which is individualistic and abstract, become more relational and 
concrete? What does relationality mean as an alternative model to that of the 
individualistic and self-sufficient subject? What is the value of relationality 
between mothers/carers and what is the ‗symbolic placement‘330 of mothers 
today in the patriarchal symbolic order?  How might a different way of seeing 
                                                     
330 Sandra Bono, Paola and Kemp, The Lonely Mirror. Italian Perspectives on Feminist Theory. (London: Routledge, 
1993). p. 13.  
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the subject include mothers? How can the symbolic order change from one 
which is patriarchal and frames women in a restricted way, to one which 
recognises women as subjectively belonging to themselves and not to a 
patriarchal order which includes them but at the same time continuously 
excludes them because it does not speak to/of them?  
In this chapter I show the importance of relationality by engaging in 
relational thinking that I find closest to the theory and practice of my 
research. The theoretical approach of this chapter is based on relational 
ontology, which takes its inspiration from Hannah Arendt‘s thought on 
natality, plurality, and action, and from Cavarero‘s reading of Arendt. I want 
to show how Cavarero enters this debate by developing Arendt‘s thinking on 
these themes and adding the practice of sexual difference, in particular 
Irigaray‘s concept of sexual difference. I go on to look at the figure of the 
mother, as Cavarero has done widely in her work, and I suggest that the 
idealised figure of the sacrificial mother, so common in the West and 
exemplified by the Catholic Madonna, can be reversed and instead become a 
figure of resistance and freedom. This chapter is an exploration of the 
political rather than the legal and it lays the foundations for the next chapter 
on the 1970s  mothers‘ collective in Rome in that it focuses on 
relationality/carers – and relationality between mothers/women – which was 
at the core of the Roman collective.  
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the theory and praxis of autocoscienza, affidamento and partire da sé331 
The concepts and praxis I am interested in expounding in this section inform 
the rest of the chapter and the thesis. They originate mainly from Italian 
feminist thinkers and activists, the work of the Milan Women‘s Bookstore 
Collective (affidamento, entrustment is a practise ideated at the Milan 
Collective) and the feminist philosophical community Diotima,332 based at the 
University of Verona. Their thinking values the embodied, lived experiences 
of women. These feminists see an ‗embodied theory‘, (in Italian, una teoria 
corporale), as fundamental for uncovering the historical disappearance of 
women from philosophical and legal discourses via the abstraction of 
thought.  
Italian sexual difference feminists regard relationality between women 
as one of their core principles, as something to be practised in the concrete 
and put into theory afterwards in a lived, concrete experience of thought. As a 
result, owing to the practices of autocoscienza (consciousness-raising/self-
knowledge) and affidamento333 (entrustment — which was a practice of mutual 
recognition between women first articulated by the women of the Milan 
Women‘s Bookstore Collective involving the symbolic recognition by one 
                                                     
331 Affidamento means entrustment between women and partire da sé means ‗to start out from oneself‘. Both 
concepts are explained further in this part of the chapter. Also very important for Italian sexual difference 
feminists were the practice of autocoscienza (consciousness-raising) and la pratica dell’inconscio (the practice of the 
unconscious). The practice of the unconscious originated from the work done by the group led by the 
French feminist Antoinette Fouque called Psychanalyse et Politique. Italian sexual feminists were inspired by this 
practice and practised it and developed it extensively.  
332 ―Http://Www.Diotimafilosofe.It/,‖ n.d. 
333 See Graziella Parati and Rebecca West, eds., Italian Feminist Theory and Practice. Equality and Sexual Difference. 
(Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002).; Paola Bono and Sandra Kemp, ―Italian Feminist 
Thought: A Reader‖ (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991).  
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woman of another, similar to a mother-daughter relationship), that women 
were able to do together, collectively, they understood that their condition 
was not only a private and personal concern, it was a public concern too. 
These practices generated an identity that was more collective than 
individualistic and worked towards building relational links between women.  
Italian sexual difference feminists interpreted the early consciousness-
raising practice of American women‘s liberation by expanding it to include la 
pratica dell’inconscio (the practice of the unconscious) which was inspired by 
psychoanalysis.334 Some Milanese feminists adopted this practice, inspired by 
the French feminist group ‗Psychoanalyse et Politique‘ in short ‗Psych et Po‘335 
founded by Antoinette Fouque.336 In this group women used psychoanalytic 
practice, especially the relationship between analyst and analysand, in the 
relationships between women. What they were interested in was revealing the 
unconscious and ‗not said‘ in women‘s relations, the projections and 
identifications that can happen between women, which often originate from 
their relationships with their mothers. In 1972 the women of ―Psych et Po‖ 
organised two long weekends away in France, inviting many women and 
feminist groups from other European countries. A group of Italian feminists 
                                                     
334 Lea Melandri, Una Viscerilita’ Indicibile: La Pratica Dell’inconscio Nel Movimento Delle Donne Degli Anni Settanta. 
(Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2000). 
335 Antionette Fouque, Michele Idels, and Sylvina Boissonnas, MLF Psychoanalyse et Politique: 1968-2018 50 Ans 
de Liberation Des Femmes. Volume 1, Les Premieres Annees. (Paris: Editions des Femmes., 2018). 
336 Antoinette Fouque, There Are Two Sexes. Essays in Feminology. (New York: Columbia Univesity Press., 2015). 
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attended these meetings, and this is how some of the ideas of ‗Psych et Po‘ 
were then elaborated by Italian feminists, especially those from Milan.337  
The Milan Women‘s Collective challenged stereotypical ideas of what it 
meant to be a woman and they realized that it was patriarchal culture that had 
consigned them to those defined and restrictive boundaries:  
For it [the practice of doing] gathered together women who were not 
necessarily bound to one another by affection or familiarity, or rallied 
by succinct slogans, but who were unified instead by a common 
project, to which each of them was committed for her own reasons, 
her own desires and abilities, putting them to the test of collective 
implementation.338  
 
For the women of the Milan Bookstore Collective the political is located in 
one‘s own life story, and in Cavarero‘s philosophy it is in the corporal 
singularity of one‘s voice, necessarily exposed in reciprocal relations among 
other human beings, that we can find an ethics and value of relationships 
inscribed in one‘s uniqueness. According to Zerilli, the Milan Collective 
challenged ‗the conception of freedom, inherited by the Western tradition, as 
a phenomenon of the will, a property of the subject, and a means to an end 
whose name is sovereignty.‘339 In an affirmative move, for The Milan 
Collective, freedom is instead something quite different: 
It is a creative and collective practice of world-building, fundamentally 
inaugural in character, which establishes irreducibly contingent and 
politically significant relationships among women as sexed beings who 
                                                     
337 Alex Martinis Roe, To Become Two. Propositions for Feminist Collective Practice. (Berlin: Archive Books, 2018)., p. 
41; The Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice. p. 46-53.  
338 The Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice., p. 86.  
339 Zerilli, Feminism and the Abyss of Freedom. p. 93. 
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otherwise have none apart from their place in the masculine economy of 
exchange.340 
 
It is this this kind of collective, creative, and affirmative politics that I am 
interested in exploring further in the rest of the thesis. We will see this 
exemplified in Chapter 4 where I discuss the experiences of a mothers‘ 
collective in 1970s Rome.    
 Another interesting praxis was the powerful idea of partire da sé [starting 
out from oneself], as I already briefly introduced in Chapter 2. This was a 
personal and political praxis for women to learn to exercise autonomy and 
agency in their own decisions and actions. In the practice of starting out from 
oneself [partire da sé] one follows one‘s needs and one‘s desire, not in a self-
centred and individualistic way but in a way that makes one’s subjectivity coincide 
with one’s life, where both have a space for becoming. It is a desire that is linked 
to discovering one‘s bodily autonomy which is linked to subjectivity. For 
sexual difference feminists this praxis became vital in Italy in the 1970s and 
1980s when they realised that women had seldom ever followed their desires; 
on the contrary, their life and destiny had been framed and drawn by a 
patriarchal order.  
Following Arendt‘s thought on political action, Italian feminist 
philosopher Diana Sartori says that in her experience starting from oneself [partire 
da sé] means to start something, or rather, farsi inizio, ‗to be the starting out of 
                                                     
340 Ibid. p. 94. 
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oneself‘341 which has some similarities to the concept of natality put forward 
by Arendt. The importance of women following their desires is supplemented 
by the work of Cigarini as we have seen in more detail in Chapter 2. In her 
book La Politica del Desiderio,342 she shows how sexual difference feminism 
made it possible for women to follow their desires, to look for and discover a 
sense of agency, to find what it means for each concrete, embodied woman to 
be herself, from what Cavarero describes as the abstract what, to a particular, 
unique and embodied who.343 This is the reason why starting out from oneself 
[partire da sé] is fundamental here, because it is at the origin of ‗having control‘, 
‗gaining control over‘ one‘s subjectivity. This is not intended in the sense of 
mastering unity of the self but in the sense of being near oneself, essere vicina a 
se stessa, which is a centring and an individuating never ending process vital for 
women. This process is maybe even more necessary for mothers when they 
are constantly interrupted by their infant, toddler or child and their 
subjectivity is experienced as interrupted as Baraitser writes and as I have 
noted in the Introduction. What is probably needed then, when this happens, 
is a subjective move to be near oneself, to be more conscious of oneself, of 
ones‘ needs more necessary probably for a mother/a carer because she is 
more exposed to an experience that risk dispossessing oneself because the 
                                                     
341 ‗Partire da se‘, si potrebbe dire in questo spirito, significa ―iniziare‖ qualcosa, o meglio farsi inizio. Non 
esprimersi ma mettersi in gioco in una realta‘, facendola essere e cosi‘ facendosi essere.‘ In Diana Sartori, 
―Nessuno e‘ l‘autore Della Propria Storia: Identita‘ e Azione.,‖ in La Sapienza Di Partire Da Se’. ed. Diotima 
(Napoli: Liguori Editore, 1996), 23–57. p. 55. 
342 Cigarini, La Polit. Del Desiderio.  
343 Cavarero, For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression. And in the original language 
Cavarero, A Piu’ Voci: Per Una Filosofia Dell’espressione Vocale.  
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baby and child ‗interrupts‘ her subjectivity as Baraitser stated, as I said in the 
Introduction.   
Relationality helps us re-imagine and rethink the question of maternity 
and motherhood. Furthermore, it helps us to dislodge ‗the mother‘ from the 
solipsistic, sacrificial and, as Cavarero points out, oblative image that we often 
still have of her. Classical psychoanalysis from Freud, Winnicott, and Bowlby 
onwards saw the mother as a solipsistic figure and when she is discussed and 
theorised, she is often solitary. Women‘s subjectivity was often equated with 
maternal subjectivity so a mother was not seen as person with her own 
identity and subjectivity. For instance, in 1951 Bowlby‘s contribution to a 
World Health Organisation Monograph included the advice that mothers 
should look after their babies ‗365 days a year 24 hours a day.‘344 We can see 
how the woman, as person in her own right, did not exist in this scenario, she 
was only seen in function of her infant as a mother. I am also struck by the 
enormous task imposed on her, which Bowlby suggests a mother is to do 
alone. No other person is present in his indications. Feminist psychoanalyst 
Joan Raphael-Leff states:  
Psychoanalysis has long neglected maternal subjectivity. Within 
psychoanalytic theorising, a mother is usually treated as ‗object’ of the 
baby‘s desires, or depicted through the ‗containing‘ or ‗transformative‘ 
function that she performs. The mother as a person in her own right has 
been largely absent, as are the subjective meanings a woman gives to 
moment to moment lived experience of mothering a young child.‘ 345  
 
                                                     
344 Raphael-Leff, ―Healthy Maternal Ambivalence.‖ p. 1.  
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Indeed, the mother seems to be an isolated woman who ‗only‘ relates to her 
baby and is at the ‗service‘ of the baby‘s growing subjectivity. Furthermore, 
Joan Raphael-Leff states that ‗‗even Winnicott succumbed, resorting to the 
ordinary mother's devotion to her infant primed by ‗Primary Maternal 
Preoccupation‘ (1956) as the pathway to normal mothering.‘ 346 His idea was 
that mothers are engaged in a primary relationship with their baby but as we 
know, it is not sustaining for an adult to spend all day for many hours alone 
with a baby without support. I could rephrase the previous paragraph by 
saying that apart from being engaged in the primary relationship with her 
baby where there is a level of to and fro communication, a mother is alone, or 
often alone. These images of mothers that Freud, Winnicott and Bowlby had 
were often taken from stereotypical ideas of middle class, white mothers who 
were housewives, whose husbands worked all day out of the home. 
Experiences of Black mothers and mothers of colour, or collective mothering, 
or experiences of mothers who worked all day outside the home, were 
neglected in this image.347  
In classical psychoanalysis, whenever the mother is discussed, she is 
conspicuously alone, only relating to her baby and child, and she does not talk 
to other adults. It is as though she is not part of the adult world. At times, in 
some writings, the overemphasis on the humanity and centrality of the child 
can run the risk that the baby and child dehumanises, de-subjectifies the 
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mother, as the child is both the reason for her separation from the human 
world and her only connection to it. On the other hand, as discussed in the 
introduction, feminist psychoanalysts and feminist philosophers have 
reflected on the importance of a ‗separate‘ or at ‗some point separate‘ 
maternal subjectivity in the relationship of the mother with the child, and as 
Everingham states: 
The claim that mothers had rights and needs of their own provided a 
standard by which to assess psychological theories of child development. 
Feminist writers used this standard to highlight the innumerable ways in 
which psychological theories and models of child development 
oppressed women, through their failure to consider the other‘s set of 
separate needs and interests.348  
  
Feminist writers have given a prime place to the lived experiences and 
unconscious processes that take place once a woman becomes a mother.349 
Our task here, as feminists committed to relationality, is to safely transport 
the woman who is a mother/carer, ‗the mother‘, from the small island where 
she has historically been placed, to the communality of the world, especially, 
but not only, to relate to other women/carers, who like her are mothers and 
look after a vulnerable baby or young child. Specifically when I speak of 
                                                     
348 Christine Everingham, Motherhood and Modernity: An Investigation into the Rational Dimension of Mothering (New 
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relationality between women who are mothers and carers I speak of a 
relationality which, as Italian feminist theorist Ida Dominijanni argues, has the 
potentiality ‗to unleash female energies and desires and bring them to the fore 
in the world‘ hence it is not ‗a relationality which cuts out only reassuring 
―confined‘ spaces‖350 for women who are mothers. I contend that a relational 
model of motherhood has the potentiality to influence maternal subjectivity in 
a positive way, or at least in a complex way, making it more layered and 
multifaceted, when women who are mothers ―put these desires and energies 
in circulation in the world.‖ paraphrasing Ida Dominijanni.  
motherhood as a mode of resistance and freedom 
How do we recuperate motherhood from the sacrificial place into which it 
has been put? This recuperation can take many forms. I suggest it is crucial to 
carry on challenging the middle-class bourgeois idea of the family which is 
also nuclear and heterosexual because, as pointed out earlier, it is into this 
setting that classical psychoanalysis has ‗inserted‘ the often aloof image of the 
mother who looks at and relates to her baby, but to ‗nothing else.‘ 
Challenging this idea of the nuclear family is already a way of recuperating 
motherhood as a mode of resistance and freedom, as it allows for re-
imagining other ways of being a mother. The most pressing and important 
aspect of this is for women who are mothers to disentangle themselves from 
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the sacrificial, oblative image that they have carried with them, mainly in the 
West, for centuries. Culturally many women take a lot of the responsibility of 
mothering, thinking that is what they ought to do, that it is their calling, their 
nature.  
This naturalised image of the mother and of motherhood is often 
linked to religion particularly the Catholic myth of the Virgin Mary.351 This 
myth was explored in Marina Warner‘s book (1976) Alone of All Her Sex: The 
Myth and The Cult of the Virgin Mary352 in which she analysed the link between 
the idealised feminine and Catholicism. In this respect, Cavarero argues that 
we need to ponder what the figure of the mother is; we should not turn away 
from thinking and theorising about her because she is an oblative and sacrificial 
figure hence irrelevant for philosophy. Cavarero states:  
At the same time that the infant, as the emblem of a unilateral and 
absolute dependence, often appears at centre stage to exemplify 
relational ontology, the mother, because of the burdensome self-
sacrificing stereotype that is draped over her, is often absent.353 
 
Instead we need to look at ‗the mother‘ and through looking at and thinking 
about her, I argue, this figure can be revised; she can become a figure of 
resistance and freedom. 
Looking at the figure of the oblative mother there is also a lot of work 
on expectations placed on mothers (which vary according to class) to be 
                                                     
351 My own maternal Catholic grandfather venerated the Virgin Mary, la Madonna. He often used to listen to 
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352 Marina Warner, Alone of All Her Sex: The Myth and the Cult of the Virgin Mary. (Oxford: OUP , 2016). 
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responsible for the development of their children – so for instance the 
resurgence of ‗attachment parenting‘ – particularly in vogue with middle-class, 
educated mothers.354 There are ongoing debates within this group about the 
effects on children of their mothers going back to work or remaining home, 
and it perpetuates a naturalised and idealised view of the mother not 
dissimilar to the one associated with the Virgin Mary as discussed by Marina 
Warner.  
These views of motherhood have been analysed by Roziska Parker355 
and Jessica Benjamin too, the latter argues that the image of the mother in 
Western culture is an ―all-giving, self-contained haven.‖356 This style of 
parenting originates from the Anglophone world, following the work of John 
Bowlby357 on attachment theory and developed by American paediatrician Dr 
William Sears and nurse Martha Sears in their book on attachment 
parenting.358 These ideas perpetuate an idealised image and role for the 
mother. As psychologist Helena Vissing writes, ‗the psychological function of 
the maternal ideal is to block out fear of negative feelings and their destructive 
power; essentially a defence against ambivalence.‘359 Healthy maternal 
ambivalence is an important aspect of motherhood, the maternal ideal that 
                                                     
354 Linda Rose Ennis, ed., Intensive Mothering. The Cultural Contradictions of Modern Motherhood. (Bradford, Canada: 
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negates this is problematic. Social media use and the internet are making this 
style of parenting more popular in other parts of the world too. I argue that in 
an ‗insecure‘ world (climate change, austerity, wars, poverty, and now the 
Covid-19 pandemic etc.) mothers, and fathers too, may have a conscious and 
unconscious desire, and feel pressure, to make the life of their children more 
secure, so attachment parenting responds to those fears and insecurities too.  
 How do mothers become figures of resistance and freedom? The first 
step in exploring this aspect of motherhood, for me, comes from the Milan 
Women‘s Bookstore Collective. As we have seen they criticised liberal equality 
and argued that the institutional political system has:  
no problem in admitting that women are victims of a wrong, although it 
then reserves the right to decide according to its own criteria how they 
will be compensated, so the game may go on forever.360  
Furthermore, they contended that the State, to ‗justify‘ giving rights to 
women, needs:  
housewives, women with abortion problems, raped women – not flesh 
and blood women, desiring and judging, but figures of the oppressed 
female sex and, as such, avatars of everything female.361 
As the Collective saw it, liberal second-wave feminists worked within this 
paradigm; their main scope was to fight for women‘s rights, hence they 
positioned women as symbolically ‗passive‘ and victimised. In contrast, I 
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suggest that the Milan Collective sought to reject this victimisation and create 
a different symbolism for women. 
 I agree with Cavarero that it is important and interesting that theorists 
and philosophers keep investigating the figure of the oblative mother to 
dislodge her from the sacrificial space in which she has been pigeonholed, 
keeping in mind, as I just explained, that the way I see mothers is not as 
passive victims. I do not see the mother as a sacrificial figure but mothers in 
general in various countries are the ones paying a high price and working 
harder to combine motherhood with work and thereby keep an independent 
sense of self. During the 2020/21 Covid-19‘s world pandemic this has 
become even more prevalent.362 As I argued in the Introduction, middle class 
and upper class families particularly in rich countries all over the world are 
often able to outsource the care of their children, either via expensive 
nurseries or via nannies and babysitters. This is an example of neoliberal 
privatisation and racialised outsourcing of care. This aspect is crucial to 
understand neoliberal understanding of care and how mothers are placed 
within this system. We have seen during the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic how 
the economy was declared closed in many countries, sadly what was forgotten 
was that the unpaid work of reproduction that many women do had not 
stopped. That has carried on, and as before, but even more evidently, it was 
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women who took the majority of the burden of care.363 This is an aspect I am 
not dealing with in-depth in the thesis, as it requires a focused discussion, but 
at times I will discuss it briefly.  
In the UK, the government offers thirty hours of free childcare for two 
year olds. Before that how do parents who work cope? In some households 
one parent gives up work for few years and stays at home with the children. 
Often where this occurs it is women who stay home, but sometimes men. For 
instance in the UK ‗more than twice as many women, at 29%, than men 
(14%) have found that returning to work after having a child isn‘t financially 
worthwhile, according to research given exclusively to The Observer by the 
National Childbirth Trust.364 So either a parent stays home or they pay for 
private nurseries, nannies or au-pairs. In some countries these positions are 
filled by low paid migrants from poor countries as I mention in the 
Introduction. The rest of the society will either pay for poor quality nurseries 
with less trained staff or rely on family to look after their kids. Even though 
the social situation of mothers is better today than what it was fifty years ago, 
mothers are still among the worst off, both in rich and poor countries, when 
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National Stereotype.‘ ―La Mamma Italiana: Interrogating a National Stereotype.,‖ 
https://lamammaitaliana.wordpress.com/, n.d. Saraceno and Keck, ―Towards an Integrated Approach for 
the Analysis of Gender Equity in Policies Supporting Paid Work and Care Responsibilities.‖ Demographic 
Research. 25. 371-406. 
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neoliberal economic policies are implemented and austerity measures are put 
in place.365 As Imogen Tyler and Tracey Jensen said in the Special Issue of 
Studies in the Maternal dedicated to austerity parenting:  
In the current radical restructuring of welfare systems, reducing public 
services, condensed public sector workforces, rising unemployment and 
so on, emerging evidence finds that it will be mothers that are set to lose 
out disproportionately as these changes are implemented.366  
The lived experiences of mothers are often at the mercy of economic cuts in 
the public sector, therefore this research wants ‗to keep an eye on the mother‘ 
for this reason too. A 2017 Australian study found that single mothers whose 
benefits were cut managed their food intake and that ‗food had become an 
expense that could be tightly managed, limited or foregone.‘367 Like many 
other social groups, mothers are at the mercy of external factors which will 
affect their lives directly. There are developments of increasing legal and 
social regulation around women who are pregnant and breastfeeding and their 
duty and responsibility to their children.368  
                                                     
365 Dannielle Dolman, Anita, Schwartz-Bechet, Barbara and Joy Davis, ed., Motherhood in Precarious Times. 
(Demeter Press, 2018).; Abigail L. Silva, Dorsía Smith, Malik, Laila , and Palko, ed., Mothers, Mothering and 
Globalisation. (Demeter Press, 2017).; Giles Vanderbeld, Mothering in the Age of Neoliberalism.   
366 Tracey Jensen and Imogen Tyler, ―Austerity Parenting: New Economies of Parent-Citizenship,‖ Studies in 
the Maternal 4, no. 2 (2012). 
367 Hayley Jane McKenzie and Fiona H Mc Kay, ―Food as a Discretionary Item: The Impact of Welfare 
Payment Changes on Low-Income Single Mother‘s Food Choices and Strategies,‖ Journal of Poverty and Social 
Justice 25, no. 1 (2017): 35–48. 
368 ‗A survey of 20,000 mothers undertaken by Pregnant Then Screwed found that in the UK 46% of women 
were made redundant during the pandemic because of lack of childcare, 72% have had to work fewer hours 
because of childcare problems, and calls to a legal helpline for working mothers rose by 450%. The results of 
these inequalities filter directly to children, with 2.5 million children now living in food insecure households 
in the UK and 1 in 3 children in poverty. In addition 60% of women using domestic violence services are 
mothers, and it is now clear that there was a surge in domestic violence worldwide during conditions of 
lockdown,‘ in Baraitser and Spigel, ―Editorial.‖ see as well ―Https://Pregnantthenscrewed.Com/.‖ 
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 The way motherhood can be thought and recuperated as a mode of 
resistance and freedom could be to parent in a more collective form and to 
defy the capitalistic, private property view of what having a child entails, that a 
child is ‗mine.‘ There are concrete limitations, societal and cultural pressures 
that make it difficult to decouple a child from a possessive way of 
mothering/parenting. It can be challenging to become aware of the need to 
ask for support while mothering – not only from the State, from childcare 
provisions, but also organising informal childcare provisions among friends 
and relatives. I think in this decoupling of motherhood and private property 
there is the possibility of resistance and freedom for women who are mothers. 
This will come to the fore in Chapter 4 when I focus on one specific case 
study of the Mothers‘ Collective (Il Colletivo Madri) founded in Rome in the 
early 1970s, where the conservative idea of the family and the reactionary 
concept of motherhood, as we will see, was challenged, re-thought and re-
framed. Therefore, in the thesis I move away from a politics over life, a 
negative biopolitics which rules and excludes the body, towards an affirmative 
politics of life, put in place by the resistant biopolitical strategies of embodied 
singularities,369 to which I submit my suggestion of a relational and embodied 
model of motherhood.  
                                                     
369 As exposed by Italian philosopher Esposito, Bíos : Biopolitics and Philosophy. (Minnesota, London: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2008) 
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relationality between mothers 
What follows is what I consider to be a very stereotypical image of 
motherhood, which is at the antipode of what motherhood has the potential 
to be if disengaged from a patriarchal frame. When Israeli artistic director 
Hofesh Shechter of Hofesh Shechter Dance Company was interviewed a few 
years ago about his piece Political Mother, he was asked, ‗So for Political Mother, 
what were your initial ideas?‘ He replied:  
I started to think about neediness, both in our intimate lives and also in 
our relationships with our country, the sense of belonging, our 
nationalism. There is something very needy and quite pathetic about 
us…I was thinking about these emotional ties – with our parents, 
mother earth, our founding fathers. As I continued to think about this, 
the idea of connection between something political and something 
warm and cosy seemed impossible. But also very interesting to me. The 
words political and mother…the title made me smile. These two conflicting worlds. 
(my italics).370  
 
What I am interested in challenging in this thesis is exactly this idea that 
Hofesh Shechter discusses – that the words political and mother are two 
conflicting worlds/words. It is telling that these words made him smile, for 
into this smile we can read a lot of meanings. If these words made him smile, 
I on the other hand see no conflict at all – on the contrary I see them as 
linked. Maybe it is exactly the opposite of what Hofesh Schechter argues: 
because the maternal can be warm and cosy it is political; because it can bring us 
back, it reminds us of our connection to others, our relational existence, 
                                                     
370 Hofesh Shechter interviewed in 
―Http://Www.Hofesh.Co.Uk/Downloads/Political%20Mother%20Education%20Pack.Pdf,‖ n.d. 
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hence in Arendtian terms it reminds us of our political subjectivity in 
plurality.371 
Motherhood, as we have just seen, is often defined as apolitical, its 
activity consigned, identified, and marginalised inside the space of a home, the 
private and the insular; mothers are seen as conservative, motherhood 
idealized and romanticized.372 In this thesis I want to articulate a potentiality 
for politics in the relationality between women who are mothers. I am 
interested in the intersection between motherhood and politics as a site for 
political resistance and I see the political that links these two terms in a similar 
way to Italian feminist jurist Lia Cigarini and Italian philosopher and writer 
Luisa Muraro, who pointed out in 1992 in an article entitled ‘Politica e Pratica 
Politica’: 
A different practice in which all of us women of the movement 
recognise ourselves, concerns stepping from the political to the un-
political. That is the reason why we happily find ourselves in places 
which are political and not political, for example bookshops, 
collectives, and houses. We mix political occupations with others 
that don‘t have this name like holidays, work breaks, love and 
friendships. We do not say that everything is political but more to 
the point that everything can become political.373 
 
                                                     
371 ‗Men in the plural, that is, men in so far as they live and move and act in this world, can experience 
meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselves.‘ In Hannah 
Arendt, The Human Condition, Second (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). p. 4.  
372 Among others a book that challenges the idealized mother and the stereotypes relating to the maternal 
body is Jane M. Ussher, Managing the Monstrous Feminine. Regulating the Reproductive Body. (Hove, East Sussex: 
Routledge, 2006). For the silencing of the maternal in philosophy see as well Walker, Philosophy and the 
Maternal Body. Reading Silence. (London and New York: Routledge, 1998). 
373 Luisa Cigarini, Lia and Muraro, ―Politica e Pratica Politica.,‖ Critica Marxista. 3–4 (1992). ‗Un‘altra pratica 
in cui tutte noi ci riconosciamo, riguarda il passaggio dal politico al non politico. Percio‘  noi ci troviamo 
volentieri in luoghi che sono e non sono politici, come librerie e circoli o case, e mescoliamo le occupazioni 
politiche con altre che non hanno questo nome, come le vacanze, gli intervalli del lavoro, gli amori, le 
amicizie. Non diciamo che tutto e‘ politico, ma piuttosto che tutto puo‘ diventarlo.‘ p. 14. [my translation]. 
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Hence I am interested in an enlarged meaning of politics which is not solely 
confined to the formal politics of states and governments. Specifically, a 
mother‘s desire is to be heard as her own unique existent, as a who not as a 
what as I pointed out in the Introduction. Further, I propose that for someone 
who has a child in a nuclear family setting there exists a greater ‗risk‘ of a 
fusional and symbiotic attachment to one‘s child. Therefore, to emerge as a 
who, as a woman, alongside being a mother to a child/ren too is fundamental. 
So, it is vital that my story be heard in its specificity, its uniqueness. I have the 
feeling that I am heard when ‗my‘/this story, this life, this relationship with 
my child/ren can be brought to the fore and acknowledged, then I emerge 
more as myself, as a woman. Lisa Baraitser notes:  
the mothers I have worked with therapeutically over the years have 
constantly expressed the desire to meet with others to discuss what 
mothering was like; to share stories, guilts, anxieties, failures and 
confusions, as well as to try to sort out a way to proceed.374  
 
This desire to meet with others is at the root of relationality, for mothers and 
carers of any kind this need seems more prominent. It is almost as if the 
tensions, frustrations, joys, tiredness, constant demands of the maternal 
experience require an outlet, be it sharing childcare more with others, going to 
psychotherapy to make sense of it all, speak with friends and sometimes even 
with strangers about how one feels. It reminds me of a saying that ‗there is 
more space outside then inside oneself‘ which makes talking with others 
about the tribulations and joys of motherhood so important. It‘s as if it is too 
                                                     
374 Baraitser, Maternal Encounters. The Ethics of Interruption. 153.  
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powerful an experience to be contained only within one person that it needs 
to exit ones‘ self. I see mothering as having an intrinsic political potentiality, 
especially if linked to narration, to that need to narrate each other‘s story, 
which can be called a political praxis as it brings us to the sociality of the 
polis. In the private and public domain mothering is politics, or, as many 
feminists have argued, the private and the public need to be merged and not 
kept separate.375  
cavarero’s feminist and arendtian relational ontology 
 In the first chapter of The Human Condition, titled ‗Vita Activa and the Human 
Condition‘ Arendt writes: ‗Action, the only activity that goes on directly 
between men without intermediary of things or matter, corresponds to the 
human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit 
the world.‘376 She clearly sets out that the human condition is one of interplay 
between plurality and uniqueness when a few paragraphs later she states that 
‗Plurality is the condition of the human action because we are all the same, 
that is human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who 
ever lived, lives or will live.‘377 It is this connection in her work between 
action, plurality, politics, vulnerability and the uniqueness of each human 
being that makes her work remarkable and distinct from that of other 
                                                     
375 Italian feminist writer Lea Melandri has repeatedly said that, Melandri, Love and Violence: The Vexatious 
Factors of Civilisation. Melandri, Come Nasce Il Sogno D’Amore.; Rozsika Parker, ―Why Study the Maternal,‖ 
Studies in the Maternal 1, no. 1 (2009): 1–4. ‗I think Maternal Studies involves a profound recognition that the 
personal is the political, demanding that we trace the relationship between cultural formations, individual 
experience and the limitations of academic discipline, to allow maternal words – of both pain and pleasure – 
to be heard and understood.‘ 
376 Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958. p.7. [my italics]. 
377 Ibid. p. 8.  
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philosophers of the time, especially male philosophers. I am primarily 
interested in Arendt for how her theories have informed Cavarero‘s work, 
which in turn shapes my approach to the relationality of mothers. Leaning on 
Arendt‘s thought, Cavarero illustrates how ‗one‘s uniqueness, the fact that 
‗every human being is different from everyone else that has ever lived, lives or 
will live‘ is the category of the materiality of the body of everybody‘s 
existence.‘‘378 This traditional ontology is constructed through the negation of 
uniqueness, using abstract categories such as the ‗subject‘ and the ‗individual.‘ 
Cavarero has pointed out the transformational power of thinking politics and 
law through the prism of uniqueness rather than universal individuality as I 
noted in Chapter 2. We now ask ourselves, how can Cavarero‘s meaning of 
uniqueness, singularity-corporality of being, influence law? She has observed 
that: 
Individuality is…a repeatable, atomised, serial paradigm. Each 
individual, in and of himself, is as valid for one as he is for any other; he 
is equal because he is equivalent. Uniqueness, on the other hand, ends 
up rendering useless both the concept of repetition and the principle of 
generalization that nourishes the individualist theory. Uniqueness is an 
absolute difference, which…changes the very notion of politics.379 
 
It is vital that the law recognise sexual difference and Cavarero‘s view of 
uniqueness can help take sexual difference into consideration without 
essentializing women. For these reasons, I do not wish to objectify a mother‘s 
                                                     
378 Bertolino and Cavarero, ―Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference: An Interview with Italian Feminist 
Philosopher Adriana Cavarero.‖ p. 134. 
379 Cavarero cited in Hanafin, Conceiving Life. Reproductive Politics and the Law in Contemporary Italy. p. 93. 
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experience and subjectivity in an abstract notion of her humanity, hence, like 
Cavarero I maintain that: 
My use of ontology has Hannah Arendt as its specific referent. Like 
Arendt, I think ontology is not related to human nature, but rather, 
to the human condition. Our condition is that of corporal, unique, 
vulnerable human beings, dependent on one another and reciprocally 
exposed. This is precisely the contrary of the position advocated by 
various ontologies in the philosophical tradition.380 
 
Similarly, for what concerns us here, this concreteness, to which Cavarero 
brings her attention, mirrors psychoanalyst Joan Raphael-Leff‘s contention 
about mothers: 
Addressing ‗The‘ Mother universalises the particular, neglecting 
each mother‘s unique attributes and personal psycho-histories, 
including the specific circumstances of this particular conception; 
her own current internal representations of mothers and 
mothering, the number of other children in her household, and the 
age gaps between them, the degree of practical and emotional 
support available to her, as well as the surrounding matrices of 
socio-cultural expectations, economic resources and restrictions, 
provisions of maternity care, grants and leave, and normative 
considerations of age, sex, education, peers, class, race, ethnicity 
and so on.381 
 
For reasons just outlined, the modern abstract and individualistic concept of 
the subject is wanting: its solitary and ‗erect‘ position aptly criticized by 
                                                     
380 Bertolino and Cavarero, ―Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference: An Interview with Italian Feminist 
Philosopher Adriana Cavarero.‖ p. 137. 
381 Raphael-Leff, ―Healthy Maternal Ambivalence.‖ Studies in the Maternal, 2 (1), 2010, 
―Http://Www.Mamsie.Bbk.Ac.Uk/Documents/Raphael-Leff.Pdf,‖ n.d.  p. 3; Jacques Lacan also said ‗The 
woman does not exist.‘ precisely in this sense of the universal – only as a male fantasy which, I argue, is also 
that of the mother. If, as Lacan says, the male symbolic order recognises only the phallus, then women, 
having a vulva and a vagina, are not. Hence the human is universalised as having a phallus. Jacques Lacan, 
Seminar XX (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1998). and Jacques Lacan, ―The Signification of the Phallus,‖ in 
Écrits: A Selection.  (London & New York: Routledge, 2001), 311–22.  
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Cavarero, as discussed previously, is not enough to explain the nature of the 
lived experiences of embodied singularity in each of us, and mothers in 
particular. I suggest mothers in particular because the mother, as described by 
Joan Raphael-Leff above, is engaged in a psychological and physical 
experience of her subjectivity, or what I would regard as a double call (doppia 
chiamata), or a ‗double exposure‘ or a ‗double vulnerability‘ towards herself 
and towards ‗the call‘ (sollecitazione) on her by the vulnerable infant. This can 
be linked to Guenther‘s observation that ‗both the child and the woman are in 
different senses, vulnerable, passive, exposed to the Other.‘382  
According to British psychoanalyst D.W. Winnicott, the baby after all 
does not exist in isolation.383 The infant (hence the human being) exists in and 
because of the mother (or any primary carer), because of the relationship with 
her, so I would say that it is on both sides an active engagement with the 
other. Therefore, contrary to Guenther, I would not say that the mother and 
the infant are passive.384 I do not see vulnerability as something near to 
passivity – indeed I link vulnerability to exposure - as Arendt and Cavarero 
argue, but not to passivity per se. Lisa Baraitser, too, would argue that the 
mother is in a relentless movement, constantly interrupted by her baby, 
toddler, or child/ren. She writes: 
                                                     
382 Lisa Guenther, The Gift of the Other: Levinas and the Politics of Reproduction. (Albany: SUNY, 2006). p. 100 .  
383 Donald W. Winnicott, The Family and the Individual Development. (London: Tavistock Publications Limited, 
1965). p. 15. 
384 Jessica Benjamin too says that the infant is able to interact with others from day one: Benjamin, The Bonds 
of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and the Problem of Domination. p. 17-18. 
conceptualising mothers‘ relationality and the political in women‘s relations| 199 
I want to explore the notion of the maternal subject as a subject of 
interruptions; both she who is subjected to relentless interruption, and 
she whom interruption enunciates; a subject, that is, who emerges from 
the experience of interruption itself. In some senses it is barely possible 
to conceive of maternal subjectivity outside of interruption.385 
 
 Between these interruptions a mother experiences there is no passivity, she 
exists with a constant alertness, a knowing (an embodied knowing as well, 
which makes the body alert too) that she will be interrupted sooner or later.  I 
would argue that the infant is not passive either as I said above – she is 
vulnerable, exposed, but not passive. I would call this something like an 
openness and availability to the other, to the mother or his/her primary carer. 
Through the relationship and contact with the mother (or another primary 
carer) and the world, as Winnicott says, the baby comes into being, but it is 
this interaction between mother and baby which makes the baby exist, become 
and emerge as a person. Personhood and subjectivity are ‗reached‘ through 
relationality.  
The absence of this relationality has tragic consequences. We have 
painfully witnessed through the discoveries of orphanages in Romania in the 
early 1990s, where babies and children were found in a state of semi-existence 
both concretely and subjectively. This happened because no one had cared 
enough for them. In a Cavarerian light no one had inclined towards them.  I 
personally witnessed this in February 1990 when I travelled to Timisoara and 
                                                     
385 Baraitser, Maternal Encounters. The Ethics of Interruption. p. 67. [my emphasis]. 
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volunteered with an Italian GP for the Italian Civil Protection.386 We entered 
the orphanage and saw children and babies left neglected in cots. These 
babies and toddlers did not respond to a smile; they presented severely 
unusual behaviour for children of two or three years old, such as the inability 
to walk or smile. There were very few barely smiling faces in a room filled 
with about twenty children from six months to about three years. These 
children barely existed as persons, as a person deserves to be. They had not 
had someone/a ‗mother‘ who mothered them, who brought them to life/into 
being through love, care, and attention. Concretely and figuratively in their 
case, they did not have enough people inclining towards them in their cot. I 
have never forgotten that experience.   
The body of the mother, of a birth mother, is a body which is 
experiencing a real, concrete, embodied and psychological experience of being 
at times vulnerable and exposed, and ‗doubly exposed‘, as I said previously, 
because engaged in looking after a small child which, like her, is in turn 
vulnerable, fragile and exposed and which more than any other mammal is in 
need of assiduous care to be able to survive: 
A baby on the breast forces us to acknowledge the necessary nature 
of human dependency. We‘re not all self-defining individuals, 
forging our own paths and forming only relationships of our own 
choosing. Our bodies have needs that change over time and these 
needs make us weak and vulnerable.387 
                                                     
386 The Italian Civil Protection (Protezione Civile) is the national body in Italy that deals with the prediction, 
prevention and management of emergency events.  
387 Glosswitch, ―Unconfortable with Mothers Breastfeeding in Public? It Says More About You Than 
Them,‖ The Newstatesman, November 3, 2015. 
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It is this dependency and vulnerability I am interested to explore further. 
Cavarero in Arendtian terms, states that in considering the stereotype of 
maternity,  the maternal figure reminds us of the human being as 
vulnerable, fragile and centred in the relation in which each of our 
existence is brought to the fore during birth.388 
 In the next section I explore Cavarero‘s book Inclinazioni. Critica della 
Rettitudine389 (Inclinations. A Critique of Rectitude). In this book Cavarero 
interrogates the moral and political significance of the vertical and ‗erect‘ 
position of the subject of Western classical philosophy and political theory. 
She suggests that we need to rethink subjectivity in terms of inclination. She 
argues that the ‗erect‘ subject has the tendency to be autonomous, self-
sufficient, and individualistic. Instead, she proposes that we try to incline the 
subject to become more generous, open, and relational. She proposes that by 
leaning towards the other, we open up the subject to interesting ontological 
developments. The subject, the mother, the carer, incline themselves to the 
other who is vulnerable and because he/she is vulnerable. This symbolic and 
concrete inclination (imagine if the Romanian children found in orphanages 
in 1989 and early 1990 had someone inclining towards their cots and them, 
                                                                                                                                                           
―Http://Www.Newstatesman.Com/Politics/Feminism/2015/11/Uncomfortable-Mothers-Breastfeeding-
Public-It-Says-More-about-You-Them,‖ n.d. 
388 Bertolino and Cavarero, ―Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference: An Interview with Italian Feminist 
Philosopher Adriana Cavarero.‖ p. 148. 
389 Cavarero Adriana, Inclinazioni. Critica Della Rettitudine. Cavarero Adriana, Inclinations. A Critique of Rectitude. 
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looking in to their eyes and smile) is what makes us alive, responsive, in 
relation.  
cavarero: inclinazioni. critica della rettitudine 
In the introduction of Inclinazioni, Critica della Rettitudine, Cavarero focuses her 
attention on the different meanings of the term inclination, which she says 
derives from the Greek word for bed, kline, and how it has been used 
historically. She starts her study by taking into consideration German Jewish 
philosopher, essayist, and cultural critic Walter Benjamin‘s en passant comment 
regarding one of Kant‘s youthful fragments on the concept of inclination. 
Cavarero notes that Benjamin remarked in reading the fragment that a change 
of perspective in relation to the meaning of this term (inclination) would 
transform it into one of the fundamental concepts of morals.390  
Starting from this point she then centres her analysis and critique on 
the philosophical use and meaning of the terms erect and vertical, with 
enlightening results. She reminds us that historically philosophy has neglected 
the term inclination and the metaphors attached to it, preferring instead a 
vertical, erect philosophical worldview. She explores, among others, 
philosophical texts by Plato, St. Augustine, Hobbes, Kant, Arendt, Benjamin 
and Canetti, but she also enters into texts about the language of art by Barnett 
Newman, Leonardo da Vinci and Artemisia Gentileschi; finally, she explores 
                                                     
390 Cavarero Adriana, Inclinazioni. Critica Della Rettitudine. p. 7. Talking of W. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, 
eds. R. Tiedemann and H. Schweppenhäuser with the collaboration of Th. Adorno and G. Scholem, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1974-1999, vol 6, p. 55. 
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literary works by Virginia Woolf and Marcel Proust. She argues that 
philosophy has attached some problematic adjectives to the term inclination. 
One of the most common is to refer to someone‘s character as being of ‗good 
inclination‘ or ‗bad inclination.‘ Cavarero argues that another use is to link 
inclination to feelings and sentiments and that it is specifically this erotic and 
emotional inclination towards another person that philosophers have found 
disquieting. Therefore, classical philosophers, she notes, ‗perceive this 
inclination as a threat to the equilibrium of the subject.‘391 In particular, we can 
say that they perceive the threat to the rational, autonomous and 
individualistic subject as exemplified in my discussion in Chapters 1 and 2. 
Moreover, Cavarero states: 
philosophers fear mainly inclinations that are impetuous and difficult to 
dominate. They fear inclinations in the domain of eros, precisely those 
inclinations that are carnal and lustful. Importantly, what stands out is 
the specific propensity of women (or more to the point the female 
nature) to lasciviousness.392  
 
With irony Cavarero then adds: ‗in the library of the West when we speak of 
dangerous inclinations, women are always involved.‘393 Furthermore, she 
suggests, another link is made between what philosophers incessantly say 
about women‘s natural maternal instinct and the dangerous inclinations 
attributed particularly to them, especially the binary Madonna/whore. Citing 
Proudhon, Tolstoy, Kant and Schopenhauer, she shows how these authors 
                                                     
391 Ibid. p. 9. [My translation] 
392 Ibid. p. 10. [My translation] 
393 Ibid. p. 12. 
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were particularly suspicious of what they called women‘s dangerous 
inclinations because they thought that those would stir them away from the 
natural maternal instinct they attributed to women.  
Among the various examples that Cavarero takes from these authors, 
for the purpose of our analysis here on mothers‘ dangerous inclinations I 
want to look at one example Cavarero draws from Kant‘s thought, here as 
both Benjamin and Arendt have also drawn attention to it. In the lectures 
Some Questions of Moral Philosophy, reflecting on Kant, Arendt stresses that 
‗every inclination pushes us towards the external, it brings us outside 
ourselves.‘394 Cavarero says that despite its simplicity this phrase is crucial, as 
Arendt reminds us that in modern philosophical discourse, ‗at the centre of 
the scene there is an I in erect and vertical position.‘395 Philosophers have used 
this image very frequently. In Italian, it is described as ‗uomo retto‘ which in 
English can be translated as a ‗righteous man‘. The word retto derives from the 
Latin rectum which means just, correct, and honest. Cavarero actually specifies 
that the term ‗righteous man‘ is not really used as a metaphor but it has a very 
precise literal meaning; she says ‗it is a subject that keeps to the verticality of 
the right axes, which functions as a principle and a norm of his ethical 
posture.‘396  
From modern times, and particularly since Kant‘s idea of the rational 
and autonomous subject, this inclined posture has caused apprehension in 
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395 Ibid.  
396 Ibid. 
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philosophers. Following Arendt, Cavarero says, ‗the drive of the inclination 
undermines the ego from its internal centre of gravity, hence making it lean 
externally from itself towards ‗objects or people‘ and it eats into its stability.‘397 
For Kant, ‗founder‘ of the idea of the autonomous subject of Western 
philosophy, this inclination would be horrifying, Cavarero says. 
Proust‘s À la recherche du temps perdu, which shows how Swann lost his 
own self – ‗inclined himself too much‘— because of his love for Odette, 
provides Cavarero with a further example. In the realm of love and falling in 
love it is well known, even more so by non-philosophers, that falling in love is 
an attack on our ego as we inexorably incline ourselves helplessly towards our 
lover. This inability to maintain our autonomy, Cavarero says with a certain 
amount of irony, is in Kantian terms a great misfortune.  
Tolstoy, in Anna Karenina, equates falling desperately in love, especially 
as it happens to a mother, Anna, who then leaves her child, remarries, and 
ultimately commits suicide, with very negative connotations. Cavarero says 
‗the misogynistic vein that pulsates in Tolstoy‘s masterpiece wants the fallen 
woman, more so when she is a mother, to die and she dies in a horrible way.‘ 
398 For Tolstoy, the real, ‗natural‘ mother is une couveuse, as he projects his 
maternal idealization from the words of the most libertine character in the 
book who so describes Anna. Couveuse is a French word meaning a woman 
that broods. This word is associated with hens, like ‗the mother hen,‘ in 
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Italian she would be called ‗la madre chioccia.‘399 This image, Cavarero states, 
is highly problematic. Instead of being inclined towards the other, as many 
biblical images of Mary show her inclining slightly towards Jesus, this couveuse 
mother is totally supine; denied the erect position of Man, this woman is now 
flattened to the floor. 
Cavarero observes of the often inclined posture of mothers towards 
their children – depicted in art for instance —that this posture, which 
suggests another inclination, another politics, would be beneficial for all 
human beings. Her idea of rethinking politics stems from what can be called a 
stereotype of a mother inclining towards her baby, but here she strategically 
works on a stereotype. Cavarero adds that the autocratic, autonomous, auto 
referential and individualistic subject has been attacked by various critical 
currents for at least a century; and particularly in the postmodern period these 
voices aim at its fragmentation. She then adds that:  
instead of carrying on fragmenting it, (using Arendt‘s idea above 
mentioned), I suggest we could instead try to incline the 
subject….maybe, following the relational model, we could try to incline 
it towards the other.400  
 
This inclination towards the other is Cavarero‘s departure: to rethink the 
subject, continuing her long-term work around configuring a relational 
ontology that escapes the traps of individualist ontology. Cavarero writes that 
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the inclined subject is not the above mentioned image of the hen mother, 
who is an oblative, ever-giving mother, nor the erect position of the subject of 
Kantian philosophy; instead she takes as an example the mother who is 
inclined towards her baby to rethink our subjectivity. She works with a 
stereotypical image because as she says, in the stereotype there is a kernel of 
meaning that can be overturned. This image can be useful for mothers, carers, 
fathers, and any human. To be exposed, vulnerable, inclined towards others 
can add to our humanity. 
As I stated earlier, vulnerability, or in Butler‘s terms precariousness,401 is 
the human condition. Cavarero argues that the obvious fact that the infant is 
dependent on the mother or, I add, another primary carer, ‗instead of being 
re-codified, restructured and rethought, often is censored and kept under 
silence.‘402 That is one of the reasons why Cavarero chooses to interrogate and 
explore the various biblical images of Mary, mother of Jesus, as Marina 
Warner has done too from a different angle as I mentioned earlier, to unearth 
the cultural meanings buried deep in the most stereotypical of maternal 
images in the West. No proposal of a relational ontology can put this image 
aside, she contends.  
To show why it is vital to include this stereotype in propositions of 
relational ontology, in her last chapter called Coda: Adieu to Lévinas403 Cavarero 
turns to Lévinas to rethink his philosophy in beautiful and surprising ways, 
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this time suggesting that his thinking of the ‗face to face with the other‘ needs 
to include a mother, which Lévinas himself, in following the classical 
philosophical tradition, did not do. Cavarero argues that the mother has been 
erased, denigrated, or idealised in the history of the West, hence she calls for a 
recuperation of the maternal for the sake of philosophy, for the sake of politics.404 Lévinas 
most likely did not include the maternal because the Classical philosophical 
tradition has enacted an erasure of the maternal since ancient Greek times. 
Hence even when exemplifying the relationship with another, Lévinas 
excludes the most primal relationship all humans have, that we are formed 
and created within the womb of a woman, and are together with her body for 
several months and that we are born of a woman. This erasure and the 
problems attached to it are well explained by Braidotti here:  
The subject of the unconscious demands that the subject of 
philosophy – insofar as the latter claims the prerogative of 
rationalism – faces his/her incompleteness, recognises the libidinal, 
bodily roots of intelligence and accepts the partiality of her/his 
modes of thinking. This realization requires the problematisation of 
the maternal/feminine site of origin.405 
Therefore, following Braidotti, classical philosophy, should have developed a 
form or discourse which included the maternal/material origin of us all.  
As we have seen, Cavarero enters into a genealogical investigation of 
how the thought of certain philosophers – namely Plato, St. Augustine, 
Hobbes, Kant and Canetti – revolved around the idea of a subject that was 
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morally, and hence physically and symbolically, erect on a vertical axis. Two 
others offered an alternative vision of the subject; one that was inclined, one 
that questioned the main focus of Western thought. These were Arendt and 
Benjamin. It is in this paradigm that I see relationality between 
mothers/carers, a woman who is a mother, who inclines herself towards 
another mother, to support each other in recognition of the work that they 
are doing. When I talk of a mother, I see this term as Cavarero does – a 
person, a man or woman who is doing mothering work, and moreover, I see 
‗the mother as the name of an inclination towards the other.‘406 As I explained 
in the introduction, I centre my research on women who are mothers, 
because they are largely the ones still ‗rocking the cradle.‘407  
As Cavarero says, the mother is the prime ethical figure because she 
must make a decision every day: to care for or to hurt her child and the 
learning to manage imperfectly and to tolerate the ambivalence inherent in 
motherhood. Hence as motherhood is not a natural and biological call to care, 
it instead implies a decision, the taking of a decision; that is what is ethical, 
Cavarero says, not the end result of her decision. Therefore, I argue that being 
among other mothers/carers, talking to and with them, help mothers‘ 
decision-making.  It can alter the conditions under which the decision is 
made, making it a different type of decision with differing results.  
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The infant is the creature totally oriented towards the other, who has an 
absolute existential trust of the other, of the mother. The infant is defenceless. 
In this respect Cavarero, and others like Drakopoulou, as I discussed in 
Chapter 1, abhor the association of any ethical discourse that uncritically 
associates the maternal figure with an innate natural goodness. In Chapter 1 I 
specifically link this problematic ethical discourse with the one made by 
Gilligan. Cavarero says that ‗if we limit ourselves to seeing the maternal as 
synonymous with care we risk missing the ethical importance of the choice 
between caring and hurting, which is the main component of this 
inclination.‘408 We also risk assigning to the maternal ‗only‘ the role of a 
natural, biologically determined destiny towards caring for the vulnerable. 
That is why maternal ambivalence is an important aspect of motherhood and 
care.409 Cavarero explains, instead, where she thinks ethics is and where it is 
found: 
Ethics happens when one finds oneself singularly facing a decision to 
wound, to care or not to care. I think that the mother is an ethical 
figure. The infant is vulnerable per antonomasia as it is absolutely 
defenceless and the mother finds herself faced with the alternative of 
caring for or wounding this vulnerable human being (to abandon it, 
for example). It is well known that mothers have been killing babies 
since Medea and before her. Medea is an ethical figure, or one could 
say an unethical figure or the ‗ugly face‘ of the ethical figure.410 
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Similarly to Medea, in Beloved (1987), the novel by Toni Morrison,411 the 
protagonist Sethe kills her daughter Beloved to save her from slavery. She has 
to make a decision and the ethical decision in that situation for Sethe is to kill 
her daughter to save her. For French psychoanalyst Jacques-Alain Miller, 
Medea is an ethical figure too; he argues that Medea‘s act of killing her 
children is ‗where the woman takes precedence over the mother. She is not to 
be emulated but this is an example of what it means to be a woman beyond 
being a mother.‘412 The problem arises when the ‗maternal‘ is seen ‗only‘ as a 
natural call for caring and not as a call (una chiamata) towards the vulnerable 
and the defenceless ‗rooted in the decision‘ that Cavarero talks about above. 
If the maternal is seen only as a ‗natural inclination‘ to care, it obscures the 
possibility that it contains the ethical call to care or wound (ferita) which is 
typical of the inclination towards the other. It is this call that is ethical, not the 
answer to this call. Judge Smyth says that women sometimes neglect their 
children because they have alcohol or drug addiction or/and they are victims 
of abuse. She says by supporting these mothers to solve these problems first 
then the women may be better able to care for their children.413 Obvioulsy 
that is valid for fathers too.  
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Adrienne Rich aptly explores in her 1986 book Of Woman Born. 
Motherhood as Experience and Institution,414 motherhood is framed within a 
patriarchal model. How can we challenge this patriarchal model and re-
imagine motherhood? I suggest that a starting point for the latter is 
relationality between women who are mothers who are exposed towards each 
other with an understanding of the vulnerability and creative force intrinsic in 
motherhood. The vulnerability is not seen as a weak and stereotypically 
female characteristic because it is experienced by women, but in the way that 
Cavarero tells us, but as a recognition that the human condition is one of 
vulnerability as Hannah Arendt claims. I argue that it can be more so for a 
woman once she becomes a mother and looks after a small child who is in 
turn vulnerable. Hence relationality between women who are mothers can 
bring about an awareness of the condition of our shared vulnerability.  
My interest in relationality between women who are mothers also rests 
on a concept that I call ‗horizontal knowledge sharing between mothers‘, 
where knowledge is seen as a common good, not an individualistic acquisition 
but a feminist practice. Knowledge can be ‗distributed‘ and shared among 
mothers and carers so ‗augmented‘ knowledge of one‘s subjectivity, self-
consciousness, has the intrinsic potentiality to be shared and to be learned 
from each other. This concept has an additional meaning in the case of 
motherhood because practices of maternal care, (giving birth, caring for a 
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child and breastfeeding) are learned experiences which are acquired by seeing 
other women or men engaged in the work of care and reproduction. 
Acquiring knowledge and sharing it then becomes a political practice. In 
practical terms it means seeing our parental responsibilities ‗detached‘ from an 
individualistic concept of the family. Instead we look at friends as a support 
during the same journey of bringing up children. These shared tasks can be: 
sharing childcare, looking after each other‘s children, supporting each other in 
difficult times, enjoying communal holidays where many children spend time 
together, cooking for each other when needed and so on, hence opening up 
and challenging what Herring calls the ‗law‘s obsession with a child only 
having one mother and one father.‘415  
Following on from this I contend that relationality between women who 
are mothers/carers is relevant can help to inform us of a different way of 
being together, which is significant in a liberal society that tends to see human 
beings as autonomous, individualistic and abstract as I argued in Chapters 1 
and 2. All these terms neglect the specific needs and experiences of each 
singular mother. To further explain why the meaning of relationality is 
important and how I use it in relation to mothers, we can consider how 
Butler‘s Giving an Account of Oneself416 engages with the work of Cavarero. 
Butler argues Cavarero‘s philosophy makes this claim: 
I am not, as it were, an interior subject, closed up upon myself, 
solipsistic, posing questions to myself alone. I exist in an important 
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sense for you, and by virtue of you. If I have lost the conditions of 
address, if I have no ―you‖ to address, then I have lost ―myself‖. In 
her view one can tell an autobiography only to another, and one 
can reference an ―I‖ only in relation to a ―you‖: without the ―you‖, 
my own story becomes impossible.‘417 
 
Butler points out that ‗in contrast to the Nietzschean view that life is 
essentially bound up with destruction and suffering, Cavarero argues that we 
are beings who are, of necessity, exposed to one another in our vulnerability 
and singularity, and that our political situation consists in part in learning how 
best to handle – and to honour – this constant and necessary exposure.‘418 For 
the purpose of my research this becomes important because for a woman 
who is a mother, in relational terms, if she has not a ‗you‘ to address, then she 
has lost herself and without the ‗you‘ her own story becomes impossible. 
Going back to our discussion in Chapters 1 and 2, this begins to show how 
the law might be situated within this kind of politics and what kinds of 
demands can be placed on it. How do we move the law from the model 
discussed and critiqued in the previous chapter? What would a relational legal 
structure look like? 
 How can the law account for caring relationships between people 
when it regulates? How can the law, and how the law is practised, become 
infused with the idea that we humans are interconnected and care for each 
other at different stages of our lives? It becomes important here to look at 
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how Cavarero sees the law and how she thinks it affects women. The law can 
be rigid and fixed, unbending and erect as described by Cavarero in her 
analysis of the subject of Classical philosophy and as I have analysed in 
Chapter 1 and 2. The law does not always provide justice and equal outcomes 
for people. In particular, the law has often been interpreted against women419 
as I have argued in Chapter 2 in the discussion of Attorney General v X and 
Evans v United Kingdom. These two cases stand as a few examples among many 
of circumstances in which the law has been applied in a way that undermines 
women‘s autonomy. Another example is how the court process works in 
disfavour of women is how rape, domestic and gender violence victim are 
treated in court cases. Often women have not been believed, there are some 
stereotypes about women and mothers which influence the court and often 
women have had to tell the story of their ordeal in front of the perpetrator 
and the courts which is often a very traumatic experience in itself.  
As we have seen in Chapter 1 and 2, Cavarero thinks that some laws 
and regulations further imprison women in a symbolic way within the 
patriarchal paradigm. To accommodate a more flexible, humane, and caring 
application of the law, I suggest that we  ‗incline‘ the law itself to each singular 
person‘s needs in a move inspired by Cavarero‘s thinking in Inclinations, to 
recognize each person‘s uniqueness and vulnerability. Following this then we 
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can think of a more ‗caring law‘? 420 This ability to recognise the needs of 
singular, unique people as Arendt and Cavarero would say is similar to the 
discussions of intersectional feminist approaches I discussed in the 
introduction. These approaches have made great inroads in accounting for the 
variety and complexity of women‘s experiences from different standpoints (as 
a minimum race, class, gender, and sexuality).  
In the next section, I explore how Cavarero‘s work on storytelling is 
inherently relational, how narration and the voice make up the fundamental 
ingredients for a relational ontology which is relevant, I argue, for mothers 
looking after a vulnerable child. I take into consideration the importance of 
narration for an embodied understanding of politics, and I focus on 
Cavarero‘s important and original reading of Arendt. To be more caring the 
law needs to listen to others.421 
storytelling, a vital practice for mothers?  
Cavarero‘s 1997 book Tu che mi guardi, tu che mi racconti, (You that look at me, 
you that tell my story) published in English in 2007 as Relating Narratives. 
Storytelling and Selfhood, discusses an alternative political subject shaped by 
relationality between, in Arendtian terms, unique existents. This book, as the 
title makes clear, centres on narration. Cavarero argues that narration is a 
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better means to tell someone‘s life story, better than philosophy can ever be. 
Discussing narration helps put forward my idea on relationality and how 
talking with others is important. According to her and to Arendt, philosophy 
is able to tell what one person is but not who she is, but ‗unlike philosophy, 
which for millennia has persisted in capturing the universal in the trap of 
definition, narration reveals the finite and its fragile uniqueness, and sings its 
glory.‘422 Cavarero compares philosophy and narration and finds that narration 
is better at exemplifying the uniqueness of each person‘s life. In this account 
of the link between narration and selfhood, Cavarero investigates the 
characteristics that make our lives unique.  
Similarly to philosophy the language of law can be abstract, based on 
universalistic world views and definitions as I analysed via Cavarero‘s work in 
Chapters 1 and 2.  Her work interlinks narration and philosophy and it offers 
an alternative concept of subjectivity which refuses the logic of the 
postmodernist fragmented subject. The Italian feminist political philosopher 
Olivia Guaraldo says, ‗in times of postmodern fragmentation and proliferation 
of identities Cavarero vigorously affirms that identity is not multiple but one, 
besides, if the Subject is dead it might not be the same for our own, real, 
sense of uniqueness‘.423 The critique that Cavarero makes of philosophy I 
suggest can also be made of law and it can help develop an understanding of a 
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law which is more attentive to our own uniqueness and the narrative of our 
life.  
Furthermore, I am interested in exploring the place of narration in a 
mother/carer‘s life, in her sense of self, her subjectivity and identity. I am 
interested in how  the ability to process and tell one‘s difficulties or joys to 
someone else, especially with regard to caring for  a baby, a child, or children, 
can help one have a better experience of it, or at least to feel heard. There is a 
saying in various languages, ‗better out then in‘ which can refer to a variety of 
things including emotions as many psychotherapists can attest.  
Cavarero has linked narration, as conceived by Arendt, with the Italian 
feminist practice of self-consciousness-raising groups or ‗gruppi di autocoscienza.’ 
These were established in Italy in the 1970s and 1980s in many different cities 
where groups of women met to talk about their lives, their relationships, their 
sexuality, their families, and many other topics that they needed to share with 
other women. This for me is a starting point for arguing the importance of 
mothers telling each other their life stories, because one of the most socially, 
culturally, psychologically charged experiences, that of being a parent and a 
mother, needs stories to elaborate its difficulties, joys, significance, and 
frustrations. I maintain that for a mother, talking and relating to another 
mother is being engaged in politics. Cavarero argues, ‗the reciprocal narration 
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of consciousness-raising groups is one scene in which the self is constitutively 
exposed to the other – an exposure that makes this a political scene.‘424  
How can we tell our story to another person? How can the other 
person tell our story, or to use a psychoanalytic Winnicottian image, how can 
the other person ‗hold‘ my story?425 As discussed earlier, Winnicott described 
the holding environment as the ability of the ―good enough parent‖ to 
provide the baby both with safe physical holding and the capacity to hold and 
tolerate the child‘s emotions and frustrations.426 Consequently, he argued that 
psychotherapy provides a holding environment for the patient‘s emotions. 
What would that mean in relation to this particular analysis?  
My idea of using a Winnicottian image for mothers ‗holding‘ another 
mother‘s story is a metaphor for a woman who is a mother providing the safe 
and holding environment for another woman to be able to tell her story and 
be heard. This allows for the person listening to the story to create a listening 
‗space‘ for the feelings of another mother. Or it allows for women to mirror, 
speculum (using the title of Irigaray‘s noted book427) each other‘s experiences 
and feelings into the experiences of someone else. This mirroring is an 
important aspect of our ability to be, our ability to remain human and to see 
our difficulties as something common that others experience too. Without 
this mirroring I sink into myself, no one can help me come out of the hole 
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that has been created in myself by my difficult emotions. Mirroring can be 
similar to inclination. Inclining oneself towards another or mirroring oneself 
in another‘s experience. Both speak of reciprocity, of what it means to live in 
relation with others.  
What do I mean by holding a story? I mean emotionally, when you 
have shared part of your life with someone, your difficulties and challenges or 
beautiful intimate moments and discoveries, the other person holds on (to) 
the story for you. This knowledge that someone you trust can tolerate your 
story makes it easier for you to go about your daily life. It may make it 
possible to share and expose one‘s vulnerability within a relationship based on 
trust, love, affection, and pleasure in spending time together. I think this is 
what women may discover once aware of patriarchal constraints and they 
search for a space for themselves, shaped by their own desires.  
This is precisely what happened in the late 1960s, 1970s and early 
1980s consciousness-raising groups. It has to be said that conversely, telling 
your story to another woman might also be met with envy and jealousy. This 
is where the idea of disparity, can be helpful. Bringing class, education 
differences to the fore can help in opening up discussions on inequality, 
access and privilege, which can help in realising that some of the 
disadvantages one has experienced are at times a product of external forces: 
capitalism, a patriarchal family, access to education and so on. As the women 
of the Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective, stated, ‗from being objects of 
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exchange, as they were in the male world, women can and must become 
subjects of exchange.‘428 Irigaray argues that jealousy mainly stems from 
women competing in a patriarchal society for men‘s attention and in addition, 
she says that our culture does not have many representations of women‘s 
affection for each other, women‘s relation to each other.  As I argued in the 
first chapter, and as Irigaray argues, there are not enough positive 
representations in art, literature, and cinema of mother-daughter relationships, 
in our culture a mother always carries a son.429 This lack of representation was 
much more acute in the 1960s/1970s, making this a challenge that 
consciousness-raising groups had to confront. As described in the Milan 
Women‘s Bookstore Collective book Sexual difference in 1972, the French 
women organised two international feminist meetings, one of which lasted a 
whole week, at la Tranche (Vandee) under the auspices of the MLF 
(Mouvement de Liberation des Femmes), and a five-day meeting which was 
organised entirely by Politique et Psychoanalyse. Several Italian women 
participated in these meetings and were greatly impressed by the force of the 
French women‘s ideas and practice:  
Some of the Italians understood that there was strength well worth 
appropriating in this ability to act politically without idealizing women 
and their relationships, and they tried to find a way to learn what the 
French had to teach them.430  
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As I have previously argued, it is important that women and their 
relationships are not idealized. Sadly, the feminine does at times fall into 
idealisation, as Cavarero and others have explored. This is often due to the 
need of patriarchal cultures to reject and deny the fact that women may – 
rightly so – not match the ideal. In idealisation there is less space left for the 
integration of ambivalence.  
For my work on relationality between women who are mothers, my 
main interest in the political practice of the Milan Bookstore Collective rests 
upon two things that the Collective discovered through their practical and 
theoretical work on relationality. The first two, discussed in Chapter 1, are the 
practice of autocoscienza (consciousness-raising/self-knowledge) and affidamento 
(entrustment) of one woman to another to learn from such self-knowledge and 
circulate it into the world. Secondly, and importantly in this context, is the 
realization that women are different, mothers are different, and we should not 
hide this difference in the homogenising idea of ‗sisterhood‘. Hence the 
practice of disparity is very significant for my understanding of relationality. 
This realisation came about after a few years of feminist politics. The Milan 
Collective reflected on the theme of differences between women. They called 
it disparity. It  was a practice that they felt was needed to bring to the fore, 
discuss and realise real and concrete difference between women (in education, 
class and race) and bring them out in the open, not let them simmer in the 
unconscious. Disparity between women was recognised.  
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They focused on this theme after they realised that among women 
there was the ‗risk‘ of perpetuating mother-daughter relationships or a 
symbiotic relationship, which they saw too in some of the idealization within 
the feminist movement of the term and the practice of sisterhood which was 
practised in the USA. For the women of the Milan Women‘s Bookstore 
Collective, relationality was not about sisterhood, hence it was important to 
delve into the differences among each other to keep this ‗risk‘ at bay: 
Unique to the Italians is their discovery that differences among women 
are meaningless unless there is some way to relate them to each other, 
to evaluate them or judge them. Not wanting to acknowledge 
differences is, on their account, a problem of not knowing how to 
acknowledge them. Learning how will require developing the political 
ability to relate and judge differences among women, which in turn 
requires another political skill: the feminist symbolization of sexual 
difference.431  
 
Disparity, for the Milan Bookstore Collective, was to discover and 
acknowledge that women were not all the same, that women envied each 
other for something they did not have or know (class and education 
differences were acknowledged). Hence differences between women were not 
flattened through a neutral idea of equality, but acknowledged.432 Potential 
conflict and difference where taken into consideration, even seen as positive, 
it was a politics that tried to work with these differences. It included 
differences and made facing differences a process within their politics. 
                                                     
431 Ibid. p. 92. 
432 Ibid. p. 108-113.  
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Therefore, in my idea of relationality between women I am careful not to 
make it into an idealistic politics, as I am aware of the problems of doing so. I 
work with this in mind – that women may be in conflict with each other or 
hate each other. As stated in Chapter 2, Italian feminists often used 
psychoanalysis in their approach and thinking.433  
 Another interesting feminist practice Italian feminists engaged in, 
especially the women of the Milan Bookstore Collective and those connected 
with their work, was the practice of l’autorita’ femminile,434 female authority. 
Female authority, as intended by Italian feminists, is different from power or a 
link to authoritarianism. It is an authority that I recognise in another woman 
(who maybe has specific personal or professional skills) who in turn 
acknowledges it and puts this authority in circulation for others to learn from 
her, to support a change, and awareness. Often it is an exchange between two 
people. It is precisely because Western culture has mostly excluded difference 
and tends to value sameness that disparity and female authority are important 
feminist praxes. Because they value difference, problematize it, and do not 
run away from it or try to homogenize the discourse.  
For Arendt and Cavarero too, narration is political, first of all because it is 
relational.435 This exposure to another to which Cavarero refers is embodied 
and is made up of the affective, corporal and sensual vicinity between two 
                                                     
433 Melchiori, ―Psychoanalysis in Early Italian Feminism. The Contributions of the Practice of the 
Unconscious.‖ 
434 L’Autorita’ Femminile. Incontro Con Lia Cigarini. 
435 Paul A. Kottman, ―Translator‘s Introduction,‖ in Relating Narratives. Storytelling and Selfhood. (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), vii–xxxi.  p. x. 
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people, two bodies. This vicinity and relationality was experienced in the 
Italian feminist movement by the ‗gruppi di autocoscienza‘, the consciousness-
raising groups, and later, when the analytical setting of the unconscious was 
transferred to women‘s groups and the practice of the unconscious436 took place. 
In chapter five of Cavarero‘s 2001 book Tu che mi guardi, tu che mi racconti437 she 
recounts the story of two women who tell each other their life story and what 
happens when one woman writes the story of the other woman and gives it 
back to her. Cavarero makes us witness to a true and very personal story of 
two friends in Milan, a story which is told in the Milan Women‘s Bookstore 
Collective‘s Non Credere di Avere dei Diritti (Don‘t Think You Have Any 
Rights).  
She starts the chapter thus: ‗We are in the 1970s, and the protagonists 
are two friends with assonant names: Emilia and Amalia. They attend, in 
Milan, ‗la scuola delle 150 ore.‘438 Amalia is the more ‗talented‘ one; she is able to 
express herself better both vocally and in writing. Emilia lacks these abilities. 
While at the ‗scuola delle 150 ore’ they exchange various writing exercises but 
Emilia is unable to express her life story in writing, so she keeps talking about 
                                                     
436 Melchiori, ―Psychoanalysis in Early Italian Feminism. The Contributions of the Practice of the 
Unconscious.‖  
437 Adriana Cavarero, Tu Che Mi Guardi, Tu Che Mi Racconti. Filosofia Della Narrazione. (Milano: Feltrinelli, 
2001). Cavarero, Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood. 
438 ‗Le scuole‘ delle 150 ore‘, ‗the 150-hour schools,‘ were schools founded by the Italian Left in the 1970s, 
whose purpose was to provide supplementary education in the arts and sciences for workers or housewives 
who lacked higher education – workers were allowed to take 150 hours, paid, out of their work year in order 
to attend these schools.‘ Cavarero, Tu Che Mi Guardi, Tu Che Mi Racconti. Filosofia Della Narrazione. p. 65, 
quoted from The Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice. 
pp.102-7. Feminist writer and activist Lea Melandri was one of the coordinators and teachers of the ‗Scuola 
delle 150 ore‘ in Via Gabbro in Milan. The experience is as well the theme of a documentary by Adriana 
Monti, Scuola Senza Fine (Italy, 1983).  which is as well told in the book edited by Maria Bruno, Giuliana and 
Nadotti, Off Screen: Women &amp; Film in Italy. (London and New York: Routledge, 1988).  pp. 80-2. 
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it. Amalia, on the other hand, is able to write her own life story and one day 
she gives it to Emilia to read ‗When I let her read what I had written, 
especially when I was talking about my hometown, about the farmers and in 
particular about my life, she cried,‘439 Amalia says. Consequently, Amalia 
decides to write the story of Emilia‘s life (because by now she knows it by 
heart) and gives it to her to keep. After Emilia read what her friend had 
written about her life, ‗she always carried it in her handbag and read it again 
and again, overcome by emotions.‘440 Cavarero says:  
Amalia and Emilia are two friends. The first writes the story of the 
second because Emilia has continually recounted her story, in the 
most disorganised way, showing her friend her stubborn desire for 
narration. The gift of the written story is precisely Amalia‘s 
response to this desire. Now Emilia can carry the text of her story 
with her and re-read it continuously – moved every time by her 
own identity, made tangible by the tale.441 
 
In this we see the importance of having someone to tell one‘s story – the 
political practice of relational biographical storytelling to which Cavarero 
brings her attention. We can see how Amalia managed to give Emilia an 
experience of her own subjectivity – of who she was – with the support of a 
trusted friend who told her story. Some feminists – including my mother 
Bertilla Bonato – have said that what was revolutionary about the feminist 
movement of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s and was witnessed by women 
                                                     
439 Cavarero, Tu Che Mi Guardi, Tu Che Mi Racconti. Filosofia Della Narrazione. p. 55 quote from The Milan 
Women‘s Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice.  
440 Cavarero, Tu Che Mi Guardi, Tu Che Mi Racconti. Filosofia Della Narrazione. p. 55.  
441 Ibid. p. 56. 
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themselves and by the outside society was the extraordinary fact of the birth of 
a (new) subjectivity. In this, we see how the practice of affidamento is exemplified 
through the relationship between Amalia and Emilia, and we can say that they 
expose their singularity to each other and engage in politics in a similar way to 
that described by Cavarero: 
the scene of narration, of telling each other life-stories, takes on the 
character of political action. Moreover, through such a suspension 
between discourse and life, it becomes possible to imagine a 
relational politics that is attentive to who one is, rather than to what 
one is. For within the context of telling someone the story of 
his/her life, within the scene of a narrative relation, the focus is 
shifted from the generalizable qualities of those involved, to the 
unique existents with whom the tale corresponds.442 
 
Suppose someone does not have anyone to tell their story? More precisely, in 
the context we are reflecting here, suppose a woman who is a mother does 
not have anyone to tell her story? Suppose she has no one to describe her 
experience of motherhood, the changes that bringing up a child provoke in 
her? What does it mean for these mothers to talk? The ability to tell one‘s 
story to another person, to another woman or to another mother/carer is a 
vital skill for mothers, as it can make the experience of motherhood maybe a 
little easier and/because less solipsistic. More importantly it makes mothers 
realise that their experience is not unique, that motherhood is challenging, 
especially if experienced in isolation. The experience of motherhood can be 
                                                     
442 Kottman, ―Translator‘s Introduction.‖ p. xxiii. 
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singular and shared too because every mother is different, and every baby is 
different, and their relationships is unique.  
In this chapter I have suggested that in mothers‘ relation lies a 
potentiality for politics. I have challenged the idea of motherhood as 
functional to the nuclear family and suggested that instead it can be 
recuperated as a mode of resistance. It is not that motherhood gives freedom 
per se but, if a mother can find alternative modes of care and get support from 
other carers, then she could feel less isolated and involved in a shared 
experience. This can give freedom to a carer. As well, I have suggested the 
importance of connecting care with storytelling adding to that ability to share 
one‘s story of disquiet, distress, joy, relief, confusion, exhaustion can help a 
carer feel freer because by being heard part of the feelings of isolation and 
managing the time and the tasks of what care implies can be shared. My friend 
novelist Amanthi Harris has led a storytelling making workshops for new 
parents and parents to be.443 The aim was to make a story about oneself in this 
specific time of change and share old tales of transition. Motherhood being a 
poignant transition444 is particularly open to be told as a story.445  
The themes of relationality and politics explored here are the 
foundational ideas of the whole thesis and they help me ground the next 
                                                     
443 ―Http://Amanthiharris.Com/New-Ace-Funded-Workshops-for-Adults-with-My-Project-Storyhug/,‖ n.d. 
444 ‗Many women find mothering a shocking experience in terms of the extremity of feelings it provokes, and 
the profound changes it seems to prompt in identity, relationship and sense of self‘. Baraitser, Maternal 
Encounters. The Ethics of Interruption. [Backcover]  
445 This delightful novella by my friend Amanthi tells the story of a woman nearing the due date and 
wondering the kind of mother she will be. Amanthi Harris, Lantern Evening (Norwich: Gatehouse Press, 
2017). 
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chapter which gives a concrete example of these ideas. It focuses on a 1970s 
Roman mothers‘ collective, and shows it is possible to create an alternative 
way of living and experiencing motherhood, one which is collective.   
  









rome 1970s: the politics and praxis of Il collettivo madri  
  
 
In the spring of 2019 I was on holiday in Italy – near Rome – and I met with 
Silvana Pisa, one of the members of the 1970s Roman mothers‘ collective, Il 
collettivo madri, which I discuss in this chapter.446 I have known Silvana since I 
was a child as she is a dear long-term friend of my maternal aunt Francesca, 
who was also a member of the mothers‘ collective. When I met Silvana she 
was writing a book, which was published in March 2020. The title is Il Gioco 
dei vestiti. Passione, politica e altre storie del ‘68447 [The Game of Clothes. Passion, 
Politics and other Stories from 1968]. On that occasion she gave me the draft 
of the book, which is what informs this chapter. The book is partially 
                                                     
446 For an exhaustive list of 1970s and 1980s feminist groups and collectives in Rome and Lazio, the region 
where Rome is in, see this website: ―Http://Www.Herstory.It/Category/Gruppi/Gruppi-Anni-70,‖ n.d. 
447 The book has just been published in March 2020. Silvana Pisa, Il Gioco Dei Vestiti. Passione, Politica e 
Altre Storie Del ‘68. (bordeaux ebooks, 2020). Il gioco dei vestiti (Clothes swaps) refers to the fact that many 
women in the 1970s started exchanging clothes between each other. It was a very usual practice.  
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autobiographical, of her experiences in the political feminist movements in 
Italy in the 1970s and afterwards when she became an MP in the Italian 
Parliament. Silvana recounts some of the experiences in the feminist 
movement, which brought about in her, and other women, the consciousness 
to be able to say (as we saw in the Introduction) ‗Io, sono mia!‘. When Silvana 
gave me her draft the book was provisionally titled Dall’Io al Noi [From the I 
to the We], and this is still the name of one of the chapters. This is an 
important concept and experience for feminists of that period as they realised 
that the ability to shape one‘s subjectivity, which is meaningful and rooted in 
one‘s experience, happened mainly within feminist groups. The relationship 
with other feminists, the many dialogues they engaged in, helped women 
understand better who they were and so from a feeling of belonging to 
oneself they realised that the subjective I had meaning because they were part 
of a wider We, a collective becoming. They built what can be called an ethic of 
relationships which became a force, a life-long imprint and modus vivendi. In 
previous decades and centuries women‘s identity was defined, framed, and 
forced by what can be called a patriarchal male code. In relation to the 
maternal the dictated patriarchal code was particularly restrictive for women. 
We can say that the main two achievements of the women of the Mother‘s 
Collective were in building relationships between women and in challenging 
the patriarchal framing of ‗la mamma.‘ 448 In this chapter and the next (the last 
                                                     
448 Penelope Morris and Perry Willson, eds., La Mamma: Interrogating a National Stereotype. (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2018).   
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one) one too I propose to mainly think through these two questions: firstly, 
can a relational model of motherhood protect women from the loneliness449 
many experience in the first few months and first years of a baby and child‘s 
life? Secondly, how does a move away from a model of care based on liberal 
individualism to a feminist model based on relational ontology that fosters the 
commoning of care as political collective organising modes looks like? The way I 
reply to these question in this Chapter is by showing how a group or Italian 
feminist women created a collective to elaborate in what it meant to be 
mothers – and feminists (as this was not obvious in the early 1970s in Italy – 
and how they could engage in collective way to be mothers and look after 
their children. In delving in the mothers‘ collective I present one example in 
which mothers were supported by a caring community of carers and how by 
feeling supported, heard and seen they were able to have a more fulfilling 
experience of motherhood and their subjectivity was experience less as 
lacking, a void but more a fulfilling experience. Further in the chapter then I 
show other examples of mothers‘ collective across the world and how they 
engaged in collective care.   
Pisa, now in her early seventies, has had a varied life filled with many 
interests and passions: she has been a primary school teacher and a writer, and 
                                                     
449 In 2016 research published by the Co-op and the Red Cross identified becoming a new mum as one of six 
main causes of loneliness.  They say ‗New research shows that a staggering 82 per cent  of mums under 30 
feel lonely some of the time while more than four in 10 (43 per cent) are lonely often or always.‘ 
Https://Www.Co-Operative.Coop/Media/News-Releases/Shocking-Extent-of-Loneliness-Faced-by-
Young-Mothers-Revealed, 2018.   Https://Www.Channel4.Com/News/the-Loneliness-of-Becoming-a-
New-Mum, 2016. 
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has been active in politics all her life. She eventually became an MP for the 
Democratici di Sinistra450 party during the mid-2000s. 
 Pisa‘s book starts from her experience as a volunteer at the Gorizia 
mental hospital in 1968 under the direction of Franco Basaglia.451 It was 
Basaglia who promoted the closure of psychiatric hospitals in Italy which 
culminated in the very progressive Law 180, Italian Mental Health Act 1978, 
also called the Basaglia Law.452 This law exemplified progressive approaches to 
psychiatry and has been a guide in this field in many parts of the world, 
especially in South America and continental Europe. Its implementation came 
about by the societal changes expressed in the profound critique of authority 
which permeated the reform movements in Italy in the 1970s453. In Italy these 
reforms led to the introduction of the divorce law in 1970, the inclusion of 
workers‘ rights in the progressive Statuto dei Lavoratori, legge n. 300, 
introduced in 1970 and finally the abortion law454, introduced in 1978. In 1977 
the law n. 517 was introduced, “Norme sulla valutazione degli alunni e 
sull'abolizione degli esami di riparazione nonché altre norme di modifica 
dell'ordinamento scolastico.‖ This law made some significant changes in the 
                                                     
450 Democratici di Sinistra (DS) was an Italian political party that lasted from 1998 till 2007 linked to ideas of 
left-centre and to ideals of social democracy. Many members of the party originated from the long standing 
Italian Communist Party which was the biggest communist party in Europe, founded in 1921 until it 
collapsed in 1991. From its ashes the Partito Democratico della Sinistra (PDS) and Rifondazione Comunista were 
founded.  
451 John Foot, The Man Who Closed The Asylums: Franco Basaglia And The Revolution In Mental Health Care., First 
Edit (New York and London: Verso Books, 2015). Franco Basaglia, ―Problems of Law and Psychiatry: The 
Italian Experience.,‖ International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 3 (1980): 17–37. 
452 This law is now called: Law n. 180, ―Accertamenti e Trattamenti Sanitari Volontari e Obbligatori.‖ (1978). 
453 For a detailed analysis of reproductive politics in Italy within the larger political reforms brought about by 
the feminist movement and the progressive movements who challenged authoritarianism see Hanafin, 
Conceiving Life. Reproductive Politics and the Law in Contemporary Italy. 
454 Legge n. 194, ―Norme per La Tutela Sociale Della Maternità e Sull‘interruzione Volontaria Della 
Gravidanza‖ (1978). 
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education system and it pertained to a very progressive pedagogical idea, 
regarding the integration of disabled children in primary schools and middle 
schools (from 6 to 14 years old) in the same classroom with other children. 
Schools for special educational needs and for differently able children were 
abolished.  
Silvana‘s experience in a psychiatric hospital shaped her and was the start 
of her political formation. She says ‗taking part in that experience separates 
my ―before‖ and my ―after‖ in an irreversible way.‘455 The ‗before‘ for Silvana 
was her upbringing in her traditional family, which she despised, her 
conflicted relationship with her mother and studying for a degree in law that 
she had not chosen. At one point she decided to leave all this behind, leave 
her hometown of Bologna, and become a volunteer at the mental hospital 
where Basaglia was the director. Her life took a turn from then on; she 
became politically active and a feminist, and life was never the same. And this 
is the ―after‖, Silvana‘s after – and many other women, in which I am 
interested in this chapter. 
 This chapter centres on the mothers‘ collective, Il collettivo madri, 
founded in Rome in 1976 by a group of women who were mothers. The main 
questions of this chapter are these: firstly, women who are mothers are very 
often seen as apolitical, how did Il collettivo madri challenge accepted, 
patriarchal, and conservative views of motherhood? And secondly, how did 
                                                     
455 Pisa, Il Gioco Dei Vestiti. Passione, Politica e Altre Storie Del ’68. 
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their collective work support them as mothers in practice?  How did being 
together make it easier to understand what the maternal meant? Lastly, how 
did being among mothers, exploring their experiences as mothers and 
women, aid them to gain a better understanding of their subjectivity? To 
answer these questions, I have chosen to bring to the fore the voices of the 
mothers of the collective and other feminists cited here. Therefore, I quote 
them ‗heavily‘, for the specific feminist methodological purpose of bringing 
their words out and putting them into print in the desire to show my debt to 
them, to acknowledge the work that these feminists did. This was a method 
also used by the collective when they put together their book in 1979.456  
The women of the collective and the wider Italian feminist movement 
were at the crossroad of critiques of the labour market, capitalism, woman‘s 
role in society. They were part of the anti-authoritarian movement in Italy 
which led to the many important reforms as outlined previously. In the spirit 
of the wider feminist movement they decided to form a collective to share 
their experiences of motherhood, with the aim of creating a supportive 
community for themselves and their children. This is similar to the 
―communities of care‖ Silvia Federici talks about.457 In her broader work she 
argues that it is important to break down the divide between the personal and 
the political to give value to the work of reproduction. To be able to do so it 
                                                     
456 Angela Cattaneo and Silvana Pisa, L’Altra Mamma. La Maternita’ Nel Movimento Delle Donne. Fantasie, 
Desideri, Domande e Inquietudini. (Roma: Savelli Editori, 1979). 
457 Federici, Revolution at Point Zero. Homework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle. p.12 
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is important to understand that the work of reproduction is not only a 
personal, private matter but a collective one. The women of the collective 
often exchanged childcare between them, so much that their adult children 
now often say that they are like brothers and sisters.  
 
Photo from the book: L’altra mamma. Some children and a mother from Il collettivo madri 
Photographer: Gabriella Mercandini. 
 
In creating the collective, the Roman mothers I am discussing here 
understood well that the maternal is not only a personal and private matter. 
By building webs of relationships and support between each other they 
started to break down the barriers between the personal and the political.  
In what follows I focus on the political experience of Il collettivo madri 
and how their collective experience was partly a critique of individualism, or 
in other words, of an isolated way to experience motherhood. The mothers of 
the collective collaborated outside the political institutions; nevertheless they 
engaged in a daily political practice among themselves. The significance of 
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this, as much now as then, was undeniably that the personal is political. This 
political statement was first used by second wave American feminists in the 
late 1960s, its aim being to highlight that  personal, private experiences, 
mainly but not only of women, are connected to wider social, economic, and 
political structures. It was also a challenge to the patriarchal monolithic 
understanding of the nuclear family.  
This chapter engages in a case study to demonstrate that alternative 
modes of living motherhood have existed before and are still possible. In this 
chapter and the next I use photos to illustrate some points and to bring a 
visual element to this PhD, which serves to anchor the abstract to the 
concrete. Some of the photos show the mothers of the collective with their 
children. The other reason I use photos in this thesis is that it is part of my 
theoretical and political methodology. I am criticising the universal and 
abstract nature of philosophical language and law. I want instead to bring in 
an element of grounding in reality so as to show that these were the mothers I 
am talking about in this chapter. By doing this I represent the ‗uniqueness‘ 
Cavarero, via Arendt, talks about. It is a way to step away from the metaphor 
of ‗the mother‘ and to ground her in materiality, in the here and now. In 
doing so I am attempting to de-universalise and render concrete the universal 
and abstract idea of the subject, so prevalent in law and legal discourses, 
which I have criticised in the previous three chapters. These were not just 
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‗some‘ women, a generalised category of mothers, but this specific group of 





Photo from the book: L’altra mamma. Some women, including Silvana Pisa, of Il collettivo madri. 
Photographer: Gabriella Mercandini. 
 
This was the experience of this group of women and, as Italian photographer 
Tano D‘Amico says, I am interested in showing the images of mothers who 
lived through those changing times because: 
When society starts to criticise a regime, a state of things, the first thing 
to change is the image. The image as it is present in the changing times 
of our lives. Image as that indispensable and precious emanation of 
that invisible, uncatchable and uncontrollable matter from which 
affective and love relationships and feelings come from. And, what are 
the political movements if not this?458  
 
                                                     
458 ‗Quando si mette in discussione un regime, uno stato di cose, la prima a cambiare e‘ l‘immagine. 
L‘immagine cosi‘ presente nei cambiamenti della nostra vita. L‘immagine emanazione preziosa e 
indispensabile di quella materia invisibile, imprendibile, incontrollabile, da cui nascono affetti, amori, 
sentimenti. E cosa sono I movimenti se non questo?‘ Tano D‘Amico, Anime e Memoria. Il Legame Imperdibile 
Tra Storia e Fotografia. (Roma: Postcard Edizioni, 2013). [My translation] 
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Indeed, showing the pictures depicting the mothers of the collective brings to 
the fore who these mothers were; it gives them a face, an identity. This is not 
a group of abstract mothers in a parenting manual or ‗the mother‘ of 
psychology, psychotherapy or child development books, but a concrete, 
unique group of women that came together to try to make sense of their 
experience of motherhood.  
From the early 1970s, the Italian feminist movement distanced itself 
from any link to the maternal and motherhood. Investigating maternal 
identity was a challenge because it was historically linked to a forced identity 
decided by a patriarchal culture. What feminists privileged at the start of the 
movement were instances of freedom, even from motherhood, linked to 
themes of autonomy and self-determination (the struggle for the legalisation 
of abortion and a free sexuality). In addition, in those early years many 
feminists wanted to distance themselves from their own mothers, because 
many of them lived and embodied a very traditional domesticity and had 
dedicated their lives to the family. Italian feminist historian Anna Bravo aptly 
describes those mothers as ‗incomparably loving, servant and owner of her 
children often in tears but always on her feet holding the family together…‘459 
Their feminist daughters wanted to get as far away as possible from the image 
of their own mothers, who in many cases had had many children between the 
                                                     
459 Anna Bravo cited in Morris and Willson, La Mamma: Interrogating a National Stereotype. p. 2.  
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years 1920s till 1960s. These mothers often did not have a life of their own 
separate from their husbands, children, and the home. 
In contrast, the women of Il collettivo madri were going against the grain 
of the wider feminist movement from the start, as they were already mothers. 
The denigration of motherhood was so strong in the Italian feminist 
movement that Il collettivo madri almost felt they had to emerge from hiding as 
they would not be approved by the rest of the feminist movement. By 
founding a group by and for mothers Il collettivo madri gave a voice to feminist 
mothers within the Roman feminist movement:  
Il collettivo madri tries to gain a space in a reality that in a sense does not 
account for the need of a space to study the realities of women who are 
mothers. Inside the feminist movement in Italy in the early 1970s, the 
main themes debated were the themes of abortion and sexuality. The 
theme of motherhood/maternity was a research/reflection which was 
neglected because it is a theme which is charged with traditional 
significance. Il collettivo madri had some difficulties bringing this theme 
out into the open and engaging other feminists in a collective debate on 
these themes which historically had always been lived as a private 
experience.460 
 
Hence we see how the collective challenged the traditional image of 
motherhood and challenged too the ideological image of what a feminist 
ought to be. Silvana Pisa poignantly points out:  
I perceived this sensation of motherhood-ghetto even within the feminist 
movement, it felt like having chosen to be a mother meant not having 
it very clear in our minds what the profound meaning of the ―true‖ 
                                                     
460 Cattaneo and Pisa, L’Altra Mamma. La Maternita’ Nel Movimento Delle Donne. Fantasie, Desideri, Domande e 
Inquietudini. [My translation] 
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women‘s liberation was, or a scarce consciousness of my condition as a 
woman; being a mother meant, not being ―feminist enough‖.461  
Here we see that, from the foundation of the mothers‘ collective, the women 
involved felt tensions within the wider feminist movement. They did not feel 
recognised and valued as feminists and mothers. I argue that at times when 
societies are changing rapidly the rejection of past practices is a needed push 
towards critique, innovation, and change. The Italian feminist movement is 
not immune to this, and for a valid reason. In effect, after a few years the 
wider feminist movement, on the whole, understood that the ―objective‖ to 
understand the needs of feminist mothers was the ‗recomposition‘: the ability 
to hold together liberation, self-determination, and therefore a free choice of 
motherhood. Because they understood that it is not by mutilating a side of 
oneself, the desire for children, that one becomes a free woman. But it is in 
collectively facing up to the contradictions and the ambivalence of 
motherhood. Once women become more aware of their reasons and 
consciousness, then different perspectives can be united, even though it is still 
the case that in some situations feminism still struggles with motherhood and, 
we can say that, in some cases motherhood still struggles with feminism. I 
think this is linked still with a difficulty of holding different identities together.  
Let‘s now see how the collective took shape. It was founded in Rome in 
1976. Some of the mothers involved in the collective had been part of Il 
collettivo sul parto (The Birth Collective) from 1973 till 1976. Then Il collettivo 
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madri formally lasted from 1976 until 1982 – though the same group of 
mothers still meet weekly today in 2021 – so in a way it was never dissolved. 
In 1979 Il collettivo madri transformed into The Motherhood and Women‘s 
Condition Study and Research Group called Il taccuino d’oro.462 In the next three 
parts of this chapter I focus chronologically on the different phases of the 
three groups. I chose to do a chronological account of the experiences of 
these groups because strategically I think it is important in this case to 
account for what happened before the creation of Il collettivo madri and 
afterwards too. It is valuable to focus on the consciousness-raising of this 
group of women who made it necessary at some point in their lives to 
become conscious of some of their needs when they gave birth and when 
they became mothers.  
Further on in the process of their individuation and consciousness-
raising, we can see how these women felt the need to elaborate and think 
through their experience of motherhood in a more theoretical manner with 
the creation of the research centre. For instance, they became conscious of 
the need to create a birth support group when they realised that the medical 
profession had taken over this experience that belongs to women, and they 
realised that they wanted to be more in contact with their bodies. This 
demonstrates that for feminists in the 1970s consciousness-raising was not 
only a change in perspective in relation to what it meant to be a woman in 
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society and aiming to become equal and free, but it was as well a form of 
consciousness-raising which touched on their embodied self. They realised 
that women‘s consciousness happens if there is knowledge and consciousness 
about, and a relationship with and understanding of, one‘s body and sexuality. 
That they created the research centre afterwards is indicative of their desire to 
think through and theorise on the maternal. In other words, they desired to 
unite their embodied experience of sexuality, birth, and motherhood with 
some level of thought, abstraction, and elaboration, hence to unite being 
(embodied) and language: 
Our research, enquiry, and reflections on the theme of motherhood is 
aimed at unveiling that tradition, around the maternal, that has been kept 
hidden and that belongs to the birth of the world. In the dialectic 
between the irregular and the regular, between accepting oneself and 
refusing oneself, the woman who becomes mother becomes again an 
unknown to herself where she searches for herself and her own face.463 
These women wished to experience motherhood in a collective way, similar to 
the way they were living the feminist movement as a collective experience. 
Pisa writes:  
The late sixties taught many women the practice of the collective, of 
togetherness. From the early 70s many Italian women started meeting up 
together, it was a practice inspired by American feminism. Being among 
women is the discovery of a great pleasure. Talking with each other and 
exposing each other creates connections, closeness and affection 
between us. Conflicts were present – different roles among women, 
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power struggles and group dynamics were hard to manage – but these 
were conflicts among women for women.464  
Many women started meeting up in small groups of six to eight people and 
they started practising consciousness raising, discussing and sharing among 
themselves. At times tentatively, they spoke of how they felt, how they lived 
as women in a society which did not respect them, their sexuality, how their 
childhood was often lived in very patriarchal families, and so on, no subject 
was forbidden. This practice then spread to the wider group of feminists in 
the quarters and cities and then nationally. Moreover, from the early seventies 
these women‘s internal subjective identity started to change; they started to 
become more aware of a sense of self,  when they were able to say or attempt 
to say ‗I belong to myself‘ as I have discussed in the Introduction to the 
thesis.  
 Some of the women of Il Colletivo Madri already knew each other before 
starting the collective and were close friends, while some did not. Some 
women were working-class, come middle-class, some educated and some not 
and some studying at the time with small children. They were all Italians at 
first and then a Spanish woman joined their group. Some women originally 
came from the North of Italy and some from the South of Italy, some were 
born in Rome. Of those women who knew each other some were part of the 
Roman small consciousness-raising groups and many were political militants 
of left-wing groups. Many were teachers and many were active in the Cgil 
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Scuola (Italian General Confederation of Labour union, teachers‘ section). 
Some women belonged to the left-wing teachers‘ collective, which used to 
meet at the Sapienza University of Rome in classroom IV of the Chemistry 
department. Some women knew each other from the feminist teachers‘ 
collective of via dei Gracchi and others from the feminist collective of 
Centocelle. Others knew each other as they were part of Lotta Continua, a far 
left extra parliamentary organisation, of which Toni Negri was one of the 
main ideologists, active from 1969 until 1976. One woman was part of 
Avanguardia Operaia, another far left communist organisation active from 
1968-1978. She was part of the feminist collective Appio Tuscolano. Some 
women of the collective met on holiday and others lived next to each other.  
il collettivo sul parto – 1973-1976 
Il collettivo sul parto (the birth collective) was founded in Rome in 1973 as a 
group with the aim of supporting women‘s health, giving counter-information 
on birth practices, and supporting women who wanted to give birth at home. 
In 1976 the women that were part of it joined the mothers‘ collective, Il 
colletitvo madri. Among the women of this collective, who included Silvana Pisa, 
there were some doctors and obstetricians who later supported some of the 
women of the mothers‘ collective in giving birth to their children. In The Birth 
Collective, Il collettivo parto, some of the women started analysing and critiquing 
the material and psychological conditions in which they gave birth. They had 
a desire to recuperate a conscious position in the experience of giving birth, 
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an experience which they saw instead as heavily medicalised and extrinsically 
controlled by others. Pisa says:  
We told each other about our birth experiences which were often 
traumatic and violent and very rarely a positive experience. We realised 
how we had been forced to experience the useless and often sadistic 
rituals of the medical profession (the shaving of our vaginas, the 
enemas, the catheter, the jumping on our bellies, the indiscriminate 
anaesthesia, the insults, the sarcasm and often the vulgarity).465  
During their discussions, explorations and research around their birth 
experiences the women of the group realised that when relating with the 
medical institution they delegated everything to the hospital and to the 
gynaecologist, even though they then realised that the institution was never (at 
least in the 1970s and before that) on the side of the woman‘s desires and 
needs, or physical and mental health. They realised how often women 
experience their birth as a terrible violence, like a trauma, which was avoided 
at times, only by preventing her from experiencing birth at all by giving her 
drugs to make her sleep: 
We shared among each other that institutions isolate and separate us to 
have more power over us. We discussed that often the obstetricians, 
even if women, had lost their ―original‖ autonomous, ―maternal‖ role 
(midwife) to please the male medical professionals involved in births. 
They seemed to be jealous of the creative act that birth is, which they 
will never be able to do. It seemed to us that the male doctors wanted 
to take away the role of protagonist to her birth from the woman to 
make her a passive object docile to their ―science.‖ We understood 
that, as the physiology of this event does not require, in general, the 
help of the male medical professionals, they tend to render it 
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pathological with interventions which justify his presence (the 
caesarean, oxytocin, anaesthesia).466  
Overall the result of their sharing and dialogues was the realisation that it was 
important to know as much as they could learn about their bodies and birth 
so that they were able to defend themselves better within the hospitalised 
birth. This led to a better ‗appropriation‘ of one‘s body and the Birth collective 
supported women in being active protagonists of their birth experience. It 
was the personal and collective work of feminists to learn to belong more to 
themselves and as Lucy van Pelt proclaimed as we saw in the Introduction. It 
led as well to the creation of different approaches to birth, like home birth, 
which was the common practice of many of the collective‘s mothers in the 
previous decades, as it was practice.  One association influenced by women‘s 
desire to birth in a different way, is the Associazione Nazionale Culturale Ostetriche 
Parto a Domicilio e Casa Maternita’467 which was founded in 1981. Today it 
coordinates all the different home birth centres, Case Maternita’ in Italy where 
women can decide to give birth in a home like situation, in hospitals‘ birthing 
centres. They support home births too. The Italian public health care system, 
Servizio sanitario nazionale, fully subsidizes home births in four Italian regions 
and offers a partial reimbursement in six other regions.  
Another way in which feminists reshaped how birth was viewed was the 
institution of ‗natural‘ birth wards or birth centres within hospitals. These 
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options allowed women to be more involved and be protagonists of their own 
birth more than spectators. Feminists understood that patriarchal culture kept 
them far away from knowing their bodies, sexuality, and birth. Moreover, they 
realised that pregnancy and birth had always been considered a function of 
the social reproduction of children within nationalistic discourses, not as 
something that was assumed to be part of women‘s physiological, 
psychological, and subjective experience. Historically women‘s bodies and 
reproduction have been overtaken by patriarchy for the benefits of the State, 
hence the importance of legal frames to that overtaking as I explained in 
Chapter 2. As Adrienne Rich famously said, the women of the collective 
realised that there are:  
two meanings of motherhood, one superimposed on the other: the 
potential relationship of any woman to her powers of reproduction – 
and to children; and the institution – which aims at ensuring that that 
potential – and all women – shall remain under male control.468 
 
This was a revolutionary realisation, which had an impact on women‘s sense 
of self and their relationship with birth and with their children. As a result of 
those years of analysis and sharing with each other they wanted to overturn 
this millenarian story and build a new common sense about pregnancy, birth 
and motherhood. In 1978 they decided to translate and edit, for the first time 
in Italy, an American book focusing on birth which supported women to re-
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appropriate birth. It was called The Birth Book469 by midwife Raven Lang whose 
title in translation was Riprendiamoci il parto! Esperienze alternative di parto: resoconti, 
testimonianze, immagini.470 The translation became popular in Italy at the time 
and was reprinted in three editions. In the second and third edition some 
women of Il collettivo sul parto added to the book their own experience of giving 
birth.  One member of the group made a radio programme about The Birth 
Book and some members of the group translated, from the American edition, 
a prenatal yoga book. Pisa wrote a book with information, suggestions, and 
pictures about breastfeeding, making sure not to make women who did not 
manage to breastfeed feel guilty. All these discussions, elaborations, the 
making of radio programmes, the translation and publishing of books on 
birth, yoga for pregnancy and breastfeeding, were a powerful act of 
recuperation of the maternal experiences which had been taken away from 
women by an over-medicalised view of birth and an expropriation of 
women‘s bodies as the carriers of babies without an identity and a subjectivity 
of their own.  
il collettivo madri – 1976-1982 
As discussed above, a group of feminist women who were mothers, some 
already friends, some not, created a mother‘s collective, Il collettivo madri. Apart 
from belonging to this group, these women were active politically in various 
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other areas. They participated in many demonstrations in the streets and 
squares of Rome during those years of protest and demand for change in 
Italian society. One of these demands was the legalisation of abortion and 
divorce. In the Autumn of 1976 the broad national feminist movement 
decided not to propose a ―feminist‖ abortion law. The choice was made for 
various reasons: as a refusal to deal with institutions, which women felt were 
hostile and extraneous; and in recognition of the difficulty of seeing the 
richness of women‘s ideas and experiences reduced to a law. Moreover, the 
difficulty of facing complex issues – for instance abortion after the 22nd week 
of pregnancy – which would have forced them to agree to rules and 
objectives that did not reflect their diverse experiences.  The wider Roman 
feminist movement had neglected, in their collective action, a very important 
analysis – their analysis, consciousness-raising – around the theme of 
reproduction and motherhood, which was such an important issue for women 
and often not openly discussed in the feminist collectives. Because of the 
interventions of collectives such as Il collettivo madri the theme eventually 
became more widely discussed and analysed. Silvana notes:  
The experience of the political militancy post 1968, which was common 
to many of us, had tended to negate the maternal condition of existence 
confining it to a private experience not yet politicised, of which to be 
ashamed. It was seen as a small bourgeois experience which would take 
away time and work needed for the revolution. Motherhood was seen as 
a kind of impairment tolerated as a weakness which was reproached by 
male left wing ―comrades‖. It was seen as something to discount at least 
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with the exclusion and marginalisation from the left wing political 
groups.471  
As we can see mothers were excluded, both from left wing groups for being 
less free to engage in the ‗revolution‘ and from within the feminist movement, 
as they were considered less feminist because they had children.  
Pisa explains that when she participated in feminist meetings and was 
asked to explain what motivated her choice to have children, she always felt 
defensive and would explain her desire to have a child as being linked to her 
need for creativity, which a child can fulfil, her need for affective links to 
others, her need for security. At one point in the mid-70s she wanted to share 
her experiences of motherhood with other women who were mothers too, 
and she felt the need to recompose herself in a way, so that she could exist as 
a woman and a mother in the eyes of other women, not ‗just‘ as a woman. 
Then she heard that Il collettivo madri had been formed by a group of feminist 
mothers. It had taken shape not long before in Anna‘s house, and she could 
see herself in this group. Silvana started to share her experience of 
motherhood with the rest of the collective. From this point onward she began 
to relate with other feminist mothers like herself.  More importantly, the 
collective was where she learned how to live the experience of motherhood as 
a feminist mother.  
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 The women of the collective had dinner together every week on the 
same day, in one of their houses, where they used to confront parts of their 
identity as mothers and as women. This process involved allowing what has 
always been seen as an intimate and private experience to ―getting outside‖472 
as they used to say then, which meant doing politics in a similar way to the 
much-used second wave feminist slogan ―the personal is political‖. The 
women of the collective worked on trying to understand the meaning of their 
identities as women and as mothers. For them it was important, or rather, 
vital, that they managed to keep an identity separate from their own children. 
This in practice meant having a job, interests and relationships, especially with 
other women, outside the home. We can say that these two identities of 
woman and mother are related to each other in many ways and they can 
influence and weave into each other, so there is probably no sharp separation 
between them. Nevertheless, feminist women of those years felt a strong need 
to form a different identity, if not an internal space at least a physical space, 
separate from that of mother. I think this was felt so strongly because their 
own mothers‘ identities as women in their own right was often non-existent, 
or existent but unable to flourish. I think that their relational model of politics 
enabled this because the collective space allowed them to be seen and 
recognised as other than a mother. It was a space for themselves which they 
created and valued. Indeed, in that space they spoke of their children and how 
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they lived motherhood, but not only of these things. The lesson that they left 
us is that once becoming a mother or a carer not to forget oneself, one‘s 
needs, and one‘s desires.  
 In December 1978 the women of the collective organised a first 
national conference in Rome on the theme of motherhood and the maternal, 
Convegno nazionale sulla maternita’ which was held at La Casa delle donne, ―al 
Governo Vecchio‖ (at the time occupied by the Roman feminist women). 
They decided to organise this conference as an attempt to address the 
separateness of their experience as mothers in the feminist movement and to 
share their experiences and interrogations around the maternal, hence to 
challenge the fact that, as Michelle Boulous Walker says, ‗women are silenced 
most effectively by their association with maternity.‘473 
   As a result of the women‘s personal and collective experience in the 
collective and at the conference, Silvana Pisa and Angela Cattaneo (also a 
member of the collective) decided to collect their reflections and elaborations 
on motherhood in a book titled L’altra mamma.474 The questions the women of 
the collective were interested in were the same as those of the conference, 
explained this way in the book:   
Why, women in our reality, decide to have children? How much of 
ourselves and what do we put into this decision? If it is true that 
historically motherhood has been a forced identity which if not would 
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have meant being marginalised from society? So now, is it enough that 
women refuse motherhood to build a free identity? The antithesis 
―mother or free woman‖ is a description that we reject. For us it is true 
that motherhood is a contradictory and ambivalent choice, firstly with 
ourselves, our children and their fathers.475 
These are some of the questions that the women explored, and together with 
other feminists around the world, this may have been the first time in history 
that so many women questioned motherhood at this level. This was an 
important subjective investigation which brought more awareness to women 
about themselves and their desires. Reading this archival material, what 
emerges clearly and openly and refreshingly is the contradiction and 
ambivalence women felt about their desire to have a child or not. The 
consciousness-raising of these women seems tightly linked with their sense of 
self and meaning. They seem to ask, what does it mean to live a meaningful 
life for myself as a woman? What is my innermost desire? Finding satisfaction 
through work or having a child? Can I combine having a child and work? 
What emerges is the confusion caused by what being a woman meant in those 
years. What transpires clearly is that without consciousness and knowledge of 
their bodies there is no liberation, in other words a ‗fuller‘ more embodied 
feminist consciousness happens if women also become more conscious of 
their bodies. This is linked to more awareness of sexuality and a better ability 
to decide to have a child or not and, eventually, a more conscious way to give 
birth:  
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 In the individuation of motherhood as free choice there is a big 
difference in relation to the other way to see motherhood which is 
present in our institutions and society which ignores, mortifies, sacrifices 
women in her entirety as a person and hence in her specificity. In a free 
choice of becoming a mother we feel a great drive to renew structures, 
values and methods, hence to rethink our own development as women 
in a new way.476 
Women were asking many questions about their being in the world, their 
human condition as women in Italy in the 1970s. Indeed, some of the feelings 
felt by women were confusion, rage, disappointment. They seem very 
conscious that they do not want the child to satisfy their need for love and 
affection, that a child does not guarantee affection for mothers, when they 
find it hard to find it somewhere else. In other words, they did not want to 
get personal satisfaction through a life dedicated only to their children, like 
their mothers had often done, and more incisively they did not want to have a 
personal subjective satisfaction from their children. Conversely, some women 
realised that even without having a child they did not feel satisfied with their 
lives. One woman says: 
..if I do a review of the things that I have done up to now in my life, I 
realise that even if without having had children, I am not that realised. 
My identity is not fully there, even if I have all the time at my disposal 
without a child that castrates me (senza figlio che mi castra). I feel a lack 
of creativity and it becomes less and less every day in this missed 
realisation of motherhood.477  
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We can see that even women who did not have children had an ambivalent 
relationship with the maternal, partially they thought children castrate and 
partially that their own lack of creativity might be due to the missed 
realisation of motherhood. This is significant as it shows maternal 
ambivalence in relation to a mother who has children and in relation a woman 
who does not have children who may be content or ambivalent with her 
decision. It is possibly in this seeming contradiction that we find one of the 
most important meanings of motherhood: that there somehow a loss and a 
gain in both, in having children and not having children.  
At the collective, women met regularly with and without children to 
escape the isolation of their own home. For three summers (from 1978 till 
1980) the mothers of the collective and their children went on holiday 
together to the seaside on the Italian coast south of Rome:   
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Photo from the book: L’altra mamma. Children and mothers from Il collettivo madri. 
Photographer: Gabriella Mercandini.  
The aim of these holidays, which started partly as a tacit bet, was to see if 
‗after a lot of talking during our meetings, [. . .] it works when we are all 
together with the children?478 They wanted to spend these days together to see 
how it was to move ―from theory to praxis‖ in a big group of mothers and 
children: 
We tried to implement some rules during these holidays but it turned out 
to be harder than we thought. We imposed one rule on the collective 
holiday – after failing to impose more – ‗kids should not eat between 
lunch and dinner apart from one snack‘, but this meant that we were 
forced in the end to spread jam on bread all day long for everyone as the 
kids were hungry more often. Our children were the children of the 
antiauthoritarian dream, right? Our dream for that holiday had been to 
sit on comfy chairs and spend the afternoons away from the heat 
relaxing, reading and discussing together but it all became very tiring. 
Our children ‗enslaved‘ us, our time was continually interrupted. Our spaces 
were invaded by the children and their needs, in the end the maternal 
destiny of these days was very similar to the absolutely traditional one. 
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On top of that none of us could stand any criticism of our children and 
we all found deep down that the children of the other women in the 
group were all a bit spoiled and badly behaved.‘479  
The mothers felt enslaved, invaded, and interrupted480 by their children. They 
found out that they were fragile and vulnerable and, after three years the 
holidays together as a collective ended. What they discovered was that the 
children could separate them, which was ‗heresy‘ for a mothers‘ collective. 
What came to the fore were the difficulties of relating with other women, the 
ambivalence and the reality of what a group of mothers together could or 
could not achieve. This was definitely not an idealised ‗matriarchal‘ 
community of mothers. What they seemed to have longed for during those 
holidays, was that space for themselves we discussed previously.  
This is interesting for our discussion on how mothers can help and 
support each other. It is a useful reminder that relationships between mothers 
should not be idealised, but that we should not abandon swapping childcare, 
supporting each other, spending time together, or giving each other free time 
just because these relationships might be challenging. These women did not 
live together but they spent a lot of time together, and went on holiday 
together trying to figure out a different way to live the experience of 
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motherhood. This pursuit of a more open and shared experience of 
motherhood is similar to the one feminist scholar Lynne Segal describes in 
relation to Britain: 
The majority of the hundreds of women I encountered politically in the 
1970s, who were mostly in their twenties and early thirties, lived in some 
form of shared housing. With or without men, collective living was 
viewed by many feminists as not just a more economical arrangement 
than settling down either alone or within the traditional family unit, but 
one which could encourage more open, supportive and creatively shared 
forms of companionship, domesticity, childcare, political work and 
community engagement.481  
 
We can see a parallel between British women and Italian women during that 
time. As Hazel Frizell argues about the feminist movement in the UK, there 
was a desire to collectivise. She states ‗the isolation felt by many women who 
were housebound with young children was a factor in the formation of art 
groups and feminist groups in order to break the isolation and raise 
consciousness of the changes in society needed to alleviate all aspects of 
female oppression and discrimination.‘482 One thing to note is that unlike in 
the British experience described by Segal, Italian feminists seemed to be more 
ambivalent in relation to motherhood and the maternal. Probably one reason 
for this is the deeper interrogation that Italian women posed on the maternal 
and the lived politics of motherhood. These were different in the two 
countries because the socio-cultural, economic, and political differences 
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between Italy and Britain in the 1970s were quite marked. In relation to 
universal suffrage, women in Britain had achieved more freedoms by this time 
on the whole. Some British women were granted the right to vote in 1918, 
and this was extended to all women over 21 years of age in 1928.483 In Italy 
women got the vote only in 1948. For both Italian and British feminists there 
was a desire to challenge conservative ideas of the family and both were quite 
‗successful‘ if we look at the progress they made against outdated ideas of the 
family which existed before the 1970s. In this respect, Segal says of feminists 
of those years: ‗We placed the subject of nurseries, shared parenting, working 
time, children‘s health requirements, play space, schooling, mothers‘ housing 
needs, anything else we could think of in relation to women and children, on 
political agendas. Above all, we undermined the stigma of single motherhood 
and illegitimacy.‘ 484 
la cooperativa Il taccuino d’oro485 - 1982 
The co-operative Il taccuino d’oro was created in 1982 from the transformation 
and merging of Il colletivo madri. Some of the women had been part of the 
mothers‘ collective and some had not. In this transformation of the group we 
can see women‘s desire to further understand their experience of motherhood 
and bring a level of analysis and research to their experiences and thoughts. In 
                                                     
483 Race and class status would have been a factor in terms of whether British women were experiencing 
greater relative freedom. 
484 Segal, Making Trouble: Life and Politics. p. 86. 
485 The co-operative Il tacchuino d’oro, Centro di ricerca e studio sulla maternita’ e la condizione femminile. (Research and 
study group around the maternal and women‘s condition) was based in Rome. Its members were: Valeria 
Barchiesi, my maternal aunty Francesca Bonato, Pinella De Riu, Silvana Pisa, Patrizia Regazzoni, Rosa 
Romero, Anna Rita Sciortino, Rosalba Spagnoletti and Gabriella Spigarelli.  
| 261 
Rome in those years there were many opportunities for feminist women to 
attend free courses often held at the Casa internazionale delle donne. The 
―Virginia Woolf cultural centre‖ was a feminist centre where courses of 
interest to feminists were held. The main aim of the various courses that the 
mothers of the collective decided to take part in was to create a feminist space 
for discussions, study, and in-depth collective research on some subjects that 
interested them. One of these courses, held in 1980, was a Dialogue with 
Mothers with the psychoanalyst Maria Grazia Minetti. They participated in 
fourteen sessions with her, in which the idea was to start from concrete cases 
of specific conflicts and situations in which mothers had found themselves in 
their relationship with their children, with the aim of elaborating on them 
together.  
Another course that the mothers organised in 1980, called ―Analysis that 
ends and analysis that never ends‖ was held by psychoanalyst Gabriella Ripa 
di Meana. The subjects that the women of the mothers‘ collective found 
interesting and compelling were the ones relating to psychoanalysis because 
‗they give space to desires, projections, narcissism and ambivalence.‘486 As I 
said in the Introduction, Italian feminists were very interested and invested in 
psychoanalysis for various reasons, including the fact that Irigaray, who as I 
explained in the first three chapters, had a great influence on Italian feminists, 
was herself a psychoanalyst.  
                                                     
486 Pisa, Il Gioco Dei Vestiti. Passione, Politica e Altre Storie Del ’68. [My translation] 
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In 1981 the collective participated in various courses, one titled Maternal 
ambivalence held by feminist writer and activist Alessandra Bocchetti, which all 
the women at the collective found especially interesting, while they also 
prepared the exhibition Maria, Medea e le altre which touched on the theme of 
maternal ambivalence. In the same year they participated in a literature course, 
held by feminist, communist journalist and politician Rossana Rossanda, 
Motherhood as pretext; and then they followed up the course with author Nadia 
Fusini analysing jealousy in The kidnapping of Lola Von Stein by Marguerite 
Duras. They also took a history course with Anna Rossi Doria titled The absent 
maternal and a course on psychoanalysis held by feminist psychoanalyst 
Manuela Fraire with Sandra Begnoni discussing Freud‘s Mourning and 
Melancholia. These courses represented the possibility for mothers and non-
mothers to understand better the experience of motherhood and the 
maternal.  
maria, medea e le altre. il materno nelle parole delle donne487 
The collective‘s two main imperatives and principles were: ‗making/doing 
together‘488 and ‗confront the external world.‘489 This meant concretely doing 
things together as women, organising events, collaborating, and being active 
in feminist politics. In other words, it meant taking their politics outside, to 
participate in demonstrations, or just going out as women together at night, 
                                                     
487 Il taccuino d‘oro, Maria, Medea e Le Altre. Il Materno Nelle Parole Delle Donne: Rassegna Stampa.   
488 ―Creare/fare insieme.‖ p. 
489 ―Confrontarsi con l‘esterno.‖ p.  
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everything to make them feel that they were recognised in the external 
world.490 It is this active relational space from which politics emerge that I am 
interested in this thesis.   
In 1981 the collective decided to ask the Roman municipality to open a 
public women‘s library. Sadly, their proposal was not successful, but one of 
the councillors they spoke to asked if they wanted to organise an event 
around motherhood on International Women‘s Day on the 8th March of the 
following year. The women were excited by this offer and collectively decided 
to focus the event on the ambivalences inherent in motherhood, specifically 
how maternal ambivalence has been depicted by traditional iconography in 
history, in cinema and in written documents such as newspapers and 
magazines. In 1982 the women of the co-operative Il taccuino d’oro organised 
an exhibition where they exhibited photos of paintings and films representing 
birth and motherhood throughout history:  
Now that the collective has become a co-operative for research, their 
aim is to expound their research to all women, to share their reflections 
on these problems and on the ambivalence and contradictions that the 
role of motherhood historically carries with it. This is the meaning of 
this exhibition.491 
The exhibition went well, and for the following autumn the women decided 
to publish a book which they titled Maria, Medea e le altre. Il materno nelle parole 
                                                     
490 One of my maternal aunts told me several times how as a young woman living in Rome in the early 1970s 
she forced herself to go out, travel, interact with people to get out from the shyness that came about from 
her conservative upbringing. Once she became a feminist she had to work a lot to counter that upbringing 
and to get out of her shell she forced herself to take actions that were not ‗natural‘ to her.   
491 Anna Pizzo, Il Manifesto. (Communist daily national newspaper, March 1982), cited in Il taccuino d‘oro, 
Maria, Medea e Le Altre. Il Materno Nelle Parole Delle Donne: Rassegna Stampa. p. 233. [my translation] 
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delle donne: rassegna stampa. The book included pictures of the exhibition on the 
cover and inside there were articles around the theme of motherhood and the 
maternal, written from 1972 to 1982, which appeared in Italian daily 
newspapers and magazines. The articles were written by, among others, Luce 
Irigaray, Adrienne Rich, Luciana Castellina, Rossana Rossanda, Chiara 
Saraceno, Ida Dominijanni, and Julia Kristeva. As Silvana Ada Scalchi said 
about the women‘s writing on motherhood chosen for the book:  
The maternal passes through all women‘s life, those who are mothers 
and those who are not. It is inscribed in the body and the imaginary of 
women, both if they choose to become mothers and if they choose not 
to be mothers. The significance of giving value to what has been written 
and said by women in the last 10 years – the same period which saw the 
growth of the feminist movement and the struggle to legalise abortion in 
Italy – recognises the importance for women to consider themselves as 
protagonists of their life and society.492  
In this statement we can see that these feminist women were better able to 
elaborate and reflect on the choice of becoming a mother or not. This is 
something of a privilege, as many women did not have this choice then and 
nor do they have it now. It shows how consciousness-raising can bring about 
a better understanding of oneself and one‘s desires; I would say this is one of 
feminism‘s main achievements. It also shows, in light of previous discussions, 
that reproduction is a somatic reality for both being a woman and being a 
mother. This is not because having a womb inherently links someone to 
motherhood and reproduction, but because the womb exists and we cannot 
                                                     
492 Silvana Ada Scalchi cited in Ibid. p. Xi [my translation] 
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think it away. There is a deeper level of conscious and unconscious material 
linked to it. Below we see a picture from the 1970s Roman feminist 
movement, in which a woman holds a placard saying ‗motherhood as a free 
choice not an imposed chain‘:  
 
Photo from the book: L’altra mamma. Some mothers of Il collettivo madri at a 
demonstration in Rome in the 1970s. Photographer: Gabriella Mercandini.  
 
In this image and in these words too we see the deep reflection this group of 
women engaged in; they recognised that the maternal is not a theme confined 
only to women who choose to be mothers, but it is also ‗inscribed‘ in women 
who do not choose to be mothers. There are many reasons for this, one of 
which is the conscious and unconscious desire for a child or not. As this 
anonymous woman who participated at the 1978 Roman motherhood 
conference explicated ‗this desire of a child is not a real and true desire, it‘s a 
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phantasm.‘493 In other words it‘s often not something that can be brushed off 
quickly, or it leaves some ‗residues‘ in the psyche and the body which can re-
emerge at one point or another in a woman‘s life.  
Nowadays all the members of the ‗original‘ mothers‘ collective are in 
their late sixties or early-mid-seventies. They still meet once a week and, Pisa 
says that after all those years this is where they are at:  
Together we have travelled a long road. The journey of the collective has 
lasted many years. The pictures are the witness of some goals. We have 
weaved our personal histories together, experienced some distance, 
individual crisis, common happiness, intransigencies and tolerance. We 
still meet every Wednesday in our homes to have dinner all together, ‗la 
cena delle donne‘. We share common and private projects, reading lists 
we are passionate about and regressive pettegolezzi tittle-tattle, curious 
looks on the world and disappointments. We are not a monolith: our 
personal stories and political choices, which often in feminist activism 
coincided, today are often far from each other. But for now, our boat is 
quite stable, and the storm left behind, thanks to the affection that links 
us all. We still hope to remain friends for many years to come and to sail 
away to our different destinies. Is it too much or too little?494  
 
As a summary of their collective experience, this reflects how they have built 
separate identities, indeed from the I to the We but also from the We to the I. 
There is a return of meaning from the collective to the personal and 
subjective, what feminist politics has realised, and still realises, for many 
women worldwide.  
                                                     
493 Cattaneo and Pisa, L’Altra Mamma. La Maternita’ Nel Movimento Delle Donne. Fantasie, Desideri, Domande e 
Inquietudini. p. 19. [my translation].  
494 Pisa, Il Gioco Dei Vestiti. Passione, Politica e Altre Storie Del ’68. [My translation] p. 9.  
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During those different phases of the collective the women were active 
politically in external struggles challenging the Italian state and its culture, and 
these struggles brought various advances – legal and cultural – for women in 
the 1970s and 1980s495 which had political implications and consequently 
affected the personal too. What followed was a move from the personal to 
the political, from the political back to the personal. The contribution they 
made to social change was to denaturalize mothering, to bring motherhood 
into the streets and into public spaces with the aim of challenging the 
patriarchal idea of the nuclear family. Most importantly, this group of mothers 
learned to define their experience in their own words, words which originated 
from an embodied experience of their lives as women and words which gave 
authority to their own subjective experience, (partire da se’).  
If we were to trace the origin of a subjectivity which can be processed 
and ‗acquired‘ through one‘s intrinsic motivations and not externally dictated 
by the constraints that patriarchy has placed on women, we can say that the 
women of the Il collettivo madri were working towards ‗belonging to 
themselves.‘ This was what many women were shouting at demonstrations 
from the late 1960s onwards, and what the character from the comic strip 
―Peanuts,‖ Lucy, was shouting too. We can say that these Roman women 
who were mothers are an example of a group of women who worked or 
attempted to work, paraphrasing Braidotti, to achieve a subjectivity which 
                                                     
495 Hanafin, Conceiving Life. Reproductive Politics and the Law in Contemporary Italy. 
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they ‗gained control over.‘496 They did so via seeking an embodied relationship 
and connection with their bodies, their sexuality, the birth experience, and 
finding a space for themselves. Finding a better relationship with those was, 
and is, connected with boundaries and consent. They did so collectively, and 
because of the collective, immersed in the relational modus vivendi I discussed 
previously.  
other examples of mothers’ collectives around the world 
Around the world there have been various experiences of relationality 
between mothers, where mothers have initiated and organised ways to share 
spaces collectively. Historically Black mothers have often mothered 
collectively as other women in the community or other relatives took on the 
role of othermothers as Patricia Hill Collins discusses.497 In this section I am 
interested in tracing few other experiences of collective care (there is not 
enough room to explore this theme extensively here).498 Exploring the 
commoning of care demonstrates this is often a common need mothers have; 
secondly because it shows how the Roman Mothers’ collective was part of a 
worldwide movement of women who questioned motherhood and wanted to 
change its discourse; and thirdly because it is important to give credit and 
                                                     
496 Rosi Braidotti, ―On Bugs and Women: Irigaray and Deleuze on the Becoming-Woman.‖ in Engaging with 
Irigaray. Feminist Philosophy and Modern European Thought., ed. Carolyn Burke, Naomi and Shor, and Margaret 
Whitford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 111–40, p. 118. Braidotti has made the same point 
in Braidotti Rosi, ―Envy; or, With My Brains and Your Looks,‖ in Men in Feminism, ed. Jardine Alice and 
Smith Paul (London and New York: Methuen, 1987), 233–41; and Braidotti, Patterns of Dissonance. A Study of 
Women in Contemporary Philosophy. 
497 Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought. Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment. 
498 I am interested in exploring commoning care more extensively and how it is practiced in different 
societies.  
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visibility to collectives of mothers to show how they organised to share the 
responsibility and the experience of caring for a child. The different 
collectives I discuss below illustrate how mothers in different countries and 
contexts have often felt the need to connect to each other to ease the work of 
caring for their children. They do it for many reasons, practical, emotional, 
and maybe out of a desire to share the joys and sorrows of bringing up 
children with other mothers. These examples illustrate some kind of 
universality of a need, a push, a desire, an almost at times drive to, or an 
attempt to – mothering together. Of the many human activities that can be 
done alone or together this seems to resist becoming a solitary enterprise, if it 
does it is often not a very pleasant one.  
In 1974, in the same years in which the Roman collective was active, a 
group of mainly socialist-feminist women, based in London in the UK, 
founded a collective called the Hackney Flashers.499 The women were active in 
the creative sector as photographers, cartoonists, and writers. The first project 
they worked on was ‘Women and Work’,500 and their aim was to use 
photography to record the working conditions of women in Hackney across a 
variety of occupations from clerical work to manufacturing work. The unpaid 
work of reproductive labour was not included in this exhibition. The 
importance of this became more apparent in the second exhibition which 
centred on childcare as a provision that was needed for women to be able to 
                                                     
499 ―Https://Hackneyflashers.Com/History/,‖ n.d. 
500 ―Https://Hackneyflashers.Com/Women-and-Work-1975/,‖ n.d. 
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work outside of the home and follow other interests. While working on this 
project the gap between the need for childcare and the actual provisions in 
the borough became the subject of their next project ‘Who’s Holding the 
Baby?’501 This was another photography exhibition which showed state-funded 
childcare provisions and private ones. During World War II national childcare 
provisions had been provided so that women could work, but they had since 
been cut. After the war the state did not need women to work for its benefit, 
so they took away help with childcare.  
 The group of mothers best known worldwide for collectively 
organising together, for a common need, is the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in 
Buenos Aires, Argentina. They organised to demand knowledge of what had 
happened to their sons and daughters who disappeared during the 
Argentinian dictatorship (1976-1983). Not knowing where one‘s child is an 
unimaginable grief and the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo managed to 
transform their grief into action.502According to Italian Argentinian feminist 
author Ludmila Bazzoni, for these mothers: 
to take to the square and start a collective path means starting a new life 
in a public context. That second birth allows them to establish a 
relational dimension in which to expound their own who, but mainly to 
make space for what «has not been thought before».503  
 
                                                     
501 ―Https://Hackneyflashers.Com/Whos-Holding-the-Baby-1978/,‖ n.d. 
502 Sally Webb Thornton, ―Grief Transformed: The Mothers of the Plaza the Mayo.,‖ OMEGA: Journal of 
Death and Dying 41, no. 4 (2000): 279–89. 
503 ‗Scendere in piazza e intraprendere un percorso collettivo significa cominciare una nuova vita in un 
contesto pubblico. E quella seconda nascita consente loro di istituire una dimensione relazionale in cui 
esporre il proprio chi, ma sopratutto di fare spazio a quanto «non é ancora pensato».‘ in Ludmila Bazzoni, La 
Vida Venciendo A La Muerte. Madres de Plaza de Mayo. Filosofia e Politica. (Verona: L‘Iguana editrice, 2013). P. ? 
[My translation]. 
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The who Bazzoni talks about is the uniqueness of each human being, as 
Arendt considers. It‘s the who that appears when the universalistic subject, the 
what, is dismantled. I have discussed this theme in Chapter 2, where I 
explored Cavarero‘s interpretation of Arendt‘s idea of uniqueness and its 
relevance. The significance of this is that it shows how the mothers of Plaza 
de Mayo organised collectively and how the collective action empowered 
them to seek justice. Collectively they were strong and able to challenge the 
dictatorship, exemplifying at its ‗extreme‘ the maternal resilience Baraitser 
talks about.504      
In the UK, mothers have come together to create spaces to look after 
children, to collectivize the need for childcare and build supportive 
communities.505 There are various contemporary groups where mothers meet 
with other mothers – either by themselves or with their children – and get 
organised. One example is The First Neighbourhood Co-operative Nursery, founded 
in the late 1970s in Walthamstow, London by a small group of mothers. It 
was a parent-led childcare project which remained open till the early 1990s. In 
recent years its history has inspired the project Holding the Baby.506 This project 
is an oral history of parenting and childcare, a podcast series and a travelling, 
sound-based exhibition. The producers of the project asked people from 
London‘s East End to tell stories about the care they received as children or 
                                                     
504 Lisa Baraitser, ―Mother Courage: Reflection on Maternal Resiliance,‖ British Journal of Psychotherapy 23, no. 2 
(2007): 171–88. 
505 See the work of the Pirate Care Collective too, especially ‗Planning a pirate kindergarten. 
―Https://Syllabus.Pirate.Care/Session/Howtobuildapiratekindergarteninyourneighbourhood/,‖ n.d. 
506 ―Www.Holdingthebaby.Org,‖ n.d. 
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the care they provided as childcare workers, parents, and carers. Its inspiration 
was the parent-led nursery mentioned above.   
Other parent-led nurseries in the UK started by mothers include the 
Pavillion Pre School507 in Liverpool, founded in 1969 by six mothers, and still 
open today. Another example of mothers getting organised to share childcare 
and facilitate working outside the home without the prohibitive costs of 
private childcare is Childspace508 in Lambeth in London. This is a cooperative 
nursery established in 1990 and managed by parents (mostly mothers) and a 
nursery teacher. Parents have a rota and each day one parent works alongside 
the teacher. By doing so, they keep costs down. Similarly, a nursery called 
Grasshoppers in the Park509 in Hackney in London also engages parents as 
volunteers to reduce costs. These cooperatives are an example of mothers 
organising as a collective to address one of the most pressing problems they 
face as parents, namely, the cost of care. Problematically it is often mainly 
mothers volunteering in this parent-led projects and this shows still how 
childcare is still seen and perceived as a feminised occupation. It is linked to 
the practice in most countries for women to still be the ones doing the 
majority of childcare as I discussed in the Introduction.  
Another important and interesting experience of collective action is the 
one of the mothers of the Focus E15.510 In September 2013, 29 young 
                                                     
507 ―Pavillion Pre School,‖ n.d., http://pavilionpreschool.org.uk/our-history/. 
508 ―Http://Www.Childspacenursery.Org/Home,‖ n.d. 
509 ―Https://Www.Grasshoppersinthepark.Co.Uk/,‖ n.d. 
510 ―Focus E15,‖ n.d., https://focuse15.org/about/. 
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mothers who lived in in a homeless hostel, Focus E15 in the borough of 
Newham in East London started a campaign to resist eviction. The council 
had cut funding for the hostel and the mothers had been served eviction 
notices saying that they would be re-housed outside London as far as 
Manchester, Birmingham, and Hastings. The mothers did not want to move 
away from where they lived together and where some of them had families 
and communities. In response to the eviction notice they collectively 
organised and occupied empty social housing to resist being evicted. In doing 
so they challenged repressive neoliberal laws. Since then most mothers have 
been re-housed in rented private accommodations in the borough and outside 
the borough.  
Another collective initiated by women in London in 2016, is The Mother 
House511 at the IKLECTIK Art Lab, where a group of artists who were 
mothers could use studio space to do their art work and also take their 
children along. Mothers worked – or tried to – with their children alongside, 
and at times there was a child minder available to engage with the children. 
The model is a creative and radical solution to a lack of provision for 
supporting the professional development and well-being of emerging artists 
during pregnancy and motherhood. The Mother House is an offshoot of the 
Procreate Project512 which was founded by Dyana Gravina in 2013. The 
Procreate Project is an arts organisation supporting the development of 
                                                     
511 ―The Mother House,‖ n.d.,  
https://www.motherhousestudios.com/. 
512 ―Procreate Project.‖ 
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contemporary artists who are also mothers, working across art-forms. The 
Procreate Project is a place of representation, knowledge, publication, artistic 
production, and experimentation of mothers who are artists.  
Two other UK groups involving artists who are mothers are the 
Desperate Artwives513 and the Mothers who Make.514 The first is a collective of 
feminist artists who are mothers, set up in 2010 by artist Amy Digham, whose 
practice interrogates their experience of being mothers and partners/wives 
and questions social expectations and values which frame this role. The group 
get involved in different projects, including Takeovers, which are public 
spontaneous happenings in galleries and public spaces in and around events 
and buildings in performative and interruptive actions of public art. Their aim 
is to show what the work of reproduction looks like. It is partially similar to 
the aim of the mothers‘ collective many decades before during their exhibition 
in Rome for which they wanted to show the different experiences of 
motherhood, one of which was birth. It was the first time that pictures of 
women giving birth would have been shown in public in Italy, and they were 
asked to remove them.  Many years have passed but the aim of the Desperate 
Artwives is the same: making the work of reproduction visible. Another project 
they work on is a podcast called Woman up!515 It is devised by the collective in 
collaboration with the Women‘s Art Gallery at Goldsmith‘s College and artist 
Susan Merrick. They interview women artists, academics, midwives, writers, 
                                                     
513 ―Http://Www.Desperateartwives.Co.Uk/.‖ 
514 ―Https://Motherswhomake.Org/About.‖ 
515 ―Http://Www.Desperateartwives.Co.Uk/Woman-up-Podcast-Series-2/,‖ n.d. 
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carers and so on about their lived experiences as women and mothers, and 
their achievements and inspirations. As in the Takeover project, in this project 
their aim is to make women‘s experiences visible, audible, and important.  
Mothers who Make was founded in London in 2014 from an idea by 
theatre maker Matilda Leyser. Their mission statement reads:  
We are a peer-support network but we believe that simply by our 
presence and our practices within the cultural landscape we can help to 
effect change. We have a vision of a world in which instead of women 
‗dropping out‘ to have children, their experiences and insights as 
mothers might be ‗picked up‘ and fed into their field of work. Through 
our presence we hope to contribute to the wider conversation about 
caring roles and care as a force within the arts sector.516 
 
It is an initiative aimed at supporting mothers who are artists – professional 
or not – writers, actors, painters, dancers, any kind of maker and any kind of 
mother, as their website says. On the idea behind the initiative Leyser says:  
The initiative grew from Matilda‘s sense of there being experiences and 
challenges specific to being both a mother and an artist. She noticed 
many parallels between the two roles: both are concerned with 
creativity and play, both require stamina, patience, sensitivity, both 
keep her up at night. At the same time she was struck by the strength 
of the cultural assumption that the two were incompatible, that she 
must compromise on either her creative work or on her mothering. She 
wanted to challenge this. She put out an invitation to mother-artists, 
across art forms, to join a peer support group to which they could also 
bring their children of any age. The response has been extraordinary.517 
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The idea has spread rapidly across the UK and many new groups started in 
many regions. Currently there are thirteen peer-support groups regularly 
meeting at major arts venues, new groups are starting, and there is also 
growing interest internationally. These examples of collective organizing are 
important demonstrations of the need and desire for commoning care and 
they show how relationality and the maternal are often interlinked, 
interdependent and sometimes a necessary resource and strategy for managing 
the newness, stuff and interruptions518 children often bring to a mothers‘ life 
in the first few years.  
In this chapter I discussed the origin and work of Il colletivo madri. I 
showed how life and politics were intertwined for these mothers who 
challenged the practice of individualised care. Subsequently I considered other 
groups of mothers who came together to change and resist the status quo of 
solitary motherhood. These examples demonstrate how establishing 
relationships between mothers is often helpful and can make it easier to 
process the meaning of the maternal experience and the practical need for 
childcare. In addition they show mothers who challenge hetero patriarchal 
definitions of motherhood and it shows how mothers can often become 
figures of resistance when they work together. The Milan Collective writes 
‗the entrustment of one woman to another is the stuff of political struggle.‘519 
                                                     
518 Baraitser, Maternal Encounters. The Ethics of Interruption. p. ? 
519 The Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective, Sexual Difference: A Theory of Social-Symbolic Practice., p. 31. 
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This chapter then has been a kind of springboard for the next as I have 
showed how collective mothering can work in reality using a case study. In 
the next chapter instead I consider how mothering in isolation is one of the 
main causes of postnatal depression. Consequently I further argue for a more 
relational and collective approach to motherhood, as I have showed in this 
chapter, can support women to feel less isolated. In addition, I look at an art 
practice-based work that I created with two artists, using a thick and wide 
colourful thread, to explore the meaning of relationality in a more practical, 





























In concluding her article ‗Maternal Subjectivity‘ (2009), on how  nuclear 
individualistic modern parenting practises at times negatively affect 
‗westernised‘ women, British psychoanalyst Joan Raphael-Leff states ‗in my 
view, it is this rich seedbed of subjective experience that awaits closer 
mapping by today‘s researchers.‘520 This thesis and this last chapter in 
particular, is my attempt at investigating ‗mothers‘ rich seedbed of subjective 
                                                     
520 Raphael-Leff, ―Maternal Subjectivity.‖ p. 5. 
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experience‘. In the previous four chapters I have suggested that the work of 
reproduction is more challenging in individualistic, neoliberal, and capitalist 
societies where often mothers mother in relative isolation at different stages 
of their children‘s life. I have suggested that we need to keep challenging this 
idea of the subject. I have discussed the ideas of feminist writers and activists 
who argue that women are still doing a majority of the care work of babies 
and children (and not to speak of elderly relatives and disabled or special 
needs children who are very often looked after women for the majority of the 
time) and work what is often called the ‗double shift‘ or ‗second shift‘.521 It‘s 
the work done by women in the work place and then the work of 
reproduction which often falls on their shoulders, when they arrive back at 
home. I have shown how the abstract and universalistic idea of the subject is 
detrimental to women and mothers in legal cases. I then discussed how the 
political can be found in women‘s relations, and how relationality can help us 
foster a better way to care. I then showed how a group of Italian women in 
the 1970s in Italy founded a mothers‘ collective and how they viewed care as 
something to engage in groups rather than alone.    
 The main questions of this chapter are this: the first is the same as the 
one in chapter 4 as I carry on the investigation in ascertaining if a relational 
                                                     
521 The scond shift is a term coined in 1989 by Arlie Hochschild. This definition has been criticised as being a 
middle class deifinition of the double shift and centering on the experiences of heterosexual white women. It 
disregards the marginalised women who have done unpaid, undervalued work for centuries. See Carla D. 
Brailey and Brittany C. Slatton, ―Women, Work, and Inequality in the U.S. : Revising the Second Shift,‖ 
Journal of Sociology and Social Work 7, no. 1 (2019): 29–35, https://doi.org/10.15640/jssw.v7n1a4. 
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model of motherhood protect women from the loneliness522 many experience 
in the first few months and first years of a baby and child‘s life? That is why in 
this chapter I look at research into post-natal depression and trace how 
loneliness is one of the causes of depression in new mothers/primary carers. 
The research I look at in this chapter is in the realm of psychoanalysis and 
sociology so it is a different register then in the first three chapters which are 
philosophical, conceptual and legal and the fourth which is a case study. I link 
the level of this question to the previous two because I believe that a more 
concrete, embodied view of humans is needed to then make a philosophical 
conceptual case. A solely abstract, philosophical thesis to look at mothers‘ 
loneliness and post-natal depression would not suffice. The way I link the two 
different registers is to lean my thinking to those feminist thinkers who 
worked to de-universalise the subject and think the subject as an embodied 
subject. The feminist thinker that helps me communicate between these two 
registers is Adriana Cavarero as she refrains to use an abstract language when 
speaking of the subject but prefers to think the uniqueness of each of us. By 
doing this we are ‗forced‘ to think of each person with a face, a life story, a 
biography, a set of feelings and embodied concrete materiality of who they 
are.  
                                                     
522 In 2016 research published by the Co-op and the Red Cross identified becoming a new mum as one of six 
main causes of loneliness.  They say ‗New research shows that a staggering 82 per cent  of mums under 30 
feel lonely some of the time while more than four in 10 (43 per cent) are lonely often or always.‘ 
Https://Www.Co-Operative.Coop/Media/News-Releases/Shocking-Extent-of-Loneliness-Faced-by-
Young-Mothers-Revealed, 2018.   Https://Www.Channel4.Com/News/the-Loneliness-of-Becoming-a-
New-Mum, 2016. 
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Secondly, does engaging in mothering/caring while being supported by 
other mothers, carers and the community change the subjectivity of a 
mother/carer?  
Some sub questions of this chapter are: firstly, how does maternal 
subjectivity change if lived in different conditions – not in isolation but 
together with the support of other people, especially other mothers? 
Secondly, how do we foster, and maintain, an understanding that a 
connection between women who do the same challenging work of 
reproduction is important? In this chapter I bring the ideas of the previous 
four chapters to bear. The chapter is divided into four main themes: the first 
theme centres on postnatal depression. I investigate how many new mothers 
suffer from postnatal depression in a still unequal society, despite the often-
heard rhetoric of equality, because they are still the majority doing care work. 
My analysis of postnatal depression focuses on one of its causes, the isolation 
Raphael-Leff discusses above, and it considers the significance of mothers‘ 
relationships with each other as helpful to counteract isolation as Mauthner 
states here:  
Although partners might be understanding and caring, it might be that 
what mothers want and need at this particular moment in their lives are 
relationships with other mothers, and other depressed mothers, who 
have a much deeper and personal understanding of their experiences. 
Consequently, it is important that future research bear in mind that a 
mother‘s partnership cannot necessarily satisfy all her emotional needs, 
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and consider the significance of mothers’ relationships with each other to their 
feelings of psychological and emotional well-being.523  
 
I too believe that more feminist readings of postnatal depression which look 
at mothers‘ relationality with other mothers, is necessary. I go further than 
Mauthner, though, to suggest that social contacts between mothers will 
engender a different kind of subjectivity in women. Meeting up with other 
mothers, I suggest, is not ‗just‘ functional to ward off postnatal depression 
and foster emotional well-being, but it is an important aspect of women‘s 
lives and sense of self,  identity and subjectivity.  
The second theme of this chapter is maternal subjectivity.  I analyse 
how feminist scholars, psychologists, and psychoanalysts have looked at, 
interpreted, and thought maternal subjectivity via both their theoretical work 
and some clinical work. The third theme of the chapter focuses on relational 
maternal subjectivity where I suggest, as in previous chapters but from a 
different lens, that we need to dislodge maternal subjectivity from an 
individualistic lens to counteract the individualistic capitalist forces at play that 
see caring as an individualistic activity. By counteracting this view, we can aid 
mothers in understanding that any carer needs support so that they do not 
find themselves alone and depressed without at times knowing why. It is a 
small quest, maybe, but it is close to my heart. It pains me to hear of mothers 
being very depressed when they have a small child or baby. I find it unfair that 
                                                     
523 Natasha S Mauthner, ―POSTNATAL DEPRESSION The Significance of Social Contacts Between 
Mothers,‖ Women’s Studies International Forum, vol. 18, 1995. p. 321. [My emphasis] 
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women the world over are left to deal with this emotional situation alone. It is 
time that we made it clearer that it is not natural to mother alone. My hope, 
maybe a little idealistic I admit, is that one day the numbers of mothers left 
behind, feeling lonely decreases and other collective mothering (caring) 
strategies are envisaged.  
The fourth theme focuses on an art exercise – to enact with others – 
that I co-created with Alex Martinis-Roe, a Berlin-based feminist artist, where 
I used a colourful thick fabric thread to symbolise relationality can make us 
think of what it means to care in a collective manner based on solidarity.  
being constantly attentive and attuned 
Concerning mothering and motherhood in this thesis I am interested in 
considering if relationality between mothers and carers, experiencing 
motherhood more collectively than in isolation, can help reveal a maternal 
subjectivity – paraphrasing what Lucy van Pelt says in the vignette in the 
Introduction, one that ‗belongs‘ to each woman and is always in process, 
always becoming and is a creative, learned social experience. This view of 
maternal subjectivity also plays a role in how legal rights can be thought of 
in this context. Women‘s subjectivity is connected to legal rights. How 
women‘s subjectivity is approached, thought about, and valued or not 
valued in law is important to reflect upon as we are born into law. In 
contrast to a collective view of motherhood, if mothering work is done in 
isolation, less relationally let‘s say, it can be difficult and damaging to the 
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person who cares and it can have an effect on the infant and young child 
who is cared for. In this respect British psychoanalyst Joan Raphael-Leff 
says:  
I want to stress that all primary carers of whatever sex and age find 
parenting difficult, especially in societies-in-transition such as our 
own, where extended families are dispersed and child rearing 
traditions eroded. Being constantly attentive and attuned to the needs 
of someone else for whom one has total responsibility at all times is a 
daunting task.524  
 
It is this being constantly attentive and attuned that is an exhausting and 
daunting task when done alone without support. This is because we do not 
exist in isolation; we are ontologically related and, more importantly, I infer 
that humans were not ‗meant‘ to mother/care alone, but together with 
others.  
What then is the weight and what are the subjective and 
psychological ‗consequences‘ of mothering alone in modern, capitalist and 
generally individualistic societies? This is the main question and kernel of 
my thesis; this is what has kept me awake at night, what has kept coming 
back to rekindle my drive to think of alternative modes of mothering. In 
this question, I have attempted never to lose sight of the millions of 
women who mother the world over, who, more often than not, probably 
                                                     
524 Raphael-Leff, ―Healthy Maternal Ambivalence.‖ p. 7.  See as well Carolina del Olmo, ¿Dónde Está Mi 
Tribu? Maternidad y Crianza En Una Sociedad Individualista (Madrid: Clave Intelectual, 2013).  
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mother alone for many hours a day.525 On the other hand, I have tried not 
to forget the socio-cultural and political realities of each woman‘s life. I do 
not advocate for an idealised and romanticised community of mothers 
who get together with an idea of a matriarchal past, but instead a 
‗community‘ of mothers and carers who get together for support and 
solidarity to common care. At the same time I believe, as Stone notes, that 
even if the social condition of mothers were improved, motherhood could 
not become an entirely unproblematic experience:  
At times in feminist work on mothering [….] there is an implicit 
suggestion that given different social conditions – better childcare 
provisions; the transformation of our workplaces and public spheres 
to accommodate mothering, child-caring and care more generally; full 
sharing of childcare between the sexes – mothering could become an 
entirely unproblematic experience. I agree that mothering could 
become significantly less problematic, but I am not convinced that it 
could ever be entirely so. …The sorrowful side of mothering is no 
doubt more or less pronounced for different women, and for some it 
may be negligible; yet it remains structural to maternity.526 
 
While I agree with Stone‘s assertion, nevertheless mine is a suggestion – 
that relationality between mothers and carers can help in mothering work, 
that it can become a little easier if, and when, mothers and carers of 
dependent children can relate to each other and support each other while 
doing the same job.  
                                                     
525 ‗Care is an arduous temporal practice‘. in Lisa Baraitser, Enduring Time (London & New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2017). 
526 Stone, Feminism, Psychoanalysis and Maternal Subjectivity. p. 165. [my emphasis]. 
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In the UK, around one in five women experience postnatal depression, 
according to the mental health charity Mind. Lack of support is considered, 
among others to be one of the risk factors in developing postnatal 
depression.527 Maternal mental health problems both during pregnancy and 
after giving birth or after adoption are often overlooked and under reported. 
Pregnancy and childbirth are life changing experiences that women go 
through where they frequently become extremely isolated after giving birth. 
Women who are mothers often get caught in a never-ending cycle of poverty 
and child rearing, both in the UK and across the globe, affecting their mental 
health and their ability to function; therefore I am interested in how 
relationality with other mothers and carers can prevent this from happening 
and make the mothering experience a little bit easier. Moreover, ‗the mother‘ I 
am looking at, and the interest I have in the maternal, is similar to that 
described by sociologist Tina Miller: 
I have much more particularly couched my work in a space called 
‗maternal subjectivities‘ which for me as a feminist sociologist locates 
the focus in individual experiences in particular structural conditions 
and gendered circumstances which are classed and ‗raced‘ – and lived 
in particular historical moments. A focus which has illuminated the 
ways in which in every culture childbirth and motherhood are culturally 
inscribed and socially produced (Jordan 1993).‘528  
 
                                                     
527 ―Https://Www.Mind.Org.Uk/Information-Support/Types-of-Mental-Health-Problems/Postnatal-
Depression-and-Perinatal-Mental-Health/,‖ n.d. Accessed on 06.01.2020.  As stated in the document other 
risk factors in postnatal depression are: previous experiences of mental health problems, biological causes, 
difficult childhood experiences, experience of abuse, low self-esteem, stressful living experiences, major life 
events.  
528 Miller, Tina ―Thoughts around the Maternal: A Sociological Viewpoint,‖ Studies in the Maternal 1, no. 1 
(2009): 1–3. 
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Hence the mother I am interested in looking at is a particular mother at a 
particular moment, and, for me, what is universal or at least extremely 
common and socially normalised of her experience, is the possibility that once 
she becomes a mother, she may find herself alone and isolated.  I recognise 
that the differences in women‘s lives will affect the specificities and quality of 
this isolation; no two mothering experiences will be the same. Therefore, 
because of this possibility that a mother may find herself in an ‗isolated 
condition‘, she represents a ‗universal mother‘.  
My main preoccupation in this thesis, as I stated at the start, is that once 
women become mothers, more often than not, they go through an internal 
subjective change which has many different layers of reference: how one was 
mothered, how one is able to ask to be supported by others (or not) once she 
has birthed a baby. This subjective change happens to all  mothers at different 
levels and to varying degrees, but I suggest this change can take a more 
dramatic turn if a woman is isolated and does not have much support around 
her. This experience is common, particularly in the Western world, and 
elements of it are likely to be increasingly shared by women living in capitalist 
neoliberal societies, even if there are subjective and substantial material 
differences to do with the intersection between race, class, and culture that 
vary some of the applicability of the analysis here.  
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on postnatal depression 
As I said in the Introduction to the thesis, according to a 2016 research by the 
Co-op and the Red Cross, mothers‘ isolation during the first year of their 
baby‘s life is among one of the six main causes of loneliness in the UK.529 The 
way I start to answer the questions I asked above is by first looking at 
isolation, at one of the causes of postnatal depression.530 The reason we need 
to reconceptualise maternal subjectivity through feminist relational theory and 
practice is that an individualistic view of the subject is not enough to describe 
maternal subjectivity. As we have seen, isolation is one the causes of postnatal 
depression.  We might say that postnatal depression is a symptom of the 
alienation of mothering work, especially present in capitalist, neoliberal 
societies where often mothers end up mothering alone or with little support. 
Becoming a mother is a big transition, being pregnant, giving birth, and 
becoming responsible for another human being is a significant undertaking 
within one‘s embodied and psychological sense of self.  Professor of 
Childhood and Youth Studies Rachel Thomson, and Mary Jane Kehily, Lucy 
Hadfield, and Sue Sharpe, worked on a research project analysing how this 
transition happens.531 Their findings were made into a book.532 Thomson and 
                                                     
529 ―Https://Www.Co-Operative.Coop/Media/News-Releases/Shocking-Extent-of-Loneliness-Faced-by-
Young-Mothers-Revealed.‖ 
530 Patricia Leahy-Warren, McCarthy Geraldine, and Corcoran Paul, ―First-Time Mothers: Social Support, 
Maternal Parental Self-Efficacy and Postnatal Depression,‖ Journal of Clinical Nursing , 2011, 1–10 ; In this 
article lack of social support was identified as one of the causes of ante-natal and postnatal depression 
Bronwyn Leigh and Jeannette Milgrom, ―Risk Factors for Antenatal Depression and Post Natal Depression 
and Parenting Stress,‖ BMC Psychiatry 8, no. 24 (2008). 
531 Rachel Thomson et al., ―Http://Modernmothers.Org/,‖ n.d. Another study that have looked at the 
transition to motherhood and identity is this Lucy Bailey, ―Refracted Selves? A Study of Changes in Self-
Identity in the Transition to Motherhood,‖ Sociology 33, no. 2 (1999): 335–52. 
532 Rachel Thomson et al., Making Modern Mothers (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2011). 
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her colleagues interviewed sixty expectant first time mothers from the ages of 
fifteen to forty-eight – all diverse in relation to social class, ethnicity, gender, 
living situation, work status, and proximity to family support. They followed 
twelve families till their child turned four years old. They found that ‗the 
transition to motherhood in the contemporary era is an arena where 
socioeconomic differences between women are defined, compounded and 
inflated through the creation of distinct cultures of child rearing.‘533 They 
analysed how these new mothers‘ identities changed and they found that there 
were various variables dependent on age, work status, class, race, and support 
network. The overall finding was that the women‘s identities changed within 
themselves and that people perceived them in a different way since becoming 
mothers, both at work and in the wider society. The expectations and realities 
of motherhood were discussed too.534 Especially at work, women were often 
asked to do fewer important tasks and took up fewer executive decision-
making positions once coming back from maternity leave. This took time to 
adjust to and it was not seen as a good experience associated with 
motherhood.   
The amount of support new mothers receive is an important aspect of 
how motherhood is experienced. In the UK only 2% of fathers take SPL 
                                                     
533 Ibid. 
534 Rebecca McErlean and Valsamma Eapen, ―Post Natal Depression: When Reality Does Not Match 
Expectations,‖ in Perinatal Depression, ed. Maria Graciela Rojas Castillo (Rijeka, Croatia: InTech, 2011), 55–80. 
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(Statutory Parental Leave)535 leaving mothers with a higher burden of childcare 
in the first few years of a child‘s life before they start school. Psychoanalyst 
Joan Raphael-Leff elucidates that lack of support in the West often leaves 
new mothers isolated: 
One consequence of post-industrial urbanisation is that due to social 
stratification, geographical mobility, breakdown of extended families 
and changing social mores, ‘westernised’ women often mother in isolation. 
Alone, having lost both intergenerational support and traditional 
community network, a new mother is at risk of being overpowered 
by the impossible expectations and emotional forces inherent in the 
childbearing/rearing situation.536 
 
For Raphael-Leff mothering in isolation does not really work, or it ―works‖ at 
the cost of heightening mothers‘ infantile emotions, splitting, denigration, and 
idealisation which render her vulnerable.537 These bring about different 
feelings about how mothers experience motherhood. Some of these 
heightened feelings can bring about postnatal depression.   
Psychiatrist Ian Brockington gives a medical and psychological 
perspective of maternal mental health. He argues that the psychopathology of 
the postpartum period in mothers can take many different forms. In his 
comprehensive book Motherhood and Mental Health538 (1996), he identified 
twenty forms of postnatal depression which go from maternity blues to 
                                                     
535 ―‗It Was Seen as Weird‘: Why Are so Few Men Taking Shared Parental Leave?,‖ The Guardian, October 5, 
2019, https://doi.org/https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/oct/05/shared-parental-leave-seen-
as-weird-paternity-leave-in-decline. 
536 Joan Raphael-Leff, ―Maternal Subjectivity,‖ Studies in the Maternal 1, no. 1 (2009): 1–5.  
537 Ibid. p.  
538 Ian Brockington, Motherhood and Mental Health. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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puerperal psychosis. Some of these are: idiopathic confusional states;539  
stupor;540  eclampsia;541   ‗maternity blues‘;542 post-traumatic stress disorder;543 
anxiety which can take many forms;544 obsessional disorders from infanticide 
to sexual abuse;545 and depression546 which includes postnatal depression. In 
this chapter I only consider maternity blues and postpartum depression. As 
we have seen above, childbirth and the transition to motherhood is a big 
change for women. It is a period of subjective and inter-subjective changes. 
Brockington writes:  
Childbirth is a complex event, packed with somatic and psychological 
incident. It is a period of rapid biological, social and emotional 
transition. It is a social and psychological crisis requiring intrapsychic 
adaptation and interpersonal reorganisation, especially after the first 
child. There is physical discomfort, and there may be loss of 
employment, financial pressures, changes in the social network, 
decreased recreation, confinement in the house, and boredom. 
Marriage and other relationships may come under strain. It would not 
be surprising if such a challenge provoked a wide variety of psychiatric 
disorders.‘547  
 
Many changes occur which can bring about a period of heightened emotions.  
According to Brockington, some women report how they feel to their GP, 
but many times they do not. He says, ‗many more mothers become depressed 
                                                     
539 Ibid. p. 139-141.  
540 Ibid. p. 141.  
541 Ibid. p. 141-145.  
542 Ibid. p. 147-153.  
543 Ibid. p. 153-154. 
544 Ibid. p. 157-162.  
545 Ibid. p. 162-165.  
546 Ibid. p. 165-187.  
547 Ibid. p. 138.   
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than ever make their way to their family doctor‘s surgery.‘548 He carries on by 
saying that:  
The reasons for the failure to seek help are not fully understood. One 
can guess that some recover early, others do not realise they are ill, and 
a third group are ashamed, or apprehensive about the effect of 
confessing their symptoms. These mothers suffer in silence because of 
public ignorance about depression, taboos about psychiatric illness and 
fears of losing their baby.‘549  
 
Women live with postnatal depression sometimes for months without 
understanding fully what they are going through, possibly as well for a still 
quite pervading stereotypical idea (and unconscious embodied historical idea 
too) that mothers are ‗naturally caring.‘550 According to a National Childbirth 
Trust survey, even when new mothers manage to go to their six-week 
postnatal check-up at their GP  – which often is done at the same time as 
their baby‘s check-ups – there is not enough time to discuss their feelings at 
length. Sarah McMullen, NCT‘s Head of Knowledge says ‗Many new mums 
don‘t find it easy to admit they are struggling, so it is impossible to make them 
feel comfortable enough to discuss their concerns in less than three 
minutes.‘551 
                                                     
548 Ibid. p. 174.  
549 Ibid. p. 174.  
550 Elisabeth Badinter argues that mother love has been invented and that historically French women were 
more than happy to leave their children to be looked after by other women while they worked or they 
socialised. Badinter, Mother Love. Myth & Reality. 
551 ―New Mothers‘ Mental Health Problems Going Undetected, Says Charity,‖ 
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/sep/05/gps-are-ignoring-new-mothers-mental-health-says-
parenting-charity, n.d. 
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To reflect on and try to make sense of the transition to motherhood 
and how a baby and mother relate in 2015 I decided to take a two year course 
on Infant and Child Observation at the Tavistock and Portman NHS Trust in 
London, where I observed a five week old baby once a week until he/she was 
two years old. This course has informed some sections of my thesis. I am not 
a psychotherapist or a psychoanalyst so my interest in maternal subjectivity is 
mainly from a feminist perspective, my experience of being mothered and 
being a mother and I am informed by psychoanalysis by many years of a 
personal interest in it and by undergoing personal therapy myself. I purposely 
took this course to learn to become an observer and to think through an 
infant‘s growing subjectivity in relation with others. In addition, as I am 
interested in relational ontology, I wanted to observe and think through what 
goes on between a mother and a baby.  
Maternal mental health is often seen from a medical perspective and 
the biggest ‗side effect‘ of postnatal depression is often seen as the effect it 
has on children‘s well-being,552 what is called adverse child outcomes. The 
mother is seen as the one who needs to get better for the benefit of her 
children. Accordingly, some studies have looked at fathers‘ postnatal 
depression too, from the same perspective: the effect on the children.553 Even 
                                                     
552 Peter J Cooper and Lynne Murray, ―Post Natal Depression,‖ British Medical Journal 316, no. 1884 (1998), 
https://doi.org/doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.316.7148.1884. Peter J. Murray, Lynne and Cooper, ed., 
Postpartum Depression and Child Development. (London: The Guildford Press, 1997). Lynne Murray et al., 
―Association of Persistent and Severe Post Natal Depression with Child Outcomes,‖ JAMA Psychiatry 75, no. 
3 (2018): 247–53. 
553 Paul Ramchandani et al., ―Paternal Depression in the Postnatal Period and Child Development: A 
Prospective Population Study,‖ Lancet, 2005, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(05)66778-5.  
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if children‘s well-being is a very important point of view, and one which I am 
interested in too, it is not the focus of my thesis. Instead I look at postnatal 
depression as something which can be detrimental to mothers‘ subjective 
experience. Feminists have read postnatal depression from a psychosocial 
perspective. I am interested in looking at ‗maternal blues‘ and postnatal 
depression from a feminist perspective because I argue that if a mother is 
depressed it is detrimental to her own experience of motherhood and her 
sense of self.  As I stated before my focus in this thesis is a feminist view of 
motherhood, in which I care for mothers to have a relatively satisfying 
experience of motherhood. My approach on this matter is that if a mother is 
relatively content, as a consequence things will be better for her children, but 
I do not want to see the mother solely as a function of her children. I propose 
that the importance of new mothers having a relatively satisfying experience 
of motherhood is important for women‘s subjectivity and their internal world 
is important as a ‗theme‘ per se.  
on maternal subjectivity   
In this section I focus on Hollway‘s understanding of maternal subjectivity 
from her 2001 article ‗From Motherhood to Maternal Subjectivity.‘554 Hollway 
is a British feminist psychologist and she is useful for my discussion because 
she has done a study of the meaning of intersubjectivity between a mother 
and a baby. Because I am interested in relational ontology, I posit that it is 
                                                     
554 Hollway, ―From Motherhood to Maternal Subjectivity.‖  
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through relationships that we can read maternal subjectivity, and it is for this 
reason that Hollway‘s work connects to that of Cavarero and others I have 
turned to throughout the previous chapters. It is those authors who have 
made this connection that I find most useful for my idea of relational 
maternal subjectivity. I argue that we cannot read maternal subjectivity via an 
individualistic lens because mothers‘ subjectivity is too enmeshed with their 
experiences of how they were mothered by their own mothers/fathers/carers. 
Hollway argues that, if to be a mother you need a child, and it is via a child 
that one becomes a mother, so it is via the intersubjective exchange between 
mother and child and the world around them that the mother‘s experience is 
shaped. Focusing her work on feminist psychology, she describes maternal 
subjectivity as that which ‗emphasises unconscious intersubjectivity,‘ hence, 
that which accounts for mothers‘ unconscious lived experiences while relating 
to their baby and child. Hollway reinstated the mother as subject with a set of 
concepts which are intersubjective. She then adds that even though the child 
is a central figure in her article, which may alarm some feminists, she thinks 
maternal subjectivity can be accounted for when it is seen as (an) 
intersubjectivity between the mother-child relationship. To understand what is 
going on for a mother, we need to challenge the idea of the bounded rational 
subject of the Enlightenment, as I have attempted to do in this dissertation.  
 Hollway argues that much of classical psychoanalysis (exemplified by 
the work of Klein, Bion and Winnicott), sees the mother as the ‗empty 
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category into which children‘ needs can be placed.‘555 At the same time 
Hollway has read these works from a feminist perspective and she inserts the 
mother‘s own needs, desires, wishes and reality firmly into the picture. 
Interestingly she argues that historically within much of feminism mothers‘ 
and children‘s needs and interests were set up in opposition.556 But it is not 
very useful to set them against each other, Hollway argues that, as the mother 
does not exist without her baby, a mother‘s subjectivity is shaped by that 
relationship also. Notwithstanding that a woman is a mother, she often 
desires some space for herself in which to feel at home in herself, in a room 
of her own, to paraphrase Virginia Woolf (1929).557 Importantly, along with 
other feminists, Hollway says that ‗feminist psychoanalysis has gone further 
and argued that children need that their mothers be subjects in their own 
right‘558 therefore it is in this framework that I understand the subjectivity of 
women who mother. Irigaray559 and Kristeva560 stated the importance of a 
mothers‘ subjectivity which is independent. Hollway states: ‗mothers are not 
‗just‘ mothers‘561 and argues that: 
psychoanalysis and psychology, by looking at mothers through the prism 
of the child‘s needs, have been compromised by representing women 
who are mothers as being entirely the objects of their children 
developmental needs. This blindness to women‘s outer and inner lives 
                                                     
555 Ibid. p. 2.  
556 Ibid. p. 5.  
557 Virginia Woolf, A Room of One’s Own (New York: Vintage Classics, 2018). 
558 Hollway, ―From Motherhood to Maternal Subjectivity.‖, p. 2.  
559 Irigaray, ―Body against Body: In Relation to the Mother.‖ 
560 Julia Kristeva, ―Stabat Mater.,‖ in The Kristeva Reader., ed. Toril Moi (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley 
Blackwell, 1991), 160–86. 
561 Hollway, ―From Motherhood to Maternal Subjectivity.‖ 8.  
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echoes the narcissistic blindness of a young child to its mother as 
anything other as an extension of its demands.562  
The focus in my research is on the importance of a mother being a woman 
too. Hollway focuses on the same, and poses a fundamental question for 
women and feminists (mothers and non): ‗how [does] being a mother coexist 
[..] with these other parts?‘563 Hollway states that in analysing how maternal 
subjectivity is constituted we must explore ‗concepts of maternal ambivalence, 
containment, recognition and maternal development – all ways of 
understanding the specific workings and effects of specific unconscious 
intersubjective dynamics.‘564  She adds that she favours a version of 
subjectivity that includes the issue of coherence or integration.565   
Hollway expands on the idea of maternal subjectivity first proposed by 
Sara Ruddick566, who argued that some realities of maternal work reproduce 
universal requirements on mothers. What Hollway adds is the unconscious 
emotional work of mothers. She states that within a model of 
intersubjectivity, it‘s important to accept the powerful effects of children‘s 
emotions on maternal subjectivity.567 In relation to maternal ambivalence 
Hollway suggests that like all people, mothers use splitting to protect 
themselves against anxiety, hence she says ‗contrary to cultural constructions 
                                                     
562 Ibid. p. 8, 9.   
563 Ibid. p. 9.  
564 Ibid. p. 2.  
565 Ibid. p. 9.  
566 Ruddick, Maternal Thinking. Towards a Politics of Peace. 
567 Hollway, ―From Motherhood to Maternal Subjectivity.‖ p.10.  
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about maternal love, mothers too are not immune from the splitting of love 
and hate in their relations with their children.‘568  
Rozsika Parker‘s569 study of maternal ambivalence is important for my 
understanding of the difficulties posed by mothering in isolation and the 
splitting Hollway discusses above. Parker argues that in the contemporary 
landscape of the motherhood experience there is what she calls the ‗happiness 
imperative.‘570 It is this idea that a parent needs to show always the good, 
cheerful side to their children. I argue that being alone in charge of children 
can exacerbate feelings of hate at a level in which it is hard to integrate these 
feelings with a wider variety of feelings. Parker, too, argues that it is hard for 
mothers to acknowledge feelings of ambivalence or hate towards their 
children. The fear of hating children in some mothers produces what in 
psychoanalysis is described as ―split off.‖ Instead of acknowledging hate and 
integrating it in the variety of feelings one has for a child, it is hidden away 
and split off from the idea we have of ourselves. For Parker what is important 
is to incorporate hate with love. This helps mothers to think about what their 
child needs in a realistic way. When the maternal is linked always and solely to 
love, because maternal love is seen as natural, mothers who are not always 
loving towards their children, like most mothers are at time, are regarded as 
bad mothers. This idealised image of the mother serves as a shared defence 
                                                     
568 Ibid. p.13.   
569 Parker, Torn in Two. The Experience of Maternal Ambivalence. Parker, Mother Love/Mother Hate. The Power of 
Maternal Ambivalence. 
570 Parker, Torn in Two. The Experience of Maternal Ambivalence. p.   
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for all of us against the maternal hatred, which we cannot bear to 
acknowledge consciously. By assigning the label of the bad mother to 
other/mothers we ‗cleanse‘ our psyche of the fear of having been/being 
hateful towards our children.   
According to Parker, Hollway, Raphael-Leff, and Baraitser the concept 
of maternal ambivalence can help a mother‘s mixed feelings towards her 
infant (and later on towards her older toddler and child) to be better 
integrated. This helps in her understanding that babies need imperfection 
from their mothers, not perfection. Psychoanalysis and feminist 
psychoanalysis, according to Hollway, has given a different importance to the 
infant‘s relation to the mother because of the infant‘s relationship with her 
body, hence fathers and other primary carers signify differently for infants 
and children.571 Hollway writes that Frosh‘s572 query as to how fathers would 
signify to children if they were the sole primary carer or if they had equal 
shared responsibility from the start is a challenging question for 
psychoanalysis.573  Similarly it is the reason why I argue, in this research, that I 
cannot put fathers and mothers in the same frame and focus on a neutral 
term like ‗parents‘ only, this would efface all the affective realities of mothers 
and equally of fathers.574  In this light Hollway says ‗the initial dependency on 
                                                     
571 Hollway, ―From Motherhood to Maternal Subjectivity.‖ p. 16.  
572 Stephen Frosh, ―Fathers‘ Ambivalence Too,‖ in Mothering and Ambivalence. , ed. W Hollway and B 
Featherstone (London: Routledge , 1997), 37–53. 
573 Hollway, ―From Motherhood to Maternal Subjectivity.‖ p. 16.   
574 Notwithstanding that some parents who adopt would have a different relationship with their children 
depending on many factors and non-binary parents who are primary carers too. I still think the way we were 
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the biological mother‘s body provokes unconscious fantasies in which the 
mother is a powerful and dangerous figure.‘575 It would be interesting to 
explore this aspect in the light of the relationship of a surrogate child with his 
‗adoptive‘ parents and what remains of the surrogate mother‘s body in the 
infant and child‘s fantasy. Problematically, for Hollway, even in writing of 
feminist writers the fantasy of the ideal mother still persists; Chodorow and 
Contratto576 state that ‗if current limitations on mothers were eliminated 
mothers would know naturally how to be good.‘577 This is problematic in that 
it implies that there is something natural in women allowing them to be good 
mothers, which put it in this way, would reinforce patriarchal dogma. I think 
this is far from the truth and that in reality, women and mothers are not 
naturally good mothers, but if supported and in the absence of ―current 
limitations‖578 they might find mothering a bit easier. This would be because 
their mental health would be protected, not because a natural propensity for 
mothering would emerge.  
Classical Freudian psychoanalysis saw the mother as an object of the 
baby‘s needs. By contrast the feminist psychoanalysts I mentioned above and 
many others have acknowledged the importance of the mother as a woman in 
                                                                                                                                                           
parented would filter into the way we parent our children and some conscious or unconscious ‗gender‘ sign 
would probably remain.  
575 Hollway, ―From Motherhood to Maternal Subjectivity.‖ p. 16, 17.  
576 Nancy Chodorow and Susan Contratto, ―The Fantasy of the Perfect Mother,‖ in Rethinking the Family: 
Some Feminist Questions, ed. Barrie Thorne and Marilyn Yalom, Second rev (Northeastern University Press, 
1993). 
577 Hollway, ―From Motherhood to Maternal Subjectivity.‖ p.17.   
578 Joan Raphael-Leff, Psychological Processes of Childbearing. (Cheltenham: Nelson Thornes Ltd, 1990). 
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her own right. This has been an important achievement for feminism. For 
Winnicott too it was important that the mother be differentiated from her 
child. According to Hollway, Rozsika Parker579 introduced the idea of 
maternal development to challenge the idea that mothers are a static object of 
their children‘s wishes and to shift the focus on concentrating on child 
development and to seeing the mother as a subject too and to be able to start 
to theorise about her.580  For Hollway the mother changes too in the face of 
the infant and child‘s development. They both change, hence the mother‘s 
development is a subjective development while she recognises the infant‘s 
changing development, all influenced by the ability of not to integrate the 
ambivalence she feels towards the children.   
It would be interesting, Hollway argues, to see if once the gender of 
parenting is less important this will have an effect on how the baby fantasises 
about the omnipotent mother, and if she will lose some of her power and 
presence within the baby‘s fantasies. Hollway says that we can extend to 
everyone the intersubjective capacity that enables a person to bear the 
demands of others in the service of their moral development, but this does 
not mean that we should belittle the emotional work mothers often do.581 
Finally she says the kind of enabling which would be helpful in caring for 
others looks almost like a transitory suspension of desires ‗which draws on 
                                                     
579 Parker, Torn in Two. The Experience of Maternal Ambivalence. 
580 Hollway, ―From Motherhood to Maternal Subjectivity.‖  p. 27.   
581 Ibid. p. 31.  
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subjective resources far removed from the phallocentric subject.‘582 I posit that 
the capacity to care can be developed by everyone, including fathers 
obviously, even though at times fathers may find it hard to identify with a 
helpless and demanding baby due to historical conditions of masculinities. 
This challenges the idea of a mother as an autonomous subject in her own 
right but proposes the creation of the mother‘s subjectivity happening 
through intersubjective exchanges. I too have challenged the idea of an 
autonomous, self-sufficient subject throughout this thesis through my 
argument that this view of the subject harms everyone, particularly mothers 
and carers.  
for a relational view on postnatal depression 
Different perspectives on the causes and experiences of postnatal depression 
and maternity blues in women are revealed depending upon whether one 
analyses these experiences through  the lens of  biomedicine or through the 
lens of  psychology. Valerie Thurtle583 argues that to explain the complex 
theme of postnatal mental health it is important to add a sociological lens to 
this theme. The most comprehensive way to understand postnatal depression 
and its effect on mothers is through a holistic and multidisciplinary approach. 
Brockington suggests various mechanisms to support a mother with postnatal 
depression, including psychotherapy:  
                                                     
582 Ibid. p. 31 
583 Valerie Thurtle, ―Post-Natal Depression: The Relevance of Sociological Approaches.,‖ JAN, The Journal of 
Advanced Nursing 22, no. 3 (1995): 416–24.  
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There will be an opportunity to explain that these experiences are 
widespread, though too often faced in loneliness and silence by 
mothers, who do not know that they are common, understandable and 
remediable. It is an enormous relief to mothers to hear that others have, with help, 
been able to overcome them.584  
 
In this passage we see that when a new mother goes to therapy, she may be 
relieved to learn that other women experience similar difficulties. As a 
psychiatrist Brockington also advocates the use of drugs to cure postnatal 
depression to which I suspend my judgement or reflection for lack of 
knowledge in this matter. Nevertheless, as we have seen above, he recognises 
the importance for mothers to realise that maternity blues and postnatal 
depression are shared experiences many new mothers go through. This 
realisation, he says, brings ‗an enormous relief.‘585  
This was something feminists had discovered from the 1960s onwards, 
beginning with Betty Friedan‘s (1963) very popular book The Feminine 
Mystique, in which she gave an account of many American wives and mothers 
who found the loneliness of married life and having children often 
excruciating. After reading Friedan‘s book, many women, both in the States 
and abroad (in Italy it was published in 1975), understood that other women 
felt the same as them: motherhood was challenging. This was a liberating 
realisation. Prior to this point women often experienced those feelings in 
isolation within the parameter of patriarchy and without a common language. 
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There is a sense of solidarity in knowing one person is not alone in 
experiencing those feelings and is listened to by others. Brockington writes, ‗it 
is well to bear in mind that most people receive ‗psychotherapy‘ from friends, 
their own mother, or their spouse… The need for professional counselling 
arises, to some extent, because many do not have understanding friends and 
relatives.‘586 Therefore, we see the importance of having understanding people 
around, and according to Brockington, ‗Lack of social support is another well-
known association of depression, and one would expect this to be important 
in recently delivered mothers.‘587 He carries on by arguing that ‗social support, 
however, is complex and difficult to objectify; there are many variables to be 
considered, including the number of confidantes, the frequency and form of 
contact, and the type of support provided—emotional support, guidance or 
socialisation.‘588   
 Looking at isolation after giving birth we can see it is a universal 
phenomenon, that can happen in many different cultures so it is not exclusive 
to Western culture, even if probably more prominent.589 The importance of 
having supportive friends and relatives around extends, as Brockington 
argues, even to helping a pregnant woman to understand and grapple with her 
pregnancy.590 There are some cases in which a woman alone does not realise 
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she is pregnant because there is no one to mirror her, to tell her, to see her in 
short.   
I suggest that motherhood is a learned experience and the more one is 
mothering alone and in isolation the more challenging it is. I sustain the 
importance of women spending time together and seeing each other 
breastfeed or bottle feed,  changing nappies, asking for suggestions, talking 
about how one feels – the tiredness, the frustration of the non-stop nature of 
mothering – or sharing the powerful experience of hearing the story of 
another mother‘s birth. Tyler and Baraitser have argued that: 
Outside the important work of a small number of artists who opened 
up childbirth as a viable artistic subject during feminism‘s second wave, 
and the medical, health and instructional contexts that have allowed, 
and yet simultaneously ‗confined‘ its visualisation, childbirth has until 
recently remained ‗the great unseen‘ of European culture.591 
 
Why is the experience of motherhood/birth/breastfeeding so hidden? What 
is there to hide? It is still the case that these experiences are often going 
unrepresented, but in recent years birth has been more visible via social media 
platforms in which mothers ask for suggestions about birth plans. There are 
now also many Youtube channels which portray the whole process of birth 
and explain matters relating to motherhood and babies. (I discuss maternal 
subjectivity in this thesis as deeply embedded, linked, and dependant on 
relationality.)  
                                                     
591 Imogen Tyler and Lisa Baraitser, ―Private View, Public Birth: Making Feminist Sense of the New Visual 
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As we will see in the next part and as we have seen in the previous 
chapters, the core of my research is relationality between mothers for the 
reasons Italian sexual difference feminists Lia Cigarini and Luisa Muraro 
explain here: 
 our political practice is based on the dual relationship of exchange 
based on trust – relationship which is marginal in a capitalistic society – 
which forms the mediation to allow for women‘s freedom.592  
I‘ll now briefly account for the link between relationality and motherhood and 
why I think it is important before looking at relationality in particular in the 
next part. Within sexual difference feminist theory, there are several books 
that take relationality between women very seriously but there are not many 
books about the specificity of the relationality between women once they 
become mothers.593 
I see the political not as separate from life in governments and its 
apparatuses, but as part of life. As Cigarini and Muraro say ‗it is not our 
interest to separate politics from culture, love, work. We would not like a 
politics separate in this way, and we would not be able to practice it.‘  I see 
                                                     
592 ‗La nostra pratica politica che fa della relazione duale di scambio basato sulla fiducia – relazione marginale 
in una societa‘ capitalistica – la mediatrice della liberta‘ femminile.‘ in Cigarini, Lia and Muraro, ―Politica e 
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two members of the collective, Angela Cattaneo and Silvana Pisa with the contribution of the other mothers 
too, Cattaneo and Pisa, L’Altra Mamma. La Maternita’ Nel Movimento Delle Donne. Fantasie, Desideri, Domande e 
Inquietudini.  
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relationality and relationality between mothers or carers as political, then, 
because care and the work of reproduction is political.  
If, as Cavarero says, as I said in Chapter Three instead of fragmenting 
the subject, we would instead incline the subject (in a similar way to ‗the 
mother‘ in the stereotypical ideal of the oblative mother), we can see how by 
inclining her towards her baby the mother is supported/aided in this 
inclination/in this mothering work, if she inclines herself towards 
another/towards another ‗mother‘. In this ‗double inclination‘, her 
vulnerability is somehow halved. She is not the solipsistic subject who 
mothers in isolation, closed up in this self-sufficient idea of herself, instead in 
this ‗double inclination‘ she finds that mothering together 
with/another/‗mother‘ instead of fragmenting herself (what can we call 
postnatal depression if not a fragmentation of the subject/self?...) she may be 
better able to ‗add‘ to her subjectivity/to ‗augment‘ her mothering ‗capacity‘, 
to learn to mother from and with another m/other. Hence in a way we have a 
different subjectivity. Italian feminist political philosopher Olivia Guaraldo 
argues that  
What politics and ethics should take into account is the way in 
which relationality contributes to shape a notion of subjectivity, 
which is linked, from birth, to the indispensable presence of 
another human being. 594 
 
                                                     
594 Olivia Guaraldo, ―Thinkers That Matter. On the Thought of Judith Butler and Adriana Cavarero.,‖ About 
Gender, International Journal on Gender Studies.  1, no. 1 (2012). p. 92-117. p. 110. 
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This ‗different‘ subjectivity, I suggest, is the result of relationality 
between mothers and carers. Following Cavarero‘s thinking in the 
previous chapters relationality aids us to shape our idea of our own 
selfhood and subjectivity. If this primal relationality which happens from 
birth, is then reactivated in other stages of life, more importantly when 
we are most vulnerable, then we carry on being part of the world by 
virtue of a relation. The ‗otherworldly‘ and depressive state of postnatal 
depression can then remain at bay, allowing us a ‗unified‘, more content, 
more within the world subjectivity.  
on relational maternal subjectivity 
Motherhood elicits in women complex feelings and, by relating to other 
women who are mothers too, women may be able to process those feelings 
and hopefully to externalise them and verbalise them. This processing and 
elaborating of feelings is vital and can help ward off postnatal depression. As 
we have seen in Chapter 4, the mothers‘ collective found that the sharing of 
personal experiences of birth and motherhood made them less difficult to 
deal with. Finding out that other mothers  can feel the same: sad, frustrated, 
lost, in love, elated, excited, exhausted, makes one‘s story more valid, real, and 
concrete. In suggesting the benefits of mothering happening in collaboration, 
solidarity with other mothers and carers, I am aware of sentiments of jealousy 
among women, hatred, and projections of our relationships with our mothers 
onto other women in which we can take the role of the mother or daughter.  
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 As I discussed in Chapter 3 what I call  the mother‘s ‗double 
vulnerability‘ towards herself,  her changing subjectivity and her infant‘s 
vulnerability can add something  to how we view, account for, and theorise 
mothers‘ subjectivity. Understanding this can help us understand the mother 
not as the all giving and constantly responsive depositary to her infants needs 
but as someone in a dynamic relationship, a human who encounters another 
(each with different realities, the adult as an adult but nevertheless vulnerable, 
as Arendt says, vulnerability is the human condition). I suggest that we start 
looking at the relationship between an infant and its mother (or other primary 
carer) as one between two vulnerable human beings, both with different sets 
of powers and roles. Perhaps in this light we can account for and keep present 
the subjectivity of the mother as the one who responds or tries to respond 
attentively to her infant‘s needs, but who is at the same time, having her own 
desires and wishes because she is utterly human, not an idealised figure as she 
has been historically and culturally framed for centuries. In addition, I argue 
that if we saw mothers‘ subjectivity as based on relationality then relational 
subjectivity comes into play, where mothers can benefit from relationships 
with other carers so that the ‗weight‘ of caring for a child does not fall only on 
them, but the mother is supported and recognised (in her maternal work) by 
others. I argue she would experience an utterly different subjectivity if 
supported in her mothering. This I argue can work as ‗protection‘ against 
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postnatal depression. It is our failure to see women as part of society and part 
of politics which has often condemned mothers to mother alone.  
 I read Baraitser‘s book Maternal Encounters when I was pregnant of my 
child between 2009/10 and while being very excited about the imminent birth 
but already knowing quite well that motherhood was not going to be just rosy. 
I realised even more while reading it how motherhood was going to be 
delightful and challenging (too). At the same time as realising this further, I 
began to think about relationality and how motherhood could be different if 
thought in a relational way. Baraitser states that maternal subjectivity can be 
described as that which we fail to precisely describe:  
Perhaps we might say that the process of attempting, and perhaps 
inevitably failing to catch hold of the mercurial mental and 
emotional currents prompted by maternity is one way to 
understand what we may call maternal subjectivity.595 
 
It is this ‗failing to catch hold of the mercurial mental and emotional currents 
prompted by maternity‘ that I am interested in bringing into the political 
sphere of the maternal. Subjectivities can (only) be seen as relational, and this 
is even more so true of maternal subjectivity because unless it is relational and 
supported by others – grandmothers and grandfathers, relatives, other 
mothers, fathers, friends, own siblings - it fails to be a subjectivity but becomes a 
minus, a lack, a need of, a cry for, a unilateral pursuit, a physical and mind-
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wrecking activity that can bring about postnatal depression. I suggest that, 
unless shared, motherhood is debilitating – and if done in a nuclear household, 
capitalist, neo-liberal context it can be at the cost of the mother and 
(children‘s well-being). In addition, if motherhood is a fragmentation of the 
self as Kristeva says of pregnancy, then only in sharing the experience of 
motherhood can we see an emerging of a maternal subjectivity which can feel, 
even if just slightly unifying and centered. 
For me maternal subjectivity and relationality between mothers are 
deeply interlinked, because within an abstract concept of the subject, once a 
woman becomes a mother she can realise several things. Firstly, she realises 
that her subjectivity is not universal, that her experience can be very different 
from that of other mothers and that her experience is very different from a 
man from whom the idea of the subject was derived.596 Secondly, she 
understands that her experience of becoming a mother is far from abstract. 
Being pregnant, giving birth, breastfeeding, all these bodily experiences are 
grounded in an embodied and embedded experience of herself. Thirdly, she 
comes to realise that she is not autonomous as the child‘s vulnerability and 
needs puts the very idea of an autonomous self into question as Joan Raphael-
Leff has argued.597  
                                                     
596 For a an historical geneaology of this assimilation to women to the  male paradigm see Cavarero, In Spite of 
Plato. A Feminist Rewriting of Ancient Philosophy. and Luce Irigaray‘s work    
597 ‗Given the western focus on autonomous individuality and the tacit message of impossible bodily 
connectedness and/or psychic fusion, pregnancy and providing sustenance from the juices of her own body 
in utero and breastfeeding, may seem equally strange to a new mother.‘ in Raphael-Leff, ―Healthy Maternal 
Ambivalence.‖ p. 5. 
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The idea of the universal subject, its abstractness, individualism and 
autonomy can be some of the reasons, I believe, why some women 
experience solitude in their new changed role as mothers, and why they may 
go through postnatal depression, experiences which are challenging and 
disrupting to a ‗mythological‘ idea of the unity of the self.598 I suggest that it is 
this mundane reality of the work of reproduction which has the greatest effect 
on women‘s subjectivity once they become mothers. It is the everyday 
repetitive side of the work of care, which when done in isolation in a post-
industrial, neoliberal, capitalistic, and mostly individualistic society, can 
impinge mostly on our sense of self and more so for mothers and carers. 
 As previously discussed, there is still a quite widespread idea that 
motherhood is natural to women, hence, if a mother becomes depressed after 
having a baby, some perceive her as an ―unnatural‖ mother. As Parker argues 
all feelings in motherhood are valid and, she proposes, ambivalence is part 
and parcel of having a baby. It is the avoidance of acknowledging that 
mothers can be ambivalent about their babies which is the problem. Mothers 
at times may feel guilty about having those difficult and ambivalent feelings 
towards their babies and are not able to integrate love and hate towards them. 
But as Parker says ‗it is the troubling co-existence of love and hate that 
propels a mother into thinking about what goes on between herself and her 
child.‘599 Hence it is this ability to ‗incline‘ oneself materially, physically but 
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symbolically too towards another, towards a vulnerable baby, which is 
important here, but it is the ability to recognise that sometimes one cannot 
incline oneself towards a baby that is more important.  Going back to 
Cavarero, this is the crux of the matter, for her it is not that the mother 
naturally inclines herself towards her baby. On the contrary is it is because 
mothers have often inclined themselves towards their babies – that it has 
become a stereotype dictated by a patriarchal order that destined women that 
way – that we can rethink subjectivity for all. It is exactly by using this 
stereotype that we can rethink, the subject as constructed in the Western 
thought, in a more empathic and dependent way.  
 Natasha S. Mauthner argues that sometimes feminist researchers have 
focused too much on the social isolation of mothers600 and that many mothers 
have more social contacts than we think. I agree with Mauthner‘s suggestions, 
but simultaneously, I do believe that in capitalist societies like, for instance the 
UK, many mothers find themselves alone with a baby for many hours a day as 
Raphael-Leff601 has argued, and as I stated previously. Many studies have 
mostly taken for granted that a new mother in a nuclear setting would be 
caring alone for her baby for most of the time. When assessing maternal 
mental health it is important to see the mother relationally as someone whose 
subjectivity is shaped by relationships with others and by living in the world, 
in the polis. Someone who needs other people around her to care, support and 
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sustain her and who can offer the same. Mauthner carried out an enlightening 
qualitative study of postnatal depression from a feminist perspective.602 Her 
doctoral research603 looked at why and how some women feel depressed 
following a birth. She found out that ‗for the specific group of women that 
took part in my study, their encounters with other mothers with young 
children were critical to their feelings of emotional and psychological well-
being.‘604 This is similar to what Brockington reported too, as I said in the first 
section of the chapter. Mauthner argues for the importance of a relational lens 
to look at the subject.605 Her method is based mainly on the work she has 
done with Carol Gilligan and her colleagues. My lens pulls away from 
Gilligan‘s analysis of the naturally caring nature of women. But I think 
Mauthner has taken some ideas of Gilligan and applied them in her analysis 
very skilfully, without ever falling into the idea that because one is a woman 
one can care more effectively. My take on relationality is different from 
Mauthser though as it centres mainly on Italian feminism and on those who 
have worked on relational ontology. But her insights are valuable for my 
analysis. I am returning now to explore more in-depth postnatal depression in 
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the light of critiquing individualism from a feminist perspective and arguing 
for a relational view of maternal subjectivity. 
In her study on postnatal depression, Mauthser argued that ‗recovery 
and change‘ began:  
through talking to, and finding that their experiences resonated with 
another mother [. . .]partly because these relationships allowed and 
enabled them to openly question, if not resist, the ideal of motherhood 
they had struggled to fulfil.606  
 
Those mothers perceived that their experiences resonated with another 
mother. It is this resonating which is the key to understand the importance of 
relationality for new mothers. In Chapter 3, I discussed the importance of 
storytelling and listening, both are linked to what resonates in one‘s life 
experience. What is needed for an experience to resonate with another is the 
openness to listen to their story.  
Therefore, Mauthner‘s conclusion has been my starting point in the 
sense that I share her argument but then I look further at how these 
relationships among mothers can be fostered and strengthened with the aim 
of a less isolated, and hopefully a more satisfying experience of motherhood. I 
posit these potentially fulfilling relationships with other mothers – some may 
bring about conflicts as an important aspect of relationships - and carers with 
the possibility that the experience of motherhood could be less isolating and 
individualised for mothers, hence hopefully more self-satisfying not in an 
                                                     
606 Ibid. p. 346. 
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‗imperative way‘, but experienced as a work that can possibly be done in 
solidarity with others and not as a solipsistic activity. In viewing it this way I 
argue women may avoid being swamped by feelings of guilt that the maternal 
ideal produces.  
In the Introduction, I suggested that my thinking is at the intersection 
of Baraitser‘s ideas on maternal subjectivity as a subjectivity which is 
interrupted and that motherhood has a kind of viscosity due to the slowness it 
fosters by having to deal with ‗stuff‘ which can include the pram, the baby 
food, the baby changing bag, an older sibling, herself:  
She is encumbered, not by the physical presence of a child who needs 
holding, carrying, who walks a quarter of her speed, who pulls on her 
legs, by the multiplicity of relationships negotiated with child, 
environment and stuff.607 
 
This being encumbered is a familiar feeling for many mothers. I have specific 
memories of it. Baraitser traces the journey of a mother, herself, from her 
home to her mother‘s home. The hundreds of tasks it takes to get ready, to 
bring a buggy down from the third floor, to bring the older child downstairs, 
to hold the baby and the buggy and so on ‗she manoeuvres the older child out 
of the front door holding the baby. She must persuade the older child who is 
just walking to wait alone while she carries the baby and the buggy 
                                                     
607 Baraitser, Maternal Encounters. The Ethics of Interruption. p. 130. 
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downstairs, where she plans to deposit the baby, leaving it unattended while 
she walks back up to pick up the older child and carry him down.‘608 
I propose something else. What about the mother saying ‗no this is not 
working for me‘, I will go and call my neighbour and ask for help with the 
pram while I and the kids go down the stairs.‘ The maternal subjectivity 
proposed by Baraitser represents a mother alone in the city, the epitome of 
the idea of the subject as individual, solipsistic, who manages care in what we 
can call a neoliberal stance. The reality is that maternal subjectivity is more 
often than not like or very similar to the one described by Baraitser, but my 
questions are these: What if a mother is more supported in her care work, 
would she feel so interrupted? Would more support help mothers experience 
motherhood in a less burdensome way? Both concretely in the way she deals 
with the ‗maternal stuff‘609 Baraitser talks about, and her baby, and in her 
subjectivity? Would her subjectivity be the same? My suggestion is that it 
would be different. It would be less solipsistic and ‗interrupted‘, and it may 
give more space to mothers, both physical, temporal (few free hours a days 
for oneself) and internal.  
a thread, a maternal thread 
This section is a case study of mothers‘ relationality. It is one example of an 
exercise that can be done, in different situation and with an array of people, 
to think through what it means to support each other as carers.  I discuss a 
                                                     
608 Ibid. p. 148.  
609 Ibid. pp. 122-150.  
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live art intervention (or Proposition) I worked on with Berlin based artist 
Alex Martinis Roe610 which we called ―Ritual for the Support of 
Mothers.‖611 In addition, I discuss the workshop I led at the Women‘s Art 
Library at Goldsmiths in London in collaboration with London based artist 
Rose Gibbs, based on the Proposition I created with Martinis Roe. In both 
workshops I used a thick, colourful thread (pictures below) to symbolise 
webs of relationships; at the same time, in a practical exercise a group of 
women, some of whom were mothers/carers while others were not, 
created a real web, passing the thread from one person to another.  
What an art practice adds to my research is the concretisation of the 
critique of universalism, through Cavarero‘s work on this theme which I 
discussed in various ways in Chapters 1, 2 and 3. I explained in the previous 
chapter that I have taken a decision to use some images. I can reach a greater 
and wider theoretical and conceptual depth with a practice that uses the 
artistic and visual than from a purely verbal, theoretical PhD. A further reason 
for my interest in using images is that in the feminist theory I use, which 
disrupts the universalistic and the abstract idea of the subject, images bring a 
concreteness and specificity that sometimes theory alone does not. Hence, I 
want to bring images to render the symbolic concrete and make it touchable 
(the colourful thread) and visible with the senses. This chapter is linked with 
the previous chapters in which I disrupted the idea of the universal, 
                                                     
610 Alex Martinis Roe ―Www.Alexmartinisroe.Com,‖ n.d.  
611 This proposition is now part of this book Martinis Roe, To Become Two. Propositions for Feminist Collective 
Practice.  
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individualistic, abstract subject of classical Western philosophy through the   
example I provide of human beings who are concrete in their uniqueness. I 
suggest legal theorists and practitioners would benefit from seeing the 
uniqueness in each human being, dispensing with the abstractness of subjects 
as understood in Classical philosophy. In these two workshops I used images 
to render the symbolic meaning of relationality concrete and make it 
touchable (the colourful thread) and visible. In other words, I attempted to 
show how motherhood is a concrete, everyday reality and how we can 
politicise it by making it a collective work. I wanted to bring this reality and 
concreteness alive in my thesis. 
The main question I try to answer in this section is this: how do I 
render the theoretical concrete? My interest in doing this is to bring the 
theoretical ‗down‘ to a concrete level, working with women using images and 
a thick fabric thread. I can theorise about relationality between women, but a 
thread symbolises it better and brings it to a conscious and affective level that 
a purely written text cannot convey. This section, and the practice of the 
thread, is the visual representation of what the mothers‘ collective I discussed 
in the previous chapter engaged in for many years. They built a web of 
relationships, exchanges, dialogues, and practical support which was positive 
and helpful but difficult as well; it exemplifies the complexity of human 
relationships. I do not see an idealised group there, but a collective who 
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brought out the ‗good and the bad‘ which lies in any group of people working 
together.  
This section, then, is informed by relationality between mothers so I 
am indebted612 to women that came before me who understood the 
importance of women‘s relationality and of mothers helping each other when 
engaged in reproductive work. As I explained in the introduction this idea, 
and the practice of maternal relationality, comes from the lived experience of 
my own mother, Bertilla Bonato. What follows is the theoretical background 
to the ideas that were later translated into the group exercise in the 
Proposition I worked on with Alex, ‗A Ritual for the Support of Mothers and 
Carers‘ and the workshop I held at Goldsmiths in London. This short 
theoretical background to the Proposition is based on this PhD research but it 
is worth, for the sake of clarity, representing here in a shorter version before 
introducing and showing some pictures of the actual exercise.  
In the West the family has been historically constructed within the 
paradigm of a bourgeois society; it is mainly a nuclear, heterosexual, two-
parent family. It is conceived within a liberal, capitalistic, individualistic frame 
and within a broader meaning of private property, owing a home, and ‗having 
a wife/husband‘, e.g. ‗my wife‘, ‗my husband‘, ‗my daughter‘, ‗my son‘ etc. I 
want to open up this way of seeing the family as private property by looking 
                                                     
612 As Cavarero says she is indebted to Irigaray and Hannah Arendt (in Elisabetta interview), I feel in debt to 
feminist women who came before me because I understand that they have done significant work in liberating 
themselves from patriarchy and as a consequence they secured my liberation in which I was born and grew 
up in.  
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at a child as part of society, with more than one mother/one father. You can 
start by viewing your very close friends as ‗second‘ mothers/carers to your 
children, and this can open up your relationship with a child to the 
perspective that children are part of and the responsibility of the whole 
community of human beings. This is true too for the elderly and those at the 
most vulnerable times in their lives.  It is here that I locate the importance of 
relationships between women who are mothers. They can support each other 
and be a referent to a child, like a ―second mother‖. A child is part of the 
world and not our own in a strict sense. We all (all human beings, men or 
women) mother in many different ways and situations – on the bus, at work, 
when we prepare each other a coffee, etc. The ‗maternal‘ can be seen broadly 
in terms of care – caring for an old friend or elderly parent with the intrinsic 
understanding that all humans are vulnerable. Legal theorist Jonathan Herring 
argues that ‗we are all vulnerable and rely on others to provide for our needs. 
To divide society up into those providing care and those needing care 
disguises the vulnerability that we all face.‘613  
I met Berlin-based artist Alex Martinis Roe in London in December 
2015 at The Showroom614 art space where she was to run a two-day workshop 
in which I took part. Alex‘s workshop was part of a programme called Vai 
                                                     
613 Herring, Caring and the Law. p. 4. 
614 The Showroom is a contemporary art space focused on collaborative approaches to cultural production 
within its locality and beyond. 63, Penfold Street. London NW8 8PQ ―Http://Www.Theshowroom.Org,‖ 
n.d.  
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Pure, Now You Can Go615, inspired by the work of the Italian radical feminist 
Carla Lonzi,616 previously mentioned in Chapter 3. Vai Pure was a programme 
of events considering feminist thinking, art, and activism, taking place 
across The Showroom, The ICA, Space Studios and Raven Row. Alex 
Martinis Roe‘s workshop focused on trans-generational collective politics and 
it was a chance to experiment practically with some Italian feminist collective 
practices as a way to continue inventing and imagining new ones. Participants 
undertook a series of exercises based on collective political practices 
developed by the Milan Women‘s Bookstore Collective from the 1970s to 
today.  
A few months later, in May 2016, Alex Martinis Roe invited me and 
twenty-one other feminists from around Europe to a large house in the 
countryside outside Berlin to collaborate with her on a live art intervention 
(Proposition) as part of her feature length film Our Future Network which is 
itself part of Alex‘s To Become Two617 project. We spent four days together and 
tried out a series of what Alex termed ―Propositions for feminist collective 
practice‖ that she had developed in collaboration with each of us contributors 
in the months leading up to the meeting. Alex had read the Milan Women‘s 
Bookstore Collective‘s Non Credere di Avere dei Diritti (Don’t You Think You 
Have any Rights) several years before while she was studying in Australia. It had 
                                                     
615 Now You Can Go ―Http://Nowyoucango.Tumblr.Com/About,‖ n.d.  
616 Carla Lonzi was a feminist art critic and writer. She was one of the main founders of Rivolta Femminile 
(Female Revolt) in 1970 an important Roman feminist collective which influenced many other Italian 
feminist groups. She wrote several books among which: Lonzi, Sputiamo Su Hegel. Lonzi, La Donna Clitoridea e 
La Donna Vaginale.  
617 ―Http://Alexmartinisroe.Com/To-Become-Two,‖ n.d.  
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a lasting effect on her; it is her favourite book, she says, and has inspired 
much of her recent artistic practice. 
 Alex contacted me a few months before the meeting in Berlin to ask 
me to devise a proposal based on my PhD thesis. She asked me to consider 
how I could make the main ideas of my PhD concrete and visual and 
translate them into an ‗artistic practice.‘ We spoke on Skype and while we 
were speaking, I suddenly came up with the idea of expressing relationality 
between mothers and carers by using some beautiful, long, thick, colourful 
fabric thread that I had at home and making a group exercise out of it. The 
thread was to become a symbolic but concrete exercise in relationality; 
passing the thread around to each other represents, and expresses, the need 
for humans to establish relationships and ask for help from each other 
when we are most vulnerable. The thread itself represents relationality; it is 
a concrete representation that we are not born alone in this world, but that 
we exist because of relationships.  
As I explained in the introduction to this thesis, relationality between 
mothers is something I have actually practiced and experienced, not only 
within a theoretical frame but in the affective, practical, and concrete reality 
of my relationships with other mothers, fathers and carers since the 
summer of 2010 when my son was born. When Alex asked me to create an 
artistic, concrete, ‗filmable‘ Proposition lasting about two hours, I thought 
about the support needed by mothers and the webs of relationships, and 
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the thread came to my mind very quickly. Thus, the practice-based exercise 
was born!  
I have anchored my ideas and theoretical suggestions to reality with 
the thread and with concrete human beings, not abstract subjects. It is 
exactly this anchoring which I find interesting in theoretical research and I 
see my thread exercise as a form of ―performed scholarship‖ such as 
cultural theorist Lorna Dwight Conquergood discusses, a scholarship 
which ―interrogates and decentres, without discarding, the text‖ as a way of 
acknowledging what ―gets lost and muted in texts.‖618 In doing these 
practical exercises, my desire is to merge theory and practice. Conquergood has 
argued for this in her work and, in the context I am discussing here, I think 
Italian feminists have achieved it with ‗the practice of doing‘ I discussed in 
the Introduction. In other words, I wish to render the theoretical political, 
linked to action which, as Arendt would argue, is the meaning of politics.619 
Or, as Cavarero puts it, ‗I am first and foremost an activist then a 
theoretician.‘620 
One way to bring the theoretical ‗down‘ to the level of the concrete, 
practical and the political is to foreground the work of sociologists Les 
Back and Nina Wakeford, who have both tried to revive sociology from 
being a very still and methodologically stuck discipline. While they come 
                                                     
618 Lorna Dwight Conquergood, Cultural Struggles: Performance, Ethnography, Praxis., ed. E. Patrick Johnson 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013). 
619 Arendt, Hum. Cond. p. 1958. 
620 ―Giving Life to Politics: The Work of Adriana Cavarero.,‖ accessed January 27, 2020, 
http://arts.brighton.ac.uk/research/cappe/calendar/cavarero. Conference Brighton, UK 19-21 June 2017. 
Key note speakers were: Adriana Cavarero, Judith Butler and Bonnie Honig.  
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from a sociology background and Cavarero is a philosopher, their work 
‗revives‘ sociology using similar strategies to  Cavarero‘s work to bring life 
to politics. Wakeford‘s work focuses on visual sociology.621 Back‘s work 
calls for a sociology that is livelier and more sensuous and is committed to 
finding different ways of sociological writing and representation:  
Through using multi-modality researchers develop a different kind of 
attentiveness to the embodied social world in motion. Not being 
limited to what people say explicitly enables us to train a kind of 
attentiveness to tacit forms of coexistence.622  
 
Furthermore, he argues for the advantages of a live sociology:  
One that is able to attend to the fleeting, distributed, multiple and 
sensory aspects of sociality through research techniques that are 
mobile, sensuous and operate from multiple vantage points. If 
researchers enact reality rather than simply reflect it, there is an 
opportunity to create sociological forms of representation that are 
more knowing and innovative then their antecedents.623  
 
These are the reasons why in these two live art exercises I have been 
interested in bringing people, in their own uniqueness, together to enact 
relationality in an affective, emotive, and sensorial way. Going back to 
Cavarero, she notes that Arendt said it is important to avoid rendering 
human beings superfluous, but to see them in their uniqueness.624 Seeing 
them as superfluous is very dangerous as we have seen in history (Hannah 
                                                     
621 Nina Wakeford and Celia Lury, eds., Inventive Methods: The Happening of the Social. (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2013). 
622 Les Back, ―Live Sociology: Social Research and Its Futures.,‖ in Live Methods., ed. Les Back and Nirmal 
Puwar (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2012), 18–39. p. 29.  
623 Ibid. p. 7.  
624 ‗Arendt says that when one dissolves human beings in discourses in general, human beings, as such, 
become superfluous.‘ Cavarero in Bertolino and Cavarero, ―Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference: An 
Interview with Italian Feminist Philosopher Adriana Cavarero.‖ p. 156.  
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Arendt talks about the holocaust as the result of seeing humans as 
superfluous and indistinct) and we still see in humanitarian crisis. To avoid 
that, to me, also means to working together, to act, to meet, to relate, to 
exchange with others as our unique selves in relation to other unique selves 
‗we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is ever the 
same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.‘625 
berlin, a ritual for the support of mothers and carers 
This Proposition had two aims. The first was to challenge the well-entrenched 
historical view of motherhood as a natural destiny for women, hence ‗easy‘. 
The second was to acknowledge that mothers may find it hard to ask for help 
when they are struggling with a new-born baby (and their other children), if 
they have more than one, exactly due to the idea that caring is ‗natural‘ for 
women. In this exercise, a network of supportive relationships was created 
when each person asked for help from another mother/carer and the thread 
was passed around. This support network was expressed as a web of colourful 
thread and it was hoped that this web would have a positive impact on the 
mothers‘/carers‘ daily lives by enabling them to imagine a communal way of 
caring.  
My proposal with Alex Martinis Roe was made up of two exercises; the 
first was to open up a discussion around our reproductive desires, or/and lack 
of desire. The importance of this discussion among women is often made to 
                                                     
625 Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958. p. 8.  
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seem irrelevant by ideas on neutrality, equality, and universality. To really 
understand women‘s desire or non-desire to have children, I feel it is 
important to have an open dialogue around these themes.  
I devised and read the following questions to the group in Berlin in May 
2016. The aim of the questions was to prompt the discussion on desiring a 
child or not and the ambivalence surrounding this decision (this was recorded 
only as a sound recording): 
- Would someone like to talk about their desire for a child? 
- Would someone like to talk about their non-desire to have a child, for 
now or for ever? 
- Would someone like to talk about their desire for a child but the 
difficulties (past/present) of conceiving a child? 
- Would someone like to talk about their past desire for a child and their 
coming to terms with not being able to have a child and being happy 
now with not having a child?  
- Would someone like to talk about their experience of having a child? 
- Would someone like to talk about their past desire to have a child and 
their new-found ‗passion‘/desire for something else which makes the 
desire for a child less present or not present at all? 
- Would someone like to talk about regretting having had a child? 
- Would someone like to discuss their (or partner‘s) inability to conceive 
and the deciding to adopt a child?  
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What follows now is the second exercise, called the fabric thread web of 
relationships ‗exercise‘, ―a Ritual for the Support of Mothers and Carers‖: 
- We create a list of ‗things‘ that women who become mothers need help 
with: 1, 2, 3, etc.  
- We all sit on the floor or on chairs in a circle and we imagine having a 
baby (or looking after an elderly person) and being on maternity leave 
and spending a lot of time alone as your partner works, or if you parent 
alone as you are a single parent what do you need? What could make 
your life easier while looking after a baby? A short discussion about a 
problem and how you work it out: for example, you struggle with 
breastfeeding, you are alone at home, your baby cries, you are still in 
your pyjamas and you eventually want to go out. 
- Have a recording of a baby crying in the background before we do this 
exercise. Ask women to close their eyes and think/feel what the sound 
of a baby crying makes us feel. Babies crying can elicit strong emotions 
in people that can re-waken ways in which we were cared for as babies 
ourselves. Some people are better able to accept, or tolerate more 
‗easily‘, a baby‘s cries, while others want to stop the crying very quickly 
as they are not able to tolerate and be present to the baby‘s distress. 
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Most times it is a mix of the two, at times one is more patient and able 
to tolerate, other times much less so.626  
- Then imagine being alone with a baby crying/tending to his/her needs 
and your needs for a long time (changing nappies, dressing/undressing 
baby several times a day/breastfeeding or bottle feeding/getting baby 
to sleep/ in the meantime tending to your needs, taking a 
shower/getting dressed/making yourself a coffee/lunch/dinner, trying 
to get out/maybe bringing a buggy down the stairs/then the baby, a 
bag, etc.). 
- We are now going to pass this thread around in a random way and 
while we do that, we say what we think we would need to ease this 
work of mothering. It would be good to think specifically of what we 
would see as important/vital elements in making a web of relationships 
between other mothers, specifically a kind of support network, 
communal practice of childcare (two or more women in someone‘s 
home, looking after their children together with the specific intent of 
working on what interests them during this time or one woman looking 
after her child and a friend‘s child and then reverse while the other 
mother naps/goes out for a coffee/works for few hours). Can you 
come to see me once a week for 1 hour? I take a shower, and take a bit 
of time off and you tend to the baby? Here below is the visual result of 
                                                     
626 Aletha J Solter, Tears and Tantrum. What to Do When Babies and Children Cry (Goleta: CA: Shining Star Press, 
1998). 
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the Berlin workshop based around my work that became a concrete, 
visual and artistic practice while I collaborated with Alex Martinis Roe 
which then became a film: 
 
 
Alex Martinis Roe, Our Future Network, film still of the proposition ―A Ritual for the Support of 
Mothers,‖ developed with Sara Paiola, 2016. 
 
 
Alex Martinis Roe, Our Future Network, film still of the proposition ―A Ritual for the Support of 
Mothers,‖ developed with Sara Paiola, 2016. 
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Alex Martinis Roe, Our Future Network, film still of the proposition ―A Ritual for the Support of 
Mothers,‖ developed with Sara Paiola, 2016. 
 
What do notions of ‗webs‘ represent? What is it precisely that the physical 
thread does in enacting and representing these webs? Why then do I use a 
physical thread to represent webs of relationships? I think that to enact a 
collective activity between mothers and carers by being physically present in a 
space with the aid of a physical thread is a good way to allow carers some 
reflection together.  
london, let’s talk about motherhood  
On a cold, rainy Sunday afternoon on 15th January 2017 I made my way to 
The Women‘s Art Library at Goldsmiths University in South London to meet 
artist Rose Gibbs. We worked on a workshop together which was devised 
around my PhD work. There were six attendees – all parents, five women 
who were mothers and one man who was a father, as well as Rose and I who 
are both parents. The workshop was devised a little differently from the 
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Proposition I did with Alex Martinis Roe. First, unlike the original workshop 
in Berlin in which there were only two mothers among the women who 
attended, in the workshop in London we were all parents, hence we could 
work on the concrete realities that this role presented us with every day, not 
the ‗virtual‘ imaginary of what it would mean to mother a child alone in a flat 
day in and day out, or care for an elderly person or parent or disabled person 
or a child or adult with special needs and differently able. In this workshop all 
the examples were concrete reality for all of us.  
During the workshop I gave people five minutes to introduce each 
other through an icebreaker exercise. One person guides another person from 
the back, putting a hand on their shoulder if they are happy with it. Then they 
swap and the other person closes their eyes and they let themselves be guided. 
Then they stop and each person talks for five minutes to the other person 
about themself and then each person introduces the other person to the 
whole group.  
I then talked about myself and why I wanted friends and aunties about 
when I had my son. I asked all my aunties to come and help me when my son 
was one month old. My starting point for challenging care in isolation and 
asking for support was that I did not like the fact that in the UK there are a 
lot of private nurseries, feeding into capitalism and into a capitalistic idea of 
care. The most vulnerable and non-economically productive in society, 
children, and elderly people, will go into care – childcare and elderly people‘s 
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homes. Notwithstanding that some care homes are lovely and some elderly 
people are very happy in care homes as they can be very sociable places. I 
explained that my grandparents were looked after at home by one of my aunts 
and an uncle and another had a private live-in carers paid for by all the 
siblings and the pension they receive. I also discussed briefly Silvia Federici 
and the ‗Wages for Housework‘ movement.  
I asked the participants to draw or write about a time when they felt 
vulnerable and were caring for their baby or someone else and what they 
would have needed. I asked them to write or draw this need they felt for 
support. I gave them fifteen minutes to think about these themes: How do 
you represent this need for support, to not care alone and in isolation? Do 
you ask your partner, a friend, another family member to do this care work 
together with you or do you find it difficult to ask for a shared partnership in 
the case of care work? Are you able to express your desires to your partner, 
and what you need for yourself? What are our assumptions of our partners? 
Before this exercise started, I told everybody that if at any point they found 
this exercise uncomfortable they could step out of the workshop. I had 
created a small ‗peaceful corner‘ with some pillows, a little plant, a few books, 
the Samaritans phone number if they needed to speak with someone and 
some water. After the exercise finished, I asked each participant if they 
wanted to discuss what they had written or drawn with the person next to 
them. I gave them ten minutes to discuss this together and then we had a 
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general conversation about what we had said to each other and how to ask for 
help. This conversation was facilitated by the exercise in which we passed the 
colourful thread around as shown here:  
 
Goldsmiths The Women‘s Art Library. Photo: Sara Paiola 
While we passed the thread around, I asked them to think about whether it is 
hard to ask for help when mothering and caring, and how we can learn to ask 
for help. The exercise consisted in literally asking each other for help in some 
‗virtual‘ or already experienced scenarios.  
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Goldsmiths The Women‘s Art Library. Photo: Sara Paiola 
 
 
Goldsmiths The Women‘s Art Library. Photo: Sara Paiola 
 
These live art interventions, what Martinis Roe calls ‗Propositions‘, represent 
the potential for seeing other mothers and carers as allies. They challenge 
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what it means for new mothers to care for a vulnerable infant in a capitalist 
and increasingly individualised society. They are visual, symbolic, and concrete 
representations of relationality, which I‘d like to call the ‗art‘ of 1970s and 
1980s feminist women. It was/is the art of building webs of relationships, 
exchanges, dialogues, and practical support for each other. It was this desire 
for friendship, support and solidarity that spurred me ‗outside‘ when I had my 
son. My proposition with the thread is an example of collaboratively thinking 
through maternal subjectivity, disrupting its individualised paradigm, which 
was valuable for the people who participated (some mothers, a father, and 
several non-mothers). It has been an impressionistic and creative way to 
explore maternal subjectivity collectively. The results of the exercises were 
qualitative, they brought about awareness, sharing, communality, thinking 
otherwise, thinking of building webs of support to escape isolation.  The art 
projects show how relationality can be enacted in a physical, touchable form 
within a group of people. They add to the idea that I have explored in the 
thesis that concreteness is an important medium to explore the embodied 
realities of carers and what they need.   
 In addition, in the first part of this chapter, I focused on postnatal 
depression and maternal subjectivity and how it can be re-thought as 
relational maternal subjectivity. I suggested that it is helpful for mothers to 
relate to other mothers and carers to be able to keep mother-child over-
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identification at bay, which is one of the reasons why motherhood in isolation 











































The substantive work of this thesis began through a focused reading of 
feminist authors whose work revolves around relational ontology, which 
challenges and criticises equality, individualism and universalism. I centred my 
readings on 1970s and 1980s feminist theorists, mainly the historical alliance 
between Irigaray and Italian feminists627, from the sexual difference theory 
standpoint. Through these readings of authors (Cavarero, Arendt, Federici, 
Irigaray) who take relational ontology as the departure point of their 
                                                     
627 See Chapter 1 ―a feminist critique of equality, individualism and universalism.‖ 
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understanding of the human I proposed that a different kind of vision is 
necessary, especially when humans are involved in caring roles. In this thesis I 
have argued that a critique of individualism (individualism as propounded by 
classical liberal theorists628 and ‗popularised‘ by the logic of free market 
neoliberalism), is necessary, and key, in the context of care and motherhood. 
In other words when one is in a caring position toward a dependant and 
vulnerable human being - a baby, a young child/ren, an elderly person in need 
of care, an otherwise able person or child/adult with special additional needs 
– the autonomous and self-referential subject of classical western philosophy 
is wanting.  
The five central questions I asked in this thesis, and how I have 
addressed them, are these: The first question was whether a relational and 
collective model of motherhood and care is important for rethinking women‘s 
political subjectivity? By looking at the work of Italian and French feminists in 
Chapters One, Two and Three I have argued that indeed by using a relational 
paradigm and a collective model of care we can fundamentally rethink 
women‘s political subjectivity, which is a subjectivity thought of as 
fundamentally relational, carved and created via relationships, firstly from our 
first relationships from when we are born and secondly a feminist model or 
relationality seen as political via the thinking of Hannah Arendt and Adriana 
Cavarero on politics. One tension in relation to this question was that I did 
                                                     
628 See Chapter 1 for a discussion on classical liberal theorists.  
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not fully resolve the tensions within the term ‗subject‘. I will address this in a 
section below. Secondly, I asked, how did the abstract, universalistic and 
autonomous view of the subject influence law and is it detrimental to all 
humans and women, mothers and cares too? I have addressed this question in 
Chapter Two in particular by discussing the work of the Milan Women‘s 
Bookstore Collective, Italian feminist philosopher Wanda Tommasi, feminist 
lawyer Lia Cigarini, feminist philosopher Adriana Cavarero who all state that 
the universalistic view of the subject is problematic for women and for all. 
Thirdly, I asked if re-thinking the model of care from an individualised one, to 
one that is collective and puts care in the realms of the commons (a relational 
model of motherhood/care) disrupts the individualistic idea of the subject, 
and broadly challenges individualism and the politics of care? This is the 
prime question and interest in my thesis and I addressed it by showing how 
care can be political by applying feminist ideas of collectivity and Arendtian 
thinking on action and plurality, particularly as developed and expanded by 
adding a feminist perspective by Cavarero. Fourthly, I asked if a relational 
model of motherhood, the commoning of care, ‗protect‘ women from the 
loneliness629 many experience in the first years of a baby and child‘s life? And, 
the fifth and last question is, does engaging in mothering/caring while being 
supported by other mothers, carers and the community change the 
                                                     
629 In 2016 research published by the Co-op and the Red Cross identified becoming a new mum as one of six 
main causes of loneliness.  They say ‗New research shows that a staggering 82 per cent  of mums under 30 
feel lonely some of the time while more than four in 10 (43 per cent) are lonely often or always.‘ 
https://www.co-operative.coop/media/news-releases/shocking-extent-of-loneliness-faced-by-young-
mothers-revealed, 2018. See also  https://www.channel4.com/news/the-loneliness-of-becoming-a 
-new-mum, 2016. 
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subjectivity of a mother/carer? Or, to put it in other words, how would a 
mother/carer‘s subjectivity be different if they had a circle of support around 
them? Would she have a different subjectivity then if she mothered mainly 
alone for long hours day in and day out? I have addressed these last two 
questions in Chapter Four by looking at a mothers‘s collective based in Rome 
in the 1970s  in which a group of mothers shared the experiences of 
motherhood together for many years, from meeting every week to create a 
space for themselves, to supporting women give birth in a more informed 
manner, to create a research centre on motherhood and to go on holiday with 
their children for several summers until they discovered that they preferred to 
meet without the children present which was ironic in many ways and very 
telling. To answer the above questions in Chapter Five I then looked at the 
studies that showed how one of the causes of post-natal depression is 
isolation and lack of support. As I have outlined in the literature reviewed in 
Chapter Five on maternity blues and postnatal depression, mothers are often 
not able to carry on mothering alone without it impacting on their mental 
health, sense of satisfaction, and sense of meaning. These studies were mainly 
from the Red Cross and the Co-op and from Natasha Mauthner and 
psychiatrist Ian Brockington. I concluded that, if mothering was with more 
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support carers/mothers‘ subjectivity would be different in many ways630 and 
less marked by ‗primary maternal persecution.‘631   
I will draw my conclusions by following five points of discussion which 
have emerged through this research and its aim is to be a reflective exercise to 
point to some of the tensions that emerged within the thesis: Irigaray and 
Cavarero on law; subjectivity ‗versus‘ uniqueness; intersectionality. I then 
focus on a section on why the commoning of care is important and the 
listening law. After these points of discussion the next section is titled 
‗contribution to knowledge and future research‘ and the last section is the 
‗epilogue/conclusions.   
 
irigaray and cavarero 
I have explored the work of Irigaray in different sections of the thesis 
(especially in Chapters One, Two and Three) as she is a foundational theorist 
in what I discussed, especially her critique of equality and universalism. In 
addition many of the feminist authors I have explored are informed by 
Irigaray‘s thoughts in profound ways. Nevertheless I have not made specific 
use of her work and perspective in Chapter Two titled ‗legal imaginations‘ on 
the critique of the law and where I looked at two particular cases. The reason 
is that, even though I know Irigaray‘s critique of the law is extensive and she 
                                                     
630 Specifically how different mothers/carers subjectivity would be if mothering collectively was not the 
scope of my research. However, it may be the theme of future research.  
631 Raphael-Leff, Psychological Processes of Childbearing., p. 315.  
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suggests ideas on how the law could change to achieve more justice for 
women, it was not this aspect I was interested in exploring as I think it is an 
already widely used feminist lens to read the law critically.632 Instead, I decided 
to use the work of Cavarero to show how her thinking on ―uniqueness‖ can 
bring about a different perspective to lawyers and judges, one which is more 
emphatic.  
subjectivity 
One theme that I did not manage to fully resolve in the thesis was the 
tensions within the term ‗subject‘. I think one reason is that I centred my 
analysis on maternal and carers‘ subjectivity so there was this other specific 
subjectivity which would emerge when one is a carer which is not ‗just‘ a 
subjectivity, but is an intersubjectivity. Hence my analysis was clouded by 
reflecting and focusing more on maternal subjectivity then the term ‗subject‘. 
The other reason is that in Cavarero‘s philosophy she refrains from calling 
people ‗subjects‘ as for her it is an abstract manner in which to describe 
humans, therefore I was more centred on the Cavarerian idea of ‗uniqueness‘ 
to define subjectivity, as that which distinguishes each of us in very specific 
ways, the who which Hannah Arendt talks about ‗the fact that, while acting 
and speaking, people expose who they are; they make their appearance in the 
                                                     
632 There are many feminist critical legal scholars who have used Irigaray in their work because of her critique 
of equality and the law. This is a conicise list: Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects. Feminist Essays in Legal and 
Social Theory (Oxford: Hart, 1998). Pateman, The Sexual Contract. Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Accomodation: Ethical 
Feminism, Deconstruction and the Law. (New York, London: Routledge, 1991). Albertson Fineman, Martha, and 
Thomadsen Sweet, At the Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory. Eisenstein, The Female Body and the Law. 
Drakopoulou, ―The Ethics of Care, Female Subjectiviy and Feminist Legal Scholarship.‖  
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human world and thus reveal actively and politically their unique personal 
identity‘.633  
Thus, I too personally have in the thesis used very little the term 
‗subject‘. In her philosophy and in Italian sexual difference feminism 
‗feminine subjectivity as expressed in relations among women, relations that 
were not mediated by men, which in turn generated a specifically ontological 
approach to feminist thought.‘634 Hence, for me a ‗subject‘ is the who that 
Cavareo talks about ‗when I speak of the ontology of uniqueness, I intend 
precisely and above all a contrast with traditional ontology, which is 
constructed through the negation of uniqueness with abstract and universal 
categories such as the subject (or the anthropos, the individual and so on).‘635 
Therefore, when I speak of uniqueness this is what I mean, it is what others 
describe as a ‗subject‘ but in Cavarerian terms it‘s a who and by adding a 
relational feminist lens, from the Italian perspective, it‘s a who who relates to 
other unique whos. This is how subjectivities are formed and they are 
intrinsically relational so exist only via relationships as I mentioned in the 
Introduction in the section on subjectivity. I am thus unable to describe a 
‗subject‘ fully as for me it brings me back to a metaphysical abstract being, 
produced by classical philosophy which is what I have criticised, via a 
Cavarerian lens, in different sections of this thesis, especially in Chapters One, 
                                                     
633 Bertolino and Cavarero, ―Beyond Ontology and Sexual Difference: An Interview with Italian Feminist 
Philosopher Adriana Cavarero.‖ p. 130.  
634 Ibid. p. 129 
635 Ibid. p. 137.  
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Two and Three. What I think work in my use of subject and subjectivity is 
that following a Cavarerian thesis that using the term subjectivity objectify 
and universalises human being, people, persons I have made a case for using 
embodied uniqueness to signify our humanity. It is a move which I think 
would benefits many philosophers which still use the term subject at large. 
intersectionality 
In relation to the limitations of adopting more fully an intersectional 
perspective I acknowledge that there were limitations in the feminist 
organising in Italy (because of the socio-cultural, economic political reality of 
Italy in the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s) and I wonder if my thesis has 
replicated these limitations by not asking some questions. The theme of 
intersectionality related to care and motherhood, more specifically how the 
intersection of race, class, gender, sex and sexual orientation impact on 
different models and approaches to care was not fully explored and resolved 
in my thesis. As I explained in the Introduction, in turning to history I am 
looking at scholarship through a PhD project and I have engaged with the 
literature that has been important to me as a student, nevertheless there is 
perhaps something lost in not engaging strongly with the traditions of 
communing and collective motherhood from black feminism.  
On the question of intersectionality in Italy at least till the mid/late-
1980s as there was not much migration from other countries to Italy till 
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then636 - so in relation to the literature and case studies I have brought into the 
thesis including the mothers collective in Rome in the early 1970s refer mainly 
to class and not to race. As I said in the introduction the way Italians and their 
institutions – especially in the centre and northern part of the country – 
treated Italians from the south was racist. The role of Italian feminist women 
from the south in the movement could have been an important aspect to look 
at in this thesis which may be a theme of future research.  
Since the early 1990s Italy has seen a very important increase in the 
employment of women in the care industries, especially women from Eastern 
European countries, South America, Africa and South-East Asian countries, 
who are employed mainly in peoples‘ homes to look after elderly Italian 
people or children.637 These carers are called badanti in Italy and they are 
employed with flexible, temporary contracts which makes them very 
precarious.  
As I said in the Introduction Italy had an important internal migration 
(from the poorer south to the more affluent and industrial north of Italy) in 
the 1960s and 1970s and the women who moved from the south to the north 
were influenced by the feminist movement. Antonio Gramsci had written of 
the ―Questione Meridionale‖ in the 1920s of the problems of how southern 
Italy had remained economically underdeveloped (almost at feudal levels) as 
                                                     
636 Michele Colucci, Storia Dell’immigrazione Straniera in Italia. Dal 1945 a Oggi (Roma: Carocci Editore, 2018). 
637 Cristina Morini, ―The Feminization of Labour in Cognitive Capitalism,‖ Feminist Review 87, no. 1 (2007): 
40–59. 
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several successive governments had adopted a politics of privileging the 
economic growth of northern Italy.638   
In addition, in relation to intersectionality, even though in the thesis I 
have acknowledged the importance of it, I focused on other aspects. In 
relation to the matter of care and the work of reproduction it is an essential 
view of analysis. A focused analysis on this research, which is an unexplored 
body of research in my thesis, is for instance the edited book by Bhattacharya, 
Tithi Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression (2017)639 
which focuses on the way in which reproductive labour is, as Federici has 
asserted in the 1970s, a means for capitalism to drive the accumulation 
ideology. The anti-capitalist, anti-racist and feminist perspective helps to forge 
an intersectional reading of the work of reproduction. Using more of this 
approach in my thesis would have added perspectives of marginalised, 
migrants, Black, Brown and Latina mothers who carry a lot of the work of 
reproduction not done by white, middle or upper class women.  
In addition, as stated in the Introduction Joy James‘ work on the 
―Captive Maternals‖ 640 made me reflect about my own theoretical blind spots. 
James says that the ‗Captive Maternals can be either biological females or 
those feminised into caretaking and consumption.‘641 The way in which 
                                                     
638 Gramsci, The Southern Question. 
639 Tithi Bhattacharya, ed., Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression (London: Pluto 
Press, 2017). 
640 Joy James, ―THE WOMB OF WESTERN THEORY: TRAUMA, TIME THEFT, AND THE 
CAPTIVE MATERNAL.‖ 
641 Ibid.   
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James‘s work has been useful for me to think through is because I understood 
her call to reappraise Western feminist theory what she calls ‗Womb Theory‘, 
as Baraitser and Sigal states ‗Womb theory therefore fails to adequately 
theorize violence against the reproductive labour of Captive Maternals – 
labour that produces wealth and stabilizes culture.‘  Therefore that is why 
maternal studies need to pay attention to the work of Joy James to distance 
itself from a theory which is still violent in its exclusions of the realities of 
Black, Brown, minority and migrant mothers.642 In addition Tracey Reynolds 
has called for a ‗need of a critical analysis of maternal studies – now more 
than ever – to contextualise and understand black mothers‘ lived experiences 
in contemporary Britain.‘643 
The work of James, Reynolds and Hill Collins on Black mothers would 
have enriched the analysis of my thesis in the way in which I would have 
utilised a lens to include more experiences of marginalised mothers and I 
would have sought to include maternal subjectivity of Black mothers who 
need to contend with bringing up their children in a discriminatory society. I 
would have probably read the feminist theorists I have used in a perspective 
called upon by Joy James to unearth the ‗Captive Maternals‘ in their theory.  
 
commoning care 
                                                     
642 See as well the work of Tracey Reynolds on Black mothers in the UK. Tracey Reynolds and Umut Erel, 
eds., Migrant Mothers’ Creative Challenges to Racialised Citizenship (New York and Abingdon: Routledge, 2019). 
Tracey Reynolds, Caribbean Mothers. Identity and Experience in the UK (London: Tufnell Press, 2005).  
643 Reynolds, ―Studies of the Maternal: Black Mothering 10 Years On.‖ 
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An interest, and life experience, in commoning and collectivity influenced my 
view that mothering with more support engenders positive outcomes for 
carers and mothers‘ subjectivities and identities. My embodied life experience 
comes from Italian feminism and the strong collective practices that they 
engendered therefore, as I said in the Introduction, I did not explore the 
collective mothering practices of other societies, cultures and realities enough. 
I could have, though, still drawn from this literature without offering different 
case studies. According to Reynolds it was Patricia Hill Collins644 who ‗first 
highlighted the practice of ‗other mothering‘ to demonstrate a system of care 
through which black women provide care for children in the community.‘ 
Reynolds adds that ‗Pivotal to black mothers‘ community engagement is their 
kin-work - black women‘s operating as teachers, community volunteers and 
health care workers - within their local neighbourhoods and community 
organisations.‘645  
Cognisant of these important collective mothering practises that come 
from the Black community has made me reformulate that commoning of care 
is an important political proposition and that care should be seen as shared 
and not a lonely individualised experience. Mothering alone with not enough 
support can bring about feelings of isolation, loneliness, distress, and of being 
‗interrupted.‘646 The many demands on her newly forming identity as a carer 
looking after a vulnerable being will be too centred on how she feels, hence 
                                                     
644 Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought. Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment. 
645 Reynolds, ―Studies of the Maternal: Black Mothering 10 Years On.‖ 
646 Baraitser, Maternal Encounters. The Ethics of Interruption. 
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leading to a heightened sense of oneself which can be difficult. Granted the 
maternal experience can be creative too, or ‗generative‘ as Baraitser states647 
and I embrace that, but at the same time a constant ‗interrupted‘ experience 
of the maternal seems, in part, still partially sacrificial and I suggest we need to 
dislodge the mother from that ablative figure as Cavarero would say. 
Relationality between carers can do that.  
When mothering takes place with the support of other people/carers, a 
new mother could have time to let go, forget about herself, rest, sleep, eat 
properly and she can have more energy for the new baby and young 
child/ren. She would be able to meet other new parents and carers, share each 
other‘s experiences, joys, difficulties, frustrations. She may be less ―self-
centred‖ in terms of experiencing strong feelings which put the pressure on 
oneself, and I suggest her new identity can be shaped to a higher extent by 
relating to others, not only by giving to a vulnerable baby. I suggest, as already 
stated previously in few sections of this thesis, that she would have a different 
subjectivity, hopefully less solipsistic and maybe at times more joyful.648 This 
different subjectivity is political. In this thesis I have applied the notion of the 
political from Arendt, and as developed by Cavarero, within the context of 
motherhood and care. In Arendtian terms only by being together, in action as 
she says, can we say that we create meaning, politics on earth. So I reclaim 
commoning of care as a political action, ―being together‖ intended as political. 
                                                     
647 Ibid. p. 7. Baraitser speaks of the generative in motherhood, importantly without celebrating or idealising 
motherhood.  
648 Lynne Segal, Radical Happiness: Moments of Collective Joy (London & New York: Verso, 2017). 
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This is not a small thing, but it affects who we are in the world. Mothering 
with other carers who do the same work and can support a mother and carer 
can bring about a sense of self which feels connected to others. Mothers and 
carers can feel a sense of meaning, that they matter and they are part of the 
world.   
My view of mother-to-mother relationships includes feelings of love, 
hate, affection, jealousy, anger, frustration and aggression and to include all 
the range of feelings a mother can feel. As the Milan Women‘s Bookstore 
Collective argued, as I said in Chapter Three, the relationship between women 
should start from disparity not sisterhood. Once disparity among each other is 
acknowledged then feelings of love and hate could be better integrated and 
not split off or denied. As we have seen in Chapters One and Two, liberalism 
conceives of human beings in an abstract way which cannot account for the 
particularities of each person‘s uniqueness and specific history and experience. 
The first step in this critique came from Irigaray‘s work. My analysis 
attempted to offer an alternative model of motherhood based on an 
embodied and relational reading of law and politics which Cavarero and other 
Italian feminist theorists have not done yet. I posited that it is important to 
rethink political community and its relevance for strategies of resistance, 
specifically in relation to the meaning of motherhood and care. I suggested 
that motherhood and care can be thought of and recuperated as a mode of 
resistance and freedom.  
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listening law 
The other question I explored in this thesis was how can the law be more 
attentive to women‘s and mothers/carers uniqueness? A ‗listening law‘ as I 
discussed in Chapter Three could help with this. The most important striking 
difference is that how the law operates can often adopt a universalistic view of 
humans. Instead a law (and legal profession) that cares for each‘s client 
outcome can adopt a ‗listening‘ perspective as I explained in more detail in 
Chapter Two, especially in the case of the Irish Judge Patricia Smyth who 
makes a point in listening to her clients carefully and at length. A law that 
listens to the uniqueness of our own stories. Stories can be told through 
writing and by using bodily expression such as in dance, drama, and music, 
and storytelling, which uses the voice. Some stories are told without the use of 
the voice, for instance sign language, used in deaf communities. This last 
aspect of storytelling has been explored elsewhere.649 The voice and listening 
are, at most times, interlinked. In addition to the vocal and the verbal, telling 
stories has a whole layer of meaning which is affective, embodied, corporeal, 
and made up of gestures. Taking some lessons from storytelling, the voice, 
and what Cavarero tell us about it, makes me think about what would a 
‗listening law‘ look/sound like? A listening law can be a more caring law 
because it is a law that can be silent, with time to pause and listen to others. 
                                                     
649
 Donna Jo Sutton-Spence, Rachel Napoli, ―Anthropomorphism in Sign Languages: A Look at Poetry and 
Storytelling with a Focus on British Sign Language,‖ Sign Language Studies 10, no. 4 (2010): 442–75. ; Elisabeth 
Winston, ed., Storytelling and Conversation: Discourse in Deaf Communities. (Washington D.C.: Gallaudet University 
Press, 1999).  
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Caring law as intended in Cavarerian terms as she suggests in her book 
Inclianations, that to be inclined – towards others - benefit all humans. So 
instead of idealising and saying that a feminist ethics brings about a more 
caring law, which I am not, I suggest that by being more inclined to others, as 
Cavarero says, we can all reach a better ability to listen. A law that retrieves 
and that back-tracks and maybe eventually disappears. All in all, maybe a 
‗listening law‘ demonstrates less of a need for the law. Perhaps this ‗retrieving‘ 
law is similar to what Drakopolou asserts that a feminist project of law could 
be one where we keep unearthing the patriarchal roots of law and ‗open a 
discursive space which allows for the process of re-considering the feminist 
engagement in law, its objectives and its ethical and political validity‘.650 In this 
thesis I have attempted to do that.  
A listening law could have some of the characteristics described by 
Jocelyn Downie and Jennifer Llewellyn, one where the ‗focus is on the 
dynamics, characteristics of relationship that need to be supported and 
encouraged in order to foster human flourishing‘.651  In relation to law they 
give the example of Canada as a country where abortion is decriminalised. 
They say it exemplifies a step towards a relational law on reproduction. A 
further step would be ensuring that all women had a positive protection to 
allow them to access abortion (for instance ensuring that they could easily 
                                                     
650 Drakopoulou, ―The Ethics of Care, Female Subjectiviy and Feminist Legal Scholarship.‖ p. 221. 
651 Jocelyn Downie and J. Jennifer Llewellyn, Being Relational: Reflections on Relational Theory and Health Law, ed. 
Jocelyn Downie and J. Jennifer Llewellyn (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012). p. 6.  
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find a clinic where they felt safe, they could choose between different 
methods of abortion etc.)  
What does it mean for women and mothers to be listened to during a 
court case for instance? To have the singularity of their own voice tell their 
own story, their own life experiences, different from anyone else‘s life? 
Cavarero has explored the significance of the voice,652 she argues that the 
philosophical tradition does not only ignore the uniqueness of the voice:  
but it also ignores uniqueness as such, in whatever mode it manifests 
itself. The unrepeatable singularity of each human being, the embodied 
uniqueness that distinguishes each one from every other is, for the 
universalizing taste of philosophy, a superfluity.653 
 
Furthermore, she argues that the inaugural move of metaphysics, rests in a 
double gesture in which, speech is separated from speakers and is designated 
to finds its home in thought.654 
 The uniqueness to which Cavarero refers to is a kind of lived unique 
existence of one unique person, which seems to me well exemplified by James 
Joyce‘s narration of Leopold Bloom‘s very ordinary day as told in his novel 
Ulysses (1904). As Cavarero says, narration and poetry are better able than 
philosophy to speak of uniqueness, to bring the concrete and materiality of 
                                                     
652 Cavarero, A Piu’ Voci: Per Una Filosofia Dell’espressione Vocale. Cavarero, For More than One Voice: Toward a 
Philosophy of Vocal Expression. Cavarero is not the only philosopher to engage with the voice. For Lacan the 
voice was one of the objects a, an object of desire. For a Lacanian perspective on the significance of the voice 
see Slavoj Salecl, Renata and Žižek, ed., Gaze and Voice as Love Objects. (London: Duke University Press, 1996).  
Cavarero and Lacan adopt different philosophical methods in analysing the voice.  
653 Cavarero, A Piu’ Voci: Per Una Filosofia Dell’espressione Vocale. p. 9. 
654 Ibid. p. 9. 
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human beings to the fore.655 For example in Joyce‘s Ulysses the narration of 
Leopold Bloom‘s day is the story of that man, not the story of any man; it is 
far from abstract, as we are told of all his bodily sensations, what his bodily 
needs are,656 his interactions and thoughts. The concreteness of his body, the 
descriptions of his movements and actions in detail makes the reading slow 
because Leopold Bloom‘s day is told at a slow, detailed pace: ‗men had killed 
and maimed one another‘s bodies in the name of abstract virtues, so Joyce 
resolved to write a materialist ‗epic of the body‘, with a minute account of its 
functions and frustrations.‘657  
 On the other hand the erasure of the uniqueness of each person‘s voice 
from the philosophical tradition reflects the erasure of difference from the 
same tradition. In law, listening to the singularity of the voice of each person 
takes on a further meaning: ‗telling the story differently includes paying close 
attention to the persons involved, often giving voice to women who have 
                                                     
655 ―This explains why I often make use of literary or poetic texts, using them against philosophy. It is well 
known, in fact, that poetic and narrative language is less rigid, more open and polysemous than the language 
of philosophy. In relation to language in its general sense, I am convinced that the position shared by many 
contemporary French thinkers and their followers, which reduces everything to language and negates the 
meaning of the extralinguistic, is curiously in tune with Plato‘s thought. In other words, in the past few 
decades, we have seen the emergence of a neo-totalitarian conception of language. This position seems 
nested in metaphysical foundations rather than being a subversive and demystifying novelty. In this sense, 
from Parmedines to Derrida, through different styles and contexts, things have not changed very much. In 
contrast, like the maidservant from Thrace, I believe in facts, bodies and material givens. One‘s uniqueness 
or, to quote Hannah Arendt, the fact that every human being is different from ―everyone else that ever lived, 
lives or will live‘ is precisely a material given. The language of philosophy, which proceeds through abstract 
categories, seeks to make this insignificant or even insignifiable. The language of literature, which narrates 
stories of singular lives, instead confers meaning on this materiality.‖ Bertolino and Cavarero, ―Beyond 
Ontology and Sexual Difference: An Interview with Italian Feminist Philosopher Adriana Cavarero.‖ p. 134. 
656 ‗He describes his character pissing and shitting in order to show that here is a man thoroughly free of 
abstract pretentions.‘ Declan Kiberd, ―Introduction,‖ in James Joyce, Ulysses (London: Penguin Books, 1992).  
p. xvi. [my italics in the quote].  
657 Ibid.  p. ix, x.  
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been silenced, or at least side lined.‘658 Indeed, I posit that, specifically in the 
case of women, and mothers, listening to their voice is of great importance 
when, for centuries, their voices were not heard. Alison Young has assessed 
how women‘s stories in rape trials often go unheard:  
the defence demolition of the victim‘s narrative and it‘s replacement 
with their counter-narrative occurs through the proposition of detailed 
elements of the narrative sequence, to which […] the victim usually 
replies ‗No‘ or ‗I disagree‘ or ‗No, that didn‘t happen‘. The victim‘s 
response is, however, rendered immaterial in the most fundamental 
sense.659  
 
Young elucidates that in these cases very often women‘s voices are silenced 
and their ‗no‘ goes unheard.660 And moreover, she argues; ‗Closing its dirty 
ears, law is deaf to the accusations of rape, and silences woman, replacing her 
tongue with the pathos of wordless song, inarticulated sound, non-language, 
the pain of alterity‘.661   
The Feminist Judgements Project in England, re-interpreted a number of 
case law judgements featuring women. They have shown that women‘s 
experiences are often not heard or are misinterpreted. In their interpretative 
work they set out to write alternative feminist judgments. The participants in 
the project engaged in a practical, ‗real world‘ exercise of judgement-writing 
                                                     
658 Hunter, Rosemary, McGlynn, Clare and Rackley, Feminist Judgments. From Theory to Practice. p. 36. 
659 Alison Young, ―‗The Waste Land of the Law, the Wordless Song of the Rape Victim.,‘‖ Melbourne 
University Law Review 22, no. n. 2 (1998): 442–65. p. 463.  
660 Ibid. p. 464.  
661 Ibid. p. 465. 
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that gave a voice back to women that went unheard in the real judgment.662 As 
Baroness Hale remarks ‗an important project of feminist jurisprudence has 
been to explode the myth of the disinterested, disengaged, and distant 
judge.‘663  
further thoughts on relationality 
Cavarero argues that language without voice is apolitical as it does not include 
the embodied reality of our existence, hence it remains abstract, and it 
represents the what of someone not the who. It comes as an obvious 
consequence that the narration, the telling of a story, is done by a voice. What 
is this voice? What does it represent? For Cavarero it is the embodied reality 
of the uniqueness of our singular lives, where the voice is distinctly different 
in each person. From early on, the baby can distinguish the mother‘s voice 
and they learn language while in the womb too.664 I am therefore interested in 
the extent to which mothers are able to use their own voice to tell their stories 
and to vocalise their inner experiences, and the effect it has on them. Can 
their story be uttered, come out of their bodies, their throat? What happens if 
they are not able to talk, if they do not have anyone to tell their story to? As 
                                                     
662 Hunter, Rosemary, McGlynn, Clare and Rackley, Feminist Judgments. From Theory to Practice. (unable to check 
page number due to Covid-19)  
663 Ibid. p. 31 quoted from Rt Hon. The Baroness Hale of Richmond PC FBA, ―A Minority Opinion?,‖ in 
Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence (London: 154 Proceedings of The British Academy, 2008), 319–36. p. 319- 
320. 
664 ―Before it is even born, the infant has started to learn its mother‘s tongue, particularly the vowels and the 
metric of the language.‖ Hugo Lagercrantz, ―Foreward,‖ in Early Vocal Contact and Preterm Infant Brain 
Development. Bridging the Gaps Between Research and Practice, ed. Manuela Filippa, Pierre Kuhn, and Bjorn Westrup 
(Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2017), v–vii. 
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we have seen in Chapter Five the inability to share the difficulties of caring 
for a young child or multiple children can bring on post-natal depression.665  
 As feminists found out in the 1960s and 1970s, relationality is 
mirroring each other, finding one‘s experiences reflected – though in different 
ways – in someone else‘s experiences. It seems to me that in the case of 
motherhood – ‗mothering work‘, people caring for others, people attending to 
the vulnerability of another human being – if they cannot tell the story of 
their experience of tending to the other, their own vulnerability, the other‘s 
vulnerability, the utter neediness of the other person, the effort to care well 
and sometimes failing, feeling frustrated or needing support, brings about a 
‗double exposure.‘ Being exposed to our own and the other‘s vulnerability 
which I explored in Chapter Two can lead to a kind of closure of subjectivity, 
or of too much subjectivity or a rawness which can be hard to manage. This is 
because it can bring about an overwhelmingly subjective experience with dire 
consequences for the concept of the subject that we hold.  
As we have seen in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, consciousness-raising 
groups were important spaces for women where they could share their 
problems and ask questions. Lucia Farinati and Claudia Firth argue that 
                                                     
665 Two days before submitting my thesis coincidentally I met the mother of the baby I had been observing 
for my Infant and Young Child Observation course between 2016 to 2018. We stopped and had a little catch 
up. She revealed to me – unprompted – that when I was going to observe her baby she had post-natal 
depression and she said ―It really helped that you came to see me every week. I wanted to say thank you.‖ 
She said she had gone to counselling and she said these words ―I was keeping all my feelings inside and I 
tried to make it work. It was so hard with no family around. I eventually decided to speak with a counsellor. I 
don‘t know why I found it hard to speak about it. It helped a lot to speak with the counsellor. Just to say that 
I had postnatal depression helped.‖ While she was telling me this she cried, it was an emotional moment. 
This random meeting really struck me as in a few words she basically told me how mothering in isolation was 
very hard for her, which is what I have been discussing in this thesis. I never spoke about my thesis with her.  
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‗Consciousness-raising groups were therefore places for women to start to be 
able to name a problem that they did not have the language for before.‘666 It is 
this fact of not having the language to name a problem, a feeling, a sensation 
that has been revolutionary with feminism, it gave women words, a language 
to speak, to express one‘s feelings, one‘s condition. The key to achieve this is 
relationality, that mutual ability to speak and be heard and listened to. This 
listening and talking space becomes a political space of exchanges. I maintain 
that motherhood can be constructed as a resistance and freedom. This 
happens, I think, not because a woman is a mother, but because having become a 
mother makes it possible for her to forge her own creative path, which can 
bring her closer to herself. Becoming a mother can make a subjective shift 
which brings one‘s heightened attention to personal needs and societal 
pressures and mothers can make a stand.  
 There are various social media groups active in the UK where mothers 
air their worries, concerns, and difficulties without (for the most part) being 
judged. The amount of women posting how difficult motherhood is 
staggering, often there are innumerable posts similar to this one:  
Ok mums! I‘m a mum that‘s really struggling today! I‘m a Mum that 
puts in 100% everyday but doesn‘t feel enough! I‘m a mum that 
worries everyday of being good enough for my daughter! I‘m a Mum 
that writes a list of things to do and panics if it‘s not completed by the 
end of the day. I‘m a mum that‘s struggling to be a mum today! I‘m a 
mum with mental health!!667  
                                                     
666 Farinati and Firth, ―Feminism - Speaking and Listening in Feminist Consciouness Raising Groups.‖ 
667 ―https://the-motherload.co.uk/,‖ n.d. and ―The Motherload‖, Solidarity in Motherhood Facebook group 
page, September 2019.  
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In the Introduction I discussed a 2016 research published by the Co-op and 
the Red Cross that identified becoming a new mother as one of six main 
causes of loneliness. The Facebook posts of struggling mothers are heart-
breaking, mothers with little support, lonely mothers:  
Anyone else have NO friends? I see these ladies with a circle of 
support during these mummy years and I think to myself  ‗where‘s 
mine?‘ I have suffered with depression on and off for years since 
having my babies 14, 9, 6 and I wonder sometimes am I just feeling 
sorry for myself ? I had a little cleaning business before all this Covid 
madness and now I only have 1 customer left out of 15. I thought of 
those customers as friends (bit sad I know) as I‘m only their cleaner 
but I finally felt like I was a somebody! Not just mummy or wife to the 
iPhone hugging male in my house and now I‘m scared that it‘s all 
gone.668  
This woman received hundreds of comments from other mothers showing 
solidarity and many said they felt the same; they did not have any friends 
either. Some mothers said where they were from and those who lived quite 
close to each other decided to meet up when the Covid-19 emergency was 
over. There is solidarity, support, advice on all sorts of questions (including 
on domestic and gender violence) and some posts are funny too. In this 
group, mothers share the funny side of motherhood, not only the difficulty 
and the misery, they know they are all in the same boat.  
 I have completed this thesis during the Covid-19 pandemic and I have 
witnessed, and experienced (even if my child has turned 11 in 2021 so he is 
                                                     
668 Ibid. Facebook post from April 2020 
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more independent) more than ever how mothering/caring in isolation is 
challenging. These last few months of lockdown have been an example of the 
worst scenario of what I have been trying to demonstrate in this thesis: that 
mothering/caring in isolation is not natural, not human, not okay.669 During 
these last few months mothers have been looking after one or more children, 
day in and day out, sometimes with very little support from their partners. 
Many mothers have worked full time from home, looked after children and 
home educating them at the same time. One mother, exhausted by ‗too much 
mothering‘, claimed ―I don‘t want to mum anymore. I want to dad.‖670 We are 
in 2020 and still the realities that mothers face are hard, hence as Kristeva 
suggested in 1977, we still need to listen carefully to mothers:  
There might doubtless be a way to approach the dark area that 
motherhood constitutes for women; one needs to listen more carefully 
than ever, to what mothers are saying, through their economic 
difficulties and…..through their discomforts, insomnias, joys, angers, 
desires, pains and pleasure.671   
 
Certain aspects of many mothers‘ lives have become better since 1977, when 
Kristeva wrote the above phrase, but many difficulties have remained the 
same. Loneliness has probably increased for mothers since 1977 when 
Kristeva was writing the above, and it brings about some difficult feelings to 
manage while being alone with a child. Parker has noted that:  
                                                     
669 Andrea O‘Reilly, ―‗Trying to Function in the Unfunctionable‘: Mothers and COVID-19,‖ Journal of the 
Motherhood Initiative for Research and Community Involvement 11, no. 1 (2020). 
670 ―https://the-motherload.co.uk/.‖ Facebook post from February 2020 
671 Julia Kristeva, ―Stabat Mater.,‖ in The Kristeva Reader., ed. Toril Moi (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley 
Blackwell, 1991), 160–186., p. 179. 
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Socially, mothers of young children are frequently (often constantly) 
isolated from other adults. This induces an intense intimacy in which 
both mothers and children become the focus of each other‘s needs and 
desires. Mutual projective and introjective processes lead both mother 
and child to experience something of each other‘s feelings. The baby or 
child projects her or his rage and frustration into the mother where it 
marries up with her own infantile feelings of anger and need.672  
 
This is why mothering in isolation is hard. It highlights and bring to the fore 
some very difficult feelings for mothers. During the pandemic, and with tragic 
consequence, it has highlighted even more than ever the connection between 
capitalism, patriarchy, and racism. Who has been doing the ‗dirty‘ work during 
the pandemic? Many women, and many Black and minority women. In the 
UK, and in many other countries, in the last few months there have been 
many emergency statutes to redirect public funds in other areas of our lives, 
yet there have not been any emergency statutes to protect pregnant people 
from going to work in unsafe places. Or, to support mothers who are taking 
on teaching from home while also caring for their children. Or, for those who 
care in isolation. 
recommendations and future research 
Firstly, I suggest that future research on maternal subjectivity keeps in 
consideration that mothering in isolation is not ideal and ―natural‖ for a 
mother and a carer. I suggest that we do not take it for granted that 
motherhood must be hard. I suggest that this fact remains the pivotal 
                                                     
672 Parker, Torn in Two. The Experience of Maternal Ambivalence., p. 206-207.  
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knowledge for future policies and for assessing mothers‘ needs and difficulties 
and that it serves as a lever to implement more support which is geared 
towards reducing maternal isolation and creating webs of supportive 
relationships.  
Secondly, other areas relating to relationality that can be explored/I 
could have explored further are: jealousy and competition between 
mothers/carers; differences in mothering which can bring up tensions; 
different personalities, lifestyles and core beliefs that mean it will not 
automatically be the case that two or more mothers and carers would become 
friends and support each other; the effect of class, race, sexuality and 
education in mothers‘ relationships; unconscious feelings, identification and 
projections about other women and how this effects the ability to genuinely 
relate.  
Thirdly, while writing this thesis I have touched on ideas of 
deconstruction and how it may not be a very apt method to adopt when 
thinking of maternal subjectivity. This is another area I could have explored 
further and that I am interested in exploring in the future.  What does 
deconstructing subjectivity mean for maternal subjectivity? Or, how can 
deconstruction be useful for maternal subjectivity? Or, is it useful up to a 
certain point, as more attention and care must be taken when thinking of 
deconstructing maternal subjectivity? Not because maternal subjectivity is 
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necessarily more ―delicate‖ but because it can be more varied and complex 
and made up of different factors than other subjectivities.  
Fourthly, I would like to explore intersectionality in relation to 
motherhood and care in more depth and I would like to use the work of Joy 
James as a frame of reference to uncover better the blind spots she discusses 
in relation to the work of western feminist theorists rendering Black mothers 
captives. Another aspect I would like to delve into is the work of Tracey 
Reynolds on Black mothers in the UK. Broadly, in relation to these two 
themes, I would like to explore the link of psychoanalysis with studies on 
motherhood, the maternal and child development and the fact that 
traditionally psychoanalysis has been a white, European, and Jewish tradition 
discipline and how this has affected the exclusion of Black and marginalised 
motherhood from its discourse.  
Lastly another theme I would like to consider for future research are 
the  realities of migrant women (moving to Italy from other countries) in Italy 
in the 1970s and 1980s at the height of the feminist movement. In particular 
the women of the Somali, Libyan, Ethiopian and Eritrean communities in 
Italy (the four main countries that Italy colonised) and find out the women 
from these communities that were part of the feminist movement and their 
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stories.673 And if they were not part of the movement what prevented them 
from joining it?  
concluding remarks 
In the process of writing this thesis and in concluding it, I have come to 
realise that the thread I have been discussing signifies more than relationality 
between carers/women/mothers. It also signifies, as I said at the start, a 
thread that I have had with my feminist mother and the maternal all my life as 
I recounted in the Introduction. Ever since my mother moved away, I have 
been ‗preoccupied with the maternal‘—reversing in a way the Winnicottian 
term ‗primary maternal preoccupation‘674, which enables mothers to care for 
their children. Indeed, I have become preoccupied with my mother not being 
physically there. We never stop being daughters while our mothers are alive. 
We never completely stop being daughters once our mothers pass away. And 
a mother who loses her child never completely stops being a mother because 
their child is not alive.675 My mother‘s reflection upon motherhood a long time 
ago, spurred her to enquire, to ask questions about herself and her place in 
                                                     
673 Elvira Banotti was an Italian-Eritrean writer and journalist who was part of the early 1970s‘ roman 
feminist group called Rivolta Femminile which she founded with feminist art critic Carla Lonzi and artist Carla 
Accardi, see Elvira Banotti, Una Ragazza Speciale (Latina: Ortica Editrice, 2011). There were a few other 
known women of dual Italian-Eritrean heritage (often their fathers were Italian and their mothers Eritrean) in 
the Italian feminist movement. They were the children of Italian men who lived in Eritrea while it was 
occupied by the Italian colonial Empire of East Africa (1880s till 1941). These Italian men lived there and 
worked for Italian companies and some met Eritrean women and had children with them. Then these 
families often moved back to Italy once Britain conquered the Italian occupied territories in 1941 or in the 
remaining consequent years. Another Eritrean-Italian woman was the music producer Lara Saint Paul see 
Cecilia Brioni and Simone Brioni, ―Transnational ‗Italian‘ Stardom: Lara Saint Paul and the Performativity of 
Race,‖ Italian Studies 73, no. 4 (2018): 351–64. 
674 I am using the Winnicottian image of ‗Maternal preoccupation‘ in the reverse way. I appropriate it. D.W. 
Winnicott, ―Primary Maternal Preoccupation,‖ in Collected Papers through Paediatrics to Psychoanalysis (London: 
Tavistock Publications, 1958), 300–305.. 
675 ‗He is not dead to me‘ in Denise Riley, Time Lived, without Its Flow (London: Capsule Editions, 2012). p. 36.  
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the world as a woman and a mother. Her courage to detach herself from the 
idea of the ‗naturally‘ good mother, to dare, to challenge conventions had 
allowed us to have a very profound, complex, at times difficult, and beautiful 
relationship for which I am grateful.  She has allowed me to know her as my 
mother and as the woman she was.  
My mother‘s collective outlook, her subjectivity, thinking, life 
experiences (she always lived collectively till the last ten years of her life when 
she lived with her partner) have inspired me and changed the way I 
experienced motherhood and myself. I have appreciated first-hand how 
collectivism and mutual aid can benefit mothers and carers. But it is fair to say 
that in the most difficult moments, while bringing up my son, I too 
experienced some of the ―viscosity‖ and ―interruptions‖ to my sense of self 
of which Baraitser talks about.676  
 The thread now brings me back to the start, not because I see a 
beginning and a definite end in this maternal thread, this maternal story, but 
because I see a web-like shape made of life stories, subjectivities, inter-
subjectivities and relationships. This is a web made of a thread where 
vulnerability, dependency, and the need for support are acknowledged. A web 
where the fantasy of individualism is uncovered and where to care in isolation 
is seen as unfit for mothers, for fathers, for carers, for humans. This is a web 
                                                     
676 Baraitser, Maternal Encounters. The Ethics of Interruption. 
conclusion| 367 
where caring is seen as a collective practice677, not as an isolated private 
matter. Finally, as a web has no beginning or end, it seems almost 
inappropriate to append a conclusion to this thesis, other than the realization 
that one of the reasons I have written on the maternal, on motherhood, was 
probably in order also to elaborate and process the relationship with my own 
mother:  
woman must write herself: must write about women and bring women 
to writing, from which they have been driven away as violently as from 
their bodies-for the same reasons, by the same law-with the same fatal 
goal. Woman must put herself into the text-as into the world and into 
history-by her own movement.678 
 
Hence, if I have written on the maternal, on mothers it was, perhaps, to keep 
my mother symbolically with me. I partially remember how difficult it was for 
my nine-year-old-self to see her leave all those years ago.  
 
                                                     
677 This book that has just been published in August 2020 proposes to put care at the centre of politics and 
society. The Care Collective, The Care Manifesto: The Politics of Interdependance (London: Verso Books, 2020). 
678 Cixous, ―The Laugh of the Medusa.‖ p. 1. 
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